From Fixed to Flexible? Wage Coordination and the Collective Bargaining System in Italy

This article analyses the rules on wage coordination and their effectiveness in the Italian two-tier bargaining system. It seeks to cast light on bargaining coordination by starting from the analysis of collective agreements, rather than focusing exclusively on normative and institutional aspects of wage bargaining. Accordingly, the study examines a dataset of 498 company-level collective agreements concluded between 2012–2015 in three sectors – metalworking, food, banking and finance – to analyse wage developments in company-level bargaining. The study considers the extent to which local wage negotiations are consistent with the rules on wage bargaining coordination laid down in economy-wide agreements and national collective labour agreements. Wage coordination rules are generally respected, though a significant number of company-level agreements still provide fixed-rate pay rises in breach of the rule that wage increases at company level should be linked to productivity and other factors relating to the workers’ and/or the firm’s economic performance. Although the violation of wage bargaining rules between national agreements and company-level collective agreements is in line with the favourability principle, it is argued that local negotiations on fixed-rate pay rises could be regarded as a form of uncoordinated decentralization, diminishing the effectiveness of horizontal coordination policies and the normative role of the social partners