For centuries, courts have dealt with the challenge of imposing penalties for crimes when governing law changes. Applying the new provisions can be a straightforward exercise for courts, but when legislatures are ambiguous with regard to which law applies-forexample, to pending cases-the courts are forced to interpret what legislatures intended. For some judges, the answer is easily found in the plain meaning of the text. For others, legislative intent can become the deciding factor. Throughout United States history, this has been a manageable yet controversial task, but aside from interpretive differences among judges, creating laws with uncertainty is a dangerous policy that legislatures should end. Because some cases with the most advers...
In 1984 the Sentencing Reform Act was passed, ending fully discretionary sentencing by judges and al...
Statutory interpretation often seems like a doctrinal and jurisprudential abyss. We didn\u27t need ...
Debates about statutory interpretation typically proceed on the assumption that statutes have lingui...
Judge Frank Easterbrook is known for insisting that legislative intent is a misconception, bordering...
How should courts handle interpretive choices, such as when statutory text strongly points to one st...
Prosecutors control statutory ranges by selecting charges. In addition, prosecutors decide whether t...
There is an important but chronically overlooked problem in statutory interpretation. Courts frequen...
Vagueness, as the word suggests, is inherently uncertain. This Note addresses the issues of vaguenes...
Ambiguity serves a legislative purpose. When legislators perceive a need to compromise they can, amo...
Discussing the judge\u27s role in interpreting statutes, Justice Holmes wrote that if my fellow cit...
Statutory interpretation dilemmas arise in all areas of law, where we often script them as scenes of...
In recent years, judges and scholars in Canada and the United States are devoting more attention to ...
The article questions the persistent argument of U.S. Supreme Court Associate Justice Antonin Scalia...
Why do judges interpret statutes the way they do? Positivist analyses aimed at answering this questi...
Judicial review of agency statutory interpretations depends heavily on the linguistic concept of amb...
In 1984 the Sentencing Reform Act was passed, ending fully discretionary sentencing by judges and al...
Statutory interpretation often seems like a doctrinal and jurisprudential abyss. We didn\u27t need ...
Debates about statutory interpretation typically proceed on the assumption that statutes have lingui...
Judge Frank Easterbrook is known for insisting that legislative intent is a misconception, bordering...
How should courts handle interpretive choices, such as when statutory text strongly points to one st...
Prosecutors control statutory ranges by selecting charges. In addition, prosecutors decide whether t...
There is an important but chronically overlooked problem in statutory interpretation. Courts frequen...
Vagueness, as the word suggests, is inherently uncertain. This Note addresses the issues of vaguenes...
Ambiguity serves a legislative purpose. When legislators perceive a need to compromise they can, amo...
Discussing the judge\u27s role in interpreting statutes, Justice Holmes wrote that if my fellow cit...
Statutory interpretation dilemmas arise in all areas of law, where we often script them as scenes of...
In recent years, judges and scholars in Canada and the United States are devoting more attention to ...
The article questions the persistent argument of U.S. Supreme Court Associate Justice Antonin Scalia...
Why do judges interpret statutes the way they do? Positivist analyses aimed at answering this questi...
Judicial review of agency statutory interpretations depends heavily on the linguistic concept of amb...
In 1984 the Sentencing Reform Act was passed, ending fully discretionary sentencing by judges and al...
Statutory interpretation often seems like a doctrinal and jurisprudential abyss. We didn\u27t need ...
Debates about statutory interpretation typically proceed on the assumption that statutes have lingui...