Delegation and Commission leadership in Economic and Monetary Union

peer reviewedThe aim of this contribution is to explore Commission leadership in terms of the powers and responsibilities delegated to the Commission under the TEU and the Stability and Growth Pact (Stability Pact, Pact, SGP). Delegation theory is a useful tool to elucidate the scope and limits of the Commission’s leadership role in EMU. The Commission’s potential for leadership or ‘entrepreneurship’ is maintained yet constrained by the terms of delegation. These terms provided considerable scope for Commission leadership in Stage II of the EMU project (from 1994) notably in rendering credible the commitment of member states to the start of Stage III on 1 January 1999 and the subsequent launch of the euro. Delegation theory can also demonstrate why the Commission has had difficulty asserting a leadership role since 1999 in the context of macroeconomic – notably fiscal – policy coordination in EMU and more specifically with regard to the application of SGP rules. The Commission’s role can be seen principally in terms of the management and watch-dog functions delegated to it in the Maastricht Treaty and the SGP. However, the rule book according to which the Commission must operate in terms of these two functions has been widely criticised – both by member state governments and the Commission itself