The 1993 U.N. Straddling Stock Agreement prescribes a multi-national organizational structure for management of an exploited marine fish stock, one whose range straddles both "Extended Economic Zones" (EEZs) and high seas waters. However, the Agreement provides to the Regional Organization no coercive enforcement powers. In this connections two problems in particular have been cited: The first, called the "interloper problem", concerns the difficulty of controlling the harvesting by non-member vessels. The second problem, called the "new-member problem", concerns the inherent difficulties of negotiating mutually acceptable terms of entry. Here we explore the extent to which the coalition, by exerting economic power alone, might be able atta...
National jurisdiction over the fishery resources within the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) can be s...
Property rights are in the center of fisheries management difficulties. The problem becomes more com...
This paper applies game theory to address the problem of allocating profits among fishing nations, o...
The 1993 U.N. Straddling Stock Agreement prescribes a multi-national organizational structure for ma...
The 1993 U.N. Straddling Stock Agreement prescribes a multi-national organizational structure for ma...
The 1993 U.N. Straddling Stock Agreement prescribes a multi-national organizational structure for ma...
According to international law, straddling fish stocks should be managed cooperatively through Regio...
This paper examines how a Regional Fisheries Management Organization (RFMO) might successfully achie...
To ensure the long-term conservation and sustainable use of straddling fish stocks, the 1995 United ...
Coastal nations can impose conditions of use on foreign fishermen that operate in their Exclusive Ec...
Management of straddling fish stocks has been noted for its political complexity. Negotiations frequ...
The post World War II era saw the development of powerful self-contained fishing fleets, so-called d...
To ensure the long-term conservation and sustainable use of straddling fish stocks, the 1995 United\...
A basic issue in transboundary fishery management is the new member problem. In this paper we addres...
National jurisdiction over the fishery resources within the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) can be s...
Property rights are in the center of fisheries management difficulties. The problem becomes more com...
This paper applies game theory to address the problem of allocating profits among fishing nations, o...
The 1993 U.N. Straddling Stock Agreement prescribes a multi-national organizational structure for ma...
The 1993 U.N. Straddling Stock Agreement prescribes a multi-national organizational structure for ma...
The 1993 U.N. Straddling Stock Agreement prescribes a multi-national organizational structure for ma...
According to international law, straddling fish stocks should be managed cooperatively through Regio...
This paper examines how a Regional Fisheries Management Organization (RFMO) might successfully achie...
To ensure the long-term conservation and sustainable use of straddling fish stocks, the 1995 United ...
Coastal nations can impose conditions of use on foreign fishermen that operate in their Exclusive Ec...
Management of straddling fish stocks has been noted for its political complexity. Negotiations frequ...
The post World War II era saw the development of powerful self-contained fishing fleets, so-called d...
To ensure the long-term conservation and sustainable use of straddling fish stocks, the 1995 United\...
A basic issue in transboundary fishery management is the new member problem. In this paper we addres...
National jurisdiction over the fishery resources within the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) can be s...
Property rights are in the center of fisheries management difficulties. The problem becomes more com...
This paper applies game theory to address the problem of allocating profits among fishing nations, o...