Could less be more? : small state influence on European Foreign Policies

In this thesis I have found that Sweden has had influence on the Euro-Med Partnership. Size, side payments, or threats to veto or form alternative alliances can not explain the how influence was possible. Instead, Sweden s reputation for value-added foreign policies and lack of colonial past seems to have given them a status that facilitates influence both in relation to EU states and the partner states on the other shore of the Mediterranean. In chapter one, I presented a matrix that could help me make Swedish National Interests in the Mediterranean operative. It was based on Bicci (2003) and focused on the aims of National Interests according to whether they were broad or specific in their formulations and materialistic or symbolic in their expected returns. I also presented a matrix for making the notion influence operative. This was based on Romsloe (2004) and focused on whether Sweden had influenced the contextual or the institutional design of the partnership, and whether this was done in an active/offensive or passive/defensive way. In chapter two, I discussed two theories on influence in international cooperation, the Intergovernmental and the Deliberative approach. I argued that the preconditions for argumentative behaviour might be present in the Euro-Med Partnership, as I look at the policy-making on the European side of it. I also gave a presentation of how I have worked to ensure the reliability and validity of the thesis. I have done this for example by triangulating sources, through direct interviews with a combination of open and semi-structured questions, documents and secondary literature, and by focusing on the validity of the operated notions. I also discussed the impact of choosing a case study as design for my study. In chapter three, I classified Swedish National Interests in the Mediterranean. There were six preferred policy areas, where two were defined in exclusively broad terms and four in a mixture of broad and specific terms. The expected returns of the policies were all mainly focusing on material returns: Increased security, justice and issues connected to being a member of the EU. Security was causally linked to environmental factors, increased democracy and diminishing the gap between the shores in terms of life standard. Free trade and dialogue were the two main policy areas that were expected to have an impact on this. The focus on justice showed a prolongation of traditional Swedish foreign policy. It focused on the need for justice between the people on the two shores, between the states, especially in relation to free trade and the inclusion of agricultural products in the free trade agreements, and on justice for people within their own societies. Even justice had a connection to security, as the injustice was seen to contribute to diminishing security. Even here, free trade and dialogue was seen as among the most contributing factors. The issues connected to being a EU member focused on the need to apply Swedish expertise and knowledge on the EU level and on a feeling of common security. It also focused on a duty to get involved in other EU frontiers than the Nordic, as Sweden otherwise could not expect others to get involved in their region. In chapter four, I asked if Sweden had influenced the Euro-Med Partnership and how. I found that they had influenced both the contextual and the institutional dimensions of the cooperation. In the contextual dimension, their main contributions were regular hearings on Human Rights and to put the Dialogue between Cultures and Civilisations on the regular agenda. Both issues had been politicised through active/offensive behaviour. In the institutional dimension, Sweden s main contributions were the Anna Lindh Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures and Civilisations, and the regular meetings of Trade Ministers. The Anna Lindh Foundation was worked through a combination of active/offensive and passive/defensive behaviour, as Sweden both were behind the initiative to establish the Foundation where it is, and managed to block a competing candidature. The Trade ministers meetings were pulled through in an active/offensive way. In chapter five, I asked how this influence was done, and found that the intergovernmental hypothesis could not explain the outcome, as size, threats to veto, offers of side payments or threats to form alternative alliances did were not the determining factors. I argued that the preconditions for deliberative behaviour were present when the Anna Lindh foundation was decided on, but that it could not explain how the Italian delegate, who was the competitor of the Swedish-Egyptian candidature, was persuaded into consensus. He was in fact forced to comply by the Irish Chairmanship. I decided that the regular meetings for Trade Ministers did not qualify to be evaluated against the theoretical approaches, as this was settled between the upcoming Swedish Chairmanship and the Commission, and as such not object for negotiations between states. Instead I concluded that Sweden managed to pull the initial meeting through in spite of the Commission s economical scepticism through being flexible. In chapter six, I made a short résumé of my findings and argued that the intergovernmental hypothesis had found support in some areas, as cooperation between states seemed to be a good strategy in order to enhance influence. It somehow failed to explain what defines a good partner, in stead of size, the factors that made Sweden a good partner were their reputation for value - added foreign policies and their lack of a colonial past in the region. Their reputation for having skilled and well- informed delegates also played in. When Sweden chose cooperation partners to launch the initiative, they chose a state that was not a member of the EU. They also cooperated with the Spanish Chairmanship in calling for an action plan for the dialogue in the region, but for the actual candidature, they chose to cooperate with Egypt, and competed with as well the Spanish, as an Italian candidature. I made a connection back to the Swedish National Interests and concluded that their reputation and their choice to cooperate with a relatively week state in this framework actually increased their bargaining power, which would be the objective for an instrumental logic in negotiations. I also concluded that a good idea , trust and empathy were important factors in order to explain Swedish influence, but that the mechanisms to convince were based on force not on argumentation. The final conclusion would be that intergovernmentalism succeeded in explaining the mechanisms of persuasion, but not how Sweden came in a position to influence, while deliberation could explain how Sweden could come in this position, but not the actual mechanism of persuasion. I finished by concluding that further research need to be done on value- added foreign policies as a possible new rational behaviour in foreign policy making with third countries for the EU