Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/72383/1/1467-6451.00039.pd
Following the structure of many commodity markets, we consider a reduced number of large firms and a...
The stability of collusion in quantities in a differentiated duopoly is analised, and the result is...
In this paper we analyse a railroad cartel run by the Joint Executive Committee (JEC) in the United ...
ate the contributions of noncooperative, repeated game models of collusion to our under-standing of ...
From 1885 to 1902 manufacturers and distributors in the American bromine industry cooperated to incr...
This paper analyzes price fixing by the Joint Executive Committee railroad cartel from 1880 to 1886 ...
Chapter prepared for publication in Oxford Handbook on International Antitrust Economics, Roger D. B...
SES-8209266 and SES-8308783 respectively) is gratefully acknowledged. This paper studies implicitly ...
Coordinated price fixing among firms in an industry remains one of the few practices which is per se...
This paper gives an unified explanation of some of the most widely known facts of the cartel literat...
This article reexamines the experience of the Joint Executive Committee, an 1880s railroad cartel, t...
This paper is an attempt to reconcile the – at first sight different – views on the determinants of ...
Collusion can profitably be classified into three distinct types. In our classification, Type I co...
We advance a new framework for investigating the dynamic effects of collusion. In contrast to the st...
We analyze collusion under demand uncertainty by risk-averse cartels that care about the utility der...
Following the structure of many commodity markets, we consider a reduced number of large firms and a...
The stability of collusion in quantities in a differentiated duopoly is analised, and the result is...
In this paper we analyse a railroad cartel run by the Joint Executive Committee (JEC) in the United ...
ate the contributions of noncooperative, repeated game models of collusion to our under-standing of ...
From 1885 to 1902 manufacturers and distributors in the American bromine industry cooperated to incr...
This paper analyzes price fixing by the Joint Executive Committee railroad cartel from 1880 to 1886 ...
Chapter prepared for publication in Oxford Handbook on International Antitrust Economics, Roger D. B...
SES-8209266 and SES-8308783 respectively) is gratefully acknowledged. This paper studies implicitly ...
Coordinated price fixing among firms in an industry remains one of the few practices which is per se...
This paper gives an unified explanation of some of the most widely known facts of the cartel literat...
This article reexamines the experience of the Joint Executive Committee, an 1880s railroad cartel, t...
This paper is an attempt to reconcile the – at first sight different – views on the determinants of ...
Collusion can profitably be classified into three distinct types. In our classification, Type I co...
We advance a new framework for investigating the dynamic effects of collusion. In contrast to the st...
We analyze collusion under demand uncertainty by risk-averse cartels that care about the utility der...
Following the structure of many commodity markets, we consider a reduced number of large firms and a...
The stability of collusion in quantities in a differentiated duopoly is analised, and the result is...
In this paper we analyse a railroad cartel run by the Joint Executive Committee (JEC) in the United ...