Love and the Individual : The Morality of Platonic Love and its Metaphysical Presuppositions

What is it that we really love when we love an individual person, and to what extent are we egoistical in the search for happy love? Moreover, what/whom should we love, and for what reason? I approach the subject “Love and the Individual” by analyzing Gregory Vlastos’ two main charges against Plato’s theory of love: Firstly, that Plato’s theory fails to give a satisfying account of love directed from one individual towards another individual; and secondly, that it is essentially egoistical. The two charges might be connected in the following way: the Platonic lover seemingly loves the beloved per accidens, i.e. only in so far as the beloved embodies qualities considered advantageous for the lover himself. Throughout the thesis I underscore the points considered vulnerable to criticism, and highlight the phenomena subjected to insufficient treatment. As I assess Vlastos’ charges, three Platonic dialogues will be discussed in depth: the Symposium, the Lysis and the Phaedrus. With a few passages from other dialogues, I hope to complete the picture