Revenue sharing and competitive balance when teams are not wage takers

National audienceRecent papers have enriched the conventional modeling of teams’ behavior through a game theoretic background at the competition level (introducing a contest success function). We take a step forward and consider contest on the talent market as well. Each team takes into account the fact that the price to be paid recruiting talent is a function that depends on both its own demand and the demands from the rival teams. For the two-team model, we show that the removal of the assumption that teams are price takers implies that the invariance proposition only survives if the price-function for talent is linear increasing. The extension to the n-team model shows that this result no longer holds; in fact, revenue sharing improves the competitive balance. More generally, an improvement in competitive balance is the most likely if one rules out the possibility of a very convex price-function. In addition revenue sharing can reduce the economic inefficiency of teams’ behavior, and so profits may increase