This paper deals with roommate problems (Gale and Shapley, Am Math Mon 69(1):9–15, 1962) that are solvable, i.e., have a non-empty core (set of stable matchings). We study rank-fairness within pairs of stable matchings and the size of the core by means of maximal and average rank gaps. We provide upper bounds in terms of maximal and average disagreements in the agents’ rankings. Finally, we show that most of our bounds are tight. © 2018, Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature
An instance of the classical Stable Roommates problem (SR) need not admit a stable matching. This m...
The aim of this paper is to propose a new solution for the roommate problem with strict preferences....
Abstract The aim of this paper is to propose a new solution concept for the roommate problem with st...
This paper deals with roommate problems (Gale and Shapley, 1962) that are solvable, i.e., have a non...
We introduce a restriction of the stable roommates problem in which roommate pairs are ranked global...
We introduce a restriction of the stable roommates problem in which roommate pairs are ranked global...
We introduce a restriction of the stable roommates problem in which roommate pairs are ranked global...
In the roommate problem, pairs of agents must be formed, based on ordinal preferences of the agents ...
This paper studies the one-to-one two-sided marriage model (Gale and Shapley 1962). If agents’ prefe...
Di¤erent solution concepts (core, stable sets, largest consistent set,...) can be de ned using eithe...
The classic Stable Roommates problem (the non-bipartite generalization of the well-known Stable Marr...
AbstractAn instance of the classical Stable Roommates problem need not admit a stable matching. Prev...
AbstractIn the Stable Marriage and Roommates problems, a set of agents is given, each of them having...
An instance of the classical Stable Roommates problem need not admit a stable matching. Previous wor...
In the Stable Marriage and Roommates problems, a set of agents is given, each of them having a stric...
An instance of the classical Stable Roommates problem (SR) need not admit a stable matching. This m...
The aim of this paper is to propose a new solution for the roommate problem with strict preferences....
Abstract The aim of this paper is to propose a new solution concept for the roommate problem with st...
This paper deals with roommate problems (Gale and Shapley, 1962) that are solvable, i.e., have a non...
We introduce a restriction of the stable roommates problem in which roommate pairs are ranked global...
We introduce a restriction of the stable roommates problem in which roommate pairs are ranked global...
We introduce a restriction of the stable roommates problem in which roommate pairs are ranked global...
In the roommate problem, pairs of agents must be formed, based on ordinal preferences of the agents ...
This paper studies the one-to-one two-sided marriage model (Gale and Shapley 1962). If agents’ prefe...
Di¤erent solution concepts (core, stable sets, largest consistent set,...) can be de ned using eithe...
The classic Stable Roommates problem (the non-bipartite generalization of the well-known Stable Marr...
AbstractAn instance of the classical Stable Roommates problem need not admit a stable matching. Prev...
AbstractIn the Stable Marriage and Roommates problems, a set of agents is given, each of them having...
An instance of the classical Stable Roommates problem need not admit a stable matching. Previous wor...
In the Stable Marriage and Roommates problems, a set of agents is given, each of them having a stric...
An instance of the classical Stable Roommates problem (SR) need not admit a stable matching. This m...
The aim of this paper is to propose a new solution for the roommate problem with strict preferences....
Abstract The aim of this paper is to propose a new solution concept for the roommate problem with st...