The collapse of Somalia : of selective incentives and state collapse

What initiated the collapse of Somalia? Explanations based on clan are almost axiomatic in studies of the Somali conflict thus a different approach could be needed. The thesis " The Collapse of Somalia: Of Selective Incentives and State Collapse" tries to explain the Somali collapse but does not focus explicitly on clan or culture. It focuses on the choices available to actors in the Somali conflicts and on the reward and punishment they expected from the government and its rival organisations. By focusing on these choices, one could see if other incentives than clan and culture influenced the decision-makers. Such focus also made it possible to explore important interaction between clan, culture, political variables and economy. The theoretical focus is on Mancur Olsons theories on collective action. In brief Olson stipulate that individual reward or punishment, called selective incentives, are needed to produce successful collective action. Olson views rebellion as a form of collective action. Thus changes in the individual reward structure becomes important for the occurrence of rebellious action. The works of Barry Posen and Johan Galtung are used to explore how such changes can come about. To many westerners, the Somali conflict surfaced after 1991, especially after the complete disappearance of a centralised Somalian state around the 27th January (Høydal 1993: 15-16). The aim of this thesis was not to study the civil war between fractions following this date, but only to study the breakdown process leading to the demise of the Somali State structure. Westerners tend to overlook the long history of the Somalian conflict and that the strongest rebel movements developed and gained power at a much earlier stage. The most powerful rebel organisations had been formed during the period 1978 to 1989. It seems quite clear that without the formation of these rebel organisations, neither the breakdown process nor the full collapse of 1991 would have taken place. Instead of focusing on the fighting in 1991, the thesis focus on factors leading to the formation and growth of these organisations during the seventies and eighties. Thus the thesis concentrates on the years 1971 to 1990, without ignoring important events outside this period. This thesis concludes that the Somali Conflict could have been avoided. Economic and political developments activated the clan identity and made it more important than earlier. Examples of such decisions are the way the demobilisation after the Ogadeen war was handled, the way hyperinflation was handled and the way early rebellious action was dealt with by the Barre regime