Most Favoured Nation Treatment Application in International Investment Arbitration : A Study on Conflicting Precedence in International Dispute Settlement Procedure

i Abstract In the past decade there has been a series of conflicting arbitration awards regarding the interpretation of the Most- Favoured-Nation standard and if it can be extended to dispute settlement procedure. The analysis suggests that there is an imperative difference of the outcomes between a teleogical interpretation of MFN treatment and an objective interpretation of the respective MFN clauses. While there are many aspects to consider regarding an expansion of the MFN scope, it is the contention of this thesis that in the context of procedural predictability and article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, that the benefits of a teleogical interpretation against an extension of the MFN standard into procedural provisions outweighs the benefits of an objective allowing an extensive interpretation. Furthermore, an analogy to how the MFN clause is interpreted in international trade law suggests that it would not be reasonable to expect that an MFN clause should be extended to dispute settlement provisions if the clause does not explicitly state that it does extend to such provisions