Can a trifle gain to sufficiently many well-off justify imposing a much larger sacrifice on the worst-off? We show that if one answers negatively to such a question, one is forced to accept the maximin principle and give full priority to the worst-off even when a trifle gain to the worst-off imposes a substantial sacrifice on arbitrarily many well-off. If one dislikes this consequence, one faces a real dilemma in choosing between the tyranny of aggregation and the tyranny of non-aggregation
This paper presents multiple reasons for why contractualists should adopt a weighted lottery in sav...
In two recent papers Christian List and Philip Pettit have argued that there is a problem in the agg...
Several authors have indicated a contradiction between consistent aggregation of subjective beliefs ...
Can a trifle gain to sufficiently many well-off justify imposing a much larger sacrifice on the wor...
Can a tiny gain to sufficiently many well-off justify imposing a much larger sacrifice on the worst-...
Consider the following social choice problem. A group of individuals seek to classify the elements o...
Levi’s ‘robust aggregation’ suggests a generalization of the standard ‘ex ante’ mode of aggregating ...
Mongin (1994) proved a multi-profile version of Harsanyi (1955)'s Aggregation Theorem: within the ex...
Abstract Among the many sorts of problems encountered in decision theory, allocation problems occupy...
Binary aggregation studies problems in which individuals express yes/no choices over a number of pos...
Is an outcome where many people are saved and one person dies better than an outcome where the one i...
In an article from 1973, Rittel and Webber distinguished between “tame” or “benign” problems on the ...
We arrive at new conclusions for social choice theory by considering the process in which we refine ...
The aggregation of consistent individual judgments on logically interconnected propositions into a c...
Is there any number of people you should save from paralysis rather than saving one person from deat...
This paper presents multiple reasons for why contractualists should adopt a weighted lottery in sav...
In two recent papers Christian List and Philip Pettit have argued that there is a problem in the agg...
Several authors have indicated a contradiction between consistent aggregation of subjective beliefs ...
Can a trifle gain to sufficiently many well-off justify imposing a much larger sacrifice on the wor...
Can a tiny gain to sufficiently many well-off justify imposing a much larger sacrifice on the worst-...
Consider the following social choice problem. A group of individuals seek to classify the elements o...
Levi’s ‘robust aggregation’ suggests a generalization of the standard ‘ex ante’ mode of aggregating ...
Mongin (1994) proved a multi-profile version of Harsanyi (1955)'s Aggregation Theorem: within the ex...
Abstract Among the many sorts of problems encountered in decision theory, allocation problems occupy...
Binary aggregation studies problems in which individuals express yes/no choices over a number of pos...
Is an outcome where many people are saved and one person dies better than an outcome where the one i...
In an article from 1973, Rittel and Webber distinguished between “tame” or “benign” problems on the ...
We arrive at new conclusions for social choice theory by considering the process in which we refine ...
The aggregation of consistent individual judgments on logically interconnected propositions into a c...
Is there any number of people you should save from paralysis rather than saving one person from deat...
This paper presents multiple reasons for why contractualists should adopt a weighted lottery in sav...
In two recent papers Christian List and Philip Pettit have argued that there is a problem in the agg...
Several authors have indicated a contradiction between consistent aggregation of subjective beliefs ...