Domains and naïve theories

Human cognition entails domain‐specific cognitive processes that influence memory, attention, categorization, problem‐solving, reasoning, and knowledge organization. This article examines domain‐specific causal theories, which are of particular interest for permitting an examination of how knowledge structures change over time. We first describe the properties of commonsense theories, and how commonsense theories differ from scientific theories, illustrating with children's classification of biological and nonbiological kinds. We next consider the implications of domain‐specificity for broader issues regarding cognitive development and conceptual change. We then examine the extent to which domain‐specific theories interact, and how people reconcile competing causal frameworks. Future directions for research include examining how different content domains interact, the nature of theory change, the role of context (including culture, language, and social interaction) in inducing different frameworks, and the neural bases for domain‐specific reasoning. WIREs Cogni Sci 2011 2 490–502 DOI: 10.1002/wcs.124 For further resources related to this article, please visit the WIREs websitePeer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/87128/1/124_ftp.pd