Empatia, mindreading e introspezione

A number of theorists have proposed approaches to empathy based on the simulation theory of mindreading. Within this framework, a distinction was drawn between a developmentally early and conceptually poor capacity variously referred to as “low-level mindreading”, “basic”, or “mirroring” empathy, and a developmentally later and conceptually complex capacity for simulation also referred to as “high-level mindreading” or “reconstructive” empathy. Basic empathy involves the attribution of simple mental states such as face-based emotions; reconstructive empathy involves the ascription of complex mental states such as propositional attitudes. This article critically examines this theoretical approach to empathy, focusing on two strands of the simulationist theorizing: a simulationist account of basic empathy based on the neuroscience of mirror neurons; and Alvin Goldman’s account of reconstructive empathy in terms of high-level simulative mindreading. In both cases, it will be argued, a number of problems associated with such approaches arise