This paper presents an alternative explanation for the possible incentives of the incumbents in authoritarian regimes to hold elections by utilizing a formal model that is derived to simulate the strategic interaction between the incumbent and the people. Equilibria of themodels show us that, there exists feasible circumstances under which the incumbent would prefer to allow elections to be hold with the purpose of the selection of an officer that the incumbentmay later on benefit from by shifting the blame of an external crisis, hence weaken the risk of a regime breakdown
In this dissertation, I offer an answer to one of the most important questions about authoritarian p...
This study offers an explanation of why voters repeatedly choose leaders who came to power democrati...
Hegemonic party regimes are non-democratic regimes that (1) rule with the aid of a dominant politica...
We focus on political violence as a mechanism that allows the political leader to fight off oppositi...
Although most authoritarian regimes nowadays hold competitive elections, the actual level of competi...
We propose a model of political competition and stability in nominally democratic societies characte...
What incentives are there for non-democratic governments to agree to risk losing power in elections?...
This paper studies the effect of crises on the behavior of co-opted opposition elites in authoritari...
Abstract. This study provides theoretical conditions for a stable political system. This study has t...
Abstract: Authoritarian regimes adopt nominally democratic institutions despite the inherent uncert...
How, if at all, do nondemocratic elections affect credible signaling in interna-tional crises? While...
What happens to autocratic leaders who hold competitive elections? Autocrats gain a key benefit by h...
I consider a model in which an autocrat can be removed from power either through a military coup or...
This thesis is focused on the question -of how authoritarian leaders remain in power. The main idea ...
While it is clear that contemporary authoritarian incumbents use democratic emulation as a strategy ...
In this dissertation, I offer an answer to one of the most important questions about authoritarian p...
This study offers an explanation of why voters repeatedly choose leaders who came to power democrati...
Hegemonic party regimes are non-democratic regimes that (1) rule with the aid of a dominant politica...
We focus on political violence as a mechanism that allows the political leader to fight off oppositi...
Although most authoritarian regimes nowadays hold competitive elections, the actual level of competi...
We propose a model of political competition and stability in nominally democratic societies characte...
What incentives are there for non-democratic governments to agree to risk losing power in elections?...
This paper studies the effect of crises on the behavior of co-opted opposition elites in authoritari...
Abstract. This study provides theoretical conditions for a stable political system. This study has t...
Abstract: Authoritarian regimes adopt nominally democratic institutions despite the inherent uncert...
How, if at all, do nondemocratic elections affect credible signaling in interna-tional crises? While...
What happens to autocratic leaders who hold competitive elections? Autocrats gain a key benefit by h...
I consider a model in which an autocrat can be removed from power either through a military coup or...
This thesis is focused on the question -of how authoritarian leaders remain in power. The main idea ...
While it is clear that contemporary authoritarian incumbents use democratic emulation as a strategy ...
In this dissertation, I offer an answer to one of the most important questions about authoritarian p...
This study offers an explanation of why voters repeatedly choose leaders who came to power democrati...
Hegemonic party regimes are non-democratic regimes that (1) rule with the aid of a dominant politica...