Standard accuracy-based approaches to imprecise credences have the consequence that it is rational to move between precise and imprecise credences arbitrarily, without gaining any new evidence. Building on the Educated Guessing Framework of Horowitz (2019), we develop an alternative accuracy-based approach to imprecise credences that does not have this shortcoming. We argue that it is always irrational to move from a precise state to an imprecise state arbitrarily, however it can be rational to move from an imprecise state to a precise state arbitrarily
In this paper I investigate an alternative to imprecise probabilism. Imprecise probabilism is a popu...
In this paper I investigate an alternative to imprecise probabilism. Imprecise probabilism is a popu...
There is currently much discussion about how decision making should proceed when an agent’s degrees ...
Standard accuracy-based approaches to imprecise credences have the consequence that it is rational t...
Many have claimed that epistemic rationality sometimes requires us to have imprecise credal states (...
suggested that uncertain beliefs in light of evidence are best represented by sets of probability fu...
Beliefs formed under uncertainty come in different grades, which are called credences or degrees of ...
Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/111950/1/j.1520-8583.2010.00194.x.pd
Jim Joyce argues for two amendments to probabilism. The first is the doctrine that credences are rat...
Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/115897/1/nous12073.pd
Rational credence should be coherent in the sense that your attitudes should not leave you open to a...
Formal epistemologists traditionally model rational states of partial belief with probability measur...
Imprecise probabilism—which holds that rational belief/credence is permissibly represented by a set ...
In this paper I investigate an alternative to imprecise probabilism. Imprecise probabilism is a popu...
In this paper I investigate an alternative to imprecise probabilism. Imprecise probabilism is a popu...
There is currently much discussion about how decision making should proceed when an agent’s degrees ...
Standard accuracy-based approaches to imprecise credences have the consequence that it is rational t...
Many have claimed that epistemic rationality sometimes requires us to have imprecise credal states (...
suggested that uncertain beliefs in light of evidence are best represented by sets of probability fu...
Beliefs formed under uncertainty come in different grades, which are called credences or degrees of ...
Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/111950/1/j.1520-8583.2010.00194.x.pd
Jim Joyce argues for two amendments to probabilism. The first is the doctrine that credences are rat...
Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/115897/1/nous12073.pd
Rational credence should be coherent in the sense that your attitudes should not leave you open to a...
Formal epistemologists traditionally model rational states of partial belief with probability measur...
Imprecise probabilism—which holds that rational belief/credence is permissibly represented by a set ...
In this paper I investigate an alternative to imprecise probabilism. Imprecise probabilism is a popu...
In this paper I investigate an alternative to imprecise probabilism. Imprecise probabilism is a popu...
There is currently much discussion about how decision making should proceed when an agent’s degrees ...