Add to ORKGThe validity of majority rule in an election with but two candidates—and so also of Condorcet consistency—is challenged. Axioms based on measures—paralleling those of K. O. May characterizing majority rule for two candidates based on comparisons—lead to another method that is unique in agreeing with the majority rule on pairs of “polarized” candidates. The method—majority judgment—meets R. A. Dahl’s requirement that an apathetic majority does not always defeat an intense minority. It is a practical method that accommodates any number of candidates, avoids both the Condorcet and Arrow paradoxes, and best resists strategic manipulation
International audienceThe paper deals with voting rules that require voters to rate the candidates o...
This book argues that strange election outcomes should become less likely as voters' preferences bec...
Condcrcet ' s criterion states that an alternative that defeats every other by a simple majorit...
The validity of majority rule in an election with but two candidates—and so also of Condorcet consis...
International audienceThe validity of majority rule in an election with but two candidates—and so al...
The validity of majority rule in an election with but two candidates—and of Condorcet consistency—is...
The validity of majority rule in an election with but two candidates—and so also of Condorcet consis...
AbstractThe majority judgment (MJ) voting method works well in theory and in practice. Not only does...
"Majority Judgment" is an evaluative voting rule that picks a candidate with the best median evaluat...
This paper describes aspects of the majority judgment in an election. The majority judgment is a met...
The Borda rule is known to be the least vulnerable scoring rule to Condorcet inconsistency, Saari (2...
The main criticism to the aggregation of individual preferences under majority rules refers to the p...
Which is the best, impartially most plausible consensus view to serve as the basis of democratic gro...
International audienceThe paper deals with voting rules that require voters to rate the candidates o...
This book argues that strange election outcomes should become less likely as voters' preferences bec...
Condcrcet ' s criterion states that an alternative that defeats every other by a simple majorit...
The validity of majority rule in an election with but two candidates—and so also of Condorcet consis...
International audienceThe validity of majority rule in an election with but two candidates—and so al...
The validity of majority rule in an election with but two candidates—and of Condorcet consistency—is...
The validity of majority rule in an election with but two candidates—and so also of Condorcet consis...
AbstractThe majority judgment (MJ) voting method works well in theory and in practice. Not only does...
"Majority Judgment" is an evaluative voting rule that picks a candidate with the best median evaluat...
This paper describes aspects of the majority judgment in an election. The majority judgment is a met...
The Borda rule is known to be the least vulnerable scoring rule to Condorcet inconsistency, Saari (2...
The main criticism to the aggregation of individual preferences under majority rules refers to the p...
Which is the best, impartially most plausible consensus view to serve as the basis of democratic gro...
International audienceThe paper deals with voting rules that require voters to rate the candidates o...
This book argues that strange election outcomes should become less likely as voters' preferences bec...
Condcrcet ' s criterion states that an alternative that defeats every other by a simple majorit...