Firing blanks? The Arms Trade Treaty

This paper assesses key provisions of the ATT by first back-grounding its origins and contested formulation before assessing its transfer, prohibition and national control provisions, Introduction The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) was adopted by vote at the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in April 2013 and opened for signatures two months later. It was approved by 154 states (later revised to 156), three against (Iran, Syria and North Korea), its 23 abstentions including some of the world’s key arms exporters and manufacturers (China, Russia, India) and leading arms buyers (Egypt, India, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia). The treaty formally enters into force on December 24 2014 having received its requisite fiftieth ratification (including Australia and New Zealand) three months earlier. The United States reversed the previous Bush Administration’s opposition and signed the ATT in September 2013. In brief, the ATT introduces specific, legally binding measures to regulate international trade, transit and brokering of conventional arms, including small arms and light weapons (SALW). Before authorising transfers, states parties must subject them to criteria established under a mandatory national control system. The treaty prohibits transfers where a UN authorised arms embargo is in place, where there is violation of international agreements relating to the transfer or illicit trafficking of conventional arms, or where risks of genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes are known to exist. Where such prohibitions do not apply, an assessment is required as to whether a transfer risks undermining peace and security, potential violation of human rights, mounting of terrorist attacks, or conduct of organised crime. States parties are required to report annually to the UN on international exports and imports of conventional arms, and on the national laws and administrative procedures adopted for ATT implementation