In a setting with two managers/owners who both make relation- and asset-specific investments, I suggest a model where a linear implicit contract can strengthen the incentives to invest, if the parties are sufficiently patient. Otherwise, only asset ownership can be used to influence the incentives. First, I analyze the case where the implicit contract may include a fixed transfer, which then must be paid by the manager with the weakest bargaining position. I argue that this arrangement is not observed in business relations, due to risk aversion, bounded rationality and social norms. Therefore I focus on implicit contracts without fixed transfers in the rest of the paper. The same ownership structure is then optimal under both spot governanc...
We base a contracting theory for a start-up firm on an agency model with observ-able but nonverifiab...
Contractual arrangements involving revenue/profit sharing are often based on fairly simple, often li...
Experimental evidence has accumulated highlighting the limitations of formal and explicit contracts ...
In a setting with two managers/owners who both make relation- and asset-specific investments, I sugg...
A framework is developed for a theory of the firm that combines asset ownership and implicit contrac...
In a setting where two managers make relationship- and asset-specific investments, the optimal relat...
In a property-rights framework, I study how organizational form and quantity contracts interact in g...
Explicit contracts are used most frequently by theorists to model many relationships, ranging from l...
This paper investigates the importance of the fiow of funds as an implicit incetive provided by inve...
Consider a partnership consisting of two symmetrically informed parties who may each own a share of ...
This article provides a theory of interfirm partial ownership. We consider a setting in which an ups...
We analyze the role of implicit contracts' (that is, informal agreements supported by" reputation ra...
I suggest a model for two managers/owners and two assets, where the optimal allocation of ownership ...
In Chapter 1, by using a simple model with moral hazard and managerial entrenchment, I derive the op...
We base a contracting theory for a startup firm on an agency model with observable but nonverifiable...
We base a contracting theory for a start-up firm on an agency model with observ-able but nonverifiab...
Contractual arrangements involving revenue/profit sharing are often based on fairly simple, often li...
Experimental evidence has accumulated highlighting the limitations of formal and explicit contracts ...
In a setting with two managers/owners who both make relation- and asset-specific investments, I sugg...
A framework is developed for a theory of the firm that combines asset ownership and implicit contrac...
In a setting where two managers make relationship- and asset-specific investments, the optimal relat...
In a property-rights framework, I study how organizational form and quantity contracts interact in g...
Explicit contracts are used most frequently by theorists to model many relationships, ranging from l...
This paper investigates the importance of the fiow of funds as an implicit incetive provided by inve...
Consider a partnership consisting of two symmetrically informed parties who may each own a share of ...
This article provides a theory of interfirm partial ownership. We consider a setting in which an ups...
We analyze the role of implicit contracts' (that is, informal agreements supported by" reputation ra...
I suggest a model for two managers/owners and two assets, where the optimal allocation of ownership ...
In Chapter 1, by using a simple model with moral hazard and managerial entrenchment, I derive the op...
We base a contracting theory for a startup firm on an agency model with observable but nonverifiable...
We base a contracting theory for a start-up firm on an agency model with observ-able but nonverifiab...
Contractual arrangements involving revenue/profit sharing are often based on fairly simple, often li...
Experimental evidence has accumulated highlighting the limitations of formal and explicit contracts ...