Interim report: 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission

This Interim Report makes 51 recommendations and is the culmination of six months\u27 work, including four weeks of community consultations; examination of more than 1,260 submissions and eight weeks of public hearings involving a total of 87 witnesses. In late January 2009 heatwave conditions developed across Victoria and on 7 February many all-time temperature records were set. In Melbourne the temperature reached 46.4°C. The previous record was 45.6°C set on Black Friday (13 January 1939). Many long-serving Country Fire Authority officers had not experienced such fires. The rate of spread of the fires equalled the maximum previously recorded, and the prolific spotting made fire behaviour on the day unique. Reports referred to flames leaping 100 metres into the air, generating heat so intense that aluminium road signs melted. The plume of the fires created a convection effect that generated winds so strong that trees appeared to have been screwed from the ground. One hundred and seventy-three people died in the fires. The 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission was established on 16 February to investigate the causes and responses to the bushfires which swept through parts of Victoria in late January and February 2009. Findings There were a number of weaknesses and failures with Victoria’s information and warning systems on 7 February. Warnings were often delayed which meant that many people were not warned at all or the amount of time they had to respond to the warnings was much less than it should have been. The warnings that were issued often did not give people a clear understanding of the location and severity of the fire and how they should respond. The methods of delivery of the warnings were also inadequate. Some techniques for raising awareness such as the use of an emergency warning signal to capture people’s attention when warnings are broadcast were not used. Similarly, other avenues for issuing and raising awareness of warnings were not encouraged, such as the use of local sirens or the use of commercial radio and television. Finally, the sources of information and warnings that were available during the fire did not cope well with the level of demand. People had difficulty getting onto the relevant websites and about 80 per cent of the calls to the Victorian Bushfire Information Line were unanswered. Often the information available through these sources was incomplete or out of date. The Final Report is due July 2010