Proportional election systems and ethnic armed conflict : An empirical investigation

In the thesis I discuss the accommodationist claim that proportional election systems can contribute in reducing the risk of intrastate armed conflict in divided societies. I contend that if proportional systems reduce the risk of conflict anywhere, it is where ethnic differences are salient - where there are severe ethnic conflicts to absorb into politics. I look at groups that have large demographic power on the one hand, or are marked by high levels of negative horizontal economic inequality on the other. I discuss a theoretical model unpacking central mechanisms suggested by conflict regulation theory and comparative political science. By the use of the rare events logistic model I find support for my hypothesis that proportional election systems reduce the risk of conflict for relatively large ethnic groups. I hypothesize that economic inequality is less of a threat to peace under proportional systems than under majoritarian. The result from regression suggest the opposite: Increasing levels of inequality is a greater danger under proportional systems than under majoritarian. Further, my empirical investigation gives support to previous research contending that horizontal economic inequalities are a threat to intrastate peace. I also find that regulations allowing ethnic parties to compete for legislative power are associated with decline in conflict risk. Moving beyond an interpretation of coefficient strength and significance, I discover that the marginal effects of proportional election systems are close to zero, contrary to the claims of the advocates of both majoritarianism and proportionalism regarding divided societies. My benign test evidences that neither the majoritarian nor the proportional election system is superior; Any reduction in risk of armed conflict induced by the election system is negligible