Report Allocation in the European Parliament : selection Criteria of Key-Legislators in EUs Directly Elected Assembly

Using an original dataset, the study sets out to model report allocation in the European Parliament (EP). Putting aside the debate on the relative importance of national delegations, the review takes into account another specificity which has largely been ignored in previous empirical research: Only parts of the elected members are inclined to invest in European legislative work. Once the free-riders are filtered out, it appears the EP has developed much of the organizational aspects needed to assert its powers. The study adapts American theories of legislative organization to the European context, and finds transnational political groups to be central players in a largely consensual arrangement. Expertise is of increasing importance, and is put to use for the common good. Legislative drafts are objects of an informational two-level game between the floor majority and caucuses. As Parliament matters more, report allocation becomes more competitive; thereby enhancing the traditional organizational features predicted by theory