The OECD Model Tax Convention. Explaining the OECD's legitimation strategies and why states adhere to the principle of exclusive rights to tax royalties in the state of residence

Although taxation matters are generally accepted to be an issue of national concern, increasing attention is paid to international efforts at conforming and standardising taxation systems internationally. In a global economy where national borders are becoming less important for economic activity, this shift in focus is only appropriate. In order to deal with double taxation as a barrier to trade and investment, taxation treaties are negotiated between states to allow for predictable taxation for companies and individuals pursuing economic activity across national borders. The Model Tax Convention, published regularly by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), is one of the most important documents for harmonising international taxation systems, and provide a basis for negotiations between states. The aim of this thesis is to investigate how and why the Model Tax Convention has become an important tool internationally, despite the limited membership of the OECD. It finds that through a strategy of portraying the Model Tax Convention as the obvious choice for policy-makers, the OECD has legitimated the Model. However, this strategy has not had the desired effect on states, which do not necessarily adhere to the propositions encouraged by the OECD. Rather, states seem to make reservations towards the Model Tax Convention if they feel that its content does not satisfy their self-interests. This thesis furthermore finds that, depending on the countries negotiating, the outcome of negotiations over taxation treaties is determined by either the most powerful state or by moral considerations