THE CONTEXT OF MORALITY AND THE QUESTION OF ETHICS: FROM NAIVE EXISTENTIALISM TO SUSPICIOUS HERMENEUTICS

This study attempts to situate ethical discourse within descriptions of a moral context which do justice both to concrete individual moral experiences and to the socio-historical framework within which they are lived. In light of these descriptions it is argued that an adequate theory of morality must focus on the essential continuity between the individual moral life and the communal practices and institutions which constitute our ethical substance. In Chapter One it is shown how the existentialist liberation of the moral subject centers ethical concerns around the concrete living individual, who, for the most part, had no place in traditional ethics. In Chapter Two it is argued that the existentialist revolt in morals is incomplete and misguided, insofar as the power of individual freedom is overemphasized and the weight of socio-historical reality is neglected. On the basis of hermeneutical analysis of human existence, it is shown how the cultural fabric of interpretations and practices sustains and gives meaning to the moral life. On the basis of Sartre\u27s Marxism, it is shown how the social field of classes and violence alienates and frustrates our individual moral projects. In Chapter Three it is asked what implications for ethical theory and conduct emerge from these descriptions of the moral context. It is argued that while Heidegger\u27s thought provides an important criticism of the history of ethics, it escapes all concrete applications to ethical discourse. In this respect Gadamer\u27s hermeneutics is found more fruitful, although his Aristotelian account of the situated moral life underestimates the ideological distortions of the moral context as well as the power of moral consciousness to reject tradition and project its freedom. In order to abet such a critical account of morality, Habermas\u27 analysis of the moral consciousness and its development within the socialization process is introduced. But it is argued that Habermas\u27 emphasis on a theoretical grounding of ethical discourse loses touch with the concrete existential/historical dimension of the moral life. It is proposed that only by moving out from descriptions of individual experiences of injustices and wrongs will it be possible to successfully combine moral and social considerations in a critical theory with practical intent