This paper presents an extension of the automatic protocol verifier ProVerif in order to prove more observational equivalences. ProVerif can prove observational equivalence between processes that have the same structure but differ by the messages they contain. In order to extend the class of equivalences that ProVerif handles, we extend the language of terms by defining more functions (destructors) by rewrite rules. In particular, we allow rewrite rules with inequalities as side-conditions, so that we can express tests ''if then else'' inside terms. Finally, we provide an automatic procedure that translates a process into an equivalent process that performs as many actions as possible in- side terms, to allow ProVerif to prove the desired e...
Formal methods have proved their usefulness for analyzing the security of protocols. Most existing r...
International audienceProVerif is an automatic symbolic protocol verifier. It supports a wide range...
In this paper we present an extension of the AKISS protocol verification tool which allows to verify...
International audienceThis paper presents an extension of the automatic protocol verifier ProVerif i...
International audienceObservational equivalence allows us to study important security properties suc...
Many tools have been developed to automatically verify security properties on cryptographic protocol...
This paper presents APTE, a new tool for automatically proving the security of cryptographic protoco...
Formal methods have proved their usefulness for analyzing the security of protocols. Most existing r...
International audienceObservational equivalence allows us to study important security properties suc...
International audienceThis paper presents a major overhaul of one the most widely used symbolic secu...
AbstractIn the analysis of security protocols, methods and tools for reasoning about protocol behavi...
Observational equivalence allows us to study important securityproperties such as anonymity. Unfortu...
The original publication is available at www.springerlink.comInternational audienceIndistinguishabil...
International audienceFormal methods have proved their usefulness for analyzing the security of prot...
Indistinguishability properties are essential in formal verification of cryptographic protocols. The...
Formal methods have proved their usefulness for analyzing the security of protocols. Most existing r...
International audienceProVerif is an automatic symbolic protocol verifier. It supports a wide range...
In this paper we present an extension of the AKISS protocol verification tool which allows to verify...
International audienceThis paper presents an extension of the automatic protocol verifier ProVerif i...
International audienceObservational equivalence allows us to study important security properties suc...
Many tools have been developed to automatically verify security properties on cryptographic protocol...
This paper presents APTE, a new tool for automatically proving the security of cryptographic protoco...
Formal methods have proved their usefulness for analyzing the security of protocols. Most existing r...
International audienceObservational equivalence allows us to study important security properties suc...
International audienceThis paper presents a major overhaul of one the most widely used symbolic secu...
AbstractIn the analysis of security protocols, methods and tools for reasoning about protocol behavi...
Observational equivalence allows us to study important securityproperties such as anonymity. Unfortu...
The original publication is available at www.springerlink.comInternational audienceIndistinguishabil...
International audienceFormal methods have proved their usefulness for analyzing the security of prot...
Indistinguishability properties are essential in formal verification of cryptographic protocols. The...
Formal methods have proved their usefulness for analyzing the security of protocols. Most existing r...
International audienceProVerif is an automatic symbolic protocol verifier. It supports a wide range...
In this paper we present an extension of the AKISS protocol verification tool which allows to verify...