Distortion of preferences and the Nash theory of bargaining

Crawford, Vincent P.
Varian, Hal R.

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Publication date

January 1979

DOI

10.1016/0165-1765(79)90118-6

Publisher

Elsevier BV

ISSN

0165-1765

Citation count (estimate)

Abstract

It is shown that in Nash bargaining over division of a single good, when agents are allowed to distort their von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions into any (weakly) concave form, reporting linear utility functions constitutes a unique dominant-strategy Nash equilibrium.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/23692/1/0000662.pd

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Distortion of preferences and the Nash theory of bargaining

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Distortion of preferences and the Nash theory of bargaining

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