Add to ORKGWe use partisan and opportunistic political business cycle (“PBC”) considerations to develop and test a framework for explaining election-period changes in credit spreads for developing country sovereign bonds. Pre-election bond spread trends are significantly linked both to the partisan orientation of incumbents facing election and to expectations of incumbent victory. Bond spreads for right-wing (leftwing) incumbents increase (decrease) as the likelihood of left-wing (right-wing) challenger victory increases. For right-wing incumbent partisan and opportunistic PBC effects bondholder risk perceptions are mutually reinforcing. For left-wing incumbents partisan PBC effects dominate bondholder risk perceptions compared to opportunistic PBC ef...
peer reviewedWe expose the way the market evaluates internal political risk and instability in demo...
Political economy theory expects politicians to use budget deficits to engineer an election-timed bo...
Why and under what conditions do governments borrow before elections? This thesis aims to shed light...
We use partisan and opportunistic political business cycle (“PBC”) considerations to develop a frame...
We use partisan and opportunistic political business cycle (“PBC”) considerations to develop a frame...
We empirically examine whether and how opportunistic and partisan political business cycle (“PBC”) c...
We empirically examine whether and how opportunistic and partisan political business cycle ("PBC") c...
This article argues that advanced economies never eradicated political risk. We demonstrate that el...
This thesis is composed by two articles. In the first paper, co-authored with Roberto Pancrazi, we s...
Partisan theories of political economy expect that bondholders will panic with the election of a lef...
This article tests systematically the effect of political structures on the credibility of sovereign...
We re-examine the concept of 'democratic advantage' in sovereign debt ratings when optimal repayment...
Why do middle-income country governments use costlier sovereign debt markets when cheaper finance is...
Why do middle-income country governments use costlier sovereign debt markets when cheaper finance is...
The literature exploiting historical data generally supports the democratic advantage thesis, which ...
peer reviewedWe expose the way the market evaluates internal political risk and instability in demo...
Political economy theory expects politicians to use budget deficits to engineer an election-timed bo...
Why and under what conditions do governments borrow before elections? This thesis aims to shed light...
We use partisan and opportunistic political business cycle (“PBC”) considerations to develop a frame...
We use partisan and opportunistic political business cycle (“PBC”) considerations to develop a frame...
We empirically examine whether and how opportunistic and partisan political business cycle (“PBC”) c...
We empirically examine whether and how opportunistic and partisan political business cycle ("PBC") c...
This article argues that advanced economies never eradicated political risk. We demonstrate that el...
This thesis is composed by two articles. In the first paper, co-authored with Roberto Pancrazi, we s...
Partisan theories of political economy expect that bondholders will panic with the election of a lef...
This article tests systematically the effect of political structures on the credibility of sovereign...
We re-examine the concept of 'democratic advantage' in sovereign debt ratings when optimal repayment...
Why do middle-income country governments use costlier sovereign debt markets when cheaper finance is...
Why do middle-income country governments use costlier sovereign debt markets when cheaper finance is...
The literature exploiting historical data generally supports the democratic advantage thesis, which ...
peer reviewedWe expose the way the market evaluates internal political risk and instability in demo...
Political economy theory expects politicians to use budget deficits to engineer an election-timed bo...
Why and under what conditions do governments borrow before elections? This thesis aims to shed light...