Poisson games have been proposed to address equilibrium indeterminacy in Coordination games. They model the number of actual players as a Poisson randomvariable to capture population uncertainty in large games. Two natural questions are(a) whether uncertainty about the number of actual players does have an impact onsubjects' behavior, and if so (b) whether such behavior is consistent with the theoretical prediction of Poisson Coordination games. Investigating these questions is the focus of this paper. We find that uncertainty about the number of actual players may influence subjects' behavior. Crucially, such behavior is consistent with the theoretical prediction
We study how the presence of multiple participation opportunities coupled with individual learning a...
There are many situations where two interacting individuals can benefit from coordinating their acti...
We study a coordination game where N players simultaneously and independently decide whether to take...
Global games and Poisson games have been proposed to address equilibrium indeterminacy in Common Kno...
International audienceGlobal games and Poisson games have been proposed to address equilibrium indet...
In many situations in macroeconomics strategic complementarities arise, and agents face a coordinati...
We perform an experiment on a pure coordination game with uncertainty about the payoffs. Our game i...
Lecture on the first SFB/TR 15 meeting, Gummersbach, July, 18 - 20, 2004This paper explores predicta...
This paper explores three aspects of strategic uncertainty: its relation to risk, predictability of ...
We perform an experiment on a pure coordination game with uncertainty about the payoffs. Our game is...
We construct a Cournot model with uncertainty in the number of firms in the industry. We model such ...
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 2001.Includes bibliograp...
We construct a Cournot model with uncertainty in the number of firms in the industry. We model such ...
This paper compares the leading theoretical approaches to equilibrium selection, both traditional an...
We study how the presence of multiple participation opportunities coupled with individual learning a...
There are many situations where two interacting individuals can benefit from coordinating their acti...
We study a coordination game where N players simultaneously and independently decide whether to take...
Global games and Poisson games have been proposed to address equilibrium indeterminacy in Common Kno...
International audienceGlobal games and Poisson games have been proposed to address equilibrium indet...
In many situations in macroeconomics strategic complementarities arise, and agents face a coordinati...
We perform an experiment on a pure coordination game with uncertainty about the payoffs. Our game i...
Lecture on the first SFB/TR 15 meeting, Gummersbach, July, 18 - 20, 2004This paper explores predicta...
This paper explores three aspects of strategic uncertainty: its relation to risk, predictability of ...
We perform an experiment on a pure coordination game with uncertainty about the payoffs. Our game is...
We construct a Cournot model with uncertainty in the number of firms in the industry. We model such ...
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 2001.Includes bibliograp...
We construct a Cournot model with uncertainty in the number of firms in the industry. We model such ...
This paper compares the leading theoretical approaches to equilibrium selection, both traditional an...
We study how the presence of multiple participation opportunities coupled with individual learning a...
There are many situations where two interacting individuals can benefit from coordinating their acti...
We study a coordination game where N players simultaneously and independently decide whether to take...