THE CANADIAN NAVY AND DOMESTIC MARITIME ENFORCEMENTbyLaurence M. HickeyA thesis presented for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at Cardiff UniversityUMI Number: U585194All rights reservedINFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,a note will indicate the deletion.Dissertation PublishingUMI U585194Published by ProQuest LLC 2013. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346DECLARATION AND STATEMENTSI declare that this work has not been accepted previously in substance for any degree, and is not being concurrently submitted in candidature for any degree.This thesis is being submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.This dissertation is the result of my own independent work, except where otherwise stated. Other sources are acknowledged by explicit references.I hereby give consent for my dissertation, if accepted, to be available for photocopying and for inter-library loan, and for the title and abstract to be made available to outside organizations.Signed: Laurence M. HickeyDate:AbstractThe objective of this research is to evaluate the employment of the Canadian Navy in a maritime enforcement role within the Canadian maritime zones. This investigation is comprised of two main parts: an analysis of the Canadian political and regulatory structures, as well as an analysis of naval enforcement operations. The marine geography of Atlantic Canada is described through six key ocean-use sectors, followed by an analysis of important oceans policy initiatives, and the federal government’s ad hoc approach to security and defence policy formulation. The mandates, jurisdictions, and general capabilities of Canadian federal departments with either direct or indirect links to marine security and maritime enforcement are discussed, as well as the legal framework for the use of Canadian military forces for domestic operations. The second part of the thesis analyses the capabilities that the Navy brings to maritime security and enforcement operations. These include the contribution to maritime domain awareness, government “presence” derived through aerial surveillance, search and rescue operations, and naval support to fisheries enforcement. An analysis of patrol patterns is offered, as well as spatial analyses of at-sea inspection data. Two exploratory studies that address the perceived deterrent value of naval support to fisheries enforcement, and public opinion as it pertains to naval support to constabulary operations are presented, as well as the effect that fisheries support missions have on the combat readiness of warships. The thesis suggests that the Canadian Navy could take on a greater role in domestic enforcement, and a proposal is made for enhanced legal powers. The thesis ends by summarizing the Navy’s important role championing and enabling improvement in the government’s Marine Security Response System, as well as a whole-of- government approach to maritime surveillance planning.AcknowledgementsA project of this nature cannot be completed without the assistance of a great number of people. This is my opportunity to thank and acknowledge the efforts and encouragement of this supporting team.First, I wish to thank my advisor, Dr. Hance Smith, for the fatherly chats, sound advice, and quick responses to my queries despite the seemingly long interludes between intercontinental contacts.Second, I’d like to acknowledge the outstanding assistance of Roxanne Gauthier, whose proficiency (and patience) with ArcGIS resulted in the excellent maps found throughout this thesis.Many others have supported this research. Dr. Yvonne Severs gave generously of her time in helping me structure and proofread some of the chapters. Greg Royston assisted me with the many ships’ logs at the Archives. Janice Peters gave a year of her time reading news stories on my behalf. Paul Massel compiled the force employment record that made possible a logical search through the Archives for patrol data. The Commanding Officers of HMCS Montreal, Dean McFadden then Norm Jolin set the standard for collection of fisheries patrol data for this project. I’d like to thank them as well as the Officers-of-the-Watch and operations departments of all of the warships who collected patrol data on my behalf. Scott Howden, Spike Lavigne, Sid Green, Chris Munro-Cape, Rob Elford, Greg Stead, Rory Rafuse and the watch-keepers of the Maritime Operations Centre made possible the extraction of patrol and surveillance data. Tilman Bieger provided inspection statistics that were seemingly unobtainable from Fisheries and Oceans Canada. Gino Gagnon assisted with the archival microfiche search for the media content analysis. Guy Wheeler extracted combat readiness statistics on my behalf. Perry Kurzynski made the search and rescue data available through the Canadian Coast Guard.Others contributed through discussions on thesis content or technical assistance. These people are Dr. Richard Gimblett, Nick Carson, Stephen Flemming, Ian Anderson, Ted Parkinson, Scott Latter, Steve Bell, Fred Crickard, Peter Haydon, Ed Tummers, Bob Edwards, Glen Herbert, Brent Hobson, Lome Richardson, Mike Mangin, Randy Wyatt, Nicki Newell, John Van Oosten, Andrew Hawrylak, Isabelle Campagnon, Rick Mayne, Ralph Lang and Colin Warman.I’d also like to thank the fishermen who participated in this project. These are Jeff Brownstein and Pat Rhynold, who reviewed the deterrence questionnaire for me from the fisherman’s perspective. Other participants were Lenus Bungay and trawlermen of Grand Bank Seafoods Ltd, fishermen of Atlantic Herring Coop Ltd, Canso Trawlermen's Coop, Cumberland North Fishermen's Union, Eastern Kings Fishermen's Association, Eastern Shore Fishermen's Protective Association, Inverness North Fishermen's Association, Maritime Fishermen's Union Local 6, Maritime Fishermen's Union Local 9, Prospect Area Full-Time Fishermen's Association, Southwest Nova Tuna Association, Upper Bay of Fundy Fish Draggers' Association, and Western Gulf Fishermen's Association.Although she appears at the end of this long list, her contribution is unquestionably the greatest. I’d like to thank my wife Linda for giving me the space needed to pursue this project, and for providing a supportive environment at home. I could not have completed this undertaking without your support.Table of ContentsSection No. Page No.AbstractAcknowledgementsTable of Contents iList of Tables ixList of Figures xiiList of Appendices xviiiList of Abbreviations xixChapter One: INTRODUCTION1.1 Introduction 11.2 Aim of the Study 21.3 Geography versus Political Science 31.4 Scope of Study and Study Area 31.5 Structure of Research 51.6 Significance of the Study 71.7 Previous Research 71.8 Effect of Terrorist Attacks on 11 September 2001 151.9 Summary 15Chapter Two: RESEARCH METHODS2.1 Introduction 172.2 Thesis Structure 182.3 Research Design 182.3.1 Theme - Geographical Description of Study Area 192.3.2 Theme - Policy and Regulatory Framework 192.3.3 Theme - Interdepartmental Co-op and Domestic Ops 212.3.4 Theme - Contribution to Maritime Domain Awareness 222.3.5 Theme - Contribution to Patrol and Response 232.3.6 Theme - Value of Naval Enforcement Activity 25i2.4 Data Collection and Analysis 272.4.1 Surveillance Data Collection 282.4.2 Observation 312.4.3 Mapping Analysis 322.4.3.1 Standard Map Format and Attributes 322.4.3.2 Map Analysis Methods 362.4.4 Media Content Analysis 362.4.4.1 Media Content Analysis Criteria 392.4.5 Data Sources 402.5 Quality Control 432.6 Interviews, Questionnaire Design, Format and Distribution 442.6.1 Questionnaire Development 462.6.2 Questionnaire Responses 472.7 Stakeholder Involvement 482.8 Role of Researcher, Opportunities and Constraints 482.8.1 Constraints 49Chapter Three: MARINE GEOGRAPHY OF ATLANTIC CANADA3.1 Introduction 533.2 General Description of Atlantic Canada 533.2.1 Population 563.2.2 Critical Infrastructure - Road, Rail and Air 573.2.3 Ocean Dimension of Canada and Atlantic Region 593.2.4 Canada’s Maritime Spaces and International Law 623.2.5 Maritime Boundary Disputes 643.2.5.1 Northwest Passage (Canada / United States) 653.2.5.2 Hans Island (Canada / Denmark) 663.2.5.3 Machias Seal Island (Canada / United States) 663.2.6 Military and Search and Rescue Zones 663.3 Economic Impact of Atlantic Canada’s Maritime Zones 723.3.1 Renewable Natural Resources 722.3.1.1 Commercial Fishery 723.3.2 Non-renewable Natural Resources 782.3.2.1 Offshore Non-Fuel Mineral Resources 782.3.2.2 Offshore Hydrocarbons 793.3.3 Marine Construction / Ship Repair 85ii3.3.4 Marine Transportation 863.3.5 Ocean Tourism 972.3.5.1 Ocean Tourism 972.3.5.2 Recreational Fishery 973.2.6 Conservation and Protection 983.4 Summary 100Chapter Four: CANADIAN MARITIME POLICY FRAMEWORK4.1 Introduction 1054.2 National Interests 1054.2.1 Vital and Secondary Interests 1074.2.2 Canada as a Maritime Nation 1074.2.3 Vital Maritime Interests 1094.3 Oceans Policy 1104.3.1 Periods of Policy Development 1104.3.2 The Oceans Act 1134.3.3 Canada’s Ocean Strategy 1144.3.4 Oceans Action Plan 1144.4 National Security and Defence Policy 1164.4.1 1971 Defence White Paper 1194.4.2 1974 Defence Services Review 1204.4.3 1987 Defence White Paper 1214.4.4 1994 Defence Review and Defence White Paper 1224.4.5 National Security Policy 1244.4.6 Maritime Sovereignty 1284.5 Whither Surveillance Policy? 1344.6 The 2005 Defence Policy Statement 1384.7 Summary 140Chapter Five: REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MARITIME ENFORCEMENT5.1 Introduction 1455.2 The Federal Setting 1465.2.1 Joint-Federal-Provincial Agencies - Petroleum Boards 149iii5.2.2 Federal Regional Councils 1525.2.3 Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment 1545.2.4 Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency 1555.2.5 Atlantic Pilotage Association 1555.2.6 Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency 1565.2.7 Canadian Transportation Agency 1575.2.8 Transportation Safety Board 1575.3 Federal Depts - Primary Responsibility for Enforcement 1585.3.1 Fisheries and Oceans Canada 1585.3.2 Canadian Coast Guard 1605.3.3 Transport Canada 1645.3.4 Public Safety Canada 1675.3.5 Royal Canadian Mounted Police 1705.3.6 Canadian Security Intelligence Service 1745.3.7 Canada Border Security Agency 1755.3.8 Environment Canada 1795.3.9 Natural Resources Canada 1805.3.10 Department of National Defence 1815.4 Enabling Provisions for Naval Support 1855.4.1 Memoranda of Understanding 1855.4.1.1 DND/SOLGEN - Support to Counter Drug Ops 1865.4.1.2 DND/DFO - Support to Fisheries 1865.4.1.3 DND/EC - Environmental Emergencies 1875.4.2 Domestic Operations 1885.4.3 Regional Joint Task Force Structure 1935.5 Summary 195Chapter Six: INTERACTION BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND DEPARTMENTS6.1 Introduction 1986.2 Security - Law Enforcement or Defence? 1996.3 Nature of Multi-agency Relationships 2016.4 The National Setting (Strategic Level) 2026.4.1 Informal / Formal Relationships 2056.4.2 Proactive Engagement 2056.4.2.1 Day-to-day Liaison 2066.4.2.2 Inter-agency Committees and Working Groups 2076.4.2.2.1 The Osbaldeston Study 208iv6.4.2.2.2 IPCRC 2096.4.2.2.3 Cabinet Committee on Security 2176.4.2.2.4 IMSWG 2186.4.2.2.5 ITAC 2216.4.2.2.6 ASWG 2236.4.3 Reactive Engagement 2246.4.3.1 Federal Emergency Response System (FERS) 2246.4.3.2 National Emergency Response System (NERS) 2286.5 The Regional Setting (Operational Level) 2296.5.1 Informal / Formal Relationships 2306.5.2 Proactive Engagement 2316.5.2.1 Day-to-day Liaison 2316.5.2.2 Inter-agency Committees and Working Groups 2336.5.2.2.1 Oceans Management Committees 2336.5.2.2.2 IBET/ INSET / NPET 2346.5.2.2.3 ECIMOC 2356.5.2.2.4 NSFC Security Sub-Committee 2356.5.2.2.5 Atl Regional Security Committee 2366.5.2.3 Inter-agency Exercises and Simulations 2376.5.2.4 RICMO 2396.5.2.5 Summary Key Regional Proactive Relationships 2396.5.3 Reactive Engagement 2406.5.3.1 Threat Assessment Grp / Federal Co-ord Grp 2416.5.4 Maritime Domain Awareness 2426.5.4.1 Marine Security Operations Centres 2436.6 Summary 247Chapter Seven: NAVAL CONTRIBUTION TO MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS7.1 Introduction 2507.2 Naval Use of the Sea 2507.2.1 Role of Navies 2507.2.2 Constabulary Role of Navies 2527.2.3 Spectrum of Conflict 2547.2.4 Maritime Threats and Maritime Domain Awareness 2557.3 Naval Contribution to Maritime Domain Awareness 2577.3.1 Recognised Maritime Picture 2587.3.1.1 Data Collection for the Maritime Picture 2587.3.1.2 High-Frequency Surface Wave Radar 2627.3.2 Contribution of Surveillance to Domain Awareness 264v7.3.2.1 CP-140 Aurora Presence (DND) 2667.3.2.2 Contracted PAL Aircraft Presence (DFO) 2717.3.2.3 Spatial Aspect of Marine Traffic 2747.3.3 Comparison of Marine Activity and Govt Presence 2787.3.4 Other Contribution to Maritime Domain Awareness 2817.3.4.1 Canadian Maritime Network 2817.3.4.2 Route Survey 2837.4 Summary 285Chapter Eight: NAVAL CONTRIBUTION TO PATROL AND RESPONSE8.1 Introduction 2878.2 Contribution to Search and Rescue 2878.2.1 Search and Rescue Structure in Canada 2888.2.2 Search and Rescue Resources 2918.2.3 Search and Rescue Activity Results 2938.2.3.1 Spatial Aspect of SAR Support 2938.2.3.2 Search and Rescue Output 3018.3 Contribution to Fisheries Enforcement 3118.3.1 Maritime Domain Awareness 3128.3.2 Naval Fishery Patrols 3128.3.2.1 Historical Context 3138.3.2.2 Level of Effort to Fisheries Enforcement 3158.3.2.3 Spatial Aspect of Fisheries Patrol Effort 3178.3.2.3.1 Typical Patrol 3178.3.2.3.2 Naval Vessel Patrol Patterns 3198.3.2.3.3 Hague Line Patrols 3228.3.2.3.4 Naval Enforcement Presence 3238.3.2.4 Inspections / Boardings 3248.3.2.4.1 Spatial Aspect of Boardings 3288.3.2.4.2 Proximity Analysis of Boardings 3318.3.2.4.2.1 Distance to Bases 3318.3.2.4.2.2 Distance to EEZ 3388.3.2.5 Naval Fishery Patrol Statistics 3448.4 Summary 348viChapter Nine: NAVAL BENEFIT FOR SUPPORT TO MARITIME ENFORCEMENT9.1 Introduction 3519.2 Estimation of Deterrent Effect of Naval Forces 3519.2.1 Prior Studies on Deterrence in Cdn Fisheries 3529.2.2 Deterrence Survey for this Research Project 3559.2.3 Purpose of Key Questions in Questionnaire 3579.2.4 Response to Questionnaire 3609.2.5 Validity of the Survey 3639.2.6 Results of Exploratory Deterrence Survey 3649.3 Public Opinion Value 3709.3.1 Media Content Analysis Results 3709.4 Benefit of Fisheries Patrols on Warship Crew Readiness 3779.4.1 Combat Readiness Requirement Analysis 3779.4.2 Additional Training Value 3869.4.3 Enforcement Support - Effect on Combat Readiness 3879.5 Summary 387Chapter Ten: ANALYSIS OF THE NAVAL ROLE IN MARITIME ENFORCEMENT10.1 Introduction 38910.2 Threats and Security 38910.3 Wariness for Increased Role 39210.4 Reticence - Armed Forces for Maritime Enforcement 39510.4.1 The Army and Law Enforcement 39610.4.2 Legitimacy of CF for Law Enforcement 39910.4.3 Lack of Distinction between Army and Navy 40110.4.4 Army as Non-Traditional Employment 40210.5 European Example of Naval Enforcement 40810.6 United States Experience with Posse Comitatus 40910.7 Proposal for Naval Enforcement in Cdn Maritime Zones 411vii10.8 Champion and Enabler for Marine Security Processes 41310.8.1 Marine Security Response System 41510.8.2 Improved Surveillance Planning 42010.9 Additional Naval Contribution to Oceans Management 42310.10 Summary 425Chapter Eleven: CONCLUSION11.1 Introduction 42611.2 Policy Framework 42611.3 Complexity of Enforcement Problem 42711.4 Naval Contribution through Patrol and Response 42811.5 Naval Contribution through Maritime Domain Awareness 42911.6 Naval Contribution as Champion for Co-operation 42911.7 Contribution to Knowledge 43011.8 Future Research 43111.9 Closing Thoughts 432BIBLIOGRAPHY 433viiiList of TablesID Title Page2-1 Data Sets Used to Illustrate Geography of Study Area 202-2 Diverse Co-ordinate Formats by Source 343-1 Population - Atlantic Canada 573-2 Length of Canadian Shoreline 603-3 Size of Canadian Exclusive Economic Zone 613-4 Canadian Commercial Fishery 1995-2000 743-5 Offshore Petrocarbon Inventory 803-6 Oil and Gas Production - Atlantic Canada 1995-2000 853-7 Canadian Marine Construction 1995-2000 863-8 Canada’s Top Ten Ports in 2005 893-9 Canadian Ocean Tourism 1995-2000 973-10 Canadian Ocean Industry Employment 1995-2000 1023-11 Gross Value of Output of Ocean Sectors 1995-2000 1025-1 Government Bodies with Oceans Responsibilities 1475-2 Non-Government Bodies with Oceans Interests 1495-3 DFO / CCG Vessel Fleet 1625-4 DFO / CCG Aircraft Fleet 1635-5 RCMP Vessels and Aircraft 1735-6 Naval Fleet - Atlantic 1845-7 Naval Aircraft - Atlantic 1845-8 Key Inter-departmental Agreements 1885-9 Legal Instruments Shaping Domestic Operations 1927-1 DND CP-140 Aircraft Patrols by Area - 2002 2677-2 DFO PAL Aircraft Patrols by NAFO Sub-Area - 2002 2738-1 Distribution of SAR Cases - Halifax SRR 2002 3058-2 Marine Responders in SAR Cases - 2002 3078-3 Naval Responders in SAR Cases - 2002 3088-4 Aircraft Responders in SAR Cases - 2002 3098-5 Chronology of Changes to Dept Responsibility 3148-6 Naval Vessel Total Days at Sea - Atlantic 3158-7 DND Fisheries Patrol Asset Allocation - Atlantic 3168-8 Fishing Vessel Inspections by Department 3258-9 Fishing Vessel Inspections by Nationality 3258-10 Naval Fisheries Patrol Boardings by Ship - 1990-2002 3288-11 Naval Fisheries Patrol Averages - 1980 to 1997 3458-12 Naval Fisheries Patrol Averages - 1999 to 2002 3459-1 Fisheries Violations - Expectation of Consequences 3559-2 Areas Fished by Respondents 3639-3 Fishing Experience of Respondents 3649-4 Time Spent Fishing Per Year 3659-5 Licences Held by Respondents 365ixList of Tables (continued)ID Title Page9-6 Areas Fished by Sub-Area or District 3669-7 Number of Sightings Per Week of Patrol Assets 3679-8 Perceived Deterrent Value of Patrol Assets 3689-9 Enforcement Officers Embarked on Military Patrols 3699-10 Media Content Analysis - Themes and Types 3719-11 Media Content by Theme - 1 Jan to 31 Dec 2002 3729-12 Media Content OGD Support - 1 Jan to 31 Dec 2002 3739-13 Example Individual and Small Team CRRs 3799-14 Example Intermediate CRRs 3799-15 Example Advanced CRRs 3809-16 CRR Completion Percentages - 1999 to 2001 382A-1 Federal Legislation - DFO as Lead Agent A1A-2 Federal Legislation - ACOA as Lead Agent A4A-3 Federal Legislation - Agri-Can as Lead Agent A4A-4 Federal Legislation - ParksCan as Lead Agent A5A-5 Federal Legislation - CTA as Lead Agent A5A-6 Federal Legislation - INAC as Lead Agent A6A-7 Federal Legislation - DOJ as Lead Agent A7A-8 Federal Legislation - DND as Lead Agent A7A-9 Federal Legislation - EC as Lead Agent A8A-10 Federal Legislation - DFAIT as Lead Agent A10A-11 Federal Legislation - HC as Lead Agent A10A-12 Federal Legislation - HRDC as Lead Agent A11A-13 Federal Legislation - IC as Lead Agent A11A-14 Federal Legislation - NEB as Lead Agent A12A-15 Federal Legislation - NRC as Lead Agent A12A-16 Federal Legislation - CRA as Lead Agent A12A-17 Federal Legislation - NRCan as Lead Agent A13A-18 Federal Legislation - PCO as Lead Agent A14A-19 Federal Legislation - PWGSC as Lead Agent A15A-20 Federal Legislation - TC as Lead Agent A15B-1 Example Marine Security Scenarios B1C-1 Naval Unit Capability for Domestic Operations C1G-1 CP-140 Aurora Aircraft Patrols in Figure 7-4 G1H-1 PAL Aircraft Patrols in Figure 7-7 H1H-2 CCG PAL Aircraft Patrols in Figure 7-7 H17J-1 Naval Fisheries Patrols 1980 - 2003 J2J-2 Naval Preventative Patrols 1997 - 2003 J5J-3 Naval Fisheries Patrol Totals - Major Warship J6J-4 Naval Fisheries Patrol Totals - Minor Warship J7J-5 Naval Boardings By Ship - 1990 to 2002 J8XList of Tables (continued)ID Title PageJ-6 DFO Boardings By Ship - 1990 to 2002 J9J-7 Surveillance Coverage by Ship - 1999 to 2003 J10K-1 Naval Fisheries Patrols Used in Figures K1N-1 Participation of Atlantic Fisheries Associations N1N-2 Number of Licenced Fishers by Province - 2002 N3Q-1 Key Words for News Article Categorisation Q1R-1 Approval Authorities R1R-2 SAR Incidents by Type - 1997 to 2002 R3R-3 Marine Responders in SAR Cases - 2002 R3R-4 Locations of CCG Lifeboat Bases - Atlantic Region R4R-5 Locations DND and DFO Patrol Asset Bases R4xiList of FiguresID Title Page1-1 Periscope Photo on Front Page 12-1 PAL Flight Summary - Nfld Region Example 302-2 Patrol Reconstruction - CP-140 Aircraft 26 Sept 02 443-1 Atlantic Canada and Main Study Area 543-2 Major and Minor Airports - Atlantic Canada 593-3 Canadian Exclusive Economic Zone 613-4 Territorial Sea, Contiguous Zone and EEZ 643-5 CANLANT Area of Responsibility 673-6 Maritime Forces Atlantic Operating Areas (MARLOAs) 693-7 Air Traffic Active and Restricted Danger Zones 693-8 Routine CP-140 Aurora Patrol Areas 703-9 Search and Rescue (SAR) Zones 713-10 Sub-Regions - Halifax Search and Rescue 713-11 Commercial Fishery Annual Landings - Atlantic 753-12 NAFO Regulatory Areas - Subareas and Divisions 763-13 NAFO Regulatory Areas - Divisions and Subdivisions 763-14 Lobster Fishing Areas - Atlantic Canada 773-15 Crab Fishing Areas - Atlantic Canada 773-16 Oil and Gas Exploration Lands 2004 - Atlantic 803-17 Oil and Gas Wells - Past Locations 813-18 Oil and Gas Wells Rigs in 2006 813-19 Ports and Main Ferries - Atlantic Canada 873-20 Ports - St. Lawrence Seaway and Great Lakes 883-21 Major Shipping Routes in 2000 - Atlantic Canada 903-22 Compulsory Pilotage Areas - Atlantic Canada 923-23 Vessel Traffic Management System (VTMS) - Atlantic 933-24 VTMS - St. Lawrence Seaway 933-25 VTMS - Belle Isle 943-26 VTMS - Cabot Strait 943-27 VTMS - Placentia 953-28 VTMS - Halifax and Canso 953-29 VTMS - Bay of Fundy 963-30 VTMS - NORDREG Area 963-31 Conservation and Marine Protected Areas 993-32 Vessel Traffic Separation and Right Whales 993-33 Submarine Cables - Atlantic Canada 1004-1 A Simple Strategic Model 1064-2 A Simple Strategic Model (adapted for maritime interests) 1084-3 Rights of Coastal States in Offshore Zones 1304-4 Trisection of Policy Objectives 1414-5 Maritime Challenges and Responses - 1970 - Present 1445-1 Offshore Petroleum Board Jurisdiction - Atlantic 150xiiList of Figures (continued)ID Title Page5-2 Jurisdictions - Fisheries and Oceans Canada 1595-3 Jurisdictions - Canadian Coast Guard 1615-4 Jurisdictions - Transport Canada 1665-5 Jurisdictions - Public Safety Canada 1705-6 Jurisdictions - Royal Canadian Mounted Police 1725-7 Jurisdictions - Cdn Security and Intelligence Service 1755-8 Jurisdictions - Canada Border Services Agency 1785-9 Jurisdictions - Environment Canada 1805-10 Process for Requesting Military Support - Atlantic 1925-11 Regional Joint Task Force Atlantic 1946-1 Nature and Levels of Multi-agency Relationships 2026-2 Security Response Process Flow 2256-3 Single Mandate Scenario - National / Regional 2276-4 Multiple Mandate Scenario - Federal / Provincial 2286-5 Interdepartmental Working Group Contribution 2406-6 Relationship of Intel to Operational Response 2466-7 Relationship of Intel to Response - Multiple Agencies 2466-8 Intel-initiated Strategic and Operational Response 2477-1 Canadian Naval Roles for the 21st Century 2517-2 Spectrum of Conflict in the Maritime Context 2557-3 High Frequency Surface Wave Radar Coverage 2637-4 DND CP-140 Aircraft Patrols By Area - 2002 2687-5 DND CP-140 Aircraft Patrols 15 Dec 03 - 15 Jan 2004 2697-6 DND CP-140 Aircraft Patrols 15 Jan - 15 Feb 2004 2707-7 DFO PAL Aircraft Patrols By NAFO Area - 2002 2727-8 Vessel Detections by DFO PAL Aircraft - 2002 2757-9 Vessel Detections by DFO Aircraft - 2002 Surface 2777-10 Vessel Detections by DFO Aircraft - April 2002 2787-11 Vessel Detections by DFO Aircraft - June 2002 2787-12 Merchant Traffic Inbound to Atlantic Canada - 1995 2817-13 CANMARNET Homepage - 2001 2827-14 ELVIS Unclassified RMP Page - 2001 2838-1 Search and Rescue Structure within DND 2918-2 Coast Guard Lifeboat Locations - Atlantic Region 2938-3 SAR Incidents in Atlantic Canada - 1999 to 2002 2948-4 SAR Incidents - 1999 to 2002 Surface Model 2958-5 SAR Incidents - 1999 to 2002 - Summer Months 2978-6 SAR Incidents - 1999 to 2002 - Winter Months 2978-7 SAR Incidents - 1999 to 2002 - Summer Surface 2988-8 SAR Incidents - 1999 to 2002 - Winter Surface 2988-9 SAR Incidents - 1999 to 2002 - Air 2998-10 SAR Incidents - 1999 to 2002 - Marine 3008-11 SAR Incidents - 1999 to 2002 - Humanitarian 3008-12 Monthly SAR Caseload in Halifax SRR 2000 - 2002 301xiiiList of Figures (continued)ID Title Page8-13 SAR Incidents by Urgency - Halifax SRR 2002 3028-14 SAR Incidents by Type - Halifax SRR 2002 3028-15 SAR Incidents by Type - Halifax SRR 1997 to 2002 3038-16 SAR Incidents by User Type - Halifax SRR 2002 3048-17 SAR Incidents by Root Cause - Halifax SRR 2002 3058-18 Monthly SAR Cases in Halifax SRR -2002 3068-19 Marine Responders in SAR Cases -2002 3078-20 Aircraft Responders in SAR Cases -2002 3108-21 SAR Asset Locations in Relation to SAR Incidents 3108-22 Naval Fisheries Patrol Sea Days - Atlantic 3178-23 Typical Frigate Fisheries Patrol - 1999 to 2002 3188-24 Typical MCDV Fisheries Patrol - 1999 to 2002 3198-25 Tracks - Ships on Fisheries Patrol: 1980 to 2003 3208-26 Naval Ships on Fisheries Patrol: 1980 to 1997 3218-27 Naval Ships on Fisheries Patrol: 1999 to 2003 3228-28 Hague Line Fisheries Patrols: 1980 to 1997 3238-29 Boardings by DFO aboard Naval Ships 3278-30 Navy’s Percentage of Total Boardings for Nfld Region 3278-31 Boardings by Government Vessels - 1990 to 2002 3298-32 Boardings by Naval Vessels - 1990 to 2002 3298-33 Boardings by Government Vessels - Surface Model 3308-34 Boardings by Naval Vessels - Surface Model 3318-35 Location of Patrol Assets Airfields and Home Ports 3328-36 Distances from Inspections to Patrol Asset Bases 3338-37 Distance from Inspections to Halifax Patrol Bases 3348-38 Distance from Inspections to Dartmouth/Gander 3358-39 Distance from Inspections to Shearwater/Sydney 3368-40 Distance from Inspections to Goose Bay/Greenwood 3378-41 Distance from Inspections to St. John’s Patrol Bases 3388-42 Distance from Boardings to EEZ 3408-43 Distance from Boardings to EEZ - 1995 to 2002 3418-44 Distance from Boardings to EEZ - By Region 3428-45 Distance from Boardings to 200nm Limit Beyond EEZ 3439-1 Areas Fished by Survey Respondents - NAFO 3629-2 Areas Fished by Survey Respondents - Canadian 3629-3 Media Content by Theme - 1 Jan to 31 Dec 2002 3729-4 Media Content OGD Support - 1 Jan to 31 Dec 2002 3739-5 Naval Search and Rescue Newstories 3749-6 Naval Environmental / Pollution Newstories 3749-7 Naval Counter-Narcotics Newstories 3759-8 Naval Arctic Sovereignty Newstories 3759-9 Naval Fisheries Support Newstories 3769-10 Combat Readiness Reqts - Avg of All Categories 3839-11 Combat Readiness Reqts - Combat 3849-12 Combat Readiness Reqts - Anti-Air Warfare 3859-13 Combat Readiness Reqts - Marine Systems 386xivList of Figures (continued)ID Title Page10-1 Trisection of Federal Policies 39010-2 Proposed Marine Security Functional Template 41810-3 Whole-of-Government Decision Support Process 41910-4 New Interdepartmental Surveillance Planning Grid 422D-1 Cumulative Vessel Detections by PAL Flights - 2002 D1D-2 Vessel Detections by PA Flights - January 2002 D2D-3 Vessel Detections by PA Flights - February 2002 D2D-4 Vessel Detections by PA Flights - March 2002 D3D-5 Vessel Detections by PA Flights - April 2002 D3D-6 Vessel Detections by PA Flights - May 2002 D4D-7 Vessel Detections by PA Flights - June 2002 D4D-8 Vessel Detections by PA Flights - July 2002 D5D-9 Vessel Detections by PA Flights - August 2002 D5D-10 Vessel Detections by PA Flights - September 2002 D6D-11 Vessel Detections by PA Flights - October 2002 D6D-12 Vessel Detections by PA Flights - November 2002 D7D-13 Vessel Detections by PA Flights - December 2002 D7D-14 Vessel Detections by PA Flights - Summer 2002 D8D-15 Vessel Detections by PA Flights - Fall 2002 D8D-16 Vessel Detections by PA Flights - Winter 2002 D9D-17 Vessel Detections by PA Flights - Spring 2002 D9D-18 Cumul (16 February 2002).36It seemed necessary to answer the question, "How does media portray the Canadian Navy in its support of other government department operations, in particular, fisheries enforcement?” Accordingly, a media content analysis was designed to gauge the public relations value of naval fisheries patrols. A qualitative media content analysis was conducted largely because one of the aims of this part of the study was to determine the bias of data being collected. A qualitative media content analysis of print media would facilitate the coding of data based on an interpretation of the data by the collector.News articles from 1993 and later were reviewed because it was in 1993 that DGPA established the means to capture electronic newspaper stories from over 30 Canadian newspapers, and made them available to anyone with a DND-networked computer. This made it possible to monitor a large number of electronic print stories and all articles relating to “naval” stories could be identified easily since the network system used “key words” to categorize the electronic articles. The complete list of DGPA’s “naval” key words is found at Appendix Q.It is common in media content analysis to include many data sources, such as visual presentation, diversity of sources, photos, amount of area on the page devoted to the article in addition the story theme and author.22 However, this additional data was not considered relevant to the study. Thus, media content analysis focused on naval stories and whether or not they could be interpreted as depicting the Navy in a positive, negative or neutral light.A pilot project was conducted for a 3-month period, whereby through the DGPA web-site relevant stories were rated according to theme and categorized as to whether the print media portrayed the Canadian Navy in a positive, negative, or neutral light. The result identified 10 themes and, if they related to support to other government departments, an additional sub-theme. These findings provided the basis for the media content analysis. The front page of the template employed for the media content analysis is found at Appendix Q.37A period of one year, 2002, was chosen for analysis since a year would provide a sufficient number of articles and would incorporate a full cycle of seasons. This aspect was considered important, since many of the articles that would have a naval angle, such as search and rescue or relating to fisheries openings and closings, would have a seasonal element to them. A one-year media content analysis would then be compared to the annual DGPA public opinion poll.To avoid bias in interpretation of the data, a single reviewer compiled all the data to assess the positive, negative or neutral bias for each media piece. Instructions were provided on how to interpret the stories, categorization criteria, and which stories to include. Since the DGPA web-site includes only complete news stories as they appeared in on-line newspapers, no instructions were necessary for non-inclusion from extraneous matter (i.e., paid advertising, promotional references, sports stories, or stories from gossip columns or blogs).The reviewer was instructed to include articles about the Canadian Forces or Minister of National Defence, and articles referring to the Armed Forces that had any potential application to the Navy (i.e., articles about pay raises, quality of life in the military, stress of military life). Additionally, any reference to the Sea King helicopters, Aurora aircraft and search and rescue were counted as naval assets for the purposes of this media content analysis. Only the first appearance of a syndicated story would be counted, rather than multiple counts as the same story by the same author might appear in other newspapers.The reviewer was also instructed to exclude stories in French, as well as television or radio items, and letters to the editor, and any stories relating to the Army or Air Force that had no direct or indirect bearing on the Navy. The analysis did not include stories about the Merchant Marine, or articles about the22 Stacy Lynch and Limor Peer, Analyzing Newspaper Content: A How-To Guide (Chicago:38Minister of National Defence or Prime Minister if the articles were political in content with scant reference to the Navy.2.4.4.1 Media Content Analysis CriteriaThe reviewer was given instructions to guide in determining whether an article had a specific bias. The criteria for classifying an article as having a positive bias were those that leave a general feeling or impression that the military is good. Almost anything to do with Op APOLLO would be a positive article because the public was very supportive of the military right after 9/11.23 Often there are articles that criticize politicians and the government but are supportive of how the Canadian Forces is managing despite them. “People” stories are usually positive, as are articles about search and rescue in which the military aids individuals in distress.The criteria for an article with a negative bias were those articles that left a general feeling or impression that the military was out of touch with reality as to how its people were actually doing. Such an article might suggest that the military did “too little too late” or tried to be politically correct in what it said. The article might contain examples that refuted the “official word” or made the military look inept, incompetent or that it was merely paying lip service, or trying to hide something. Articles that portrayed the Navy as negligent or wasteful of taxpayers money, or had the appearance of not checking fully into circumstances were considered negatively biased, as were those that portrayed the military as not an organisation at which anyone would want to work.Neutrally biased articles were those that were flat, unemotional, purely factual articles. While an article might have been very negative where the government is concerned, such as with the Sea King helicopter replacement programme, the article neither praised nor condemned the military.Northwestern University, Readership Institute, 2002), 4.23 Operation APOLLO was the name given to the deployment of Canadian Forces to Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf in response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11.392.4.5 Data SourcesIn the design of this project, ship and aircraft activity data were collected from various sources for patrol reconstruction purposes, and for measurement of the naval contribution to maritime surveillance. The major source of these data was the Navy’s Maritime Operations Centre in Halifax. Three other significant sources were the National Library and Archives in Ottawa, the Halifax Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre, and the Conservation and Protection Branch of DFO Newfoundland Region.There are many formats and data collection methods used to report governmental operations both within the region and to the strategic headquarters. In reconstructing the operational activities of surveillance aircraft and ship patrols, the next few paragraphs will discuss the sources available and their utility for reconstruction of events.CP-140 Aurora aircraft surveillance flights were reconstructed from postmission summary messages (NATO Form Purple) generated by flight aircraft crews in 2002 and sent electronically for review and archiving to the Maritime Air Component Commander (Atlantic), who is co-located with the Maritime Operations Centre. Forms Purple are submitted immediately upon return to base of the aircraft, and are the most accurate flight summaries available. The patrol area and vessel detection data from the Forms Purple was extracted by the Maritime Operations Centre staff, and provided for reconstruction in MS Excel spreadsheets. Table G-1 at Appendix G contains the dates and areas patrolled by CP-140 Aurora aircraft in 2002.Contracted PAL aircraft surveillance flights were reconstructed from post-mission reports archived in the DFO/PAL Surveillance Information System server. Mission reports are saved to disk from the aircraft computer, then downloaded to the shore-based server immediately upon return to base of the aircraft. These are the most accurate summaries of PAL flight activity available. In 2002, selected staff at the Maritime Operations Centre in Halifax had dial-up access to the server, and could download the mission summaries generated by flight aircraft crews, and convert the data MS Excel spreadsheets. I obtained40access to the PAL patrol area and vessel detection data from the Maritime Operations Centre staff. Table H-1 at Appendix H contains the dates and areas patrolled by PAL surveillance aircraft under contract for fisheries enforcement in 2002.Search and rescue data were obtained from the national headquarters of the Canadian Coast Guard by placing a request through the Officer-in-Charge of the Halifax Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre (JRCC). The data were provided to the JRCC in data MS Excel format. I obtained the data, which included incident date, type, classification, geographic co-ordinates, and cause from the OIC JRCC.Reconstruction of ship patrol activities proved to be more complicated. In order to compare fisheries patrol support over an extended period, I needed to locate sources that would indicate when and where ships conducted patrols, and what occurred on the patrols. As a naval officer, I was aware of a variety of reporting mechanisms and investigated each to determine their utility. Operations schedules, individual ship “flex” schedules, electronic ship activity reports, annual historical reports, post-deployment reports, and Officer-of-the- Watch notebooks were investigated as possible sources of data. I quickly determined that none of these sources were either reliable in terms of consistency of submission, or in completeness of content.24Ship’s logs proved to be the best primary source for reconstruction of pre-1998 ship operations available to me. Ship’s logs form the official legal record of the ship’s activities, and are sent to the National Library and Archives of Canada for storage. At the Archives, I was able to draw the logs of ships that had completed fisheries patrols, and could manually record one geographic position for every four hour block of time, or “watch” as it’s referred to by mariners. In addition to the positional information, the ship’s logs provided24 For a detailed description of the accuracy and reliability of naval ship activity source material see Canada. Department of National Defence, Ship activity related data and information in the age of business planning and performance measurement, by LCdr P. L. Massel and Jay Adamson, Operational Research Division Ottawa DOR(CAM) Research Note RN 9815, December 1998.41data pertaining to length of patrols, duration of patrols, contacts detected per patrol, boardings and arrests per patrol, helicopter hours flown, and search and rescue incidents on patrol. In total, 84 naval fisheries patrols were reconstructed from ship’s logs. A list of the vessels and dates of the patrols is found at Appendix K.While ship’s logs were the only reliable means of reconstructing naval fisheries patrols prior to the 1998 commencement of this project, I was able to acquire data from ships employed in fisheries enforcement support from 1999 to 2003. Electronic templates were provided to naval ship Commanding Officers for the collection of positional information, fuel consumption, detection ranges of vessels, location of inspections and other related information. In total, 33 naval fisheries or preventative patrols were reconstructed from templates supplied by the researcher. A list of vessel patrols and dates is found at Appendix K.In all, during the project I determined that 214 fisheries patrols had been conducted in the Atlantic between 1980 and 2003. Of these, I was able to reconstruct and map the tracks of 119 vessel patrols. Although I was unable to obtain positional data on 83 of the 214 patrols, I was able, nevertheless, to use some data, such as boarding and inspection data, to further the research. No data, other than the dates of the patrols, was available for 14 of the 214 patrols.Ship’s logs and templates provided data on boardings and inspections carried out during naval fisheries patrols, but the data from some of these sources were found to be incomplete. Better quality data were extracted from the Canadian Fisheries Information Network System (CFINS) by the staff of Conservation and Protection Branch, DFO Region Newfoundland. These data were provided in the form of a MS Excel file covering the years 1990 to 2002, and contained the date, time, name of patrol vessel, name of vessel inspected, nationality, and geographic position of the vessel.42The data sources used to create the standard map format, e.g. political boundaries, isobaths, etc and illustrative maps in the next chapter were identified earlier in at Table 2-1 in section 2.3.1.2.5 Quality ControlTo ensure that the data collection method accurately represented aircraft patrol surveillance, actual track data for some of the long-range patrol aircraft were acquired for the period covering 2003. It was not possible to obtain this data for all military patrol aircraft, only those that had avionics packages designed for anti-submarine warfare. Thus although more accurate, as three of the aircraft in the operational squadrons were not fitted with the necessary avionics package, and they performed roughly half of the surveillance missions, sufficient data would not be available. However, what the track data could provide a measure of “ground truth” for the aircrews’ estimates of sector coverage.To determine the relative accuracy of the aircrews’ estimates of sector coverage, 32 missions over a two-month period were obtained for the CP-140 tracks at the end of 2003. The tracks were reconstructed and mapped against the patrol grid to determine whether the aircraft had actually covered the percentage of the sectors claimed in the formatted message summaries.In virtually every case, it was determined that the radar of the aircraft had covered more area than the aircrew had estimated. In less than five percent of the missions the aircraft did not achieve the coverage estimated by the aircrew. This confirmed that the method of counting of sectors covered by patrol aircraft provided a reasonable representation of CP-140 presence in the Atlantic region.Figure 2-2 is a post-flight reconstruction of a CP-140 patrol that shows the “ground truth” of the planned 4-sided patrol area versus the coverage achieved. This graphic is based on the actual aircraft track and two values for radar range, 150 nautical miles and 75 nautical miles (the radar horizons for the43search and identification altitudes normally flown by that type of aircraft.) The figure also records all of the vessel contacts detected during that flight.Figure 2-2. Patrol Reconstruction - CP-140 Aircraft 26 September 2002Source: Derived from data supplied by Maritime Air Component Commander (Atlantic).In late 2003, DFO agreed to allow PAL to generate an automatic ASCII flight summary of aircraft track and contact data. As with the CP-140, GIS software was used to plot almost all PAL tracks. The same 75 nautical mile buffer was applied to both sides of the tracks, which were then mapped against the NAFO grid to determine what percentage of the NAFO areas the aircraft had actually covered. Again in virtually every case, the radar coverage of the PAL aircraft was equal to or greater than 90 percent the sub-division counted. This confirmed that counting the NAFO areas by sub-division that were overflown by patrol aircraft provided a reasonable representation of PAL surveillance aircraft presence in the Atlantic region.2.6 Interviews and Questionnaire Design, Format and DistributionTo address the issue of the value of the deterrent effect, views of those individuals who spend considerable time on the water in the Canadian maritime zones was sought. Through interviews and a questionnaire format, individuals could comment upon the perceived presence of maritime patrol ships and aircraft, as well as the observed effect of this presence on those who would be44inclined break the law. Ideally, the best respondents would be commercial fishermen, drug smugglers, and illegal migrants.The latter two categories of potential respondents would be problematic. First, it would be virtually impossible to identify those with a propensity to violate these laws, unless they had been apprehended doing so in the past. This was simply out of the question because no police agency would conduct such a search without a bona fide judicial requirement. Moreover, the sample would be restricted to only those individuals who had been caught and convicted of breaking the law, and would not incorporate the much larger percentage of individuals who conduct smuggling activities but who have not yet been brought to justice. Additionally, the fact that the overall number of persons with convictions for smuggling and migrations offences is small in comparison with the large number of persons actively engaged in fishing in the Atlantic provinces. There was a much better chance of success at obtaining credible data from the population of fishers, and there would be no need to handle sensitive personal information with potential legal implications. Accordingly, fishermen were used as respondents for survey purposes.25To prepare the survey, an interview was conducted with a former commercial fisherman in the Atlantic region.26 During this interview, the types of questions were clarified, and aided in forming the language and jargon for subsequent interviews and questionnaire development. It also reinforced the mistrusting nature of all levels of government and, in particular DFO who fishermen blame for mismanaging fish stocks in the region. Moreover, the survey sought information about a potentially sensitive issue, the nature of law breaking. Some of the respondents would have violated various regulations, or knew those who had, and might be uncomfortable being questioned about the subject. To better attract participation, the questionnaire and its administration should not be perceived, and was thus clarified, as being associated with any25 The term “fishermen” refers to persons of both genders who engage in fishing as a means of support. The researcher found, in the Atlantic region at least, that females who fished for a living genuinely chafed at the more gender-neutral term “fishers” favoured by government and academia.45arm of the federal or provincial government. For this reason the survey was designed to avoid directly seeking responses about the Navy in isolation. Rather, the questionnaire posed questions concerning the maritime patrol activities of all appropriate federal departments in a comparative manner, and the naval data was culled as required.2.6.1 Questionnaire DevelopmentThe questionnaire was designed to measure the deterrent effect of government enforcement assets in the Atlantic region. This survey required the development of a suitable instrument, the sampling of an appropriate population, and the analysis of the responses. The questionnaire design incorporated a section from which information about the person’s fishing experience and geographical areas fished, as well as a section designed to elicit responses that made comparisons between surveillance ships and aircraft. In addition, some questions attempted to determine what percentage of time fishermen felt that fisheries and law enforcement officers were aboard naval vessels and aircraft. The questionnaire can be found in Appendix P.The questionnaire was reviewed by an experienced social researcher with extensive experience in survey methods and practice within the Department of National Defence. The deterrence questionnaire was also reviewed by a representative audience for content, a fisherman who represented the local union and also one representing the Fishermen's Association. The intent was to confirm that the questions and language would make sense to the sample population, and that the questionnaire was structured and formatted in a manner that would encourage completion of the instrument.Given the vastness of the study area, it would was not possible to administer the questionnaire “face-to-face” at all Atlantic region fisheries associations. Accordingly, a decision was made to distribute through a mail26 Lieutenant(N) Colin Warman, interview by author, 12 March 2001, Fifth Maritime Operations Group, Halifax, Nova Scotia.46survey.27 An initial mailing was sent to the fisheries associations that represented those fishers who fished the inshore and offshore waters. Those associations representing the aquaculture industry, or those whose members fished internal or fresh waters were excluded from the initial mailing. Also excluded were all aboriginal fisheries associations due to ongoing tensions over aboriginal fishery rights in various locations throughout the Maritime provinces. It was felt that the questionnaire might be construed by the natives as an intrusion in an ongoing struggle between natives, government officials, and scientists.The questionnaire also included an introduction covering the key "who, what , where, when, how" information as well as a self-addressed stamped envelope for a return card on which the association could agree or decline to participate. The return card also prompted the association for the number of questionnaire copies that it would require. In order to distance the research from any arm of government, all survey correspondence was directed to a post office box address. The initial mailing consisted of letters to 76 fisheries associations.2.6.2 Questionnaire ResponsesResponses to the survey were as follows: five envelopes were returned as undeliverable due to unknown addresses or persons; the majority of return cards, 84 percent, simply were not returned. Of the fisheries associations that had responded favourably to the letter of introduction, the numbers of questionnaires requested was low relative to number of members in an association, i.e., five copies desired for a membership of over 100 fishermen.In all 144 questionnaires were mailed out to 14 different fisheries associations; 51 questionnaires were returned completed. The final questionnaire response was 35.4 percent.27 George Gray and Neil Guppy, Successful Surveys: Research Methods and Practice (Toronto: Harcourt, 1999), 134. To increase the chance that a sample population will participate472.7 Stakeholder InvolvementThe issue of release of military data was handled by obtaining verbal permission in January 1999 from the Commander Maritime Forces Atlantic, Rear-Admiral Duncan Miller, for release of the data, and for the use of naval ship and air assets for survey and data collection purposes. Subsequently, continuation of the research was obtained from each incoming authority, listed in Table R-1 of Appendix R. All military data released to me passed through the Maritime Operations Centre, Maritime Air Component (Atlantic) or the commanding officers of ships tasked with data collection. These officers and their staffs provided a “sober second-look” to ensure that no sensitive data made it to the public domain.2.8 Role of Researcher, Opportunities and ConstraintsThrough my employment as a senior serving naval officer, positions, appointments and delegated authorities provided me access to maritime operations in general, and security and enforcement operations in particular. Duties related to surveillance and enforcement operations included an appointment to command of a high-readiness frigate that conducted a fisheries patrol in 2000. This operation allowed direct experience first-hand the process from start to finish. In addition, from 2001 to 2003, I held the appointment of senior operations officer for Maritime Forces Atlantic.28 In this capacity, I had direct dealings with national headquarters at the strategic level, and was the region’s senior military liaison officer to other government departments; and was responsible for the planning and co-ordination of domestic operations, fisheries patrols, and counter-drug operations. Moreover, the appointment furnished direct access to the local federal departments’ Regional Directors General, and entailed membership on various high-level interdepartmental committees. In 2003, I chaired the Eastern Canada Interdepartmental Marine Operations Committee.in a mail survey, it is important to create a good impression and make a survey easy to complete.28 The official title of the position is Assistant Chief of Staff - Plans and Operations.48In my capacity as a warship commanding officer, and subsequent senior operations appointment, the conduct of day-to-day business allowed immediate insight into the issues that encompassed both the planning and execution of maritime enforcement operations, and to understand the perspectives of the other agencies involved.2.8.1 ConstraintsCertain factors had an impact on research design. In order to conduct spatial analyses to understand the Navy’s effect in establishing maritime domain awareness, geographic data would need to be collected from airborne, ship-borne, and shore-based surveillance platforms and sensors conducting current operations, as well as defence and other government department databases. This data includes geographic co-ordinates of government patrol assets as well as those of marine traffic, and potentially “vessels of interest.” Depending upon its nature, some of the data is “sensitive” and restricted for release. Moreover, in the case of data originating from other government departments, some data is statute-restricted for release to third-parties for purposes other than those for which the data were collected.The sensitivity of classified data usually decreases with the passage of time, particularly data that associates government assets with current geographic positions. To mitigate any reticence to release data, the research design called for the use of data that would be at least five years old at the time of thesis submission. By using this older data, no argument could be sustained that current enforcement operations might be compromised once the thesis entered the public realm.Research design was affected by concern over release of data in another way. While analysis of the full spectrum of constabulary activities would provide as complete a picture of maritime enforcement as one could hope for, some operations are significantly more dangerous than others. Counter-narcotics operations are particularly sensitive; the police have a need to protect their “sources” and, as far as civil authorities are concerned, the less49that is in the public domain about the capabilities of enforcement agencies and patterns of drug interdiction, the better.While the loss of life associated with the drug trade is well recognised, few people are murdered over fish. In light of this, the research design focused on fisheries enforcement and the naval contribution to this facet of sovereignty protection, in the expectation that federal authorities would be more willing to release fisheries data than they would counter-narcotics information.This was not entirely the case. Significant bureaucratic resistance was also encountered to release of fisheries data directly from the former Scotia/Fundy Region Fisheries and Oceans Canada office in Halifax. However, through participation in various oceans management forums and working groups, contacts were established to acquire a decade’s worth of boarding and inspection data from the Fisheries and Oceans Canada national database. This data was provided by Mr. Tilman Bieger, Director of Enforcement Operations, Conservation and Protection Branch, DFO Newfoundland Region. The data was released for academic purposes without caveat.In order to derive the best appreciation of marine traffic, clusters of activity, and patrol patterns, the design intent was to analyse data that covered a common period of investigation. However, the diverse sources from which the data were obtained were unable provide data that encapsulated a common time frame. While some of the data sets span up to twenty years, 2002 was the sole year that was common to almost all of the data sets available for analysis.In reconstruction of the naval vessel fisheries patrols from 1980 to 2003, some ship’s logs could not be located for the year 1997 and none could be located for 1998. This was because the logs had only just been received in the National Library and Archives, and had not been entered into the Archives holdings for viewing by researchers. Consequently, I was unable to reconstruct naval fisheries patrols during that period, and therefore unable to analyse a complete, unbroken 20-year period of patrol activity.50In calculating the “presence” of a patrol aircraft, if the actual track of the aircraft is known, a geographic information system can be used to determine the density of geographic positions in the patrol area. This density plot will provide an indication of relative presence of a patrol asset in a given area. However, prior to 2003, there was no means to obtain track data for CP-140 or PAL aircraft, either by electronic data capture, or by manual recording of positional information by aircrew. In order to evaluate surveillance presence in 2002, I was limited to assessing presence based upon the predefined sector in which the CP-140 or PAL flew then, once the desired period of inquiry had passed, adding up the number of times aircraft flew missions in a given sector.29 The totals for each sector would provide an indication of the relative presence of the patrol aircraft for a given period.This method was less accurate than conducting a density calculation on track positions. Some of the sectors in the patrol grid cover vast areas. In this method if an aircraft enters the sector, the entire sector is counted for presence, even though the aircraft may have favoured only a small portion of the area. Notwithstanding this limitation, considering the timeframe limitations for data collection, this method was employed as the best means available to me, and I assess that it sufficiently addresses the concept of enforcement presence.With regard to survey data collection, although much simpler and less expensive to administer, a survey of fishermen belonging to one or two fisheries associations representing a small geographic area would not reflect the spatial implications of a large area with few patrol assets. If the only fishermen surveyed were those that fished in an area that the Navy rarely patrolled, the results of the survey would be skewed. As such, ideally a poll of fishermen distributed throughout huge area of study would have been desired. Regrettably, conditions for completion of the survey would be less controlled, i.e. the researcher would not be present, and there would be potential for fewer29 Maps of the predetermined patrol grids are found in Figures 3-7 and 3-8 of Chapter Three.51respondents; however, these disadvantages would be offset by the greater credibility resulting from a wider distribution of respondents within the entire study area.A limitation of the Nearest Feature Extension tool for ArcGIS software is that it cannot measure distances point to point; the tool is constrained to measuring line to point. Due to the limitations of this extension, the patrol bases point theme data were reformatted manually to line theme data by placing short lines over the point data at a zero scale for accuracy. This manual method introduced error into the distances of less than one kilometre. This error would not be considered significant for the purposes of this thesis.This chapter has explained the framework upon which the research was carried out. The next chapter will provide a geographical description of the study area that will provide the necessary context for interpretation of the remaining material in the thesis.52Chapter ThreeMARINE GEOGRAPHY OF ATLANTIC CANADA 3.1 IntroductionThe purpose of this chapter is to examine the marine geography of the Atlantic region so that the remainder of this thesis can be placed in proper context. By understanding the region’s dimensions, patterns of movement, disposition of population and clusters of various activities, the reader will better appreciate the complexity of the enforcement challenge in the study area.This chapter opens with a general description of Atlantic Canada, with reference to the national situation when this comparison lends better insight to the subject. This is followed by a review of Canada's maritime zones as they are founded in international Law of the Sea and domestic statute. Included is a short synopsis of Canada's maritime boundary disputes. The chapter then narrows its focus to six key ocean-use sectors in Atlantic Canada, with a discussion of their economic importance to the study area. Critical infrastructure will be treated in each of the sectors rather than as a separate category.303.2 General Description of Atlantic CanadaAs stated in Chapter One, the study area is the Atlantic region of Canada that comprises the four provinces of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island (PEI) and Newfoundland and Labrador. However, reference will be made to the province of Quebec, and Nunavut and the Northwest Territories when their inclusion provides a greater context to a specific aspect to the marine geography of the east coast of Canada.The main study area is that between 40 degrees to 52 degrees North latitude and 43 degrees to 68 degrees West longitude. The limits of this area were chosen because the majority of the Atlantic region’s population resides within these boundaries, and the associated human marine activity is concentrated in this area. Beyond these limits, the land is sparsely populated to30 Critical infrastructure are those elements whose loss or damage would have a significant strategic impact on the nation as a whole, or an impact on the regional economy and population.53the north, and search and rescue is largely the only marine activity relevant to this thesis. Beyond these limits to the west, the area becomes less a maritime region than the hub of Canada’s industrial base and centre of population.As can be seen in Figure 3-1, the Atlantic region shares, in addition to the relatively short land border between New Brunswick and the United States, maritime territorial boundaries with the United States to the south, and Denmark (Greenland) to the north. The eastern frontier is the Atlantic Ocean, in which Canada and France share maritime boundaries at the islands of Saint Pierre and Miquelon, a few kilometres south of Newfoundland. The rest of Canada lies to the west along land and sea provincial borders.AreaFigure 3-1. Atlantic Canada and Main Study AreaThe physical geography of the Atlantic region is greatly varied. With the exception of Prince Edward Island, each province has abrupt transitions from gentle rolling lowlands to locally high uplands. A large block of mountains is found in northern New Brunswick and another in western Newfoundland. A linear belt of uplands stretches across southern New Brunswick and northern mainland Nova Scotia. Another linear block runs easterly through northern mainland Nova Scotia and into the Cape Breton highlands. These upland blocksGREEN54serve to divide the region not only physically but psychologically as well. The isolated valleys provide areas where general subsistence farming can be carried out, although the Annapolis Valley in Nova Scotia and the south-eastern portion of New Brunswick have well developed agriculture activities. Most of the interior regions of the area are heavily forested with the eastern boreal forest dominating in Newfoundland and Labrador and the rest of the region having mixed, predominantly softwood forests. Prince Edward Island stands unique in the Atlantic region, being mostly low-lying and rolling with well-developed soils supporting a high level of commercial agriculture.31The climate of the region is as varied as the physical geography and often geography is the main determinant to climatic differences. The climate zone ranges from moist mid-latitude with mild winters in south-western Nova Scotia to almost polar in western Newfoundland. Much of this difference is simply a function of size as the area stretches from 43 degrees to 51 degrees north latitude; however, proximity to the Atlantic Ocean also plays a key part. The ocean moderates both summer and winter temperatures making for warmer winters and cooler summers near the coast.The mid-latitude location also means the region is on or near the path of seasonal storms. The hurricanes and tropical storms move up the coast and bring heavy rains to the eastern part of the region during late summer and early autumn. In the winter, while most of Canada is under the influence of a polar high, the Atlantic region is often affected by a north-east moving low, called the “Nor-Easter”. These storms are the winter equivalent of a hurricane and bring with them high winds and heavy snowfall. In the early summer months the warmer air temperatures combined with cold sea surface temperatures mean fog is a regular occurrence with an average of 122 days at the Halifax Airport, 80 days at Sydney, Nova Scotia and 206 days at Argentia, Newfoundland. Another marine hazard, sea ice, is found predominantly in the Gulf of St Lawrence and Straits of Belle Isle area, as well as off the east coast of Newfoundland.31 Ian Brookes, “The Physical Geography of the Atlantic Provinces,” in Studies in Canadian Geography: The Atlantic Provinces, ed. Alan G. MacPherson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), 14-28.55Hurricanes, “Nor-Easters”, fog and sea ice all combine to make maritime operations difficult in the Atlantic region.323.2.1 PopulationThe Atlantic region has a small population, less than eight percent of the total Canadian population if Quebec is not taken into consideration.33 Most of the population lives in the coastal periphery and is more rural than in the rest of Canada. Halifax, with a population of 359,183 persons, is the only major metropolis in the region, and was ranked 13th among major census metropolitan areas (CMA) in Canada in 2001. St John’s, Newfoundland, ranked 19th among Canadian CMAs during the same census, is only half the population of Halifax.34 Labrador is to a large extent, unpopulated.The population is ethnically much more homogeneous than the rest of modern day Canada and, is in many ways, reflective of an old style Canada. Atlantic Canada’s population is overwhelmingly Anglophone of British origins with roots in the region going back several generations. Of the four Atlantic Provinces, only New Brunswick has a significant Francophone representation, roughly one third of its overall population.There is very little immigration (except in Halifax) in comparison to rest of Canada. Outside Halifax, there is slow to negligible population growth.32 Canada, Environment Canada, Climate o f the Atlantic Provinces, 23 December 2004 (8 August 2006).33 Eighty percent of the Quebec population, approximately 5 million people, lives far from the sea in urban areas that make up six Census Metropolitan Areas (CMA). These are Montreal,Quebec City, Gatineau, Saguenay, Sherbrooke, and Trois-Rivieres. See Gouvernement du Quebec, Vivre au Quebec: La population, 11 April 2005 (17 April 2006).34 Canada, Statistics Canada, Population and Dwelling Counts for Census Metropolitan Areas and Census Agglomerations, 2001 and 1996 Censuses -100% Data , 16 July 2002 (8 August 2006).56TABLE 3-1POPULATION - ATLANTIC CANADA2005Population35PercentEnglish36PercentFrenchPercentAboriginalCanada 32,270,500 58.5 22.6 3.3Atlantic Canada 9,942,100 71.4 24.4 1.9Nfld and Labrador 516,000 98.3 0.4 3.6Nova Scotia 937,900 92.7 3.8 1.9New Brunswick 752,000 64.6 32.8 2.3Prince Edward Island 138,100 93.8 4.2 1.0Quebec 7,598,100 7.8 80.8 1.1Sources: Canada, Statistics Canada, Population by year, by province andterritory, 2006; Canada, Statistics Canada, 2001 Census.3.2.2 Critical Infrastructure - Road, Rail and AirTo frame the later discussion of marine transportation, it is worth understanding how the critical infrastructure of road and rail transportation renders the marine link strategic to Canadian security and by extension, its economy.The Atlantic region is connected by road to the rest of Canada and to the United States. Perhaps the single most significant part of the road network lies outside of the region in Quebec in the vicinity of Riviere-du-Loup, since this represents the only road connection to the rest of Canada that lies wholly within the Canadian landmass. Similarly the Trans-Canada Highway near the Nova Scotia/New Brunswick border is the only road connection linking Nova Scotia, and by extension Newfoundland, with the rest of Canada. The Canso Causeway is the only land link for Nova Scotia’s Cape Breton Island (and by extension Newfoundland) with the Canadian mainland.35 Figures for 2005 are estimates. The last official census took place in May 2006 with data not yet available. See Canada, Statistics Canada, Population by year, by province and territory, 3 March 2006 (16 April 2006).36 Percentages are taken from 2001 census. See Canada, Statistics Canada, Population by mother tongue, by province and territory (2001 Census), 27 January 2005 (16 April 2006); Canada, Statistics Canada, Aboriginal Identity Population, 2001 Counts, for Canada, Provinces and Territories -20% Sample Data, 13 August 2004 (16 April 2006).57The Halifax-Montreal rail link is the principal rail line in the region. It is strategically important for the movement of cargo between east coast ports and the interior of Canada and the United States. There is no longer a rail network in PEI or Newfoundland.The principal commercial airports in the region are shown in Figure 3-2. Halifax acts as the regional hub. Its closure by bad weather, a rather frequent occurrence, has significant short-term impacts.Of national strategic important are the Air Traffic Control (ATC) Centres at Moncton and Gander. Moncton has responsibility for the control of all air traffic in Eastern Canada. Gander controls all trans-Atlantic travel between North America and Europe. Some 1,000 flights carrying approximately 200,000 passengers pass though the Gander ATC region every day.There are also four major military airfields in the region whose aircraft are primarily concerned with maritime operations. 12 Wing, located at Shearwater, Nova Scotia is the location of the air squadrons that provide the anti-submarine helicopter support to the Atlantic naval fleet. 14 Wing, located at Greenwood, Nova Scotia, is the largest Air Force Wing on the east coast, and provides fixed- wing air support for maritime operations, mainly CP-140 Aurora long-range maritime patrol aircraft, although several Cormorant helicopters are based there for search and rescue. Other search and rescue helicopters are located at the third air base, 9 Wing in Gander Newfoundland. The last airfield in the region is 5 Wing located at Goose Bay Labrador. This airbase was established to allow low-level flight training over the Arctic barrens, but in recent years as allied Air Forces have reduced training flights at this base it has diminished in significance. German and Italian Air Forces continue to operate from Goose Bay, but the only Canadian unit is a squadron of CH-124 Griffon helicopters that are used for emergencies at the base or in a secondary role of local search and rescue.3737 Canada, Department of National Defence, Welcome to 5 Wing, 29 March 2006 (8 August 2006).5888fAnthonyAugustirCheverySainte-Anne-Exploits#Valley»Pabokirenture a lles-de-la-PPokemoucheMadejpine 'chiMount C L ffilummerside AJOHN'SlawkesburyIrwater‘armol1000m60°W50°W50 °W60°W3b NFigure 3-2. Major and Minor Airports - Atlantic CanadaSource: Transport Canada, Canada’s Transportation System, Canada’s Major Airports,2005.of CH-124 Griffon helicopters that are used for emergencies at the base or in a secondary role of local search and rescue.37Although the land and air portions of the area are important, the defining characteristic of the Atlantic region is the maritime dimension. No place in the Atlantic provinces is more than several hours from the ocean, and this proximity has come to define the people and their way of life.3.2.3 Ocean Dimension of Canada and Atlantic RegionCanada has the longest coastline and shoreline in the world.38 The latter is some 57,759 kilometres in length, excluding the shoreline of most islands. When the perimeter of the 52,626 surveyed Canadian islands are included, that figure jumps to an enormous length of 243,042 kilometres. By contrast, the37 Canada, Department of National Defence, Welcome to 5 Wing, 29 March 2006 (8 August 2006).38 Shoreline is the more exact measure of the perimeter along the water’s edge. The term coastline refers to the general line of a coast, where straight lines may be used to join bays or other indentations to the coast. See Canada, Natural Resources Canada, Coastline and Shoreline, 9 May 2005 59shoreline in the Atlantic region is approximately 53,387 kilometres, roughly 22 percent of the entire Canadian coast.TABLE 3-2LENGTH OF CANADIAN SHORELINEProvince Mainland Perimeter of Perimeter of TotalCoast Major Islands Minor IslandsNfld and Labrador 8,172 11,548 9,236 28,956Nova Scotia 4,051 1,883 1,645 7,579New Brunswick 1,524 177 568 2,269Prince Edward Island n/a 1,107 153 1,260Quebec 10,389 554 2,380 13,323Rest of Canada 33,623 97,653 58,379 189,655Totals 57,759 112,922 72,361 243,042Source: Sebert, L.M., and M. R. Munro. 1972. Dimensions and Areas of Maps of the National Topographic System of Canada. Technical Report 72-1. Ottawa: Department of Energy, Mines and Resources, Surveys and Mapping Branch.Canada is one of only three nations in the world that borders three oceans, the Atlantic, Pacific and Arctic Oceans. Canada has the second largest continental shelf in the world, covering roughly 6.4 million square kilometres (km2). As well, Canada is one of only seven Arctic nations, and has the longest Arctic coastline in the world.39Just over 1,606,000 km2 of the country's land area is made up of islands, including one entire province. Three of Canada's provincial capital cities are located on islands. Two of these are in the Atlantic region, Charlottetown in Prince Edward Island and St. John's in Newfoundland.40Canada has the second largest landmass in the world at 9,984,670 km2. The stated size of the Canadian Exclusive Economic Zone EEZ varies depending on whether the calculation included large bodies of inland marine waters, such as Hudson Bay and the Gulf of the St. Lawrence. As well, contested maritime boundaries with the United States in the Arctic and North Pacific Ocean also affect the final outcome of the calculation. Whichever figure is used, the Canadian ocean areas are approximately two-thirds to three-(15 April 2006).R. McNab, ed., Canada and Article 76 of the Law of the Sea: Defining the Limits of Canadian Resource Jurisdiction beyond 200 Nautical Miles in the Atlantic and Arctic Oceans (Dartmouth: Geological Survey of Canada, 1994),17.40 Canada, Natural Resources Canada, Sea Islands, 10 March 2004 (15 April 2006).60quarters the size of the landmass thus, as depicted in Figure 3-3, creating a second country to seaward.41TABLE 3-3SIZE OF CANADIAN EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONERegion Size of AreaAtlantic Exclusive Economic Zone 1,400,000 km"Pacific Exclusive Economic Zone 380,000 km2Arctic Exclusive Economic Zone 2,920,000 km2Internal Arctic Waters 3,380,000 km2TOTAL 8,080,000 km2Continental Margin beyond EEZ 1,800,000 km2Source: Canadian Marine Policy and Strategy Project: Phase One Report on National Requirements, Dalhousie University, 1992.Figure 3-3. Canadian Exclusive Economic ZoneSource: Compiled from DND data set by Hydrographic Services Office Halifax.41 The size of the Canadian EEZ is given as 4,698,968 km2 (1,370,000 square nautical miles) in Martin Pratt, ed., Janes Exclusive Economic Zones (Surrey: Selwood Printing, 1999), 28; as 5,543,913 km2 in Canada’s Marine Areas: Integrating the Boundaries of Politics and Nature, (16 April 2006); and as 6,380,000 km2 in R. McNab, ed., Canada and Article 76 of the Law of the Sea: Defining the Limits of Canadian Resource Jurisdiction beyond 200 Nautical Miles in the Atlantic and Arctic Oceans (Dartmouth: Geological Survey of Canada, 1994).613.2.4 Canada's Maritime Spaces and International Sea LawThe capacity of a coastal state to conduct more effective oceans management increased as a consequence of the evolution of international law. The most recent convention, the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention III (UNCLOS 111), establishes certain maritime zones and affords coastal states jurisdiction in these waters to varying degrees depending upon the zone. From Canada’s perspective, among the most important of the UNCLOS Convention's provisions are:ARTICLE 3: Entitles each coastal state to a territorial sea extending 12 nautical miles from shore, within which the nation has complete sovereignty.ARTICLE 33: Entitles each coastal state to establish a contiguous zone of up to 24 nautical miles width from the shore within which the state may prevent the infringement of its national laws relating to customs, fiscal matters, immigration and sanitation.ARTICLE 57: Entitles each coastal state to establish an Exclusive Economic Zone extending 200 nautical miles from its shores. ARTICLE 56: Gives the coastal state sovereign rights over the resources of the EEZ. This includes the right to control exploration and development, the right to conserve and manage resources, either living or non-living, and the right to establish and enforce regulations to protect and preserve the marine environment.ARTICLE 66: Gives coastal states extensive rights to manage stock levels and fishing for "anadromous" species, i.e. salmon. This provision is of great importance to Canada, and especially to British Columbia.ARTICLE 76: Gives coastal states the right to lay claim to areas of the seabed up to the continental shelf or out to 200 nautical miles should the continental shelf not extend that far. In certain cases, coastal states may also lay claim to areas extending beyond the 200 mile EEZ limit, up to a maximum of 350 nautical miles. In order to claim areas beyond 200 nautical miles, they must lie within 60 miles of the foot of the continental slope. To claim beyond that to the 35062nautical mile maximum, the thickness of sedimentary rocks must be at least 1 per cent of the shortest distance from the foot of the continental slope. Not included in these claims are seamounts or submarine ridgesARTICLE 77: Gives coastal states exclusive rights to explore or exploit the natural resources lying on the surface of, or below their continental shelf, whether living or non-living. This includes the right to regulate drilling on the continental shelf.SECTION 5 (ARTICLES 207-212): Charges states with extensive responsibility in relation to controlling and preventing marine pollution from a variety of sources.SECTION 6 (ARTICLES 213-222): Charges coastal states with extensive responsibilities for enforcing anti-pollution rules and regulations in their territorial sea, EEZ and continental shelf areas.ARTICLE 234: Gives coastal states possessing ice-covered areas within their EEZ the right to make special laws for the protection of the marine environment in such areas. This article reinforces the existing provisions of Canada's Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act (1970).When the UNCLOS III came into force 16 November 1994, it allowed Canada to claim sovereign rights, jurisdiction or control over an area almost 10 million square kilometres in size. In response to the UNCLOS III provisions, Canada’s Oceans Act was passed by the House of Commons October 21, 1996 came into effect January 31, 1997. It describes Canada's maritime zones in much the same language as that of UNCLOS III. More importantly, it codified the sovereign rights and jurisdiction of Canada in these zones. For instance, as in the UNCLOS III Article 33 example above, Section 12(1 )of the Oceans Act specifies that in respect to customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary law "every basic power of arrest, entry, search or seizure, or other power that could be exercised in Canada ... may also be exercised in the contiguous zone of Canada."63Figure 3-4 is a smaller scale map of the southern maritime region that depicts the limits of Canada's declared maritime zones and their relationship to the continental shelf. Three offshore features that that figure prominently in Atlantic Canada's maritime affairs are the Nose and Tail of the Grand Banks of Newfoundland and the Flemish Cap.Figure 3-4. Territorial Sea, Contiguous and Exclusive Economic ZonesSource: Compiled from DND data sets by HSO Halifax.3.2.5 Maritime Boundary disputesCanada's maritime jurisdictions are well-established and internationally recognized. There are several unsettled maritime boundaries with the United States in areas of valuable fishery and seabed resource exploitation, both actual and potential. However, the two countries have developed amicable means of managing these disputes, including co-operative development or mutual, nonprejudicial use agreements for disputed areas.The two most contentious and long-standing maritime boundary disputes in the Atlantic region between Canada and other parties were settled through judicial and third party resolution processes. The first was a dispute with theN E W FO UN DLAND/ Flemish\ Cap y64United States over the international boundary on Georges Bank, south west of Nova Scotia. In that case, the International Court of Justice at the Hague established a boundary in 1984 that bisected the rich scallop fishing grounds of the bank.The most serious and protracted dispute was with France, and concerned that nation's claim to an Exclusive Economic Zone around the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon, south of Newfoundland. Through third party arbitration, on 10 June 1992, a decision was reached that established a narrow corridor to the south of the islands. The ruling gave Canada control over about 80 percent of the disputed area. The settlement allowed France a 24 nautical mile zone around the islands, and a 10.5 nautical mile wide corridor from the islands south through the 200 nautical mile limit EEZ. Consequently, 2,537 of the 13,703 square nautical miles fall under French jurisdiction.At present, there remain six maritime boundary disputes between Canada and other nations. Of these, three are in the study area.3.2.5.1 Northwest Passage (Canada/United States)At present, the United States does not recognize the Canadian claim that the Northwest Passage constitutes internal waters. The US position is that the Northwest Passage is an international strait within the meaning of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Thus, the United States is claiming the right to pass unhindered through Canadian waters of the Northwest Passage in the "normal mode of transit." In 1985 Canada announced that it would draw straight baselines around the islands of the Arctic archipelago, declaring all marine areas encompassed by the process to be internal waters. The new regime came into effect on 1 January 1986. It is worth noting in this regard that Canada's 12 nautical mile territorial limit effectively closes off Barrow Strait, one of the narrows within the Northwest Passage.In January 1988, Canada and the United States concluded an Arctic cooperation agreement with respect to Canadian control over Arctic waters for the regulation of commercial and icebreaker navigation. It requires that the United65States seek Canada's consent prior to navigation of the Northwest Passage by American icebreakers. The agreement does not address the issue of submarine activity in the Canadian Arctic.3.2.5.2 Hans Island (Canada/Denmark)Another dispute involves Hans Island, lying on the maritime boundary between Ellesmere Island and Greenland. Canada and Denmark/Greenland have agreed to a maritime boundary off Ellesmere Island, notwithstanding the disagreement over Hans Island. In 1973, in order to establish the maritime boundary between Canada and Greenland, the island itself was simply not included in the boundary. This dispute was largely dormant until 2004, when the Opposition party used the dispute to argue that the government was not supplying sufficient military funding for sovereignty purposes. Canadian national newspapers published a number of short articles about Hans Island, and reported that the Danes had sent ships north in the vicinity of the island in 2002 and 2003. In 2005, Canada and Denmark agreed to resolve the dispute peacefully, but there has been no further progress towards resolution since then.3.2.5.3 Machias Seal Island (Canada/United States)The other island dispute is over Machias Seal Island, which lies at the landward and unsettled end of the maritime boundary established by the International Court between Nova Scotia and the United States. The island has little inherent value, and is not a major issue in resolving the disputed boundary. In addition to being maritime boundary dispute, it remains the sole terrestrial sovereignty dispute between the two North American neighbours.The remaining contested maritime boundaries lie outside the study area on the Pacific Coast. All of the disputes are between Canada and the United States. The disputes concern the Beaufort Sea, Dixon Entrance and the Strait of Juan de Fuca.3.2.6 Military and Search and Rescue ZonesThe ocean area that Canada is responsible for defending under a combination of NATO and Canada-US defence treaties and agreements equals66an even greater 11,000,000 square kilometres. In defence circles, this zone is known as the Canadian Atlantic (CANLANT) area of responsibility (AOR). It encompasses a vast amount of water space and extends well beyond the Canadian EEZ. The delimitation of this AOR was derived through negotiated defence agreements with Allied and NATO partners. Figure 3-5 depicts the limits of the CANLANT AOR. These limits span 3979 kilometres east/west, 5627 kilometres north/south, and encompass an area of 5,931,757 square kilometres.Figure 3-5. CANLANT Area of ResponsibilitySource: Compiled from DND data set by HSO Halifax.The allocation of particular military training activities to designated areas of ocean helps to reduce the amount of interference between air, surface, and sub-surface military units, and assists civilian ships and aircraft to avoid areas in which military operations are being conducted. This process also can assist in limiting the impact that military training activities have on the marine environment by co-ordinating and thus reducing the presence and type of activity in areas of biological sensitivity.The current Maritime Forces Atlantic Operating Areas (MARLOAs) depicted in Figure 3-6, were promulgated in 1996. They replaced the Maritime Command Exercise and Firing Ranges that had formerly been used as practice67areas by naval and air units of the Canadian Forces, and before 1967 by the Royal Canadian Navy and Royal Canadian Air Force. The current MARLOAs encompass virtually all of the waters of Canada's eastern continental shelf and the Gulf of St Lawrence, not including the area surrounding the French islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon. This gives a much wider area of control for air and water space management.Warning of military exercises and activities are promulgated to civilian maritime traffic in the form of Canadian Notices to Mariners (NOTMARs) and civilian air traffic by Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs). Surface naval gunnery and air defence exercises take place in the operating areas to a maximum altitude of30,000 feet.The major naval and military base on Canada's east coast is Canadian Forces Base Halifax, located at Halifax, Nova Scotia. The naval dockyard located in Halifax Harbour has been in continuous operation since the 1700s and is currently home to the eastern naval headquarters, Maritime Forces Atlantic (MARLANT), as well as the eastern naval fleet.Overlying the MARLOAS is a series of air traffic zones and air maritime patrol areas off the eastern coast of North America. These zones, like their surface equivalents, provide a means for military air control authorities to separate aircraft and minimise mutual interference between aircraft. In the Canadian maritime region a number of patrol areas have also been established as a means of managing long-range maritime patrol aircraft flights in the CANLANT AOR.6840°N 50”N 40‘N 50°NN E W F O U N D L A N D..NOVAiCOTJiApproaches to Halifax, Nova ScotiaFigure 3-6. Maritime Forces Atlantic Operating Areas (MARLOAs)Source: Compiled from DND data set by HSO Halifax.50”W60 °WRUNSWIUNICORNOAK_OSCAROAK_ALPHA50"WFigure 3-7. Air Traffic Active and Restricted Danger ZonesSource: Maritime Air Component Commander (Atlantic) staff, 2003.6960 "W 50°WC A N A D A97/NFLD EAS'z897/NFLD EAST90/GULF96/GRAND BANKS92/NS OUTER 92/NS OUTERz60°WFigure 3-8. Routine CP-140 Aurora Patrol Areas50-WSource: Maritime Air Component Commander (Atlantic) staff, 2003.Given Canada’s immense land and sea area, responsibility for Search and Rescue has been divided into three geographic regions, each controlled at a Joint Rescue Coordination Centre (JRCC). The first of these JRCC’s is located at Victoria and serves the region west of the Alberta/British Columbia border and the Nunavut/Yukon borders. JRCC Trenton serves Canada east of British Coumbia to central Quebec, and north to the high Arctic. JRCC Halifax is responsible for the Atlantic region and into the Arctic east of Baffin Island. Additionally, JRCC Halifax is assisted by two Marine Rescue Sub-Centres (MRSC) located at Quebec City and St John’s. The two MRSCs co-ordinate responses to marine search and rescue incidents in their areas. Figures 3-9 and 3-10 depict these SAR zones.Note that the Canadian EEZ extends beyond Halifax Search and Rescue Region. This results in the unusual situation whereby search and rescue is administered within a portion of the Canadian EEZ by the United States through rescue co-ordination centres in Boston and Norfolk.7040°N 50“N[ENTON,HALIFAXFigure 3-9. Search and Rescue (SAR) ZonesNote: SAR zones in thick line, 200 nm EEZ in thin line. Source: Halifax Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre.60 °WMRSC St. JohnsMRSCNEWFOUNDIN EW ^ B R U N S W ICHALIFAX60 °WFigure 3-10. Sub-Regions - Halifax Search and Rescue RegionSource: Halifax Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre.713.3 Economic Impact of Atlantic Canada’s Maritime ZonesThe ocean-use sectors that will be reviewed in this chapter are renewable natural resources, non-renewable natural resources, marine construction and ship repair, marine transportation, and ocean tourism.3.3.1 Renewable Natural Resources3.3.1.1 Commercial FisheryFor a number of years up until 1988, Canada was the leading fish exporter in the world. Despite well-known difficulties within the fishery, Canada remains the world’s fifth largest exporter of fish and seafood products. The value of fish exports, measured in US dollars (2004), was just over $3.5 billion. This represents just under five percent of the value of the international fish export market. Furthermore, the United States is Canada's leading market for fish products, receiving 69 percent of the export volume. Japan and the European Economic Community (EEC) are Canada’s next largest customers, receiving 11 and 10 percent of exports, respectively. By comparison, the world's leading fish exporter, China, sold $6.79 billion in fish abroad in 2004.42A 1987 study by the Department of Fisheries and Oceans estimated that, of the $8 billion spent annually on ocean-related activity in this country, 30 percent was spent on the fishery and directly related activities.43In early 1992, due to grave concern that the Atlantic cod fishery was being over-depleted, the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans reduced quotas for that fishery, and increased diplomatic pressure on EEC states that exceeded Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO) quotas on the "Nose and Tail" of the Grand Banks, just outside the 200 mile limit of Canada's fisheries protection zone. At the same time, he closed the commercial salmon fishery in the Atlantic for an indefinite period, again, as a stock conservation measure.42 Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Exports by Major Producing Countries, 2000-2004, 6 July 2006 (8 August 2006); Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Domestic Exports of Selected Commodities by Major Market and Country, December 2004, 6 July 2006 (8 August 2006).72With concern for the fishery mounting, on 2 July 1992 the Minster of Fisheries closed the $700 million Newfoundland cod fishery for two years. The moratorium applied to an area from the south and east coasts of Newfoundland's Avalon Peninsula, along the north-eastern coast of Newfoundland and extended north along the entire Labrador coast. The fishing ban put an estimated 20,000 fishermen in almost 400 communities out of work.44 By early 1997 the Newfoundland cod fishery was just beginning to reopen and continues to be a shadow of what it was before the moratorium.Canada has three main fisheries in terms of species groupings: groundfish (i.e., cod, haddock, redfish, halibut, pollock); pelagics and other finfish (i.e., salmon, herring, mackerel, tuna, capelin); and shellfish (i.e., lobster, scallops, crab, shrimp, clams). Of these three fisheries, shellfish is the most valuable in terms of landings, at $ 1.7 billion. Groundfish were the second most valuable category, worth $ 267 million. Pelagic landings were worth $ 172 million (all measured in 2004 dollars).45Measured according to the value of species landings, the Atlantic queen crab fishery was the nation's most important in 2004, worth more than $613 million. The Atlantic lobster fishery was the second most valuable, worth $588 million. The Atlantic shrimp fishery was the third most valuable, at $247 million. These three species accounted for $1448 million - almost two-thirds of the value of national landings in 2004.46After the lean years of the mid-1990s, the fishery in Atlantic Canada is starting to show signs of a slow recovery. Although it is unlikely that the loss of the Atlantic cod fishery will ever be replaced, landings are starting to rebound43 Canada, Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Canada’s Oceans: An Economic Overview and a Guide to Federal Government Activities Communications Directorate DO, Ottawa, 1987, 13.44 “Rage greets fishery closing,” Globe and Mail (Toronto), 3 July 1992.45 Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, 2004 Value of Atlantic & Pacific Coasts Commercial Landings, by Province 12 May 2006 (8 August 2006).46 Fisheries and Oceans Canada, 2004 Value of Atlantic & Pacific Coasts Commercial Landings, by Province.73with the development of non-traditional fisheries and the expansion of foreign markets.TABLE 3-4CANADIAN COMMERCIAL FISHERY 1995-2000Primary___________ |___________AquacultureYear Volume of Value of Landings Landings (‘000 tons) ($ million)Employment(FTE)Volume (‘000 tons)Value ($ million)Employment(FTE)National1995 861 1,783 32,621 63 326 3,9501996 927 1,577 27,572 67 330 4,2401997 986 1,621 24,893 82 361 5,2301998 1,003 1,578 22,998 87 409 5,5501999 1,010 1,888 22,243 108 533 6,6202000 1,016 2,134 21,000 122 573 6,950Atlantic Region1995 638 1,359 24,529 29 146 1,8401996 686 1,149 21,481 32 159 2,0401997 735 1,215 18,847 36 177 2,2501998 785 1,294 19,005 38 171 2,3901999 792 1,571 18,353 52 231 3,1302000 873 1,790 18,500 66 281 3,530Sources: Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Statistical Services, Ottawa; Canada, Statistics Canada, Canadian Aquaculture Production Statistics, Ottawa.From a geographer’s perspective, the spatial management of the fishing areas off Canada’s East Coast appears to be a conglomeration of unrelated grids that vary by regulatory regime. Nationally, regulation of the fishing grounds is the responsibility of Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO) for waters under Canadian jurisdiction. This federal department has divided the Atlantic region into four administrative areas by province and has several different geographic grids that are employed for managing separate species.74 (14 April 2006).78Many large commercially viable sand and gravel deposits have been identified in the offshore, and could be exploited without danger to the marine environment. Millions of cubic metres of sand and gravel have already been extracted to build over 30 artificial islands in the Canadian Beaufort Sea since 1972 to support oil and gas exploration. Similar projects could supply sand and gravel for construction of artificial islands on Canada's east coast as oil and gas development there continues to progress. Sand and gravel dredged from the ocean bottom may also be used to develop such projects like the Fundy Tidal Power Project, in harbour expansion projects, or for road construction. Seabed extraction of these resources has already been attempted successfully, profitably, and in an ecologically sound manner in the United Kingdom, France and Japan.These are just some of the minerals that current technologies offer the promise of exploiting. Other more exotic seabed resources like poly-metallic sulphides also occur in Canadian waters, and may yet be harvested when have the ability to safely and economically do so is realized. The three products most likely to be extracted commercially in the short term are sand and gravel, silica sands, and gold.3.3.2.2 Offshore HydrocarbonsDuring the 1980s, extensive oil and gas exploration took place off Canadian coasts. This activity identified significant and extremely valuable reserves of both oil and natural gas. It is estimated that more than 50 percent of Canada's frontier oil reserves lie in Canada's offshore.48 The following tables provide an indication of the extent of this wealth in oil and gas. Figures 3-16 and 3-17 show the extent of exploration permits and spatial distribution of former well sites. Figure 3-18 shows the location of current wells.48 Naval Officers Association of Canada, A Maritime Policy for Canada (Ottawa: Naval Officers Association of Canada, 1990), 49.79N.OS NoOfrTABLE 3-5OFFSHORE PETROCARBON INVENTORYRegion Oil(‘000,000 cums)Gas(‘000,000 cums)Discovered ResourcesMackenzie Delta-Beaufort Sea 256.4 322.7Arctic Islands-Eastern Arctic 65.7 416.4Newfoundland Offshore 235.2 148.7Nova Scotia Offshore 23.7 164.7TOTAL 581.0 1,052.5Potential ReservesWest Coast 50.0 270.0Mackenzie Delta-Beaufort Sea 1,112.0 1,918.0Arctic Islands-Eastern Arctic 873.0 3,156.0Hudson Bay 127.0 88.0Newfoundland Offshore 894.0 1,649.0Nova Scotia Offshore 318.0 663.0TOTAL 3,374.0 7,744.0Source: 1989 Canadian Oil and Gas Lands Administration Annual ReportNEWFOUNDLANDNEW * 8 R U N S W IC A N A D ACNSOPB and CNOPB| | | Exploratory Permits H i Production LicensesSignificant Discovery Areas ParoelsFigure 3-16. Oil and Gas Exploration Lands 2004 - Atlantic CanadaSource: Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Board; Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board.80z8QUEBECNEWFOUNDLANDNEW '* B R U N S W I-.N O VA v iC O T IA > "— I 1 I I I 1---------1 I I I I------60 °W 50°WFigure 3-17. Oil and Gas Wells - Past LocationsSource: Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Board; Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board.z8NEWFOUNDLANDNOVASCOTIANEWBR U N SID, Oil Rig1, Alma Platform2, Rowan Gorilla VI (undertow)3, Global Santa Fe Galaxy II4, Thebaud Platform5, North Triumph Jacket6, North Venture Platform7, South Venture Platform8, Hibernia9, Henry Goodridge10, Terra Nova FPSO11, Global Santa Fe Grand Banks12, Sea Rose FSPOFigure 3-18. Oil and Gas Rigs in 2006Source: Halifax Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre, January 2006.50°W60“W81In view of the fact that the costs of extraction for these resources are not yet known, and because the prices for oil and gas are subject to constant fluctuation, it is not possible to place a reliable value on them. However, it goes without saying that these resources have a potential value in the magnitude of multiple billions of dollars, and will generate billions more in economic activity as production commences.The first commercial offshore oil development to commence production in Canada was the Cohasset-Panuke field, located off Sable Island, NS. Cohasset- Panuke was been developed by a partnership of LASMO Nova Scotia, and the provincial Crown Corporation Nova Scotia Resources Limited and went into production during May 1992. Cohasset-Panuke was a relatively small field with an estimated 49 million recoverable barrels. The field was decommissioned in 1999 after producing 44.5 million barrels and infused about $500 million into the Nova Scotia economy.Before the Cohasset-Panuke development, there had been interest in the natural gas fields off of Sable Island. Although interest waned during the latter 1980s, for the past several years the Sable Island Offshore Energy Project (SOEP) has seen resurgence of interest and effort. At present, the SOEP produces between 400 and 500 million cubic feet of natural gas and 20,000 barrels of natural gas liquids every day. In addition to the offshore development, the Golboro gas plant in Guysborough County, Nova Scotia processes the gas, and a plant has been constructed at Point Tupper, Nova Scotia to further process the natural gas liquids from the Goldboro plant. In addition to these projects there are several proposals in the Atlantic region for the construction of liquid natural gas storage facilities and pipelines to transport gas into the lucrative market of the north-eastern United States. The six platforms of the SOEP account for roughly three percent of all Canadian natural gas production. The only fixed conduit from the SOEP ashore is a single pipeline. Thus, much of the gas is transported by ship.4949 ExxonMobil, Sable Project -Operations < http://www.soep.com/cgi-bin/getpage7pageicM/0/0> (9 August 2006).82In 1988, the Canadian and Newfoundland governments signed a $5.2 billion agreement to begin development of the Hibernia oil field. Hibernia was expected to tap between 525 and 650 million barrels of oil, with peak output of about 110,000 barrels per day. The federal government assumed a $2.7 billion stake in the development, with each of four commercial partners committing $1 billion to the project. It had been expected to generate about 14,500 construction jobs, and 1,100 production jobs over an 18 year period and was projected to fill 12 percent of Canada's light oil requirements. The development's future was thrown into doubt in February 1992 when one of the partners, Gulf Canada, decided to withdraw from the project. Between February and October 1992, work on the project was curtailed and daily expenditures of about $3 million were cut in half. The slowdown put about 800 people out of work and delayed production by a year, from 1996 to 1997.On 9 October 1992, with an announcement on Texaco's involvement in the project imminent, the work slowdown was lifted and oil first flowed in late 1997. By the end of 2005, almost 200,000 barrels were flowing per day from Hibernia, and the development had produced a total of 455.7 million barrels.Two other substantial oil fields are found in the Newfoundland offshore. The Terra Nova field south of Hibernia went into production in 2002 and flows about 99,000 barrels per day with a total production of 164 million barrels. To the east of Newfoundland is the White Rose Field. This source flows just under50,000 barrels per day and since has produced 2.5 million barrels from commissioning in November 2005 to the end of the year. Newfoundland oil production accounts for about 15 percent of the total Canadian oil production, approximately 146 million barrels per annum.50Once the oil arrives ashore from the offshore platforms, the three main refineries and terminals in the Atlantic region together produce 473,063 barrels of oil per day. Imperial Oil in Dartmouth, Nova Scotia produces 88, 009 barrels per day, Irving Oil in Saint John, New Brunswick produces 280,011 barrels per50 Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, Mines and Energy, Oil and Gas Report - January 2006 (9 August 2006).83day, and North Atlantic Refining in Come-by-Chance, Newfoundland adds 105,043 barrels per day. These three refineries represent approximately 20 percent of the total Canadian refining capacity. They also produce over 70 percent of all Canadian refined petroleum exports, and are a major supplier of gasoline and heating oil to the eastern seaboard of the United States.Since over 50 percent of the homes in Atlantic region rely on oil for heating purposes, a much higher proportion than elsewhere in Canada, these refineries are critically important domestically as well as to the United States market.To date, there have been 23 significant discoveries of oil and gas made in the Newfoundland offshore, with the promises of further prospects. The sedimentary basins of the Grand Banks as well as those that form the Laurentian Channel demonstrate great potential for Newfoundland to become a major player in national oil and gas production. Additionally, the basins in the vicinity of Sable Island and further south offshore Nova Scotia indicate that Nova Scotia may one day assume an equally important role. The region is now of national strategic importance as a major producer of oil with a lesser role in natural gas production. Uniquely, all production in the Atlantic region is derived from offshore wells. When combined with the high volume of refining carried out at the three refineries described above, it is clear that, although not as historically visible as the fishery, the hydrocarbon industry is a key element in the economy of Atlantic Canada and, more significantly, the nation as whole.84TABLE 3-6OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION - ATLANTIC CANADA 1995-2000Year No. of EstablishmentsProduction Labour Value of Force Marketable Production(FTE) ($ million)Net Cash Expenditures($ million)Total Labour Force(FTE)Total Value of Output*($ million)1995 14 106 197.1 1,499.10 2,129 1,696.201996 16 106 201.2 1,046.40 1,386 1,247.601997 17 75 126.7 1,109.80 1,681 1,236.501998 16 300 591 2,282.70 3,540 2,873.701999 18 524 1,052.10 2,992.00 4,490 4,044.102000 18 1,310 3,103.30 2,161.80 5,910 5,265.10*Value of marketable production from processing and net cash expenditures on exploration, development, operating costs and royalties.Source: Statistics Canada, The Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas Industry (Annuals), Cat. No. 26-213.3.3.3 Marine Construction/Ship RepairThe Canadian shipbuilding and ship repair industry contributed more than $200 million to the national GDP and provided work for more than 4,000 people during 2001. Table 3-7 indicates the tonnage and number of ships greater than 100 gross tons that were on order or being built in Canada for the years 1995 - 2000.51During the early 1990s, there were four major Department of National Defence marine projects underway that provided stability to the shipbuilding industry in Canada. The Canadian Patrol Frigate programme, the Tribal Class Update and Modernization programme, the Maritime Coastal Defence Vessel Project and the Towed Array Sonar System had total approved expenditures for just under $12 billion. Once these programmes had completed by the late 1990s, DND’s investment in the Canadian shipbuilding industry declined significantly, with a predictable and consequent negative impact. However, the federal government announced recently its intention to procure three joint supply ships to replace the Navy’s aging auxiliary replenishment vessels, and should provide a much-needed boost to the industry.51 Acton White and Associates, Economic Study of Canada’s Marine and Ocean Industries, 29 March 2001 (9 August 2006).85TABLE 3-7CANADIAN MARINE CONSTRUCTION 1995-2000Year Building Oil & Gas Marine Total Value- EmploymentConstruction Rigs Works ($ millions) added (FTE)($ millions) ($ millions) ($ millions) ($ millions)National1995 205.6 1,376.90 355.3 1,937.80 880.8 11,4801996 226.1 881.4 273.2 1,380.70 617 8,3001997 213.8 824 259.8 1,297.60 573 7,3501998 229 2,013.60 302.1 2,544.70 1,125.00 11,5801999 231.9 2,651.50 332.3 3,215.70 1,406.20 17,4002000 227.2 1,678.10 342.2 2,247.50 948.3 12,200Atlantic Region1995 60.9 1,376.90 236.9 1,674.70 801.5 9,6401996 68.1 881.4 156 1,105.50 530.6 6,3901997 65.6 824 204.9 1,094.50 525.3 5,8101998 71.9 2,013.60 226.6 2,312.10 1,109.80 9,9601999 76.2 2,651.50 255.4 2,983.10 1,431.90 15,8002000 75.3 1,678.10 261.3 2,014.70 967.1 10,600Source: Statistics Canada, Capital Expenditures by Type of Asset, 1992-1996, Cat. No. 61-223; Public and Private Investment in Canada, Cat. No. 61-205; Statistics Canada, Capital Expenditures by Type of Asset, (Annuals from 1992), Cat. No. 61- 223. Statistics Canada, Public and Private Investment in Canada, Cat. No. 61-205.3.3.4 Marine TransportationOf the world's industrialized nations, Canada ranks among those most heavily dependent upon trade for its economic well-being, foreign trade generating one quarter of Canada’s gross national product, and almost 55 percent of that trade being transported by water.52 In terms of volume, 99 percent of Canadian trade with nations other than the United States is waterborne.53During 2003, the last year for which complete figures are available, Canadian ports handled almost 307 million tonnes of international cargo. This represented an increase of 8.5 percent over the previous year.54 Canada has 25 deep-water ports and 650 smaller ports. There are also about 2,200 small craft harbour facilities along Canada’s coasts that are used exclusively for the fishery52 Canada, Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Annual Report 1985/86, Supply and Services Canada, Ottawa, 1986, 21.53 NOAC, A Maritime Policy for Canada, 142.54 Canada: A Portrait (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1991), 161.86or recreational boating.55 Figure 3-19 shows the major and secondary ports in the Atlantic region.Figure 3-19. Ports and Main Ferries - Atlantic CanadaSource: Statistics Canada, The Daily: Port activity, 23 February 2004.A significant portion of the country’s water transport travels through the St. Lawrence Seaway, the world's longest canal system. This system extends over 3,769 kilometres, from the Atlantic Ocean to the western end of Lake Superior, and incorporates a total rise of 177 metres. Bulk cargoes constitute about 85 percent of tonnage moving through the St. Lawrence Seaway. Current estimates call for about 31 million tonnes of cargo to transit the Montreal-Lake Ontario section of the Seaway, with closer to 34 million tonnes moving through the Welland Canal.56 Figures 3-20 shows the major and secondary ports in the St Lawrence Seaway system.55 Canada, Statistics Canada, The Daily: Port activity, 4 April 2005 (12 April 2006).56 1991 Corpus Almanac & Canadian Sourcebook (Don Mills: Southam Business Information and Communications Group, 1991), 10-12; Great Lakes St. Lawrence Seaway System, Tonnage Information, Seaway Monthly Traffic Results as of December 31, 2005 (9 August 2006).60°WTONNAGE• 0000000 ■ 50000005000001 -1000000010000001 -15000000Ulthony15000001 - 20000000BaleVerte Ferry RouteNatashquamBaieComeaui Catalinaime by Chance (2)w St John'sCap-aux- . MeujsN E W ^ W8 R U N S W !C K > S h ip p e g a nlhartottetowrrSydneyHawkesbury (7)| » * J ^ S h e e t Harbour^ H a lifa x (10)inenburgpjrLiverpool 'ShelburneYarmouth70°W 60°Wz887MichipicotBn H artjourSault Ste Marie (18)fe. SpraggeKingstonG oO enchrorontoW elterLeami1 C A N A D ATO In9G W: Hfc5,m mJTTONNAGE• 0000000 - 5000000A 5000001 - 1000000010000001 - 1500000015000001 - 20 00 00 00U N I T E D S T AT ES ,________Ferry Route90 W ro n00 wFigure 3-20. Ports - St. Lawrence Seaway and Great LakesSource: Statistics Canada, The Daily: Port activity, 23 February 2004.During 1987, 303 Canadian marine carriers generated operating revenues of $2.17 billion. Just over half of that total ($1.12 billion) was earned transporting commodities, with about 15 percent of the total ($307 million) being accounted for by towing services. Ten percent of revenues ($200 million) were generated by charters.57Canada's busiest port is Vancouver. It is also the second largest port in North America, and the largest on the west coast of North or South America. In 2003, Vancouver handled 67.9 million tonnes of cargo, representing 15 percent (by tonnage) of Canadian shipping for that year. Vancouver accounts for roughly half of all of the nation’s container traffic. The year 2005 heralded an increase to76.4 million tonnes handled in Vancouver.58Montreal is the country's leading container traffic port, in terms of tonnage handled, and the second largest container gateway on the Atlantic coast of North57 Canada: A Portrait, 161-162.58 Statistics Canada, The Daily: Port activity.88America, after New York. In 2005, the port processed over 11.1 million tonnes of containerized cargo.59During 2003, the country’s top 20 ports handled more than 349.8 million tonnes of goods. In the same year 443.0 million tonnes of cargo were handled nation wide.60 As seen in Table 3-8, all but one of Canada’s top 10 ports, based on metric tonnes handled, are located either in Atlantic Canada or are accessed from the Atlantic seaward approaches of the study area. Figure 3-21 shows the major shipping routes that service the Atlantic region.During the period September 1990 to September 1991, more than 1.2 million people entered or left Canada using marine transportation. The vast majority (761,036) of these travelled by commercial carrier. Most of the total entries or departures (999,197) were recorded by non-Canadian residents.TABLE 3-8CANADA’S TOP TEN PORTS IN 2005Port Tonnage handledVancouver 76,481,000Come-By-Chance 43,694,000 *Saint John 27,500,000Montreal 24,344,000Port Hawkesbury 22,927,000 *Quebec 22,500,000Sept-lsles 17,500,000Halifax 13,816,000Port-Cartier 17,439,000 *Nanticoke 12,359,511* 2005 data not available. 2003 figures used. Sources: Each Port Authority’s Internet statistics page.59 Montreal Port Authority, Statistics: Traffic summary 1995-2005 (metric tonnes) (12 April 2006).60 Statistics Canada, The Daily: Port activity.8960°0'0"W 50°0'0"Wzb°STrip Departure CountriesB i l l IC' GD' Ru FA. Scandinavia MB UK’ North 869 Countries| SP, PO2 Mediterranean, Suez Canal and Africa | | Caribbean, Panama Canal and South Amenca60°0'0"W 50°0'0"WFigure 3-21. Major Shipping Routes in 2000 - Atlantic CanadaSource: Bernard Kelly, Marine Commercial Vessel Traffic Activity in Canada’s Atlantic Region, Geocentric Mapping Consulting, June 2002.The international cruise industry has grown at a compound rate of almost 10 percent since 1970, according to the Cruise Lines International Association. This trend is being felt in Canadian ports as cruise ship visits increase and throughout Canada, more than 2 million cruise ship passengers visited the nation in 2005.61 The Port of Vancouver, hub of the international Alaska Cruise industry, hosted an incredible 910,172 cruise ship passengers in 2005.62 The cruise industry's local economic impact is enormous. For example, it has been estimated that the direct economic impact of Alaska cruises in 2005 was estimated at $588.5 million, including $341 million in marine services; which encompassed provisioning services, passenger handling and non-cruise transport, and $211 million in tourist spending.63 Cruise line passengers spend time and money in Vancouver, but they also spend millions on supplementary tours to the British Columbia and Alberta Rocky Mountains, and the Yukon61 Association of Canadian Port Authorities, Industry Information - Canadian Port Industry, 2005 (10 August 2006).62 Vancouver Port Authority, 2005 Statistical Summary, 2005 (12 April 2006).90territory. The cruise industry directly contributed 91 million dollars to the gross domestic product of Greater Vancouver in 2005, and generated an additional $11 million in federal and provincial tax revenues.64On Canada’s East Coast, other Canadian destinations are also popular ports of call for the cruise lines. Two decades ago only one cruise line visited Montreal; by 2005 a dozen lines brought 45 cruise ships with 35,359 passengers aboard to the city. In 1991 local expenditures by passengers and cruise ships amounted to $9.4 million.65The cruise industry has also become an important contributor to the economy of Halifax. In 2004, for example, 122 cruise ships carrying 212,834 passengers visited the port. That figure was up from 104 calls in 2003. Further growth is expected in Halifax, which has already received bookings for 89 calls during 2006. Local spending by cruise ships passengers was estimated at $2.25 million during 2005.66The high volume of commercial and fishing traffic in the maritime approaches provides the basic elements for potential collisions at sea. To mitigate this concern, Canada has established 16 compulsory pilotage areas and several Vessel Traffic Management Schemes (VTMS) to coordinate the movement of shipping through key areas in the Atlantic Region. Determination of where compulsory pilotage is required is based on the degree of difficulty and hazard in the approaches and within the port itself , the amount of vessel movement and manoeuvrability and the size of the vessel, the design of wharves, slips, and actual space available for manoeuvring, the nature of cargo embarked, and the preservation of the ecosystem. Pilotage services in Atlantic Canada are provided by the Atlantic Pilotage Authority or, in the case of the Gulf of St Lawrence and the approaches to the St Lawrence River, the Laurentian63 Vancouver Port Authority, Port o f Vancouver Economic Impact Study, May 2005 (10 August 2006).Vancouver Port Authority, Port of Vancouver Economic Impact Study.65 Montreal Port Authority, Statistics: Cruise traffic 2001-2005 (12 April 2006).66 Halifax Port Authority, The Port o f Halifax, Annual Statistics, 2005 (12 April 2006).91Pilotage Authority. Figure 3-22 shows the compulsory pilotage areas in the Atlantic region.With respect to Vessel Traffic Management Schemes, these areas typically include the approaches to busy ports and seaways, such as Halifax and Saint John, or congested straits and narrows like the Cabot Strait and the St Lawrence Seaway. Under the International Rules for Avoiding Collision at Sea (COLREGs), a government may also establish special routing rules. For example, there is a Canadian modification that requires a vessel making a transatlantic voyage to avoid crossing the Grand Banks north of latitude 43 degrees north to minimize cargo ship traffic across the congested fishing grounds in the shallows of the Grand Banks. Figures 3-23 through 3-30 show the established VTMS regimes in Atlantic Canada.Figure 3-22. Compulsory Pilotage Areas - Atlantic CanadaSource: Transport Canada.Humber ArmN E W F O U N D L A N DSt John's Holyrood'lacentiBaytetqws Sydney . v dP py”- Bras D'or Lakes Strait of CansoHalifax1000m60 WBay of Exploits' Kestigoucpe StephenvilleHEW ^ 7 /sRUNswiciifcMiramichi c 159250°N 50°NC A N A D ANEW FOUNDLANDNE W B R U N S W I C KI—COTIFigure 3-23. Vessel Traffic Management Systems (VTMS) - Atlantic CanadaSource: Transport Canada.—65°W L.' ' , *' ; QUEBECi„' ■ : - w "■ 1 fr —y' ■ . ILE D'ANTICOSTIQUEBEC____________ — --------------Figure 3-24. VTMS - St Lawrence SeawaySource: Transport Canada.9355°WFigure 3-25. VTMS - Belle IsleSource: Transport Canada.60°WNOVASCOTIA__Figure 3-26. VTMS - Cabot StraitSource: Transport Canada.94NEWFOUNDLAND55 °W55°WFigure 3-27. VTMS - PlacentiaSource: Transport Canada.NOVAgt§S|*i60°W I—60°WFigure 3-28. VTMS - Halifax and CansoSource: Transport Canada.9544°N 46°NC A N A D ANEW BRUNSWICKMAINENOVA SCOTIA65°W65°WFigure 3-29. VTMS - Bay of FundySource: Transport Canada.Figure 3-30. VTMS - NORDREG AreaSource: Transport Canada.963.3.5 Ocean Tourism3.3.5.1 Ocean TourismAlthough a relatively recent phenomenon, ocean tourism has become an important contributor to the Canadian economy, as seen at Table 3-9.3.3.5.2 Recreational FisheryIn 2000, there were 3.6 million recreational fishermen in Canada. There were 4.7 million recreational fishing days recorded in salt water. This national industry represented $4.4 billion in direct and investment costs. In 1992, the recreational fishery generated spending of nearly $5 billion annually.67TABLE 3-9CANADIAN OCEAN TOURISM 1995-2000Year Sport FisheriesNumber of Direct* Anglers Expenditures/ (‘000) Investment ($ millions)CoastalTourismRevenue /Investment ($ millions)Cruise Ship TourismNumber of Visitor ** Visitors Expenditures (‘000) ($ millions)Total Marine Tourism ($ millions)National1995 483.4 768.3 273.7 705.5 38 1,080.001996 463.6 728.2 294.8 787.2 44.9 1,067.901997 441.8 682.2 318.6 946.5 53.4 1,054.201998 421.1 639.2 343.8 1,025.90 59.2 1,042.201999 401.3 599 365.2 1,148.40 68.8 1,033.002000 382.4 561.5 388.5 1,354.80 83 1,033.00Atlantic Region1995 186.1 234.5 91.3 108.8 6.5 332.31996 180.9 210.3 100.4 85.7 6 316.71997 171.2 177.2 111.8 130 7.3 296.31998 162.5 146.3 133.3 152.8 8.8 288.41999 154.3 118.8 149.5 200.8 12 280.32000 139.2 95.5 167.3 300.8 18.4 281.2* Direct expenditures relate to food and lodging, transportation, fishing services, fishing supplies, packages, and other; investments relate to fishing equipment, boating equipment, camping equipment, special vehicles, land-buildings, and other purchases directly related to recreational fishing.** Estimates based on average spending per trip (same-day visitors to Canada). Source: DFO, Survey of Recreational Fishing in Canada (1985, 1990, 1995,2000), Ottawa; Transport Canada, Cruise Industry Statistics. Statistics Canada, Tourism Scope, International Travel, Cat. No. 66-201. B.C. Government Annual Tourism Monitor.67 Canada, Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Joint Press Release, 29 July 1992.973.2.6 Conservation and ProtectionOf increasing importance is the conservation and protection of the marine environment. In concert with strict pollution control laws, there are controls over the routing of vessels in conjunction with marine environmental interests. Four major conservation or protected areas have been identified in the Atlantic region to provide protection for the marine ecosystem; there are many other minor areas, such as protected nesting grounds in the many islands of the region. A ground-breaking moment in the co-operation between marine industries and environmentalists occurred in 2003 when the shipping lanes in and out of the Bay of Fundy were adjusted to avoid right whale breeding areas. Another right whale protected area was identified in the vicinity of Roseway Bank off southwest Nova Scotia and mariners are asked to avoid transiting through this area.In 2004, a Maritime Protected Area (MPA) was established at the Sable Gully. As well, a section of Georges Bank was closed to ground fishing in order to protect deep sea coral habitat on the banks. Clearly the dawning of the new millennium has signalled a sea change in the collaboration between those that use the sea for economic gain and those who seek to preserve the marine ecosystems. Figures 3-31 shows the larger conservation areas and Sable Gully MPA. Figure 3-32 shows the new shipping lane that avoids right whale breeding areas superimposed on the former shipping lane in the Bay of Fundy.9845°N 45 °NN O V A1000mGeorges Bank Diiifing Moratorium60“W60 WFigure 3-31. Conservation and Marine Protected AreasSource: Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Board, 2003.67”W 66°WFigure 3-32. Vessel Traffic Separation and Right WhalesSource: Transport Canada, Proposal: Routeing of Ships, Ship Reporting and Related Matters, 2002.99The Atlantic region is both a node and conduit for many submarine cables that connect North America with the rest of the globe. Figure 3-33 shows the major cables that end in, or transect Canada’s eastern maritime approaches.Figure 3-33. Submarine Cables - Atlantic CanadaSource: United States National Imagery and Mapping Agency, 2000.3.4 SummaryThe Atlantic region of Canada comprises the four provinces of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island (PEI) and Newfoundland and Labrador. Some reference may be made in this thesis to the province of Quebec, and Nunavut and the Northwest Territories where their inclusion has specific relevance to the operations of the Canadian Forces.The main feature of the Atlantic region with its associated ocean zones is its sheer vastness. The total landmass is smaller in area than that of the province of Manitoba, but the physical extent of the region is far larger due to the adjacent maritime zones. The size of the Atlantic region’s Exclusive Economic Zone is larger than the landmasses of France, Germany, and Spain combined.70°W^ e w F O i i N o t A i i j f e60 °W 50 °W100Although vast, the lines of communication in the Atlantic region are quite linear, following the road and rail lines east to west and vice versa. The critical infrastructure tends to be linear as well, with strategic choke points that confer vulnerability to the region. The Atlantic region is the gateway to the markets of central Canada from European and US sea routes. The ocean sectors are critical to the Canadian way of life, generating huge contributions to the economy both domestically and through international trade. Tables 2-10 and 2-11 provide quantitative measures of the value of the ocean sectors to Atlantic Canada in relation to the rest of Canada. However, it should be borne in mind that in terms of “have” and “have not” provinces, the Atlantic region, with its “boom or bust” resource-based economy has traditionally been on the receiving end of financial assistance from central Canada.From a political perspective, the four different provinces (five when the eastern extent of Quebec is considered) with their three levels of government, and the inclusion of a small piece of French territory at Saint Pierre and Miquelon introduce a level of jurisdictional and administrative complexity that is not replicated on Canada’s West Coast where there is only one province adjoining the sea. There is a distinct lack of uniformity as to how the Atlantic region is delimited for regulation of water space, air space, and resource exploitation; multiple grid systems and inconsistent boundaries duplicate responsibility for many of the same areas. Regulatory regimes created by international, national, and provincial bodies and enforced by a plethora of federal and provincial agencies with responsibility for the marine sector, makes it extremely difficult to apply a common framework to the question of maritime security and enforcement. This will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapters.101TABLE 3-10CANADIAN OCEAN INDUSTRY EMPLOYMENT 1995-2000Year CommercialFisheriesOil &Gas OceanTransportTourism MarineConst.Mnfg & ServicesGovt. Fed &ProvincialTotalFull Time Equivalents (FTE)National1995 55,095 2,129 25,636 11,880 11,480 18,110 34,850 159,1801996 49,964 1,386 23,626 11,560 8,300 19,010 34,910 147,7631997 48,491 1,681 22,616 11,280 7,350 19,840 29,910 141,1681998 47,320 3,540 22,485 11,160 11,580 20,070 29,350 145,5051999 48,617 4,490 24,044 10,940 17,400 21,100 28,340 154,9312000 48,110 5,910 25,158 10,560 12,200 21,880 28,150 151,968Atlantic Region1995 41,681 2,129 12,423 3,650 9,640 9,190 26,070 104,7831996 38,621 1,386 12,229 3,430 6,390 9,210 26,080 97,3461997 36,429 1,681 11,107 3,180 5,810 9,320 22,330 89,8571998 37,256 3,540 11,443 3,080 9,960 9,370 21,640 96,2891999 38,095 4,490 12,221 2,970 15,800 9,920 21,290 104,7862000 39,530 5,910 12,227 2,880 10,600 10,300 21,180 102,627Sources: Tables 3-4, 3-6, 3-7, 3-9.TABLE 3-11GROSS VALUE OF OUTPUT OF OCEAN SECTORS, CURRENT DOLLARS 1995 - 2000Year Comm. Oil & Gas Ocean Ocean Marine Mnfg & Govt. TotalFisheries Transport Tourism Construct. Services Federal & Provincial($ million)National1995 3,300.40 1,696.20 3,823.50 1,080.00 1,937.80 1,694.90 7,149.10 20,681.901996 3,052.10 1,247.60 3,387.60 1,067.90 1,380.70 1,822.80 6,271.00 18,229.701997 3,100.30 1,236.50 3,184.10 1,054.20 1,297.60 1,965.50 5,549.40 17,387.601998 3,281.80 2,873.70 2,968.80 1,042.20 2,544.70 2,037.70 5,137.00 19,885.901999 3,738.90 4,044.10 3,127.50 1,033.00 3,215.70 2,243.00 4,887.40 22,289.602000 4,037.20 5,265.10 3,073.10 1,033.00 2,247.50 2,380.30 4,685.60 22,721.80Atlantic Region1995 2,326.40 1,696.20 2,057.20 332.3 1,674.70 802 5,347.60 14,236.401996 2,164.90 1,247.60 1,718.60 316.7 1,105.50 859.6 4,685.50 12,098.401997 2,328.60 1,236.50 1,504.20 296.3 1,094.50 916.2 4,142.30 11,518.601998 2,538.50 2,873.70 1,402.90 288.4 2,312.10 942.6 3,787.50 14,145.701999 2,836.60 4,044.10 1,420.00 280.3 2,983.10 1,063.50 3,643.60 16,271.202000 3,268.80 5,265.10 1,311.10 281.2 2,014.70 1,111.80 3,507.00 16,759.70Sources: Tables 3-4, 3-6, 3-7, 3-9.102This chapter has satisfied the objectives of the first of the six themes of inquiry, namely to furnish a geographical description of the study area in a maritime context. Chapter Four will address the first segment of the second research theme, the policy framework in which maritime enforcement in Canada is shaped.103Chapter FourCANADIAN MARITIME POLICY FRAMEWORK 4.1 IntroductionThe previous chapter provided an overview of the marine geography of Canada’s Atlantic coast, in order to show the extent of the major ocean-use sectors in the study area, as well as its sheer vastness of scale. The purpose of this chapter is to build upon that foundation by reviewing the policy framework that shapes how the Canadian Navy functions in support of oceans management, safeguarding national security and exercising Canadian sovereignty.The chapter opens with a simple strategic model to stimulate reflection on Canadian values and goals, leading to identification of Canada’s national maritime interests. This is followed by a description of the development of the three key oceans policy initiatives that constitute Canadian oceans governance in 2006. Next, the federal government’s ad hoc approach to security and defence policy formulation will be examined. It will be shown that, for Canada, the distinction between security and defence policy has been, and continues to be blurred. Within this discussion, the main elements of maritime security, as a component of national security, will be identified and the issue of sovereignty will be reviewed in detail. The concept of sea control, in the context of maritime security will be introduced. This policy examination will establish the relevant elements that influence how the Canadian government applies the policy that, in turn, affects the role of the Canadian Navy.4.2 National InterestsTo better grasp how oceans, security, and defence policy in Canada may have been shaped in the past decades, it is useful to understand what forms the basis of the models from which policy is derived. Don Macnamara and Ann FitzGerald observe that it is usual for strategic planning models to commence with the identification of national values and goals that portray the national interests that a country intends to uphold. These values and goals are considered in the context of issues and trends to develop a strategy that utilizes the human,105technical and fiscal resources available to the nation.68 American authors William Ascher and William Overholt offer a simple strategic planning model to demonstrate this concept.Interests + Environment = StrategyNational Values Domestic / International National PoliciesNational Goals • Political • Foreign/Diplomatic• Economic • Economic• Technological • Technological• Socio-Cultural • Economic• Military / Defence • Military / DefenceFigure 4-1. A Simple Strategic ModelSource: William Ascher and William H. Overholt, Strategic Planning and Forecasting (Toronto: John Wiley and Sons, 1983), as cited in W. D. Macnamara and Ann Fitz-Gerald, “A National Security Framework for Canada,” Policy Matters 3 (No. 10, October 2002): 1-27.What this model shows is that the national strategy of a country is a set of policies, the product of understanding the impact that the perceived political, economic, socio-cultural and military environments, both domestic and international, have on the nation's interests. These interests are the country's assets, fundamental values, and its national goals.While politicians frequently comment about an issue “being in the national interest,” there is no clear articulation by the federal government of Canadian national interests. However, it is possible to divine these interests by reviewing the goals outlined in various policy and constitutional documents. For example, the Canadian fundamental values, expressed in a 1995 foreign policy White Paper, are listed as respect for the rule of law, democracy, human rights, and the environment. A similar set of values was incorporated into a Department of National Defence strategic plan. In this document, two additional values were expressed, those being sustainable economic well-being as well as peace, order and good government as defined in the Canadian constitution. Moreover, the foreign policy White Paper included as well specific goals that can be construed68 W. D. Macnamara and Ann Fitz-Gerald, “A National Security Framework for Canada,” Policy Matters 3 (No. 10, October 2002): 1-27.106to be national objectives. These were the promotion of prosperity and employment, the protection of Canadian security within a stable global framework, and projecting Canadian values and culture.69These and other federal policy statements contain variations on the theme of fundamental Canadian values and goals. In summary, the values are democracy (freely elected, representative government), individual freedom (while respecting the rights of others, and social justice (intrinsic value of life). Canadian national goals may vary slightly from time to time, but invariably include security (including sovereignty), prosperity, rule-based international order, national unity, competitiveness, and sustainable development.4.2.1 Vital and Secondary InterestsTwo other terms used in conjunction with “national interests” are worthy of discussion. These terms are “vital” and “secondary” interests. A vital interest is a situation, event or trend that is of sufficient magnitude that it is perceived to threaten the survival or security of the nation. Since the threat is deemed so great, the nation would be prepared to counter it using strong measures including the use of military force. Such a scenario might include a direct attack on national territory, or a threat to national political or economic well-being such as endangered access to the energy supply. In any event, vital interests are those issues for which the state would be willing to go to war. By comparison, secondary interests are those goals that the state would like to attain but for which it would not resort to the use of force.4.2.2 Canada as a Maritime NationWhat is missing from the Ascher and Overholt model is the role of the seas. A maritime strategy is an essential component of the overall national strategy; however, it is relevant only when addressed in the context of the policy concerns of other areas.107Interests + Environment StrategyNational Values National GoalsDomestic / International• Political• Economic• Technological• Socio-Cultural• Military / Defence• Coast I OceansNational Policies• Foreign/Diplomatic• Economic• Technological• Economic• Military / Defence• Maritime I OceansFigure 4-2. A Simple Strategic Model (adapted for maritime interests)It should be apparent from the previous chapter that Canada, with the longest coastline of any country in the world and bounded by three oceans, is a maritime nation and, thus, should have a coherent maritime strategy. Canada has considerable offshore resources and is a trading nation heavily dependent on the free movement of goods upon the world's oceans. Certainly the composition of Canada's naval forces is in keeping with that of a maritime power, albeit a small one: a general purpose, expeditionary force.Some scholars suggest that a people’s proximity to the sea influences thenational character.70 The Canadian population, concentrated as it has alwaysbeen in the centre of the country and thus far away from the coasts, has nothistorically made the link between the use of the seas and economic prosperity.Cynthia Lamson notes that,for many Canadians, the oceans are simply beyond reach. Others take the oceans almost for granted and do not comprehend the need for special policy and management measures.”7169 Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada in the World: Canadian Foreign Policy Review (Ottawa: 1995), 14.; Canada, Department of National Defence, Shaping the Future of Canadian Defence: A Strategy for 2020 (Ottawa: June 1999), 25.70 E.C. Semple, Influences of Geography and Environment (New York: Henry Holt, 1911), 282, quoted in J.R.V. Prescott, The Political Geography of the Oceans, (London: David & Charles, 1975), 14.71 Cynthia Lamson, “Oceans Policy for a Complex World,” in The Sea Has Many Voices: Oceans Policy fora Complex World, ed. Cynthia Lamson (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1994), 6.108As a result, maritime interests have not been at the centre stage of political awareness.4.2.3 Vital Maritime InterestsIn 1991, the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies at Dalhousie University conducted a two-year study of Canada's maritime interests, primarily focussed on sustainable wealth generation and competitiveness. Fred Crickard, who led the study entitled Canadian Marine Policy and Strategy, identified the broad fields that a nation must take into account when developing a maritime strategy and applied these fields to the Canadian situation. In doing so, he identified Canada’s vital maritime interests. These are:a. Marine transportation and trade. This interest comprises shipping, shipbuilding, ports, harbours and waterways, search and rescue, and response to marine emergencies;b. Ocean environment. Protection of habitats, conservation of species, and pollution prevention are the main thrusts of this interest;c. Resource development. This category includes renewable resources such as fisheries, aqua-culture, and alternatives for generating energy, as well as non-renewable resources such as offshore petroleum and natural gas, minerals, and aggregates;d. Marine science and technology. Through this vital interest national capabilities in all oceans sectors are enhanced;e. Maritime security and sovereignty. This interest spans sovereignty, law enforcement, defence, and international stability.7272 M.E. Eames and C. Lamson, eds, Canadian Marine Policy and Strategy: National Requirements, (Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, 1993) as quoted in Fred Crickard, “Canada’s ocean and maritime security: A strategic forecast,” in Marine Policy 19 (No. 4, 1995): 335-342.109Given this brief overview of Canada’s broad national values, goals, and vital maritime interests, attention will be turned to how the federal government translates these interests into relevant policy. The first examination is a review of the evolution of oceans policy in Canada.4.3 Oceans PolicyThroughout its history, Canada traditionally has taken a slow, ad hoc and sometimes painful approach to oceans policy development, a process that has been described as a “youthful or hybrid form of resource or environmental policy formulation.”73 Fred Crickard observes that this policy development has occurred “institutionally by sectors under a lead federal agency and is further fragmented by the division of federal-provincial powers.”74 Ronald Crowley and Raymond Bourgeois are less complimentary in their opinion of the Canadian approach:There is probably not a single model to explain Canadian oceans policy development. Rather, what used to be called “muddling through” may provide the best explanation of individual commitments to oceans issues and the desire to improve management of our ocean space.754.3.1 Periods of Policy DevelopmentWhile the Canadian approach may have been fragmented, according to Crickard there were three distinct periods of national oceans policy-making that correspond roughly to the three decades that make up the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s.76 The first period can be categorised as a response to increased offshore hydrocarbon exploration, over-fishing, and marine pollution concerns. During the 1970s, the federal government shifted its foreign policy approach in international affairs towards what would be called today a more “Canada-centric”73 Lamson, “Oceans Policy for a Complex World,” 3.; Douglas Day, “Public Policy and Ocean Management in Canada,” Marine Policy 19, (No. 4, 1995): 251-256.; Cynthia Lamson, “Prospects: Towards a Three-Ocean, One-Nation Policy,” in The Sea Has Many Voices: Oceans Policy fora Complex World, ed. Cynthia Lamson (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1994), 321.74 Fred W. Crickard, “Oceans Policy and Naval Policy 1970 to 1997: Divergent Courses or Making the Rendezvous? The Canadian Experience,” in Summit o f the Sea: The United Nations International Year of the Ocean, 1998: Maritime Security Working Papers Number 7/8, (Halifax: Dalhousie University, 1997): 9.75 Ronald W. Crowley and Raymond C. Bourgeois, “The Development of Canada’s Ocean Policy,” Oceans ’89 Proceedings (Washington: Marine Technological Society, 1989), 178.76 Crickard, “Oceans Policy and Naval Policy 1970 to 1997,”11.110posture. Whereas in the twenty-years previous, when participation in multilateral organizations was seen as an excellent means of extending Canadian influence, in the future foreign policy was to be an extension abroad of Canadian national policy.77It was during this period that Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau introduced “sovereignty” into the federal government’s lexicon and placed the protection of sovereignty at the head of security and defence policymakers’ agendas. This occurred at a time when an increased awareness of the peaceful use of the oceans began to resonate with the Canadian public, coincident with a number of global marine pollution incidents. Likewise, the transits in 1969 and 1970 of the American vessel MV Manhattan through the Northwest Passage turned public attention northward. These challenges to Canadian sovereignty, along with concerns about environmental impact, over fishing on the East Coast, and unprecedented offshore petroleum exploration during an international oil crisis prompted a series of legislative measures. These included the declaration of a 12 nautical mile territorial sea through the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act, the introduction of the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act in 1972, and the unilateral declaration of a 200 nautical mile Exclusive Fishing Zone in 1977. Some analysts suggest that the latter two initiatives were the key events that signalled Canada’s intent to be perceived as a coastal state.78 Moreover, the federal government tabled a National Oceans Policy in 1973 that sought to guarantee Canadian industry participation in development of offshore resources and promoted key marine science and technology development. Regrettably, little tangible action resulted from this policy; some analysts suggest that it was simply ahead of its time.79By the early 1980s, a decline was registered in hydrocarbon exploration in Canada’s maritime zones due to lower world prices for oil and gas in concert with increased costs for their extraction offshore. This second period of oceans policy development saw environmental issues and the demise of fish stocks77 J.L. Granastein, Canadian Foreign Policy, (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1986), 52.78 Cynthia Lamson, “Oceans Policy for a Complex World,” 6.79 Crowley and Bourgeois, “The Development of Canada’s Ocean Policy,” 172.111supplant oil and gas exploration as the foci for oceans policy makers. By the mid-1980s, government officials realized that increased use of waters of direct interest to Canada called for a public examination rationalization of the diverse policies and regulations that had developed in the various oceans sectors. Responsibility for co-ordinating federal oceans policy was vested in the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans who, in 1987, tabled Canada’s first attempt at formulating a national oceans policy, a document titled Oceans Policy for Canada. This policy statement focussed on resource management as well as economic and technological opportunities in Canada’s maritime zones. It identified 75 ocean-related programs delivered by 14 federal departments at a cost of 1.3 billion dollars.80 Interestingly, the departments mentioned did not include the Navy, which at the time had a budget of 1.7 billion dollars. Oceans Policy for Canada was the first of a number Fisheries and Oceans national policy statements that grappled with resource exploitation and conservation themes but was largely void of consideration for maritime security, a trend that has continued to the present. However, the policy did articulate the need for coordination between federal departments with oceans-related mandates, another first.Also in the mid-1980s, the United States again challenged Canada’s claim to sovereignty in the Arctic by sending a Coast Guard ice-breaker, the USCGC Polar Sea, through the Northwest Passage in 1985 without prior permission from Canadian authorities. Although the Soviet submarine fleet remained North America’s main maritime security threat, some analysts believed the principal challenge to Canadian sovereignty would be by the nation’s close ally to the south. On a positive note, these incursions in the Arctic by the United States rekindled the sovereignty debate concerning Canada’s northern waters and focussed public attention on oceans issues.8180 Canada, Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Canada’s Oceans: An Economic Overview anda Guide to Federal Government Activities Communications Directorate DO, Ottawa, 1987, 54-65.81 F.W. Crickard, “Peace and Security in the Arctic, Decision for Canada: Nuclear Powered Submarine and Other Canadian Military Options,” Peace and Security in the Arctic, Decision for Canada (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, November 1987), 3.; Crowley and Bourgeois, “The Development of Canada’s Ocean Policy,” 171.112The third period of oceans policy development bore witness to increased emphasis on oceans governance and a shift from technology-based development to a regulatory-based approach to oceans management. With the 1990 fall of the Berlin Wall, defence planners recognized that the main Soviet maritime threat, its vast submarine force, could no longer be sustained and would fall into decline. Non-military threats replaced those of the Soviet empire, and were manifested by increasing over-fishing, marine pollution, narcotics smuggling, and illegal immigration in Canada’s maritime zones. A House of Commons committee in 1990 re-defined sovereignty protection to include these non-military threats, and identified the “major challenge confronting Canadian maritime policy” as likely being “the effective control of our coast waters and the 200 mile economic zone.”824.3.2 The Oceans ActThe Canadian government became increasingly aware of the oceans as a medium for sustainable wealth generation during the early 1990s. This increased awareness coincided with the coming into effect of the UNCLOS III Convention in 1997. However, more importantly, it was introduction of Canada’s Oceans Act in the same year that signalled that the government was truly serious about creating relevant policy in the management of Canada’s three oceans in a more comprehensive and balanced manner.83 The Oceans Act consolidated a number of extant ocean-related statutes into a single piece of legislation that promoted integrated coastal zone management, and paved the way for Canada’s 6 November 2003 ratification of the third United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea. More importantly, a legislative framework was created to support ocean governance in Canada.84 In 2001, five years after the enactment of the Oceans Act, a House of Commons committee found that the legislation had proved to be fundamentally sound.8582 Canada, House of Commons, Maritime Sovereignty, Report of the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs (Ottawa: November 1990), 2.83 Crickard and Herbert, “An Oceans Strategy for the Northwest Atlantic,” 27.84 Crickard, “Oceans Policy and Naval Policy 1970 to 1997,” 26.85 Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on Fisheries and Oceans. Report on the Oceans Act. October, 2001.< http://www.parl.gc.ca/infocomdoc/37/1/FOPO/Studies/Reports/ fopo01/07-intro-e.htm#INTRODUCTION> (11 April 2005).1134.3.3 Canada’s Ocean StrategyThe Oceans Act designated Fisheries and Oceans Canada as the lead department for oceans policy development in this country. After five years of formulation, including a public consultation process, Canada’s Ocean Strategy (COS) was formally launched in 2002. The aim of the strategy is to set policy direction for oceans management and it sets out several overarching goals. The first goal is replace the existing fragmented approach to oceans management with a collaborative integrated approach coordinating the 23 federal departments and agencies that have ocean-related policies, legislation or activities. Other goals include expanding working partnerships in the oceans sector, understanding and protecting the marine environment, optimizing the sustainable economic potential of the oceans and positioning Canada as a world leader in oceans management.86More importantly, Canada’s Ocean Strategy promotes effective ocean governance, including exercise of national sovereignty and security. The strategy recognizes the fundamental right in international law for Canada to exert sovereignty over its national maritime zones, and confirms that enforcement is key to the protection of Canadian sovereignty and maintenance of maritime order and security. Furthermore, Canada’s Ocean Strategy calls for a coordinated system of surveillance and monitoring of Canadian ocean space.87 However, the document does not prescribe how to effect these surveillance and enforcement requirements, i.e., responsibilities by department, or which agency has the lead.4.3.4 The Oceans Action PlanIn opening Parliament in the autumn of 2004, Prime Minister Paul Martin announced that “the Government will also move forward on its Oceans Action Plan by maximizing the use and development of oceans technology, establishing a network of marine protected areas, implementing integrated management plans, and enhancing the enforcement of rules governing oceans and fisheries,86 Canada, Foreign Affairs Canada, Canada and the Oceans, 16 November 2004, (28 January 2005).8f Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Canada’s Oceans Strategy (Ottawa: 2002), 17-18.114including rules governing straddling stocks.88” Unveiled in May 2005, this plan noted the failure of existing Canadian oceans management methods, due to a fragmented approach to complex issues by public and private sector stakeholders, a general lack of transparency, and a reactive posture to emerging problems rather than adoption of proactive strategies. This failure resulted in declining fish stocks, increased species at risk, and “growing user conflicts.”89The Oceans Action Plan comprises the four central pillars of international leadership, sovereignty, and security; integrated oceans management for sustainable development; health of the oceans; and oceans science and technology. With regards to the first pillar, international leadership, sovereignty, and security, the sub-themes here are overseeing the implementation of UN Law of the Sea, oceans governance, maritime security, sovereignty in the Arctic and extension of jurisdiction over the continental shelf. The Oceans Action Plan confirms maritime security as being fundamental to oceans management, and endorses its links to the National Security Policy.90The second pillar, integrated oceans management for sustainable development, is focussed on marine conservation, ecosystem-based and multiple-use oceans management, sustainable development of fisheries and aquaculture, and Aboriginal participation. The third pillar, health of the oceans, concentrates on the establishment of Marine Protected Areas, species at risk issues, pollution prevention, and the streamlining of environmental regulatory processes. The last main thrust of the Oceans Action Plan is oceans science and technology, including championing development of the oceans technology sector, the improvement of Canadian seabed mapping expertise, and ocean mapping for United Nations Law of the Sea purposes.9188 Speech from the Throne: To Open the First Session of the Thirty-Eighth Parliament of Canada, October 5, 2004, p. 13.89 Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Canada’s Oceans Action Plan: For Present and Future Generations, 27 May 2005, p. 4. (22 December 2005).0 Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Canada’s Oceans Action Plan: For Present and Future Generations, 6.91 Ibid., 5.115The Oceans Action Plan also calls for international partnerships for oceans stewardship, a bilateral council on the Gulf of Maine, adoption of an Arctic Marine Strategic Plan, and continued use of the North Atlantic Fisheries Organization to counter over-fishing. However, as in the case of Canada’s Ocean Strategy of 2002, the Oceans Action Plan does not prescribe interdepartmental responsibilities for maritime security, surveillance or enforcement 92The Oceans Act, Canada’s Oceans Strategy, and the Ocean Action Plan are recent key policy initiatives that indicate that Canadian politicians are starting to recognize that national sovereignty and security are fundamental governmental duties, and that surveillance and monitoring of Canada’s offshore estate are important components of these responsibilities. However, what is less clear, from an oceans policy perspective, is where and how those responsibilities are to be co-ordinated within the framework of federal departments with maritime interests. One would reasonably expect that security and defence policy should provide greater clarity to this issue. The next part of this chapter examines exactly that.4.4 National Security and Defence PolicyIt should be noted at the start of this discussion that in the literature, the distinction between the security policy and defence policy is often blurred. Frequently the term security is used to mean defence and vice versa. For the purposes of this thesis, defence policy is deemed to be a sub-set of national security policy. In other words, defence is but one component to providing an umbrella of security for CanadiansThe history of security and defence policy development in Canada has not been punctuated with startling epiphanies or tremendous foresight. In fact, up until 2004, no overarching national security policy had been committed to paper, and many political analysts note that Canada’s ad hoc national security policy92 Ibid., 11-12.116making apparatus had been unable to bring policy coherence within government.93 One author argues that Canada’s fundamental inability to articulate its strategic interests, crucial in the formulation of a coherent security policy, reflects a fundamental lack of strategic culture.94 This inability has meant that crisis-based management of security and defence has been the norm. A dichotomy exists between the standard rhetoric of many governmental pronouncements on national security, be they written policy statements or public addresses by elected officials, and the actual choices that are made when prioritising and allocating human and fiscal resources to the departments responsible for providing this security.Several authors suggest that the immense size of Canada, bounded by three oceans, and its proximity to the United States, makes it both indefensible yet largely free from the threat of invasion. These factors are cited by analysts as a partial explanation of why security and defence policy have seldom been high on the government agenda. Douglas Bland, Sean Maloney and Jeff Tasseron suggest that the de facto strategy of past Canadian Prime Ministers, perhaps more by design than omission, has been to maintain as little defence structure as the government could get away with. Tasseron also remarks on the “split personality” of Canadian defence policy, in which the elected officials claim security and defence of Canada as the number one priority, yet structure the Armed Forces for international military commitments.95Having noted the rather loose process employed in defence policy development, it is useful to review the main documents that have lead up to Canada’s most recent defence policy statement. Following that, the latest development in security policy formulation will be reviewed.93 Douglas L. Bland and Sean M. Maloney, Campaigns for International Security: Canada’s Defence Policy at the Turn of the Century (Kingston, ON: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004), 190-195.; Jeff Tasseron, “Facts and Invariants: The Changing Context of Canadian Defence Policy,” Canadian Military Journal 4, No. 2 (Summer 2003): 19-30.94 Scot Robertson, “Finding a Way: National Security and Defence Policy for a New Liberal Leadership Policy Options 25, No. 1 (December 2003/January 2004): 56-61.95 George Lindsey et al., “Canada’s Security Policies,” Behind the Headlines, Vol 60, No. 2 (Winter 2002/2003), 1-16; Bland and Maloney, Canada’s Defence Policy at the Turn of the Century, 193-194.; Tasseron, “Facts and Invariants,” 19-30.117From the end of the Second World War until the late 1960s, the primary focus of Canadian foreign policy was to support collective security through the United Nations and other security alliances. The effect of this approach was that defence policy gravitated towards Canadian participation North Atlantic Treaty Association (NATO) and North American Air Defence (NORAD) arrangements.96 Defence policy aims shifted with the election of Pierre Trudeau in 1968. The new Prime Minister believed that, rather than have “participation” as the key policy objective, foreign and domestic policy both should be driven by national interests, with defence policy flowing directly from foreign policy. Trudeau’s understanding of the armed forces was poor, and his perception of their value was even less sophisticated. He rapidly commissioned reviews of defence and foreign policy during a period of increasing inflation that was having negative effects on the Canadian economy.97By 1969, the defence review had been completed and three reports had been tabled by External Affairs, the Department of National Defence, and the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence. All of these reports recommended Canada’s continued commitment to NATO, a course of action that held little allure for the Prime Minister. With European nations having recovered from the ruin of the Second World War, and a general development of detente between the superpowers, Trudeau reasoned that there was little rationale for continuing the nation’s contribution to NATO at existing levels. Trudeau directed that a special report be produced that more accurately reflected his thoughts on the direction in which defence policy should head. The secret report, Canadian Defence Policy - A Study, recommended that Canada’s commitment to NATO be reduced, and that the military’s focus shift more towards domestic roles. Canadian Defence Policy - A Study formed the basis for future Cabinet decision-making pertaining to defence.9896 Bruce Thordarson, Trudeau and Foreign Policy (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 1972),174.; Canada, Department of National Defence, Defence in the 70s (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1971), 1.97 Pierre Elliott Trudeau, “The Relationship of Defence Policy to Foreign Policy,” Statements and Speeches, No. 69/8, April 12,1969.; J.L. Granastein and Robert Bothwell, Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), p.8.; Thordarson, Trudeau and Foreign Policy, 174.98 Denis Stairs, “Pierre Trudeau and the Politics of the Canadian Foreign Policy Review,” Australian Outlook 26 (No. 3, 1972): 193-196.118In April 1969, Trudeau publicly outlined a different philosophy for defence that held the armed forces were better employed domestically in Canada than in Europe. He continued by outlining the new defence priorities. These were surveillance of Canada’s territory and coastlines (sovereignty protection), defence of North America in co-operation with the United States, fulfilment of agree-upon commitments to NATO, and performance of international peacekeeping missions."Trudeau left no doubt as to which of the defence priorities was most important. In a speech later that month, he opined that, “our first priority is the protection of Canadian sovereignty, in all the dimensions that it means.”100 He then tasked the Minister of National Defence to draft a Defence White Paper that incorporated the shift in priorities. White Papers are policy statements that the Canadian government normally tables to promulgate policy within a specific ministry or sector. They may “codify incremental policy decisions aggregated over time, reaffirm previous commitments, or outline new policy thrusts of the government of the day.”101 Crickard observes that Canadian Defence White Papers are both policy statements as well as force development statements.102 The White Paper ordered by Trudeau was completed in 1971.4.4.1 The 1971 Defence White PaperPrime Minister Trudeau’s intent to shift away from NATO-driven defence objectives was articulated in the 1971 Defence White Paper, Defence in the 70s. The government, given the assumption that a state of detente existed between East and West, called for the reduction of Canadian military forces in Europe by half, in addition to personnel cuts at home, with concomitant reductions in defence expenditures. Defence in the 70s set the priority of the domestic99 Thordarson, Trudeau and Foreign Policy, 182.100 Trudeau, “The Relationship of Defence Policy to Foreign Policy.”101 Fred Crickard, “The Role of Maritime Strategy in Ocean Development and Management,” in Canadian Ocean Law and Policy, ed. David Vanderzwaag (Toronto: Butterworths, 1992), 515.102 Force development is the process of determining the operational capabilities required by an armed service from guidance articulated in national strategies and policies. The armed service’s organizational, leadership, personnel, training, materiel, and education capability requirements are developed into programs and structure, to accomplish the service’s missions and functions.119security, including protection against non-military threats, ahead of bilateral or NATO commitments which had, in the past, been what shaped defence policy development. The 1971 White Paper established the requirement to create military operations centres on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts to collaborate with other government departments on surveillance operations because, as it stated, “National Defence has, however, ultimate responsibility to ensure that overall an adequate Canadian surveillance and control capability exists for the protection of Canadian sovereignty and security.”103Three short years after the Defence White Paper, another review was undertaken. This was the 1974 Defence Services Review.4.4.2 The 1974 Defence Services ReviewBy the end of 1974, all federal departments were feeling the full effect thatdouble digit inflation had on operating budgets. At the Department of NationalDefence, major equipment such as tanks, ships and combat aircraft, were eitherat the end or approaching their useful lives. The Department was undersignificant pressure to downsize and cut back on expenditures. The Minister ofNational Defence, Mr. James Richardson, described the situation as follows,With no major equipment purchases for almost ten years, and insufficient resources to met day-to-day operational needs, the Canadian Armed Forces were approaching the point where they could no longer carry out effectively the tasks assigned to them, either at home or abroad.104The MND assembled a review committee to determine how the Armed Forces could best achieve its roles and missions within the reduced fiscal environment of the mid-Seventies. In essence, it was a capital acquisition plan with the aim of reversing the rapid decline in Canadian military capability. Fundamental to the committee’s recommendation was its assessment that detente rests on the maintenance of a balance of power, and that Canada had benefited from its collective security arrangements with its allies. Thus, in the Defence Services103 Canada, Department of National Defence, Defence in the 70s (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1971), 10.104 C.J. Marshall, “Canada’s Forces take stock in Defence Structure Review," International Perspectives (January/February, 1976): 26.120Review report there was a re-emergence of allied commitments as the key determinant of military force structure. In only three years, sovereignty protection had slipped from the number one priority to be replaced by participation in NATO.105Protection of Canadian sovereignty would not remain on the back burner of federal priorities for long. In 1977, the Canadian government declared a 200 nautical mile exclusive fisheries zone, thereby dramatically increasing the maritime waters over which Canada claimed jurisdiction by several million square kilometres. The federal government was responsible to monitor and enforce this vast area, and the Canadian Navy had a not insignificant role in sovereignty protection within this new maritime zone.4.4.3 The 1987 Defence White PaperIn 1987, the same year that the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans promulgated Oceans Policy for Canada, the Minister of National Defence tabled a new White Paper titled Challenge and Commitment. Very much a Cold War document, this policy statement argued that “the first objective of Canada’s security policy” was to promote a stable international environment in which Canadian interests and values could prosper. The main thrust of Challenge and Commitment was that collective security and deterrence would continue to be supported through Canada’s engagement in NATO and NORAD. It called for the defence of domestic territory, largely through an expanded Reserve force, and it reaffirmed the nation’s commitment to land and air forces to Central Europe. Moreover, Canada’s military would be provided the requisite modern equipment needed to carry out its missions and to maintain credibility through a “steady, predictable, and honest funding program.” 106While the capabilities of all elements of the armed forces were to be augmented, the maritime forces were the clear winners in this blueprint. Through Challenge and Commitment, a Canadian government had tabled for the first time105 Ibid., 30.106 Canada, Department of National Defence, Challenge and Commitment - A Defence Policy for Canada (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1987), 3.121a defence policy statement that portrayed Canada as a maritime nation with vital security and sovereignty interests in three oceans, and portended the creation of a “Three Ocean Navy” concept.Unfortunately, the Minister of National Defence who had championed the 1987 White Paper left office shortly after its release, and within two years his replacement was also gone. In 1989, a new Minister announced the cancellation of fourteen of the major capital projects that the White Paper had called for, including the project to acquire nuclear-powered submarines for Arctic sovereignty patrols. Within another year, the Berlin Wall toppled, and the rationale behind the 1987 White Paper had been called into question. An election loomed in 1993, and during the campaign it became evident that all of the political parties expected that whatever the election’s outcome, the defence budget would be reduced as Canada reaped the “peace dividend” from the end of the Cold War.1074.4.4 The 1994 Defence Review and Defence White PaperIn 1994 the new Liberal Minister of National Defence announced a defence policy review. The Minister promulgated a “Minister’s Guidance” document that specified the scope of the review, and it became clear that the exercise was designed to shift the focus of defence policy away from its Cold War emphasis towards a policy that was more internationalist. Included in the “Minister’s Guidance” were a suggested range of tasks that the Armed Forces could be expected to undertake. These included those normally associated with sovereignty protection, i.e. actions to support enforcement against illegal fishing, drug smuggling, human trafficking, and pollution. As well, the Canadian Forces could expect to support search and rescue operations and provide humanitarian aid. The guidance also included military support to both NATO and continental defence in co-operation with the United States.107 Claire Turenne Sjolander, Cashing in on the ‘Peace Divident’: National Defence in the Post- Cold War World,” Gene Swimmer, ed. How Ottawa spends 1996-97: Life under the Knife (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1995), 253.122The review committee issued its report in October 1994. Titled Security in a Changing World, the report recommended a number of policy positions. Foremost, the report recommended establishing the protection of sovereignty as the fundamental role of the Armed Forces. Moreover, it advocated a continued partnership with the United States in the defence of North America, and considered continued participation in NORAD as essential. Security in a Changing World, recommended that Canada retain membership in the NATO Alliance, and that the nation continue to participate in United Nations and other multinational peacekeeping missions. Also, for the first time, the report suggested that Canadian security pay more attention to the Pacific coast.108The 1994 Defence White Paper was released one month following the tabling of the Special Joint Committee’s report. It was the first Defence White Paper published in the post-Cold War era. While the document very much reflected the government’s stated aim of reduced defence spending, it nevertheless reiterated the requirement for the Canadian Forces to deal with sovereignty challenges. To address sovereignty protection, the White Paper listed several naval roles that included rendering assistance to other government departments in achieving national goals such as environmental protection, disaster relief, drug interdiction, and fisheries protection, as well the continued maintenance of a search and rescue capability. Moreover, the 1994 White Paper charged the Navy with demonstrating, on a regular basis, the ability to monitor and control activity within the nation’s maritime zones. The 1994 Defence White Paper would be the only defence policy document to serve Canadian defence community for over a decade.Before examining the development of a much overdue security policy, the following points are offered to recap Canadian defence policy development post- World War II. Since the mid-sixties Defence White Papers have followed a simple basic template. Indeed, they contained some reference to strategic assessment, but were largely devoid of meaningful choices for defence.109108 Canada, House of Commons, Security in a Changing World: The Report of the Special Joint Committee on Canada’s Defence Policy (Ottawa: 1994), 33.109 Bland and Maloney, Canada’s Defence Policy at the Turn of the Century, 193-194.123Bland and Maloney assert that these “copy-cat” White Papers reflected the strategic stalemate of the Cold War. They further argue that, traditionally, the armed forces have been viewed by politicians as a burden to the taxpayer, and the development of defence policy in Canada has been more about fitting it in around other policy objectives rather than prioritizing defence goals so that they can mutually support other policy themes.110The lack of an established mechanism for national security operations in Canada has been recognized for some time. The responsibility for various aspects of national security has rested with several federal departments and agencies, with ad hoc coordination of issues being the norm. In the past, Bland and Maloney, as well as other analysts, have called for shifts in policy, organization and procedures to facilitate an adequate state of security. Specifically, they argued for the federal government to articulate a broad definition of national security and to introduce an overarching national security policy. As well, they suggested that the federal government develop the means to bring together under the aegis of a national security policy the diverse organs of government charged with security tasks. Their third recommendation was that responsibility for national security planning and operations be vested in a single minister ostensibly so that redundancies in staffing and delays in decisionmaking could be reduced.111 For over 20 years, analysts criticised successive Canadian governments for failing to produce an overarching security policy, and it took until 2005, four full years after the attacks on North American soil at the World Trade Center, for such a policy to be realized.4.4.5 The National Security PolicyThe creation of a new federal department, known as Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC), and the concomitant appointment on 12 December 2003 of Anne McLellan as the department’s responsible Minister were the first major federal initiatives to address the coordination issue. Then, in April 2004, the federal government tabled Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy. This document attempts to set policy110 Ibid.124direction in an integrated fashion for effective multiple agency threat assessment, protection and prevention capabilities, and effective consequence management. The core national security interests articulated are protecting Canada and the safety and security of Canadians at home and abroad, ensuring that Canada is not a base for threats to its allies, and contributing to international security.112The National Security Policy breaks down the security conundrum into six key areas. These are in the domains of intelligence, emergency planning and management, public health, transport security, border security, and international security. For the purposes of this thesis, two of these are germane. In terms of intelligence, the policy speaks to increasing capabilities for intelligence collection, applying greater focus to security intelligence and, most importantly, creating a new integrated threat assessment centre.113 If executed, these initiatives will enhance the Navy’s ability to filter and act upon relevant information. The second area of interest to the Navy is transport security. In this section, the National Security Policy calls for an improvement to Canadian marine security by means of a six-point plan.114Maritime security, as a component of national security, can be defined as the compilation of practices that a nation observes to protect its maritime interests abroad, along its coasts, and in its maritime approaches. It concerns how the nation deals with maritime commerce (ports and shipping), resource exploitation (offshore platforms and fishing), and national interests in international waters and foreign ports.115Officials for Transport Canada suggest that the requisite activities that constitute a national maritime security system can be categorized into four general themes. The first is domain awareness. In developing this awareness,111 Ibid., 200-201.112 Canada, Privy Council Office, Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy (Ottawa: 2004), 5.113 Ibid.,15-20.114 Ibid., 38-39.115 Peter Avis, “Comparing National Approaches to Maritime Security in the Post 9/11 Era” (M.A. thesis, Carleton University, 2004), 3.125surveillance information from sensors and other inputs is fused with intelligence collected to produce both an analysis and an understandable picture of the marine and air traffic as well as other activities in a coastal state’s maritime zones. Successful domain awareness is the result of close coordination between domestic and international military, intelligence and law enforcement agencies, and the proof of success occurs when authorities are focussing attention on the right threats “in the right areas at the right time” on a routine basis.116 Domain awareness is largely a proactive preventative activity.The second element of a marine security system is safeguarding. This term refers to measures taken to protect the marine infrastructure against physical harm. Safeguarding also includes efforts taken to prevent criminals or terrorists from gaining access to North America or any part of the marine transportation system.Responsiveness is the third maritime security component. This reactive activity pertains to enforcement efforts undertaken by a coastal state to intercept and apprehend criminals, terrorists, or other threats to national security. All appropriate police and military forces, and mandated security agencies form part of this activity.The final requisite theme in an effective system is collaboration. This element is integral to the afore-mentioned maritime security activities. Collaboration can be viewed as an “enabler” activity for all components of security.117 Collaboration entails effective sharing, both horizontal and vertical, of information among bodies vested with security mandates and, in terms of action, includes coordination, cooperation and acting in a unified manner on security issues. Collaboration is largely a proactive preventative activity whose importance to successful maritime security cannot be overstated.118116 Ibid.,13.117 Ibid.118 Canada, Transport Canada, Enhancing the Security o f Canada’s Marine Transportation System (Ottawa: Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group, 2004), 3.126The marine security plan described in Securing an Open Society sets out to enhance coordination by designating lead agency status among the various departments and agencies with security mandates. For example, the Minister of Transport has become the designated lead for marine security policy coordination and the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness will retain the lead for enforcement and policing. In a new development, the Minister of National Defence has been assigned the lead for the “coordination of on-water response to a marine threat or a developing crisis in our Exclusive Economic Zone and along our coasts.”119Another element of the six-part plan is the establishment of naval-led Marine Security Operations Centres (MSOC) at various locations in the country that will house representatives from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Canadian Coast Guard, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Transport Canada, the Canadian Border Security Agency, and the United States Coast Guard. The purpose of these centres will be to capitalize on in-house interagency staffing to detect, assess, and respond to marine security threats.120 MSOCs went into operation in Halifax and Esquimalt in 2005, and a similar centre is being planned for the Great Lakes region, most likely to be situated at Niagara-on-the-Lake, Ontario.The marine security plan also calls for increased patrols at sea, ostensibly to “better position . . . to intervene, interdict, and board ships that may pose threats to Canada.”121 In addition, aerial surveillance by Fisheries and Oceans Canada in conjunction with DND is identified as an element requiring further effort. Increased co-operation with the United States is a stated objective of the plan, as well as strengthening the security of marine ports and facilities.122The sixth component of the plan is designed to address the inability of the three government fleets to pass intelligence, surveillance, and common operating picture data electronically to one another and to shore authorities. The119 Privy Council Office, Securing an Open Society, 38.120 Ibid., 38-39.121 Ibid., 39.127DND-led Maritime Information Management and Data Exchange (MIMDEX) project was established to rectify this gap in capability. The project uses multiagency legacy IT systems to link marine-related information into a common picture.123As a policy document, Securing an Open Society succeeds in identifying clear priorities for harmonizing security in the post-911 environment. Top-level bureaucrats will find sufficient fodder within the policy to justify expenditures to programs that transcend departmental mandates. However, the shortcomings of this policy are three-fold. First, it struggles to remain a strategic-level document, and in almost every section reads like a report card for the current government, citing successes achieved and expenditures made to date for various initiatives. No reference is made to future expenditure, so it is difficult to gauge what the level of commitment might be to security issues in the future when governments will undoubtedly be under pressure for greater spending on social programs. Second, there is little mention of existing gaps in the current framework of security policies and processes, making it problematic to determine how current practices will tie into a cogent long-term strategy. Third, Securing an Open Society leaves the role of the Canadian Forces in national security largely unarticulated, except for passing mention in relation to maritime security.A basic understanding of the components of maritime security is necessary to understand how it is dealt with in Canada, and what role the Navy plays in its maintenance. The next few paragraphs will examine maritime security and the issue of sovereignty in greater detail.4.4.6 Maritime SovereigntyIn the area in which oceans, defence and security issues trisect, certain themes reappear and are common to all three policy objectives, namely maintenance of sovereignty, surveillance, and enforcement. The first term,122 Ibid.123 There are officially only two government fleets, those of Fisheries and Oceans Canada and the Navy. Although the Canadian Coast Guard is administered by DFO and its ships are painted in the same colour scheme, for all intents and purposes its corporate culture and operating practices make it a separate fleet.128sovereignty, is worthy of further discussion since the concept is often confused with the terms security and defence.In the international system, sovereignty has come to mean the legal identity of a state. Within international law, it is recognized that sovereign states by right are permitted to exercise exclusive jurisdiction within their borders. In other words, sovereignty “signifies the capacity to make authoritative decisions with regard to the people and resources within the territory of the state.”124 This right includes ocean areas claimed as a nation’s territory. In 1990, the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs (SCONDVA) developed a definition of Canadian sovereignty as a benchmark for their study on maritime sovereignty. SCONDVA defines sovereignty as:the prevention of trespass, the provision of services and theenforcement of national and international law with Canadianterritory, waters and airspace.125Vice-Admiral Gary Garnett observes that sovereignty is perceived generally to mean “supreme dominion, authority or rule” within the bounds of territorial limits.126 In the maritime context in Law of the Sea, territorial limits means the waters of the territorial seas. However, Garnett also notes that with the evolution of international Law of the Sea, and its consequent establishment of a regime of different zones in which coastal states are afforded different rights, perhaps a broader definition of maritime sovereignty is in order.127 As codified by the UN Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) III, and pursuant to Canada’s Oceans Act of 1996, the maritime offshore “real estate” of Canada is divided into three distinct zones, as described in Chapter Three. These zones are the territorial waters from the coast or baseline out to 12 nautical miles, the contiguous zone from 12 to 24 nautical miles, and the exclusive economic zone124 Report o f the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty: The Responsibility to Protect, by Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, co-chairs (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001), 12.125 Canada. House of Commons. Report of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs: Maritime Sovereignty. November, 1990, 5.126 Gary L. Garnett. “The Navy’s Role in the Protection of National Sovereignty.” In An OceansManagement Strategy for the Northwest Atlantic in the 21st Century: The Niobe Papers; Volume 9, edited by Peter T. Haydon and Gregory L. Witol (Halifax: The Naval Officers Association of Canada, 1998), 2.129that extends to 200 nautical miles from shore. Under both international law and the Oceans Act, Canada’s sovereign rights diminish with increased distance from the coastline as depicted in Figure 4-3. Garnett points out that this situation stands in contrast to land-based sovereignty. In the terrestrial context, he notes that well-defined boundaries clearly delineate the limits of a state’s sovereignty. Thus, he proposes that Canada’s maritime sovereignty should permit the nation “to enforce internationally recognized jurisdictions and enjoy acknowledged national prerogatives in a nation’s various coastal zones.”128Sovereign rights as per landCustomsImmigratiFiscalPollutionFishingSeabedContiguousZoneRestricted RightsFishingSeabedExclusive Economic ZoneInternal Territorial Waters SeaFigure 4-3. Rights of Coastal States in Offshore ZonesSources: Figure drawn from text of United Nations, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 Dec 1982, Parts II and V; and Oceans Act, R.S.C. 1996, c31, s.4 - 16.A vital element of sovereignty is the willingness of a nation to protect its maritime zones against hostile acts or violations of domestic law. Nations that make claims of sovereignty yet do not demonstrate what Garnett terms “sea control” of their offshore estate can find their claims challenged on a legal basis. Put another way, “state sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility . . . lies with the state itself.”129 As Peter Haydon highlights, if Canadian laws are broken, a response must be initiated and executed by Canadians. It is a Canadian responsibility. He further stresses that not maintaining the capability to control all activities within a state’s coastal zones is129Evans and Sahnoun, Responsibility to Protect, xi.130“tacit acceptance that others may use them as they please without regard or respect for the law. This is an abrogation of sovereignty.130The Senate Committee on National Security and Defence (SCONSAD) remarked that both the 1971 and 1987 Defence White Papers spoke to the necessity of maintaining Canadian sovereignty, but stressed the civilian and military components differently. The 1971 White Paper articulated sovereignty to a greater degree in non-military or quasi-military terms, clearly influenced by concerns about the fisheries and the environment. By contrast, the 1987 White Paper emphasized the military component of sovereignty. SCONSAD concludes in Maritime Sovereignty that the Canadian government’s approach to sovereignty protection requires, as Martin Shadwick testified before the Committee, “a hybrid approach that takes into account the non-military, the quasi-military, and the military requirements . . . a well-thought-out, flexible and multi-tasked approach to maritime sovereignty.”131Robert W. Timbrell cautions that security and sovereignty cannot be considered the same entity:Sovereignty is not the same as security. Without security, sovereignty cannot mean very much . . . It would be possible for Canada to lose a large measure of sovereignty without increased danger of invasion, destruction, or loss of territory. Moreover, some of the sources that threaten our sovereignty could be our strongest allies for the preservation of security. Whereas our security is bound up with that of our allies, our sovereignty is our own problem, to be defended by ourselves alone.132Douglas Bland agrees, although he asserts that tasks aimed at dealing with violations of sovereign territory cannot be separated from those performed130 Peter Haydon, “Canadian Naval Requirements for the 21st Century,” Council for Canadian Security in the 21st Century, 29 April 2002, (2 February 2005).131 House of Commons, Maritime Sovereignty, 5.132 Address by Rear-Admiral R.W. Timbrell to the Royal United Services Institute, Victoria, B.C. 21 March 179 as quoted by in Tasseron, “Facts and Invariants,”20.131in the defence of North America.133 Bland cautions against confusing military defence tasks with those whose purpose is to maintain legal sovereignty. He contends that the use of military forces to exert sovereignty is not an efficient use of federal resources, particularly when there is no military threat, and there are other, better-suited departments or agencies present that can represent Canadian interests in this regard. Further, he argues that in the post-9/11 period when there is heightened concern about the threat of terrorism, the military should not become the lead agency in domestic situations.134Bland is absolutely correct in his assertion that maintaining sovereignty is not exclusively a military activity; indeed, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Canadian Coast Guard, and Fisheries and Oceans Canada bear the brunt of the sovereignty responsibility. But the Navy, and the Air Force when acting on the Navy’s behalf, should not be constrained from showing the flag whenever defence and sovereignty missions overlap, or other government departments are unable to maintain an appropriate presence for whatever the reason.Although without question a nation’s laws can be enforced at sea by civilian agencies, effective law enforcement relies on the deterrent effect that sufficient force can be brought to bear to compel compliance. Canadian nonmilitary maritime agencies cannot provide this requisite criterion and cannot meet force with force in the event of an aggressive challenge to national security.135 Thus law enforcement at sea in Canada relies on the backing of the Navy to provide credible armed force because only the armed forces have the authority and legal justification to use violence in a major way in support of policy.A sovereign coastal state must know what is going on above, below, and at the surface of its waters. This understanding includes not just the human spectre, but encompasses a complete awareness of the marine biosphere,133 Douglas L. Bland and Sean M. Maloney, Defence Policy for the World Order Era: The First Steps - Reconstitution and Transformation (Kingston, ON: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004), p.204.134 Ibid., 204-205.132geography, climatology and oceanography of the offshore estate.136 Moreover, in order to exercise full sovereignty, a nation must be able to control the human activities in the waters under its jurisdiction. This requirement is termed sea control.Sea control of a nation’s offshore estate can be achieved throughsurveillance, monitoring, and response.137 In the maritime context, surveillancerequires current knowledge of who is on, above, or below the waters and impliesthe maintenance of an infrastructure capable of detecting and reportingsituations of interest in the maritime zones. In Competitiveness and Security, the1985 Green Paper on External Affairs noted that,Control over our national territory, airspace, and coastal waters is essential, both for the assertion of our sovereignty and for preservation of our security. To be effective, control requires a surveillance and detection system able to provide an continuing picture of activities on land, in the air, and at sea. . . Most countries exert such control as a matter of routine. In our case, it is a daunting task, considering the length of our coastlines, the vastness of our territory, the hostility of our climate, and the disproportionately small size of our population.138Monitoring is the second element of domestic sea control. It refers to active observation of the maritime domain through locating, identifying, tracking and inspecting human activities in the water column and super-adjacent airspace. Monitoring is an unmistakable expression of the government’s will and authority in the area of jurisdiction. The action that a state takes to respond to incidents that threaten national security or sovereignty or, in other words, an action that forces compliance with domestic and international laws, regulations and standards is known as enforcement.139135 Amphion, “Do We Really Need a Navy?” Maritime Affairs (January, 1997): 12.136 Garnett. “The Navy’s Role in the Protection of National Sovereignty,” 3.137 Crickard and Herbert. “An Oceans Strategy for the Northwest Atlantic,” 42.138 Canada, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Competitiveness and Security (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1985), 85.139 Amphion, “Do We Really Need a Navy?” 11; Peter Haydon, “Why Do We Need a Navy?” Naval Officers Association of British Columbia (29 March 2005).133The third element of sea control of the offshore estate is response. Crickard and Herbert propose basic areas of marine activity that nations must control if they are to be taken seriously as coastal states.140 These areas include the management of renewable and non-renewable marine resources, the protection and preservation of the marine environment, the maintenance of maritime sovereignty and prevention of illegal activity, and the maintenance of marine safety. These areas, according to Crickard and Herbert, require responses through the use of operational, legal, political, and non-government resources. Operational responses refer to the wide range of personnel, equipment, and platforms as well as command and control infrastructure used to exercise jurisdiction at sea. Legal responses are the national system of laws, regulations, standards and procedures applicable to the coastal state’s jurisdiction. They may also be regional or international treaties that have been incorporated into the state’s legal system. The nature of political responses can be intra-governmental, inter-departmental and inter-agency, as well as being regional or international in dimension. The non-government responses refer to the active participation of key stakeholders, such as industry, user groups, coastal communities, NGOs, and aboriginal groups in such a way as to promote sustainable oceans use and management. The mix of responses used by a nation depends upon its unique requirements and the resources at its disposal.1414.5 Whither Surveillance Policy?As discussed earlier in this chapter, the need for surveillance of Canada’s maritime zones is present in oceans, defence, and security policy frameworks. What is fascinating, though, is that until the promulgation of the National Security Policy in 2004, there has been virtually no articulation of the responsibility by any particular federal department for this surveillance requirement, except in defence140 Fred W. Crickard, Bruce Donaldson, lain Stewart and Jeremy Conway, An Integrated Approach to Maritime Enforcement, (Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, 1992) as quoted in Fred W. Crickard and Glen J/ Herbert. “An Oceans Strategy for the Northwest Atlantic: Applications to Maritime Enforcement.” In An Oceans Management Strategy for the Northwest Atlantic in the 21st Century: The Niobe Papers; Volume 9, edited by Peter T. Haydon and Gregory L. Witol (Halifax: The Naval Officers Association of Canada, 1998): 39.141 Crickard and Herbert. “An Oceans Strategy for the Northwest Atlantic,” 41.134policy documents. A 2003 study commissioned by the Department of National of National Defence to identify and evaluate national surveillance requirements determined that, despite over 50 studies and papers over the past decade, it was not possible to identify documents that referred to a national surveillance strategy.142Indeed, through this lack of government direction, the Canadian Forces and the Navy in particular, have become the de facto co-ordinators of maritime surveillance for the federal government. While there is little in terms of policy guidance that explains with any precision the Navy’s responsibility towards maritime surveillance, it is possible to deduce a significant role based on federal statutes and military defence plans, and Memoranda of Understanding between federal departments.The Constitution Act of 1867 asserts that it is lawful for the Queen to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of Canada in relation to all matters not assigned exclusively to the legislatures of the provinces. The Act goes on to decree that Parliament’s authority extends to all matters concerning the regulation of trade and commerce; militia, military and naval service, and defence; beacons, buoys, and lighthouses; navigation and shipping; sea coast and inland fisheries. The Constitution Act also classifies shipping lines, railways, and canals, whether connecting the provinces or extending beyond the limits of the provinces “to be for the general advantage of Canada” and thus fall under the jurisdiction of Parliament.143As a minister of the crown, the Minister of National Defence has a duty to support all parliamentary acts. Thus, there is an implied departmental obligation to identify maritime sovereignty and security elements embedded within all federal acts and regulations. As such, the Navy has an obligation to be prepared142 Canada, Department of National Defence, National Defence Headquarters, 1150-1 (JFC3-3- 3) National Surveillance Policy. 20 January 2003.1 3 Constitution Act, 1867, s. 91, 92.135to conduct maritime surveillance and control in support of prevention and enforcement. Federal statutes that imply a maritime surveillance role for the Navy are the Oceans Act, which was covered in greater detail earlier in the chapter, the Fisheries Act, the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act, and the National Defence Act.While there has little in government policy that speaks directly to the requirement for federal departments and agencies to conduct surveillance, the 1994 Defence White Paper did provide guidelines for the Canadian Forces in the broadest sense. The White Paper stated that “the provision of surveillance and control is an integral part of the Forces' activities in Canada . . . the Forces must maintain and exercise the basic navy, army, and air force skills to ensure effective control over our territory, airspace, and maritime approaches.”144 This statement is strategic direction to Canada’s military to provide surveillance, albeit undefined, for the basic purposes of defence. However, to maintain a military capability, the capability must be developed and practised on a regular basis or the capability is lost. Thus, this statement in the White Paper implies that surveillance should be a routine operation and an explicit task for the Canadian Forces.The 1994 White Paper asserted that, while the military may not be the lead agency for surveillance of areas Canadian jurisdiction, the Armed Forces may possess unique capability beyond that of civilian departments. The White Paper stated that,Responsibility for many of the Government's activities in the surveillance and control of Canadian territory, airspace, and maritime areas of jurisdiction lies with civilian agencies such as the Department of Transport. The Canadian Forces, however, make a valuable contribution to this demanding task, which often requires capabilities of greater readiness and reach than those available to civilian agencies.145144 Canada, Department of National Defence, 1994 White Paper on Defence, “Chapter 4 -Protection of Canada,” 23 December 2002 (12 August 2006).136The diversity of the surveillance and control expected of the Armed Forces is captured in the following 1994 White Paper extracts,The Department of National Defence and the Department of Transport now participate in a comprehensive federal effort, led by the Department of Fisheries and Oceans. The Canadian Forces will devote a significant number of flying hours and ship days to fishery patrols . . . NORAD has a role in counter-narcotic monitoring and surveillance. This is an ancillary mission to which the capabilities of our maritime and land forces have also been applied . . . the Department of National Defence has concluded a memorandum of understanding with the Department of the Environment with respect to the use of the Canadian Forces in environmental surveillance . . . as the Forces carry out their routine surveillance missions, they will seek to identify and report potential and actual environmental problems.146These passages refer to an obligation to support other government departments in accordance with existing Memoranda of Understanding, as well as expressing the explicit task of environmental surveillance as a secondary mission on an opportunity basis and not requiring a specific mission. To facilitate what is outlined requires a means of exchanging surveillance information exchange between departments and furnishes justification for maintaining an accurate and comprehensive recognised maritime picture.The 1994 Defence White Paper also directed that the Armed Forces be able to respond to threats to sovereignty beyond 200 nautical miles and implied that the military should establish connectivity with other nations and authorities to share information beyond national maritime zones. The outer limit of this response was neither defined nor addressed in any other governing documentation.147Having established surveillance of maritime zones and approaches as a legitimate government task, there remains one major policy document to be discussed. It was left for the end of this chapter because it is the federal137government’s most recent articulation of defence policy, and incorporates elements of previous defence statements and the 2005 National Security Policy. This document, known within government as the 2005 Defence Policy Statement, was developed using a different, more holistic approach to policy formulation than has been employed in the past.4.6 The 2005 Defence Policy StatementIn April of 2005, the government unveiled a new International Policy Statement, A Role of Pride and Influence in the World, that comprised four mutually-reinforcing documents that addressed foreign affairs, defence, development, and trade.148 The main thrust of the defence document, called the Defence Policy Statement (DPS), echoes the central theme of A Role of Pride and Influence in the World that being reinvigoration of Canada’s international role. In the DPS, this reinvigoration manifests itself as a reinvestment in a Canadian expeditionary military capability. The DPS directs much of Canada’s effort to be focussed on “failed or failing states,” where Canadian troops are to be prepared to conduct “three-block war” operations. This term, first coined by senior American military commanders, describes a situation in which combat, peace support, and humanitarian operations take place within a confined geographical space. This shift in emphasis reflects the appraisal that threats to security are more likely to come from non-state actors and terrorist groups or due to political instability in struggling countries, rather than the state versus state conflicts.While there are noteworthy changes in this most recent document, much remains from previous defence statements. The Canadian Forces retain three principal roles: the defence of Canada, the defence of North America in cooperation with the United States, and contribution to international security.149 However, the DPS acknowledges weaknesses of previous policies when it states that,147 Ibid.148 The current buzzword used in the Canadian government and its bureaucracy is “three D’s and C." These stand for “diplomacy, defence, development and commerce.”149 Canada, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Defence, (Ottawa: April 2005), 2.138greater emphasis must be placed on the defence of Canada and North America than in the past. This must be the Canadian Forces’ first priority. Current threats demand that we pay increased attention to the safety and security of our citizens at home, the most fundamental responsibility of any government.150The Defence Policy Statement is ambitious in both scope and scale, calling for a major restructuring of the Canadian Forces, adoption of the concept of Canada as a theatre of operations, and the establishment of a separate “Canada Command” for command and control of domestic operations. Moreover, the DPS calls for the generation of a Standing Contingency Task Force to respond to threats domestically and abroad.Of significance to the Navy is the Defence Policy Statement’s pledge to increase surveillance of Canadian territory and areas of maritime jurisdiction, including the near-ice and ice-fee regions of the Arctic. Greater co-operation between civil authorities at all levels of government is called for in order to improve information and intelligence collection, analysis, and integration. The DPS reiterates commitments outlined in the National Security Policy. For the Navy, these responsibilities comprise the 6-point maritime security plan, and include taking the lead in the co-ordination of responses to developing on-water threats, as well as employing better use of maritime radars to develop a “common maritime picture”. The DPS calls for increased support to other government departments in “protecting endangered fish stocks, monitoring illegal drug and immigration activity, conducting environmental surveillance, and carrying out search and rescue operations.”151The 2005 Defence Policy Statement component of A Role of Pride and Influence in the World has been described by one analyst as “the most integrated, even thoughtful, approach to Canada’s relations with the rest of the world in recent memory.”152 While this may be true, it is too early to tell whether the DPS will cause the requisite government framework to be established for150 Ibid.151 Ibid., 17-19.152 David Rudd, Canada’s New Defence Policy. Canadian Institute for Strategic Studies (5 August 2006).139effective, relevant and responsive operations in support of Canadian maritime security and sovereignty.4.7 SummaryAlthough Canada has existed as a sovereign state for almost 140 years, there has been no clear articulation by successive governments of what are Canadian national interests. Federal policy statements have tended to cite Canadian values and goals, the most commonly stated being democracy, individual freedom and social justice. In the absence of clear political guidance at the strategic level, Canadian policy makers have taken an ad hoc and “stove- piped” approach to development of oceans, security, and defence policies. It has only been post-911 that Canada has produced overarching oceans strategy and national security documents.This somewhat muddled policy development process has seen the evolution of oceans policy over three decades that produced three key initiatives: the Oceans Act of 1997, Canada’s Oceans Strategy of 2002, and Canada’s Oceans Action Plan of 2005. These initiatives signal the federal government’s recognition at last that national sovereignty and security are integral but they fall short of prescribing a cogent means for coordination among federal departments with maritime responsibilities. The Oceans Act struck into Canadian law the maritime zones set forth by UNCLOS III, and provided federal government departments the legal authority for enforcement in these zones.National security and national defence are two related but separate obligations of any government. Although defence is a sub-set of national security, the terms that are often used interchangeably, leading to confusion and lack of clarity of purpose. While Canadian governments have consistently delivered periodic policy documents in the form of Defence White Papers and Defence Policy Statements, it was not until 2005 that a National Security Policy was introduced.A key priority of the Defence White Papers of the past 40 years has been protection of Canadian sovereignty. However, maintaining sovereignty is not140exclusively a military activity; indeed, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Canadian Coast Guard, and Fisheries and Oceans Canada bear the brunt of the responsibility for sovereignty protection. But the Navy, and the Air Force when acting on the Navy’s behalf, should not be constrained from showing the flag whenever defence and sovereignty missions overlap, or other government departments are unable to maintain an appropriate presence for whatever the reason.In the area in which oceans, defence and security issues trisect, certain themes reappear and are common to all three policy objectives, namely maintenance of sovereignty, surveillance, and enforcement.In many cases, tasks aimed at dealing with violations of sovereign territory cannot be separated from those performed in the defence of Canada. In much the same manner that the terms security and defence have become misused, the concepts of security and sovereignty can be difficult to differentiate, and often one term is used to mean the other. Moreover, in the post-911 era, the distinction between security and defence has become blurred.OceansPolicySovereigntySurveillanceEnforcementDefencePolicySecurityPolicyFigure 4-4. Trisection of Policy Objectives141In many cases, tasks aimed at dealing with violations of sovereign territory cannot be separated from those performed in the defence of Canada. In much the same manner that the terms security and defence have become misused, the concepts of security and sovereignty can be difficult to differentiate, and often one term is used to mean the other. Moreover, in the post-911 era, the distinction between security and defence has become blurred.The requirement for surveillance of Canada’s maritime zones is present in oceans, defence, and security policy frameworks. However, there is no national surveillance policy that articulates priorities or how surveillance is to be coordinated by government. Individual federal departments are guided to some extent by their enabling statutes for their own surveillance interests, but there is no overarching concept for surveillance. Some defence policy documents charge the Armed Forces to be ready to conduct surveillance for defence purposes, but no federal body is mandated to co-ordinate surveillance efforts on behalf of the government.There are basic areas of marine activity that nations must control if they are to be taken seriously as coastal states.153 These areas include the management of renewable and non-renewable marine resources, the protection and preservation of the marine environment, the maintenance of maritime sovereignty and prevention of illegal activity, and the maintenance of marine safety. These areas, according to Crickard and Herbert, require responses through the use of operational, legal, political, and non-government resources. The graphic at the end of this chapter summarises, in tabular form, the main maritime challenges and responses that Canada has endured for the past 40 years.154The most relevant strategic policy documents that enable maritime enforcement operations to be conducted in Canadian maritime zones and approaches are the Oceans Act, Canada’s Ocean Strategy, the Ocean Action Plan, the National Security Policy, and the 2005 Defence Policy Statement.153 Crickard, et al, An Integrated Approach to Maritime Enforcement, 39.142This chapter has addressed the first segment of the second research theme, the policy and regulatory framework. The next chapter will continue this key theme by examining those federal departments responsible for enforcement tasks and the mandates prescribed in the above noted Acts.154 Crickard, “Oceans Policy and Naval Policy 1970 to 1997,” 12, 16, 22.143Challenge ResponsePeriod External Factors Themes Doctrine Policy Response National Strategy1970s r U NC LO S III ProcessCoastal State C anadians & Foreign Policy 1969Oceans Frontier Development StrategyOceans^NForeign Fishing Fisheries Protection LO S Convention 1982Offshore Oil & Gas Energy Self SufficiencyE FZ 1977Arctic Marine 1973 O ceans PolicyEnvironment Sovereignty for C anadaDefence / East/W est relations Detente 1971 D efence W hite NATO Sea Lines ofNaval P aper Communication Strat1980s Declining fish stocks Oceans Mgt 1987 O ceans Policy Marine Resource & Environmental Conservation andO ceans*^Protection StrategyFalling oil prices Conservation & ProtectionD epartm entalco-ordinationV.Multiple Oceans Use 1990 G reen Plan Three Ocean NavyDefence / Return of Cold W ar Global Collective 1987 D efence W hite SA CLAN TNaval Security Paper, 1989 Budget C O N M A R O P S1990s r Global Economy Global EnvironmentInternational Competitiveness National Debt1994 C anada in the WorldDecentralization (Oil and Gas)Privatization (MarineO c e a n s ^Agenda 21 Reduction TransportationLO S Convention 1995Oceans Mgt 1997 Oceans Act Interdepartmental Co-ordination (IPC R C 1990)Regional Conflicts Conservation & 1996 National M arine Oceans Strategy 1997V -Collapse ofProtection PolicyD efence / Communism Peace Support Ops M aritim e Sovereignty National Sea ControlNaval 1990 StrategyAgenda for Peace Combined & Joint Doctrine1994 Defence W hite P aperNaval Vision 1994 Adjusting Course 1997Figure 4-5. Maritime Challenges and Responses 1970 - Present144Chapter FiveREGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MARITIME ENFORCEMENT5.1 IntroductionThe last chapter examined how Canadian oceans, security, defence and surveillance policies shape the strategic environment in which the Canadian Navy fulfils a full range of roles at sea and ashore. The aim of this chapter is to build upon this examination by narrowing the focus to describe the principal Canadian regulatory and advisory bodies implicated in oceans management, in particular those concerned with maritime security and enforcement issues. This chapter identifies the mandates, jurisdictions, and general capabilities of the key federal departments with responsibility for oceans management, and either direct or indirect links to maritime enforcement. It does not treat how the federal agencies interact and co-operate in the current security environment. That will be discussed in detail in Chapter Six.To establish the strategic setting for the discussion, the government bodies that have oceans management responsibilities will be introduced and their mandates and capabilities described. Included in this examination are joint federal-provincial agencies as well as various councils that have only indirect influence on maritime enforcement. Their inclusion in the discussion is important to comprehend the mosaic that forms the oceans governance structure in Canada, and how bodies lacking direct enforcement authority may influence security and enforcement activities.While it is clear that the naval contribution to maritime enforcement is the main theme to this dissertation, the description in this chapter of the Navy’s organisation and capabilities is provided following those of all other federal departments and agencies. This order was chosen for two reasons. First and foremost, the Canadian Forces, of which the Navy is a component, has no legal mandate to enforce Canadian law; the Armed Forces act only in support of those government bodies that are so enabled by federal statute. Thus, it is useful to understand the other government departments’ roles and capabilities and, more importantly, their lack of capability, to place the naval contribution145into perspective. Second, if the naval structure were to be discussed at the outset, reference would be made of support provided to specific departments, such as DFO and the RCMP. Since the organisation and capabilities of these other federal bodies would not yet have been examined, it would be difficult to put into context how the Navy’s contribution helps to “fill in the gaps” of the government’s enforcement framework.The federal setting and examination of those bodies with primary responsibilities for enforcement will be followed by the introduction three important Memoranda of Understanding between the Canadian Forces and other federal government departments. These are discussed in the latter half of the chapter. Having been introduced to departmental mandates and capabilities, the reader will be better able to understand how the MOUs address the limitations of the affected departments. The chapter will conclude with a discussion of the legal framework for the use of Canadian military forces for domestic operations.5.2 The Federal SettingAs can be seen in Tables 4-1 and 5-2, there are a plethora of government ministries, departments, agencies and councils at two levels of government as well as a host of non-government organisations that have vested interest in oceans governance. Although actual regulatory responsibilities of these bodies tend to be constrained exclusively to those laid down by their individual enabling statutes or charters, many of the bodies operate in an advisory capacity to other agencies, a capacity that spans multiple maritime sectors. Within the study area, the regulatory framework can be described by the following three categories:a. Joint federal-provincial agencies and departments;b. Federal agencies and departments;c. Provincial agencies and departments.Of these, the federal departments and agencies have the greatest interaction with the Navy. Transport Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, the Canadian146Coast Guard, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police interact largely with shore-based naval assets for routine day-to-day operations. Other departments such Environment Canada, and the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service engage with the Navy as various situations warrant co-operation. While the Atlantic provinces have a limited part to play in maritime enforcement, the emphasis of inter-departmental co-operation is primarily at the federal level. It is the relationships at this level that will be discussed in this chapter.TABLE 5-1CANADIAN GOVERNMENT BODIES WITH OCEANS GOVERNANCE RESPONSIBILITIESMinistries and Independent Advisory Councils Judicial and otherDepartments Government Agencies bodies• Fisheries and • Canada Border • Federal Regional • Justice CanadaOceans Canada Services Agency Councils: • International• Canadian Coast • Canada Revenue - Nova Scotia DevelopmentGuard AgencyCanadian- Newfoundland Research• Transport Canada •- New Brunswick- Prince EdwardCentre• Public Safety Environmental IslandCanada Assessment - Quebec• Royal Canadian Agency - British ColumbiaMounted Police • Canadian - Yukon Territory• Environment Transportation - NunavutCanada Agency Territory• Natural Resources • Transportation - NorthwestCanada Safety Board Territories• Dept of National Defence• Atlantic Pilotage Authority• Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment• Dept of Foreign • Pacific Pilotage • Canadian MarineAffairs and Authority Advisory CouncilInternational Trade • Canada- • Fisheries• Indian and Northern Newfoundland ResourceAffairs Canada Offshore Petroleum Conservation• Canadian Board CouncilInternational • Canada-NovaDevelopment Scotia OffshoreAgency Petroleum BoardThe principal tasks that these federal regulatory and advisory bodies undertake in support of Canada’s oceans management are surveillance and monitoring activities related to exercising national sovereignty, developing situational awareness of the maritime domain, and control of the sea approaches to ensure territorial security. Under these overarching aims, surveillance, monitoring and enforcement activities are conducted that pertain147to the conservation and protection of marine resources, the enforcement of customs, immigration, marine transportation, and other domestic laws and international agreements. As well, many of these bodies play a role in managing scientific research activities aimed at improving the understanding of the marine environment and its resources.With greater emphasis being given to potential sea-borne terrorism in the post-9/11 environment, government departments have begun to view enforcement as a component of the broader issue of marine security. Thus, whereas in the past, a department might not have had a stated marine enforcement role, there may be, at present, an implied function under the umbrella of “marine security.”The Navy’s interaction with NGOs for the purposes of marine enforcement is virtually non-existent. Table 5-2 is included only to highlight the broad spectrum of special interest groups concerned with Canadian oceans management issues. As well, there is little operational linkage between the Navy and the four provincial governments in the Atlantic region, so these relationships will not be addressed in this thesis, except for two joint federal- provincial agencies that deal with offshore hydrocarbon exploitation.148TABLE 5-2NON-GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS WITH OCEANS GOVERNANCE INTERESTS• Alliance for Marine Remote SensingAssociation• Aquatic Ecosystem Health &Management Society• Assembly of First Nations• Atlantic Coastal Action Plan• Atlantic Coastal Zone SteeringCommittee• Bay of Fundy Ecosystem Partnership• Bay of Fundy Marine Resource Centre• Canadian Arctic Resource Centre• Canadian Centre for MarineCommunications• Canadian Circumpolar Institute• Canadian Climate Impacts andAdaptation Research Network• Canadian Geophysical Union• Canadian International DevelopmentAgency• Canadian International DevelopmentSeries• Canadian Meteorological andOceanographic Society• Canadian Responsible FisheriesFederation• Centre for Marine Bio-diversity• Climate Action Network Canada• Coastal Education and ResearchFoundationCoastal Zone Canada AssociationCree Regional AuthorityFishermen and Scientists Research SocietyGeoconnections Discovery Portal Huntsman Marine Science CentreInternational Arctic Science Committee International Association of Hydrological Sciences International Institute of Fisheries Economics & Trade International Marine Mammal Association Inc International Ocean Institute Kivalliq Inuit AssociationLiving Oceans Society Marine Law InstituteNunavut Research InstituteOcean Innovation Conference SeriesOcean Management Research Network Ocean Technology Network Partnership for Observation of the Global Oceans Sierra ClubWorld Wildlife Fund5.2.1 Joint Federal-Provincial Agencies - Offshore Petroleum BoardsThere are two joint petroleum boards in place, on behalf of the Government of Canada and the Governments of Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland and Labrador, to regulate exploration and resource extraction in Atlantic Canada’s offshore regions. The geographic area that these Boards regulate is shown at Figure 5-1.The Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board (CNOPB) was created in March 1987, when the Canada-Newfoundland Atlantic Accord149Implementation Act received royal assent, and was further affirmed by provincial statute, the Canada-Newfoundland Atlantic Accord Implementation Newfoundland and Labrador Act of 1990. Seven persons comprise the CNOPB: three are federally-appointed members, three are provincially-appointed members, and a Chairperson is appointed jointly by both levels of government.155Figure 5-1. Offshore Petroleum Board Jurisdiction - Atlantic CanadaSource: Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Board; Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board.The Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Board (CNSOPB) was established in 1990 by the enactment of both the federal Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord Implementation Act and the provincial Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord Implementation (Nova Scotia) Act. The CNSOPB is slightly smaller than the CNOPB, consisting of only five individuals: two are federally-appointed members, two155 Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Atlantic Accord Implementation Act, S.C. 1987, c. 3, s. 9, and Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Atlantic Accord Implementation Newfoundland and Labrador Act, R.N.S.L. 1990, c. 2, s. 9.Petroleum Board Jurisdictionl cnsopbH R CNOPBN E W F O U N D L A N DNEW 'r ' SRUNSW1CNorth Grand ------------South GrandNOVAi C O T I Az8FS150are provincially-appointed members and, as in the other board, the Chairperson is appointed jointly by the federal and provincial governments.156Reporting jointly to the federal Minister of Natural Resources and to the each respective provincial energy ministers, the two boards have similar responsibilities. First and foremost, the boards manage and conserve offshore petroleum resources for optimised hydrocarbon recovery, waste avoidance, and the protection of the environment. The boards manage offshore land rights through the issuance of licences for exploration and development, and maintain safe working standards in offshore operations. In addition, the boards ensure statutory compliance by operators in matters of contracting, procurement, and employment to provide economic benefits to Canada and the provinces of Nova Scotia and Newfoundland.157The offshore petroleum boards are relevant to Canadian maritime enforcement for several reasons. First among these is search and rescue. The boards will not approve any offshore oil and gas operation in the Atlantic region unless the operator has a comprehensive emergency response plan in place. These plans must cover a variety of situations, such as fires, explosions, evacuation of the platform, spills, damage to the rig, measures to deal with icebergs, and so on.158 The Department of National Defence also maintains agreements with offshore platforms to act as fuelling bases for military helicopters, thereby extending the range of search and rescue aircraft by at least 150 nautical miles. The Halifax Joint Rescue Coordination Centre156 Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord Implementation Act, S.C. 1988, c. 28, s. 9, and Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord Implementation (Nova Scotia) Act, S.N.S. 1987, c. 3, s. 9.57 Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board, C-NOPB Overview, 9 December 2003, (14 December 2003) and Canada- Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Board, CNSOPB Overviews, (14 December 2003).158 The1982 sinking of the exploratory offshore drilling platform Ocean Ranger in the Hibernia oil field, with the loss of 84 lives, predated the creation of the CNOPB and CNSOPB. The investigation into the tragedy made 136 recommendations, including the creation of a National Search and Rescue Secretariat, major changes to both search and rescue and offshore exploration practices, particularly as they pertain to safety and training standards for workers, improvements to lifeboats and launching systems, and provision of survival suits to employees. See Canada, Royal Commission on the Ocean Ranger Marine Disaster (Canada), Hearings - Royal Commission on the Ocean Ranger Marine Disaster (Canada). (Ottawa: The Royal Commission, 1984-1985).151hosts regular oil and gas seminars to promote exchange of information and best practices. The CNOPB and CNSOPB maintain routine contact with Maritime Forces Atlantic Headquarters for the passage of information concerning proposed exploratory activities in the offshore. This information forms another important input to the Navy’s surveillance picture. Lastly, the Boards can provide expert advice to military and police forces on the physical security of offshore platforms from criminal and terrorist attack.5.2.2 Federal Regional CouncilsFederal Regional Councils came into being during the early 1980s, primarily to allow senior public sector managers to better co-ordinate regional economic development initiatives. Over the past twenty years, issues for discussion at these meetings have increased in scope, and the councils have become an excellent forum for networking and sharing of information on a broad spectrum of federal initiatives ranging from public service renewal to improving program effectiveness and service delivery. This has taken on greater importance during a decade of budgetary cutbacks and a consequent emphasis within the Public Service on “horizontal co-operation” in policy development and program delivery.159Federal regional councils are made up of the most senior bureaucrats in each of the federal departments or agencies represented in each province. The actual size of each council varies by province, but normally will be between 20 to 50 persons. Federal councils provide a forum for generating support to departments with lead agency status regionally for issues such as economic development, aboriginal, youth and rural issues, as well as implementation of oceans policy. Also, these councils are viewed frequently by non-federal parties as being the single conduit through which all federal departments can be engaged on a particular issue.160 However, none of the federal regional councils have executive authority to implement action items. A council relies159 Luc Juillet, A Report prepared for the Federal Regional Councils and the Treasury Board Secretariat, 1 October 2000, (15 December 2003).Canada, Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, The Role of Regional Councils, 8 January 1999 (14 December 2003).152on the volunteer nature of its members to progress within their respective departments agreed-upon initiatives, few of which pertain to maritime security and enforcement.Although all four Atlantic provinces maintain their respective federal regional councils, from the Navy’s perspective, the 53-member Nova Scotia Federal Council (NSFC) is pre-eminent. This is largely because the Commander, Maritime Forces Atlantic is a member of this body, along with his Army counterpart, Commander Land Forces Atlantic Area. More importantly though, the NFSC sponsors a sub-committee that provides a forum for discussion of security and enforcement issues affecting Atlantic Canada. It is through the NSFC Security Committee that real improvement to working-level intergovernmental co-operation has been made. This will be discussed in greater detail later in Chapter Six. With regard to the other Atlantic federal regional councils, the Navy also participates as a member of the New Brunswick Federal Council Security Committee, but not in Prince Edward Island or Newfoundland, although potential naval participation in the latter was discussed in 2003.In 2006 another interdepartmental security committee was established in the Atlantic Region. Known as the Atlantic Region Security Committee, it meets to address issues of national and provincial security with implications for Atlantic Canada as a whole, linking closely to provincial and national activities. Clearly, it is similar to the NSFC Security Committee in that it is comprised of federal officials representing departments with security, intelligence, and law enforcement roles. However, what is different about this committee is that provincial departments have seats at the table. Commander MARLANT, in his capacity as Commander Joint Task Force Atlantic is a member of this committee as are the Deputy Ministers of the New Brunswick Department of Public Safety, Nova Scotia Attorney-General, Newfoundland Attorney-General, Prince Edward Island Attorney-General, as well as the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Atlantic Region. Additionally, the Regional Directors General for the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS), Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA), Transport Canada (TC), Public Safety and153Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC), Health Canada, and Justice Canada are represented, as are the Assistant Commissioners of the Newfoundland and Maritimes regions of the Canadian Coast Guard. The objectives of the Atlantic Region Security Committee are to align inter-agency policy and priorities, progress intergovernmental communication protocols, carry out strategic co-ordination of joint exercises and, most importantly, to develop a common understanding of the security threat environment.5.2.3 Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment (CCME)The need for intergovernmental co-ordination of pan-jurisdictional environmental issues resulted in the establishment over a decade ago of the Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment. The council consists of 14 ministers from federal, provincial, and territorial governments, and it meets on a yearly basis to determine national priorities for work on environmental policies. Common vision, objectives, and partnering principles are contained in the CCME-sponsored Canada-wide Accord on Environmental Harmonization. Pursuant to this accord, several sub-agreements have been derived, such as the Inspections and Enforcement Sub-agreement, endorsed in 2001.161CCME’s work is aimed at the establishment of national environmental standards, maintenance of scientific data upon which sound environmental decisions can be based, strategic management of inter-jurisdictional matters, and the harmonization of environmental assessment and review procedures among its members.162 While the CCME plays a vital role in fostering cooperation between different levels of government, and co-ordinating action on environmental policy development, the council has no executive authority to implement or enforce legislation. Rather, it is incumbent upon ministries in each jurisdiction to determine whether CCME proposals will be adopted.161 Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment, About CCME, 26 November 2003, (16 December 2003).162 Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment, Statement of Interjurisdictional Coopereration on Environmental Matters, 26 November 2003, (16 December 2003).154CCME has no direct role to maritime enforcement as it pertains to the Navy; any relevance is of a tertiary nature.5.2.4 Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency (ACOA)Created in 1987, the Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency is tasked to promote the economic development of the Atlantic provinces “through policy, program and project development and implementation and through advocacy of the interests of Atlantic Canada in national economic policy, program and project development and implementation.163” Essentially, ACOA encourages entrepreneurship, with a focus on small to medium businesses, champions Atlantic Canada to national and international companies as a desirable location for setting up business, and is a portal through which business development grants are obtained.Although ACOA’s mandate extends to Atlantic Canada’s coastal zones, in practice there is only indirect relevance to maritime enforcement activities, and this pertains to non-military federal departments.5.2.5 Atlantic Pilotage Association (APA)The term “pilotage” in its nautical sense usually refers to the control of a vessel through restricted waters unfamiliar to the vessel’s master, carried out by a local mariner certified to conduct this high standard of navigation. Since 1972 in the Atlantic region, pilotage has been regulated by a Crown Corporation known as the Atlantic Pilotage Authority. Deriving its authority from the Pilotage Act, and reporting to the Minister of Transport, the Atlantic Pilotage Authority has responsibility for the training, licensing and dispatching of pilots, establishing compulsory pilotage areas, prescribing the classes of vessels requiring compulsory pilotage, and other responsibilities163 Atlantic Canada Opportunities Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.41, s.12. See also Canada, Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency, Welcome to ACOA, 4 December 2003, (15 December 2003).155concerning terms of employment for pilots.164 A similar authority exists on Canada’s west coast for the regulation of pilotage in Pacific waters.165As depicted in Figure 3-22, there are 16 compulsory pilotage areas in the Atlantic provinces. The criteria that the Atlantic Pilotage Authority uses to determine whether a port or passage should be a compulsory pilotage area pertain to the degree of difficulty for navigation and the hazards in the particular area, the amount of vessel traffic, the degree of maneuverability and size of vessels using the area, environmental considerations, and the nature of the cargo being carried.166Departments with enforcement mandates have a vested interest in maintaining good liaison with the Atlantic Pilotage Association, in view of the cumulative hours that pilots spend aboard merchant vessels. They are additional sets of “eyes on the water,” and are in a position to notify appropriate authorities of suspicious activity or potential threats to security. The naval officer appointed as the Queen’s Harbour Master is the Navy’s official liaison with the Atlantic Pilotage Authority.5.2.6 Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency (CEAA)Created in 1994 under the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency is the federal body vested with the responsibility for promoting environmental assessment as a planning tool for environmental protection and sustainment. Operating completely independently from other federal departments including Environment Canada, the CEAA reports to, and advises the federal Minister of the Environment, administers and promotes compliance with the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act and sound environmental assessment processes, and provides opportunities for public participation in this process. The intent of the Act is to ensure that projects are carried out in a precautionary manner, thatPilotage Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.P-14, s.20.165 Canada, Pacific Pilotage Authority Canada, Welcome to the Pacific Pilotage Authority Website, (14 December 2003).166 Canada, Atlantic Pilotage Authority, Atlantic Region Pilot Areas, (14 December 2003).156sustainable development is promoted, and that there is co-ordinated action between jurisdictions to prevent adverse environmental impact.167 The Navy has no direct or indirect interaction with this agency.5.2.7 Canadian Transportation Agency (CTA)Following the disbanding of the National Transportation Agency, Canadian Transportation Agency was created in 1996 through the passing of the Canada Transportation Act. With a staff of roughly 270, the CTA consists of seven members who make decisions on economic issues pertaining to federally-regulated rail, air, and marine transportation modes. In addition to serving as a dispute resolution authority, the CTA has the powers of a superior court to exercise its authority. From a maritime perspective, the CTA has responsibilities under the Coastal Trade Act, the St. Lawrence Seaway Act, the Pilotage Act, and the Shipping Conferences Exemptions Act. The CTA evaluates the fairness of tariffs, tolls, and fees in the various transportation sectors, and determines whether they are in the public’s best interest. In consultation with other federal departments, the CTA exercises regulatory responsibility for authorizing the use of foreign vessels in Canadian waters, while protecting the interests of Canadian-registered shipping. The Navy has no direct or indirect interaction with this agency.5.2.8 Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety BoardKnown by its short title, the Transportation Safety Board (TSB), this organ was established in 1990 through the Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board Act as an independent body to investigate transportation “occurrences” in federally-regulated air, rail, and marine modes of transportation. The TSB’s mandate also calls for it to identify, report, and make recommendations on public safety deficiencies uncovered during investigations.168 A staff of 220 people support the five members appointed to the Board, who report to Parliament through the President of the Queen’s Privy Council. When the TSB investigates an accident, no other government167 Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, R.S.C. 1992, c.37, as am. R.S.C. 1994, c.46, s.4.157department except the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Department of National Defence may investigate for the purposes of making findings or determining cause.From a maritime perspective, the TSB has jurisdiction in Canadian internal and territorial waters, and in the Exclusive Economic Zone above the continental shelf for marine occurrences related to resource exploitation. The TSB is required also to investigate any marine occurrence involving a ship registered or licenced in Canada, whether the incident took place in Canada or abroad. The Navy has only limited dealings with TSB, except in rare and unusual circumstances. One such example was the case of flight Swissair 111, a commercial passenger aircraft that crashed into Canadian territorial waters very close to the Nova Scotia coast. In this case, what started as a search and rescue effort, with the Navy as the lead agency, rapidly became a salvage operation, followed by an accident investigation. Lead agency status shifted four times between four federal departments or agencies in a matter of days.5.3 Federal Departments - Primary Responsibility for EnforcementThe first part of this chapter dealt with those bodies that have committee or agency status within the federal framework. While these bodies contribute to oceans management in the Atlantic region, their relationship to maritime enforcement is largely indirect. The next part of this thesis will examine those federal departments and agencies that have direct maritime enforcement functions.5.3.1 Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO)Under Canada’s Oceans Strategy, Fisheries and Oceans Canada is designated as the lead federal agency for oceans-related policy. Deriving its authority from the Oceans Act, DFO’s departmental responsibilities cover a wide range of ocean activities. This mandate includes fisheries management and research in coastal and inland waters, fisheries economic development,168 Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board Act, R.S.C. 1989, c. 3, s. 7. See also Canada, Transportation Safety Board of Canada, Mandate, 18 September 2002, (18 December 2003).158international fisheries negotiations, fisheries enforcement, oceanographic research, hydrographic surveying and charting, and the development and administration of fishing and recreation harbours. To execute the above mandate, DFO has access to over 1200 small craft across Canada. As well, the department charters a limited number of aircraft and relies on the ship and helicopter resources of the Canadian Coast Guard. Three of the aircraft are equipped with sophisticated sensor suites that provide DFO with a significant maritime surveillance capability.169 Their use in surveillance and fisheries enforcement will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Seven.60°W 50°Wz8RegionMaritime RegionFigure 5-2. Jurisdictions - Fisheries and Oceans CanadaSource: Fisheries and Oceans Canada; Oceans Act, Fisheries Act.Under the Fisheries Act, the jurisdiction of DFO extends to the 200 nautical mile EEZ for national fisheries enforcement. As well, on behalf of the North Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO), DFO Conservation and Protection officers act as NAFO inspectors beyond the 200 mile limit in waters managed by NAFO. DFO has divided the Atlantic maritime zones into four169 The Beech King aircraft chartered from Provincial Air Lines (PAL) are equipped with a modern pulse-compressed radar, originally designed for detecting submarine periscopes, as well as an integrated onboard geographic information system.159administrative regions: Quebec, Gulf, Newfoundland, and Maritimes.170 DFO’s legislative and administrative jurisdictions are depicted in Figure 5-2.5.3.2 Canadian Coast Guard (CCG)As a result of federal department restructuring in 1995, in addition to its scientific and oceans management mandate, DFO also has taken the Canadian Coast Guard under its umbrella. The overall mandate of the CCG is to ensure the provision of operational policies and programs for the use of water transportation interests. In the execution of this goal, the CCG provides oversight to the safe, efficient and economical conduct of marine activities and the protection of quality of the marine environment in waters under Canadian jurisdiction. The CCG mandate stipulates provision of marine navigation systems, including short and long range navigational aids, waterways, vessel traffic services, safety and public correspondence communications. Moreover, the CCG monitors potentially hazardous ice conditions, and provides route assistance through ice-infested waters. Other tasks include co-ordination of the re-supply of northern settlements, support of arctic research and development, and the promotion of boating safety with concomitant development, promulgation and enforcement of regulations and standards relative to marine transportation. The CCG also conducts marine emergency planning as well as pollution surveillance and clean-up.The Canadian Coast Guard’s Marine Communications and Traffic Services (MCTS) are a key component of the enhanced vessel traffic and identification security effort. MCTS centres monitor communications traffic and obtain commercial vessel data as vessels enter Canadian waters. Certain of Canada’s waterways are operated as vessel traffic zones requiring reporting of movements within a zone. This is a responsive surveillance program that has the ability to alert authorities to deviations from accepted norms.170 Formerly known as Scotia-Fundy Region.160In organizational terms, the Canadian Coast Guard is deemed to be a “Special Operating Agency” within Fisheries and Oceans Canada. Drawing upon authority vested by the Oceans Act and Canada Shipping Act, Canadian Coast Guard jurisdiction extends to 200 nautical miles for issues of safety at sea, vessel traffic management, and marine environmental response. For search and rescue purposes the CCG operates in some parts of the maritime approaches beyond the 200 nautical mile EEZ in separate internationally- agreed upon SAR zones as depicted in Figures 3-9 and 3-10 of Chapter Three. Administratively, the CCG has divided the Atlantic maritime zones into three general regions: Quebec, Newfoundland and Labrador, and Maritimes. The Arctic is administered through a regional headquarters in Sarnia, Ontario.Figure 5-3. Jurisdictions - Canadian Coast GuardSource: Transport Canada; Oceans Act; Canada Shipping Act.DFO/CCG marine assets include 32 aircraft and 108 vessels that are employed in icebreaking, tending and maintenance of navigation aids, search and rescue, fisheries enforcement, environmental monitoring and response, and channel sounding. In addition, the Canadian Coast Guard operates a number of smaller vessels and craft including 29 inshore rescue boats. The following tables depict the vessel and aircraft assets available to DFO and the CCG.60°W 50°W161The Canadian Coast Guard’s responsibilities for the marine SAR component of the national SAR program include the detection of marine incidents and, in conjunction with DND, the co-ordination, control, and conduct of SAR operations in marine SAR situations within Canadian areas of federal responsibility. In addition, the CCG provides marine resources, i.e., vessels and aircraft to help with air SAR operations, as necessary. The Canadian Coast Guard also oversees the activities of the Canadian Coast Guard Auxiliary, a volunteer organisation that assists in responding to marine SAR incidents.TABLE 5-3DFO / CCG VESSEL FLEETVessel Type NumberWatchkeeping VesselsHeavy Gulf Icebreaker 2Medium Gulf/River Icebreaker 3Major Navaids Tender/Light Icebreaker 9Medium Navaids Tender/Light Icebreaker 2Medium Navaids Tender/Ice Strengthened 5Shallow Draft River Navaids Tender 3Ice-Strengthened Multi-task Patrol Cutter 1Offshore Multi-task Patrol Cutter 3Intermediate Multi-task Patrol Cutter 4Offshore Fisheries Research Trawler 4Offshore Research/Survey Vessel 2Coastal Research/Survey Vessel 2Total 41Non-Watchkeeping VesselsSmall Navaids Tender 6Inshore Fisheries Research Trawler 8Multi-Hull Survey Vessel 3Specialised Program Vessel 3Research Barge 1Small Multi-task Ice Strengthened Cutter 1Small Multi-task Cutter 11Small Multi-task Patrol Vessel 3Hovercraft 3High Endurance Lifeboat 12Multi-task Lifeboat 7Multi-task Utility Craft 9Total 67Total Vessels 108162TABLE 5-4DFO / CCG AIRCRAFT FLEETAircraft Type NumberSikorsky S-61 1Bell 212 4Bell 206L 4Bell 206L-1 2MBB BO-105 16Dash 8 (TC Charter) 1Twin Otter (TC Charter) 1Beech King Air (PAL Charter) 3Total Aircraft 32The Canadian Hydrographic Service (CHS) provides an integral role in the collection, analysis and publication of charting and seabed data within Canadian waters. This information is a prerequisite to a number of national marine security activities.The CCG icebreaker fleet is a primary provider of the Canadian presence north of 60 degrees latitude as well as providing a visible, significant federal presence in southern Canadian waters.171 As well, CCG ships undertaking Conservation and Protection missions for DFO provide a federal presence at the 200-mile economic zone perimeter, and provide an opportunity for collateral surveillance contribution.On a day-to-day basis, the CCG works in concert with Navy and Air Force to direct marine research and rescue operations from the three Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centres. The establishment and employment of Canadian Marine Rescue Auxiliary organisations under the oversight of the Canadian Coast Guard enhance this commitment.172 As well, the Navy and the CCG work together to share information pertinent to developing situational171 For practical purposes, most federal departments use the latitude 60 degrees North to delineate “the Canadian North” or “the Arctic” for jurisdictional purposes, rather than the actual Arctic circle. This latitude corresponds with the southernmost latitude of the political boundaries of the Yukon and Northwest Territories.163awareness of merchant vessel activity and marine pollution monitoring in the Atlantic maritime approaches, as well as formulating inter-agency contingency plans. A permanent CCG liaison officer works at the Maritime Security Operations Centre in addition to the CCG officers assigned to the Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre.5.5.3 Transport Canada (TC)Transport Canada is the federal department charged with regulatory responsibility for safety and security of rail, marine, road and air transportation systems in Canada. The department is responsible for enforcing transportation policies, regulations and standards through inspection, monitoring and performance measurement of the various transportation systems. Transport Canada also has a role in elements of marine infrastructure and the transportation of dangerous goods and cargo. Moreover, the department is mandated to operate continuously a national situation centre to monitor air, marine and surface traffic within or near Canada, in order to provide a warning of and an early response to terrorist acts.Transport Canada’s Marine Safety division develops and enforces regulations and legislation for the construction, operation, and maintenance of commercial vessels, offshore drilling rigs, and air cushion vehicles. The division also is responsible for the qualification, and examination of officers and crews of merchant and government vessels. As well, the Marine Safety division maintains a Canadian ship registry, and licenses small commercial vessels. In addition to overseeing pilotage matters described earlier in this chapter, Transport Canada maintains vessel traffic management and separation systems for prevention of collision in the maritime approaches to Canadian ports and waterways.Transport Canada has a major role the prevention of ship-source172 The Canadian Marine Rescue Auxiliary is a network of individuals such as commercial fishermen or citizens in possession of recreational boats who can be called upon to provide volunteer search and rescue services in localised area searches.164pollution, deriving its authority to prosecute from the Canada Shipping Act, the Migratory Birds Convention Act, the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, the Fisheries Act, and the Arctic Waters Pollution Act. The department also maintains a port state control program for inspection of foreign vessels operating in Canadian waters. This program exists to ensure compliance with various international maritime conventions such as the International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, the Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, and many others.In response to the 2001 terrorist attacks on North American soil, Transport Canada was assigned responsibility for the oversight and development of policies, legislation, regulations, standards, and procedures for marine security. In 2004, this was reiterated in the National Security Policy and is codified in the Marine Transportation Security Act. The Act further provides the Minister of Transport with the statutory authority to formulate confidential security measures or request security rules for all vessel operators or marine facilities in Canada, and generally to require the implementation of security measures in all sectors of Canada’s marine industry.Transport Canada owns and operates particular sections of the marine transportation system such as certain public ports and provides an oversight role for Canada Port Authorities. Transport Canada also appoints Enforcement Officers for the purposes of the Canada Marine Act and designates Port Traffic Control Officials also under the Canada Marine Act.The Canada Shipping Act extends Transport Canada’s jurisdiction for enforcement beyond the 12 nautical mile territorial sea to the 200 nautical mile EEZ. For the purposes of administration, Transport Canada divides itself into three regions. Transport Canada’s legislative and administrative jurisdictions are depicted at Figure 5-4.16560°W 50°WFigure 5-4. Jurisdictions - Transport CanadaSource: Transport Canada; Oceans Act; Canada Shipping Act.Transport Canada operates three Dash 8 aircraft fitted with integrated sensor suites for pollution detection and monitoring. In addition, the department employs one Provincial Airlines surveillance aircraft contracted by DFO, but made available through a bilateral MOU. Through the Integrated Satellite Tracking of Polluters project (l-STOP),Transport Canada has pioneered the use of RADARSAT imagery for the detection and prosecution of marine polluters.173The relationship between the Navy and Transport Canada has changed since the promulgation of the National Security Policy. Prior to 2004, there was limited interaction between the Navy and Transport Canada at a regional level. However, since the establishment of the Marine Security Operations Centre construct, Transport Canada has developed a new relationship with the Navy, much closer than that of the other government departments that are represented at the MSOCs.174173 RADARSAT is a Canadian satellite fitted with synthetic aperture radar used for capturing data for environmental and natural resource purposes.174 Interview with Captain(N) Bruce Belliveau, Assistant Chief of Staff Plans and Operations, Maritime Forces Atlantic, 2 March 2007.166On a day-to-day basis, Transport Canada provides to the Navy a data feed from the automated INNAV system employed by the various vessel traffic management systems. This forms a large component of the recognized maritime picture developed by the Navy at the MSOCs. Additionally, contact data derived from l-STOP and Transport Canada’s pollution monitoring flights are added to the Navy’s overall surveillance picture. Transportation Canada background analysts are present in the MSOC, and the department also provides senior personnel to process Pre-arrival Information Reports (PAIR), the 96-hour pre-arrival notices from ships inbound to Canadian ports. These TC personnel work on a permanent basis on the watch floor in MARLANT Headquarters. They also co-ordinate the activity of Transport Canada’s Dash 7 and Dash 8 aircraft conducting maritime surveillance and ice reconnaissance.At the national level, both departments collaborate through various working bodies, such as the Interdepartmental Maritime Security Working Group, in order to formulate inter-agency marine security policy and contingency plans.5.3.4 Public Safety Canada (PSC)Public Safety Canada, formerly Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, is a relatively new department that was introduced in the post-9/11 security environment. It can best be described as an amalgamation of the former Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness (OCIPEP) and the Solicitor General.175OCIPEP was a relatively short-lived department charged with leading a comprehensive and new national approach to protecting Canada's critical infrastructure, as well as becoming the government's primary agency for ensuring national civil emergency preparedness for all manner of175 The new PSC portfolio also included the responsibilities of the National Crime Prevention Centre, but this entity will not be discussed further as it is not germane to maritime enforcement.167emergencies.176 The mandate of OCIPEP was to maximise emergency preparedness and response to natural disaster and security emergencies by providing leadership in improving connections to provincial and territorial Emergency Measures Organisations as well as among all three levels of government. Created on 5 February 2001, OCIPEP was subsumed into PSEPC in 2004.Prior to 2003, the Solicitor General was the Minister responsible for the protection of the public and “the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society.”177 The powers, duties, and functions of the Solicitor General included all matters over which Parliament had jurisdiction that related to prisons or reformatories, parole, and law enforcement, and that were not assigned by law to other departments or agencies. More importantly, responsibility for the internal security of Canada with respect to threats to the security of Canada and security offences including terrorist activities rested with the Solicitor General’s department through the national police force, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service.In 2003, the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness assumed the majority of the responsibilities formerly held by the Solicitor General. The Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Act directs the Minister to co-ordinate the activities of Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), the Canadian Firearms Centre, the Correctional Service of Canada and the National Parole Board in the domains of crime prevention, law enforcement, corrections (prisons), emergency measures, and national security.178 The Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness is also the lead minister in counter-terrorism and counter-drug176 Elements of critical infrastructure are, for example, key physical and cyber components of the energy and utilities, communications, services, transportation, safety and government sectors.177 Canada, Solicitor General, 1997/98 Estimates, Part III: Expenditure Plan, Ottawa, 1998. p.7.178 Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Act, R.S.C. 2005 c.10. Sections 2 and 5; Canada, Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, What We Do, 28 July 2006 (2 January 2007).168issues. These responsibilities are fulfilled through the activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service.PSC’s responsibility for national security is within the 12 nautical mile territorial sea; however, through its co-ordinating function with the RCMP, CBSA and CSIS, it indirectly has influence over security matters extending to the 200 nautical mile EEZ. For the purposes of administration, PSC divides itself into regions that correspond with provincial land boundaries. PSC’s legislative and administrative jurisdictions are depicted at Figure 5-5.In view of its main function as a shore-based co-ordinating body, PSC maintains no marine vessels or aircraft. National security and enforcement actions are undertaken by federal departments that have the appropriate physical resources for maritime response.On a routine basis, the Canadian Navy has little direct involvement with PSC except for limited interaction as part of ongoing contingency planning. This is due largely to the fact that PSC was established after the MSOC concept was agreed upon by the federal partners. Consequently, the department was not included in the concept or the funding for it. Moreover, PSC does not have a specifically mandated marine security operations or response role. However, during emergencies, natural or otherwise, the Navy becomes very much involved with PSC through the Maritime Operations Centre and the municipal and provincial Emergency Measures Operations Centres (EMOC). In addition, there is considerable day-to-day interaction between the Navy and three of the agencies or services that report to the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, namely the RCMP, CSIS, and CBSA.1695.3.5 Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)The RCMP is Canada’s national police force. Its authority is vested in Chapter 18 of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act and, reporting to the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, the RCMP is mandated to enforce laws, prevent crime, and maintain good order and security throughout Canada. There are no federal statutes for which the RCMP has sole enforcement responsibility; the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act and Regulations provides the authority for RCMP members to enforce any Act of Parliament. While enforcement responsibilities differ with each federal act, these enforcement duties are generally divided between the RCMP and the respective federal department or agency that maintains expertise in a particular field.The RCMP also provides contract police services to all provinces (except Ontario and Quebec), the Yukon and Northwest Territories, Nunavut and, under separate municipal agreements, police services to over 200 municipalities and 165 Aboriginal communities. The RCMP has over 750U X D L A N D60 °W 50°WFigure 5-5. Jurisdictions - Public Safety CanadaSource: Public Security and Emergency Preparedness Canada.170detachments located throughout Canada. These detachments range in strength from 1 to 250 personnel.179Although the RCMP is primarily a land-based policing organisation, it is responsible for certain federal and provincial policing matters in Canada’s maritime zones. This responsibility includes criminal, customs, immigration, and drug enforcement within the 12 nautical mile territorial sea. As well, policing responsibilities extend beyond 12 nautical miles in prescribed situations, i.e. violations to the Immigration Act (out to 24 nautical miles) or the Canada Shipping Act (200 nautical miles), assistance to other government departments, or hot pursuit.Criminal Code offences are often used as the basis for marine security incidents and investigations. The RCMP is not the police force of jurisdiction at the major international container ports at Vancouver, Fraser Valley (New Westminster), Montreal, Saint John, Halifax or Windsor; these ports are policed by municipal police services. However, the RCMP is the police force of jurisdiction at some smaller ports. Protective responsibilities also arise in designated ports during times of tension. The RCMP did not assume the duties and responsibilities of the disbanded Ports Police.From an administrative standpoint, each province forms a separate RCMP Division, designated by a letter from A through to O. The RCMP divisions in the Atlantic region are H Division (Nova Scotia and PEI), B Division (Newfoundland), C Division (Quebec) and J Division (New Brunswick.) The RCMP’s legislative and administrative jurisdictions are depicted at Figure 5-6.The RCMP’s dedicated Marine Division was disbanded in 1970, but its various marine assets were transferred to other sections within the RCMP. At179 Canada, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Marine Services, 14 November 2006 (30 December 2006). See also Canada, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, About the RCMP, 11 October 2006 (24 December 2006).171present, the force employs a variety of small boats, as well as fixed and rotary wing aircraft to carry out its maritime operations. The largest of these small vessels is the catamaran patrol boat INKSTER. At 19.75 metres in length, it is roughly 2 metres longer than the remaining four Commissioner-class catamaran patrol boats. The catamarans are operated with 4-person double crews to provide 24/7 patrol and response capability and boast sustained speeds in excess of 25 knots. Four of the five catamarans are based on the West Coast; the sole Atlantic-based RCMP catamaran is the SIMMONDS, deployed out of Marystown, Newfoundland. In addition to the catamarans, the RCMP makes extensive use of numerous rigid hull inflatable boats (RHIB) on both coasts and in the inland waterways. Most common are the 5.3 and 7.3 metre vessels that are capable of speeds in excess of 30 and 40 knots respectively.180N E W F O U N D L A N DFigure 5-6. Jurisdictions - Royal Canadian Mounted PoliceSource: Royal Canadian Mounted Police; Oceans Act, Criminal Code of Canada.T—50°WThe RCMP also operates an Air Services Branch that primarily supports the transport of personnel, be they Emergency Response Teams, prisoners, or1RO Canada, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, West Coast Marine Detachment, 24 March 2003 (30 December 2006).172members on administrative or operational duties. RCMP aircraft have a limited search and rescue capability, but are capable of surveillance and monitoring of land-oriented activity. However, RCMP aircraft lack the sophisticated sensor suites necessary for effective maritime surveillance and, unlike the DFO chartered aircraft, they are not used in that capacity except in situations in which the targets of interest are localised already. In the Atlantic region, the RCMP maintains aircraft and Air Services support at Moncton, New Brunswick; Goose Bay, Labrador; and Iqaluit, Nunavut.TABLE 5-5RCMP VESSELS AND AIRCRAFTVessel Type NumberPatrol Vessel (> 9.2 metres) 5Inland Water Transport (< 9.2 metres) 307Total Vessels 312Aircraft Type NumberFixed Wing 25Helicopters 8Total Aircraft 33Source: Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Marine Services, 14 November 2006 (30 December 2006) and Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Air Services: A snapshot of our people, places and equipment, 14 November 2006 (30 December 2006).The RCMP also co-ordinates a community-based coastal watch program. Launched initially in 1996 to counter narcotics importation on Canada’s West Coast, the program now extends to all coastal regions across the country. RCMP members and community volunteers familiar with normal marine activity meet regularly to disseminate information pertaining to on-water or coastal activities. The program educates individuals what to look for in terms of suspicious or illegal activity, and trains them how to effectively transmit this information to the appropriate law enforcement agency. The program solicits participation from recreational boaters, professional mariners, fishermen, fuel dock attendants, vessel brokers, or anyone who lives or works near the water.173Some operations to counter criminal, customs, immigration, and narcotics violations require armed boardings by RCMP Emergency Response Teams. While the RCMP maintains a large number of vessels to exercise its mandateupon the water, in some cases the RCMP require vessels larger than those in the RCMP inventory in order to accommodate their ERTs or require speed and co-ercive force the the RCMP boats do not possess. When the RCMP requires larger vessel support to its law enforcement operations, the force must rely on other government department assets, specifically those of DND and DFO/CCG.On a day-to-day basis, the Navy and the RCMP work together to share information and intelligence pertinent to developing situational awareness and assessment of marine-oriented national security threats as well as formulating inter-agency contingency plans. The RCMP maintains a representative at the Maritime Security Operations Centre housed at the regional naval headquarters in Halifax. This representative is a conduit to the RCMP’s Divisional Emergency Operations Centres (DEOC), staffed as required, and the National Operations Centre (NOC) staffed 24 hours/7 days a week.5.3.6 Canadian Security intelligence Service (CSIS)The Canadian Security Intelligence Service was established on 16 July 1984 as a separate intelligence organization from its parent, the RCMP Security Service. Deriving its authority from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, CSIS collects, analyses, and retains information and intelligence that is suspected of constituting a threat to the security of Canada, and advises the government in relation to these matters. CSIS considers the main threats to Canada to be terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, espionage, foreign interference and cyber-tampering that affects critical infrastructure. CSIS also provides security assessments, on request, to all federal departments and agencies.17460 ”W 50°WN E W F O U N D L A N D ^60°W 50"WFigure 5-7. Jurisdictions - Canadian Security Intelligence ServiceCSIS maintains close links with Canadian Forces intelligence officers and, in the naval context, with the Maritime Security Operations Centres located in Halifax and Esquimalt. CSIS has no capability to deploy into the Canadian maritime zones; intelligence collection, analysis, and sharing is almost exclusively a shore-based activity. As in the case of PSEPC, CSIS was not included in the MSOC concept or nor the funding set aside for it. Moreover, CSIS does not have a specifically-mandated marine security operations or response role as outlined in its enabling statute or the National Security Policy. Administratively, CSIS divides itself into regions that reflect provincial land boundaries as depicted at Figure 5-7. CSIS has no marine vessels or aircraft.5.3.7 Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA)The Canada Border Services Agency was created on 12 December 2003 as part of the same process that established its parent department, PSA (formerly PSEPC in 2003). CBSA is similar to PSA in that it is an amalgamation of previous departments and agencies. However, unlike PSA, the Canada Border Services Agency did not wholly subsume the legacy organisations. Rather, CBSA integrated the border functions of one federal175department and two agencies. Specifically, these were the Customs branch of the former Canada Customs and Revenue Agency (CCRA),181 elements of the intelligence and enforcement services of Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), and the Import Inspection at Ports of Entry program of the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA). The three legacy organisations continue to fulfil their other important functions.Reporting to the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada and drawing its authority from the Canada Border Services Agency Act, CBSA serves Canada by protecting Canadian society with respect to the international movement of goods and people and advancing Canadian interests both nationally and internationally in these areas.CBSA is tasked with responsibility for monitoring, control, entry, revenue collection and enforcement (goods, conveyances and persons), at Canada’s ports and designated points of entry. The Port of Entry Control section of CBSA provides guidance and support to local offices concerning examination procedures aimed at granting entry to persons determined to be admissible and refusing entry to those unable to comply with the requirements of the Immigration Act and regulations.While most activities are restricted to port areas, some activities require other departments or private sector groups to provide support at sea. CBSA’s jurisdiction is limited, for customs issues as specified in the Customs Act, to the 12 nautical mile territorial sea in accordance with the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act. However, the Customs & Excise Offshore Application Act extends jurisdiction beyond the 12 nautical mile territorial sea to the outer edge of the continental shelf or 200 nautical miles, whichever is greater. Its impact is limited to the offshore, non-living, natural resource industries. All equipment,181 The Canada Customs and Revenue Act was renamed the Canada Revenue Agency Act in 2005. With this change, CCRA became the Canada Revenue Agency. With the its customs functions transferred to CBSA, Canada Revenue Agency now focuses on its principal role as the main revenue collector for the Government of Canada through income and business taxes, and other revenue streams.176ships, drilling vessels et cetera, operating in the defined area are subject to Canadian Customs & Excise laws and regulations.For the purposes of administration, CBSA divides itself into regions that correspond with provincial land borders. CBSA’s legislative and administrative jurisdictions are depicted at Figure 5-8.CBSA capabilities include expertise and specialised equipment for rummaging vessels and expertise in collection and evaluation of maritime shipping information related to international trade. In addition, CBSA has expanded its programs to include the Container Security Initiative (CSI), a multi-national program that protects containerised shipping from exploitation or disruption by non-state actors.CBSA deploys employees to foreign ports in co-operation with host nation officials so that cargo containers destined for Canada can be prescreened and examined prior to arrival in Canadian ports. CBSA also employs modern and emerging technologies to prevent dangerous cargo and contraband from entering Canada. These devices include stationary portal radiation detectors and mobile vehicle-mounted radiation detection systems designed to detect illegal radioactive materials, such as a dirty bombs and nuclear weapons in containers. Other technologies employed are ion mobility spectrometry (IMS) for detecting conventional explosives and narcotics, and gamma-ray technology that is used to create images of marine container interiors.17750 °W60”W 50°WFigure 5-8. Jurisdictions - Canada Border Services AgencySource: Canada Border Services Agency.CBSA maintains small remotely-operated vehicles (ROVs) for inspecting the exterior of a vessel’s hull below the waterline but the agency does not have any vessels in its equipment inventory for transporting inspection teams. Normally CBSA waits until a vessel is berthed in a Canadian port before conducting an inspection. However, if the situation arises in which it is necessary carry out an inspection at sea, CBSA relies on other government department assets, specifically those of DND and DFO/CCG, to execute such a tasking.On a day-to-day basis, the Navy and CBSA work together to share information and intelligence pertinent to developing situational awareness and assessment of marine-oriented national security threats as well as formulating inter-agency contingency plans. CBSA maintains a representative at the Maritime Security Operations Centre housed at the regional naval headquarters in Halifax.1785.3.8 Environment Canada (EC)Deriving its authority from the Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA), this department’s primary objective is to preserve and enhance the quality of the environment. Departmental programs are designed to promote the establishment or adoption of objectives and standards relating either to environmental quality or pollution control, to ensure the wise use and management of renewable resources and to provide Canadians with environmental information of public interest.Environment Canada maintains the Environmental Protection Branch, whose mandate is to ensure consistent application of the CEPA, the Fisheries Act, and other federal statutes through deterrence, monitoring, and response. While at first glance, the Fisheries Act may appear to be limited in scope only to fish, indeed it is one of the key pieces of federal legislation that affects the environment. This is because its applies to anything that might have an impact on fish or fish habitat.Environment Canada is administered across the country through five regions. The provinces of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador, as well as PEI form the Atlantic region. Quebec is the other region represented on the Atlantic coast.Although EC operates a number of smaller craft for local use, DFO/TC assets are used on a cost-recovery basis to carry out their major tasks of meteorological observations, research, enforcement of environmental regulations and pollution control.17960°W 50°WFigure 5-9. Jurisdictions - Environment CanadaSource: Environment Canada.While there are some operational planning linkages with EC through the Maritime Operations Centre, the most frequent liaison occurs between the Canadian Forces’ maritime patrol aircraft and Environment Canada in surveillance of maritime zones for incidents of marine pollution and ocean dumping. For example, in 2003, military CP-140 aircraft were responsible for the detection of 85 percent of the marine pollution violations reported.182 In addition, on an infrequent basis, staff from the Canadian Wildlife Service embark aboard naval vessels conducting exercises in the maritime approaches to carry out sea bird counts to provide greater insight into bird density in relation to shipping lanes.5.3.9 Natural Resources Canada (NRCan)Natural Resource Canada objectives are to promote the discovery, development and effective use of the country’s mineral and energy resources and to broaden the knowledge base of Canada’s landmass and seabed. DFO180vessels provide the preponderance of support for NRCan geophysical research, mapping surveys and resource data collection programmes. The remaining services at sea are provided through contract, charter or multitasking of OGD vessels. NRCan has no day-to-day direct or indirect action with the Navy for maritime security purposes.5.3.10 Department of National Defence (DND)The Department of National Defence is comprised of two components: the Department which is an organ of the federal government made up of military and non-military bureaucrats, and the Canadian Forces, the uniformed combat arm of the Department. Deriving its authority from the British North America Act and the National Defence Act, the modern Canadian Forces was established in 1967 by the implementation of the Canadian Forces Reorganization Act that abolished the former three separate services and created a single service known as the Canadian Armed Forces.Located in Ottawa, National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) houses an integrated staff that supports the Minister of National Defence and the top military officer, the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS). Also based at NDHQ are the “Chiefs” of the three “Environments,” formerly known as “Services.” The three Environments also correspond to three of the major commands of the Canadian Forces: Maritime Command, Land Force Command, and Air Command. The Environmental Chiefs report directly to the CDS, and are responsible for the day-to-day management and operational readiness of the forces assigned to them.Given the naval flavour of this thesis, the discussion will focus on Maritime Command and elements of Air Command that support it. The head of Maritime Command, the Chief of the Maritime Staff, exercises overall command of Canadian maritime defence assets located on both the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, as well as the Naval Reserve. The Commander Maritime Forces182 Canada, Department of National Defence, Serving Canadians - On Guard: Watching for Polluters and Illegal Fishing, 28 January 2003 (9 October 2003).183 Under the terms of Canada/US defence agreements, he exercises control of US maritime forces engaged in the defence of North America when these units are operating in Canadian waters.184 Force generation is a term used to describe the collective steps to prepare a particular force for operations. This would entail manning the units to the required strength, training the personnel for the expected missions, equipping the personnel, and ensuring that the equipment is in an appropriate, sustainable materiel state.182harbour control, systems testing, information and communications systems, and diving. It also includes a range of supply and administrative support units.Principal components of the naval fleet are organised into two Naval Task Groups, one based in Esquimalt, and one in Halifax. Each is comprised of a Task Group command ship, two or three general purpose frigates, and an integral operational support ship. When the mission dictates, the Task Group could include one or more submarines.At present, the Canadian Navy’s order of battle includes three operational destroyers, twelve all-purpose frigates, four diesel-electric submarines, two auxiliary oil replenishment vessels, twelve maritime coastal defence vessels, three naval reserve tenders, and nineteen smaller auxiliary vessels. As well, the Navy supports the operation of two oceanographic research vessels. The composition of the Atlantic Fleet is shown at Table 5-6.Maritime aircraft operate from three bases located at CFB Greenwood and CFB Shearwater in Nova Scotia, and CFB Gander in Newfoundland. There is one main maritime air base on the West Coast at CFB Comox, British Columbia. As well, a small helicopter detachment is located at Pat Bay, north of Esquimalt. Table 5-7 depicts the nominal number of aircraft by type that support maritime and naval missions in the Atlantic Region.How are these ships, aircraft and supporting infrastructure used to achieve government objectives? That question will be treated in depth in Chapter Seven. However, for the purposes of comparing DND with the other departments, the traditional activities for which the Canadian Navy has provided support are fisheries management, counter-drug operations, search and rescue as a component of maritime safety, and environmental monitoring. The Department of National Defence maintains a number of agreements and contingency plans to provide assistance to other government departments charged with enforcement of specific statutes. This support has usually taken the form of information and data sharing as well as the provision of a particular type of platform, i.e. ship or aircraft, for a specific mission during which another183government department has been lead agency. One of the recommendations made in the Senate study on the rationalization of government fleets was that the Navy play a greater role in the assertion of Canadian sovereignty.185TABLE 5-6NAVAL FLEET - ATLANTICVessel Type NumberSubmarines (4) 3Destroyers (3) 2Frigates (12) 7Auxiliary Oil Replenishment Vessels (2) 1Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels (12) 6Patrol Craft (Naval Reserve Tenders) (3) 0Auxiliary vessels (19) 8Total Vessels (55) 27Note: Numbers in brackets indicate total number of vessels of that type on both coasts.TABLE 5-7NAVAL AIRCRAFT - ATLANTICAircraft Type NumberCP-140 Aurora Maritime Patrol Aircraft (18) 13CP-140A Arcturus Maritime Patrol Aircraft (3) 3CH-124 Sea King Helicopters (29) 14CH-129 Cormorant SAR Helicopters (15) 7CH-146 Griffon Helicopters (SAR backup) 99) 4Total Aircraft (164) 27Note: Numbers in brackets indicate total number of aircraft of that type operated by the Canadian Forces. Unlike vessel numbers that remain relatively static, aircraft are allocated to each coast by 1 Canadian Air Division based on planning requirements and aircraft serviceability, resulting in frequent fluctuation of aircraft totals.Perhaps the Navy’s greatest potential contribution to sovereignty protection is its efforts in maritime domain awareness and surveillance. In addition to the several types of patrol assets, all offering different levels of utility in the enforcement arena, there are the joint ocean surveillance and information centres at Halifax and Esquimalt. It is at these shore establishments that intelligence and surveillance data are compiled from military and other185 Garnett, “The Navy’s Role in the Protection of National Sovereignty,” 4.184government department sources. The information is fused as required to create a plot that is shared with other agencies to enhance maritime domain awareness.Having described in some detail the principal national regulatory and advisory bodies with interests or responsibilities for enforcement aspects of oceans management in Canada, the remainder of this chapter will cover certain provisions that further illustrate how the Navy fits into the regulatory framework.5.4 Enabling Provisions for Naval SupportAs noted earlier, the Navy not a designated law enforcement agency; however, support is provided to other government departments by military forces on a regular basis. This is done through inter-departmental Memoranda of Understanding, and the use of military forces for “domestic operations.”5.4.1 Memoranda of UnderstandingThe Canadian Forces maintains a large number of Memoranda of Understanding with other government departments for a variety of operational requirements. Their purpose is to enable departments to provide support to each other in situations in which one department may not have the resources available to carry out a specifically-mandated task. However, another department may possess the resources, but may not have the mandate, legal or otherwise to conduct the task. The other pertinent aspect is that these support operations are frequent, so much so that the process of seeking and obtaining ministerial approval for support becomes an administrative burden. In these situations, a standing MOU makes good sense from an efficiency standpoint.From a naval perspective, there are three key MOU that pertain to maritime enforcement. Memoranda of Understanding have been developed with Fisheries and Oceans Canada, the RCMP, and Environment Canada for185counter-narcotics and fisheries enforcement, and aid to emergency environmental response.5.4.1.1 Military Assistance to RCMP for Counter-drug OperationsThe purpose of this agreement is to define the nature and process of military support to the RCMP in support of drug law enforcement. There are two basic tenets to this MOU. The first is that military assistance shall only be sought once the RCMP have developed a concept of operations for a particular scenario and, in doing so, the RCMP has ascertained that it does not have the capability to carry out the operation without assistance that the military can provide. The second is that the RCMP shall retain responsibility for all direct law enforcement activities, and that military personnel will function in a support role where it is unlikely that they will be used directly for the apprehension of suspects. The MOU outlines the cost recovery process, and also the provisions for setting annual ceilings of naval ship days and aircraft flying hours. Historically, these have been in the order of 30 ship days and 1,000 flying hours but, in many years, these ceilings have not been used.1865.4.1.2 Military Assistance to DFO for Fisheries EnforcementThe purpose of this agreement is to define the nature and process of military support to DFO for surveillance and fisheries enforcement for national purposes, and on behalf of the North Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO). The main premise of the agreement is that an allocation of ship days and aircraft flying hours shall be negotiated annually between DND and DFO, and once agreed upon, ships and aircraft will be provided for fisheries patrols on a no cost basis to DFO. The MOU specifies that ship and aircraft captains retain command and are responsible for the safe operation of their platforms, and DFO conservation and protection officers retain responsibility for all direct fisheries enforcement activities. The MOU outlines the cost recovery process, and also the provisions for setting annual ceilings of naval ship days and186 Canada, Memorandum of Understanding between the Canadian Forces and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police concerning the Provision of Assistance by the Canadian Forces in Support of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in its Drug Law Enforcement Role, 20 January 2005.186aircraft flying hours. Historically, these have been in the order of 125 ship days and 500 flying hours.1875.4.1.3 Military Assistance to EC for Environmental Emergency ResponseThe purpose of this agreement is to define the nature and process for military support to Environment Canada in aid of environmental emergency response, in particular the use of the military’s robust command, control, and communications systems for management of environmental incidents. The purpose of the agreement is to establish designated points of contact between departments, and to outline the voice and data communications requirements needed for emergency environmental response, as well as procedures for the use of DND sites and property. Moreover, a section of the MOU discusses the use of naval vessels of opportunity that could be employed for sustained tracking of oil or hazardous material spills as well as estimation of dispersion patterns, provision of meteorological support, accommodation of EC personnel, and equipment stowage. Other provisions in the MOU articulate clearance diving support for underwater reconnaissance and surveys, as well as air reconnaissance and airlift by DND aircraft. The MOU outlines the cost recovery process, but unlike the RCMP and DFO MOUs discussed earlier, there are no annual ceilings for naval ship days and aircraft flying hours.188Table 5-8 below shows the main interdepartmental Memoranda of Understanding that pertain to maritime enforcement at the present time.187 Canada. Fisheries and Oceans Canada/Department of National Defence. Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of Fisheries and Oceans and the Canadian Forces respecting Surface Ship Patrols and Aerial Fisheries Surveillance. Ottawa, May, 1999.188 Canada. Department of the Environment/Department of National Defence. Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of the Environment and the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces relative to a Partnership for Environmental Emergency Response Assistance to the Department o f the Environment. Ottawa, March, 1994.187TABLE 5-8KEY INTER-DEPARTMENTAL MARITIME ENFORCEMENT AGREEMENTSMemorandum Of Understanding Title DND RCMP DFO/CCG ECDrug Law Enforcement X XSurface ship patrols and aerial fisheries surveillance X XEnvironmental Emergency Response X XCounter-Drug Operations X XMutual Assistance between DFO and RCMP X XSecurity and Defence of Canadian Deep-sea and Inland Water Ports during a period of tension or warX XAssistance to RCMP Law Enforcement X XEmployment of CCG ships and aircraft in a war or emergencyX XCombating Oil Spills X XNote : Memoranda of Understanding in italics have expired and are under review.5.4.2 Domestic OperationsDrawing from Chapter Three and the discussion earlier in this chapter, in a domestic context the main roles for the CF are the defence of Canada and sovereignty protection. During the Cold War, the defence role was relatively easy to articulate, given that the enemy or main threat was readily identifiable as the Soviet Union and its allies, the Warsaw Pact nations. Thus, defining the role of DND in this threat environment was equally straight -forward; if the threat posted to Canada was a state actor, it was a defence responsibility to counter the threat. Acts of violence or intimidation perpetrated by non-state actors were considered as criminal acts, and were dealt with by Canadian law enforcement agencies. Moreover, these types of threats tended to be focussed on Canadian soil, whereas defence tasks tended to be offshore or expeditionary in nature.Notwithstanding the distinction between state and non-state threats to security, the Canadian Forces were, and continue to be used to support civil authorities in areas of Canadian jurisdiction. These are known within the military and legal communities as “domestic operations.”188The National Defence Act codifies the principles for control of the armed forces, as well as providing the legal basis for the provision of military support to provinces for maintaining public order.189 Pursuant to the National Defence Act, military “service” can be furnished “in any case in which a riot or disturbance of the peace, beyond the powers of civil authorities to suppress, prevent or deal with and requiring that service.”190 The Chief of the Defence Staff is accorded the discretion to determine the scope and nature of military “service” in these situations.What is a domestic operation? It is a term used to denote “. . . any CF activities which provide assistance in response to requests for support from Canadian civil authorities, or from the Canadian public.”191 In truth, the Minister of National Defence or the Governor-in-Council may authorize the armed forces to “perform any duty involving public service,” including the “provision of assistance in respect of any law enforcement matter.”192Provision of assistance to law enforcement agencies follows a formal procedure, and is only agreed to when the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness makes the request.193 In addition, the assistance must be deemed to be in the national interest and, as well, the matter cannot be effectively dealt with except with the assistance of the armed forces. Minor assistance that is limited only to logistical, technical or administrative support does not have to follow this sequence.The Canadian Forces classifies domestic operations into five categories:a. Category 1 - Routine support to community activities. This is, by far, the most frequent type of domestic operation undertaken by the Canadian Forces and pertains to non-crisis provision of services;189 National Defence Act, R.S.C. 1985 c. N-4. Part XI.190 Ibid.191 Canada, Department of National Defence, National Defence Headquarters, 3301-0 (DCDS) NDHQ Instruction DCDS 2/98: Guidance for the Conduct of Domestic Operations. 10 July 1998, p. 1.192 National Defence Act, R.S.C. 1985 c. N-4. s. 273.6.193 Formerly the Solicitor General of Canada.189b. Category 2 - Humanitarian assistance. This includes ground search and rescue, civil disasters such as floods and fires, environmental emergencies, and other humanitarian situations such as missing persons and mercy flights;c. Category 3 - Assistance to law enforcement agencies (ALEA). This category is further sub-divided into four classes of assistance that run the spectrum from the benign, such as provision of ranges or training areas for police personnel, to situations in which a disturbance of the peace is occurring or about to occur and armed forces personnel or equipment may be needed for support;d. Category 4 - Assistance to other federal government departments’ law enforcement. This category pertains to such activities as assistance to federal penitentiaries for assisting in the suppression of prison disturbances. The four classes of assistance mentioned above can also be used in this category. As well, Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) with the RCMP, DFO, and EC fall into this category; ande. Category 5 - Aid of the Civil Power. Pursuant to the National Defence Act, the Canadian Forces may be called out in aid of the civil power in any case in which a riot or disturbance of the peace, beyond the powers of the civil authorities to suppress, prevent or deal with and requiring that service, occurs or is, in the opinion of an attorney general, considered as likely to occur."194 Under aid of the civil power, armed forces members possess the powers and duties of “constables” but remain under military command and control.Under normal circumstances, the Canadian Forces do not use resources for a purpose not directly in support of national defence objectives. However,194 National Defence Act, R.S.C. 1985 c. N-4. s. 275190there are occasions when it is consistent with the intent of government policy to provide a service in response to a request from a non-defence agency, even though the service is outside the immediate scope of the national defence mandate. As such, the Government of Canada or Governor-in-Council, other federal government departments, provincial governments, municipal governments, other non-defence agencies, and individuals may request assistance or Canadian Forces support on a routine or emergency basis.Depending on the nature and scope of the support requested, i.e., the category, a request for support is first discussed at the local level between departments, but must be processed through the requestor’s staffing chain to the ministerial level. The Minister in need of the support makes the official request directly to the Minister of National Defence, who directs the request downward through the chain of command until support can be provided appropriately.While this may appear to be an overly-bureaucratic and convoluted process, in practice authority for the provision of support can be obtained very rapidly, i.e., under an hour, in times of crisis. From time to time in domestic operations, Canadian Forces members are afforded peace officer status. This status depends on the circumstances of each situation and exists only for as long as it is required for duty. Peace officer status provides both legal status and legal protection to service members while carrying their legal duties. Notwithstanding this status, armed forces members remain under military command at all times.191MinisterMinister ResponsibleOfficial Request MNDMinister of National DefenceNational HQSAUSupport Arrangement UnitDiscussionsCDSChief of Defence StaffJZ .CFLOCdn Forces Liaison Officers\JJLocal DeptOGD e.g. RCMPSpecificNeedDiscussions JTF(A)N3 MARLANT / G3 LFAAShip / Aircraft / ServiceFigure 5-10. Process for Requesting Military Support - Atlantic CanadaTABLE 5-9LEGAL INSTRUMENTS THAT SHAPE MILITARY DOMESTIC OPERATIONSType InstrumentFederal Statute Federal Statute Federal Statute Federal Statute Federal Statute Federal Statute Federal Statute Federal Statute Governor-in-Council Order Governor-in-Council Order Governor-in-Council Order Governor-in-Council OrderMinisterial OrderMinisterial Order Memo of Understanding Memo of Understanding Memo of UnderstandingNational Defence ActEmergencies ActEmergency Preparedness ActSecurity Offences ActSecurity of Information ActCanadian Security Intelligence Service ActFisheries Act and Coastal Fisheries Protection ActCriminal Code of Canada1975 Penitentiary Assistance Order1976 Olympic Games Security Order1993 Canadian Forces Armed Assistance Directions 1996 Canadian Forces Assistance to Provincial Police Forces Directions and Principles for Federal (Military) Assistance to Provincial Policing Nov 1996 - Approval authority for classes of assistance to provincial and territorial law enforcement Nov 1997 - provision of services to non-defence agenciesCounter Drugs MOU between MND and Solicitor General of Canada Fisheries MOU between MND and Minister of Fisheries and Oceans Environmental Emergency MOU between MND and Minister of Environment192Table 5-9 above lists the key federal statutes, Orders-in-Council, and Memoranda of Understanding that affect Canadian Forces domestic operations.5.4.3 Regional Joint Task Force StructureIn 2005, the Chief of the Defence Staff of the Canadian Forces instituted a major structural change to the Canadian Forces in order for the military to better meet emerging threats in the new security environment. The Canadian Forces “Transformation” resulted in the establishment of two new operational- level command headquarters in Ottawa. The purpose of this initiative was to facilitate command and control of domestic and international operations from separate headquarters, rather than from one central headquarters that frequently found itself distracted by policy staffing and corporate governance in addition to command of operations. Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command (CEFCOM) was stood up to mount international operations, and the new headquarters that had the whole of Canada as a theatre of operations for domestic issues was established as Canada Command (CANCOM).In addition to Canada Command, the transformation agenda resulted in the creation of six regional joint task forces spread across the country. These new structures are Joint Task Force Pacific (JTFP) in Esquimalt, Joint Task Force Western (JTFW) in Edmonton, Joint Task Force Central (JTFC) in Toronto, Joint Task Force East (JTFE) in Montreal, and Joint Task Force Atlantic in Halifax. A regional joint task force commander in any of the regions is responsible for command and control of all of the forces, that is, naval, air and land forces in the affected region, for the domestic operations described in earlier sections of this chapter. The establishment of Canada Command with the regional joint task forces provides the Government of Canada with a unified and integrated chain of command for the execution of the full spectrum of domestic operations, from natural disasters to terrorist threats. Figure 5-11 depicts the regional joint task force area of responsibility.The introduction of the regional joint task force structure complicates the study of the Navy’s role in domestic maritime enforcement because many of193the tasks previously assigned through pure naval channels are now the responsibility of Canada Command, a non-Service affiliated command. Two examples of such operations are search and rescue operations and fisheries patrols. It should be borne in mind though, the Commander Maritime Forces Atlantic is also “dual-hatted” as Commander Joint Task Force Atlantic, and is responsible for the force generation and force employment of naval forces on domestic operations60°W 50°W60 “W 50°WFigure 5-11. Regional Joint Task Force Atlantic (limited to study area)missions in the Atlantic region. As well, naval staffs at the Joint Task Force Atlantic headquarters conduct the planning, command, control, and execution of these operations. Moreover, there is limited naval expertise at Canada Command headquarters, and when the need arises for advice on naval operations, the Canada Command invariably turns to Maritime Forces Atlantic (or Pacific) for this input. Hence, for purposes of this study, Canada Command missions that involve naval vessel and air assets will continue to be referred to as naval missions for the purposes of examining the naval contribution to maritime security and enforcement.1945.6 SummaryThere are a many departments and agencies, as well as nongovernmental organizations implicated in oceans management in the Atlantic region. Of these bodies, federal departments play the greatest role in governance, and its with these departments that the Navy has the greatest influence and interaction. The principal tasks that these regulatory and advisory bodies undertake are surveillance and monitoring activities related to exercising national sovereignty, developing situational awareness of the maritime domain, and control of the sea approaches to ensure territorial security. The spectrum of the various joint, federal, and provincial agencies and departments that have interests in ocean affairs in Canada are summarised at Tables 5-1 and 5-2 at the beginning of the chapter.The threat of increased terrorist activity in the post-9/11 security environment has had an impact on the responsibilities and structure of Canadian federal departments. As a result, departments such as the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, and the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness have undergone complete restructuring, or been replaced by new departments or agencies such as the Canadian Border Security Agency as well as Public Security and Emergency Preparedness Canada. As of 2001, Transport Canada assumed responsibility for marine security in Canada.The frequency of departmental restructuring should be cause for concern. For example, in the seven years since January 2001, as it morphed into the department at present known as Public Safety Canada, the department underwent four name changes as it added or discarded various responsibilities and legacy organisations. This flux in organisation structure is indicative of the difficulty that government faces in dealing with the complex post 9/11 security environment.195195 In January 2001 Emergency Preparedness Canada (EPC) was a stand alone federal department. In February 2001 it became the Office of Critical Infrastructure and Emergency Preparedness (OCIPEP). In 2004, OCIPEP morphed into Public Safety and Emergency195The number of Canadian federal statutes that govern ocean management is large, and many contain provisions that result in areas of mutual interest and responsibility between departments. Accordingly, departments draw up Memoranda of Understanding to provide support to each other in cases where one department lacks sufficient resources. Notably, despite the number of agencies and departments that have legitimate need to be “on the water,” only DND, DFO, CCG and the RCMP maintain fleets of vessels, and only DND and DFO have any significant capability for deep-water intervention.In the context of maritime enforcement, the key Memoranda of Understanding that have an impact on the Navy are those agreed upon with DFO for fisheries enforcement, the RCMP for counter-narcotic enforcement, and Environment Canada for environmental emergency incidents. The most visible manifestation for the Navy of these routine domestic operations is the provision of vessels and aircraft for OGD enforcement efforts.Domestic operations is a term used to describe the use of military personnel and equipment to support civil authority at all levels of government. Domestic operations are strictly regulated, and fall into five categories. These categories span a spectrum of activities from the relatively benign provision of services to non-crisis community activities to armed aid to the civil power where military force is used to return order resulting from a disturbance beyond the ability of local law enforcement to contain.Commander Maritime Forces Atlantic is responsible through the naval chain of command for the generation of maritime forces for defence missions around the globe and, wearing the hat of Commander Joint Task Force Atlantic, is responsible to the Canada Command chain of command for domestic operations in the Atlantic region. For the purposes of this thesis, allPreparedness Canada (PSEPC). The title of this department was shortened in 2007 to Public Safety Canada.196support generated by naval vessels and aircraft in the Atlantic region will be deemed part of the Navy’s contribution to maritime security and enforcement.This chapter completes the examination of the second key theme of inquiry, the policy and regulatory framework for maritime enforcement in Canada. As well, the chapter ends the first main part of the overall investigation. Part One described the use of the sea in Atlantic Canada as well as its political regulatory framework. In essence, Part One is the theory portion of this study. The following chapters will describe how the theory is “operationalized,” or in other words, how it is put into practice, both in terms of working relationships with other departments and, through a geographic lens, what the Navy contributes to maritime enforcement in the Atlantic region.197Chapter SixINTERACTION BETWEEN AGENCIES AND DEPARTMENTS6.1 IntroductionThe first half of this thesis has provided the theoretical framework upon which is anchored the maritime enforcement component of oceans management in Canada. Part One described the marine geography of Atlantic Canada, the various ocean sectors, the evolution of relevant policy in Canada, and the key federal departments and agencies with enforcement mandates. The aim of the second half of this study is to measure in qualitative and quantitative terms how the Navy contributes to domestic maritime enforcement in Canada.Having been introduced in Chapter Five to the key constituents in the enforcement regime, the aim of Chapter Six is to examine how these departments interact and co-operate. This chapter opens with a discussion of how maritime security is treated by government in Canada, and is followed by a review of the mechanisms for co-operation at the national level. Considerable attention is paid to the key national-level interdepartmental committee that laid the groundwork upon which much of the regional level interaction is based. The main strategic level federal committees and working groups with security thrusts are discussed as are the national level emergency response systems.The strategic level examination is followed by a detailed review of interdepartmental co-operation in the Atlantic region. Acknowledging that there are multitudes of interdepartmental working groups, only those that have maritime security or enforcement mandates are examined. The chapter ends with a discussion of the flow of processes used when reacting to marine security incidents occur. The chapter notes how linkages established through intelligence networks as well as relationships built through participation in working groups and committees enable federal departments to respond to emergent marine enforcement incidents.1986.2 Security - Law Enforcement or Defence?To understand how government departments interact with one another in an enforcement context it is important to observe that maritime security is viewed by all levels of Canadian government first and foremost as a law enforcement responsibility rather than a defence issue, even in the case of terrorism.196This significant point is lost on many analysts. Moreover, it seems not to have been completely understood by the Senate Committee on National Security and Defence (SCONSAD) in their investigation of the need for a national security policy. In their 2003 report Canada’s Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World, the Committee waxes nostalgically about the Royal Canadian Navy’s success in coastal protection when the country was on a war- time footing during the 1940s. The Committee further suggests that the Canadian Navy of present has abandoned patrols of its home coasts.197While that is clearly not the case, the fact remains that in the present governance structure the Navy, as part of the Canadian Forces, has no legal mandate for law enforcement except in very specific circumstances. As outlined in Chapter Four, the Navy fulfils its constabulary role by supporting those departments that do, the key ones being the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, and Environment Canada. This is done primarily through the provision of naval ships and aircraft as transport for peace officers or conservation and protection officers; other military capabilities are used for surveillance and monitoring of the Canadian ocean areas. Prior to 2004, short of a direct attack on Canada or some threat so overwhelming that the responsible departments simply couldn’t cope, the Navy would not have become the lead agency for most maritime security scenarios in the extant federal construct. However, with the promulgation of the National Security196 Canada, Royal Canadian Mounted Police. National Counter-Terrorism Plan. Annex L.197 Canada, Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence. Canada’s Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World. October, 2003, 17.199Policy, the Navy has been assigned the “co-ordination of on-water response to a marine threat or a developing crisis in our Exclusive Economic Zone and along our coasts.”198 This does not imply lead agency status for routine security tasks, ergo marine enforcement. However, it sets the stage for the Navy to play an important role when the scale or complexity of a security (or enforcement) scenario warrants harnessing the co-ordination, command and control capacity that the Navy can bring to bear on a problem.Prior to 9/11, the threat of foreign terrorist attack on Canadian soil seemed remote in the minds of the public and government alike. Even more remote was the likelihood that this attack could come from or be supported by sea. As a consequence, the few departments that did monitor the threats tended to conduct their analyses from an isolated law enforcement perspective rather than a broader security perspective.In a governance structure in which threats to security by non-state actors are viewed largely as criminal acts to be dealt with by the appropriate law enforcement agency, it should come as no surprise that government departments have become accustomed to viewing problems solely in the context of their narrow legal mandates. This approach has led to the conduct of government operations in what is termed a “stove-pipe” or “silo” fashion. In this manner departments and agencies address security activities without consideration of the relevance to another department’s mandate, and thus fail to capitalise on opportunities to collaborate for mutual benefit. This was the normal way of doing business for government departments post-Second World War, until a government study spawned a renaissance of co-operation on maritime issues at the strategic level that had an effect at the regional level as well.199Since 9/11, government bodies have adopted a more holistic view of security, and departments that had formerly paid only lip service to their marine198 Privy Council Office, Securing an Open Society, 38.199 The 1990 Treasury Board study led by Senator Gordon Osbaldeston is discussed in detail later in this chapter (Article 5.4.2.2.)200security responsibilities now acknowledge them, even if somewhat reluctantly. This reticence is due largely to the fact that many departments now may have “marine security” implied in their mandates but, as described in Chapter Five, they have no physical capability to either monitor or respond to security threats. However, what is important is that the concept of “contributing to marine security” appears to be a catalyst for greater co-operation among the departments.2006.3 Nature of Multi-agency RelationshipsInterdepartmental co-operation exists in Canada in an environment of complex, multi-agency relationships that, as a simple rule of thumb, span three levels of interaction. The first of these levels is the strategic. Issues at the strategic level are those that are pan-national in nature, usually concerning policy, and are addressed by national headquarters in Ottawa. The next level is the regional level.201 Issues at the regional level are those that are province- wide or cover multiple provinces and large areas of the Atlantic approaches. The last level is the tactical or local level. Tactical level issues tend to be more narrowly focussed, often pertaining to specific incidents or operations that do not employ region-wide resources.In addition to the levels of interaction, interdepartmental relationships at all levels can be categorised as being either formal or informal in nature as well being either proactive or reactive in their approach. In addition, some relationships are based on sharing of common intelligence, as opposed to some relationships that are a reflection of the need for agencies to mount a coordinated operational response to a set of stimuli. The next segment of this chapter will address the nature of inter-agency relationships at the strategic and regional levels.200 Personal observation based on experience from 2001 - 2007 as Chairman of Eastern Canada Interdepartmental Marine Operations Committee, and as Chief of Staff, Maritime Forces Atlantic.201 In military planning terms the regional level would be referred to as the “operational” level because in scope it equates to a theatre-wide level of planning for operations.201Reactive ActivitiesProactive ActivitiesStrategic Levely rInformalliaison Regional LevelTactical Level InformalliaisonInformalliaisonInformalliaisonInformalliaisonInformalliaisonFormal processes and official frameworkFormal processes and official frameworkFormal processes and official frameworkFormal processes and official frameworkFormal processes and official frameworkFormal processes and official frameworkFigure 6-1. Nature and Levels of Multi-agency Relationships6.4 The National Setting (Strategic Level)The nation’s capital, Ottawa, is where the power of government in Canada is centralised. It is in this city that Parliament resides, assisted by central agencies, and the strategic headquarters of the various federal departments and agencies. The term “strategic” is used in this context to suggest both the pan-national nature of the departmental headquarters, as well as the executive oversight elements of an organisation’s “head office.”Central agencies are authoritative organisations that are not federal departments per se, but fulfil an important role in maintaining an enabling framework for departments and agencies, as well as providing advice and reports to the Prime Minister and Parliament. Central agencies seldom have direct responsibility for any particular policy; rather they influence and coordinate the policy initiatives of federal departments. The main central agencies in Ottawa are the Treasury Board Secretariat, the Public Service Commission, the Department of Finance, the Office of the Auditor General, and the Privy202Council Office. Of these, the Privy Council Office is the only central agency likely to be engaged in operational issues of marine security and enforcement.The Privy Council Office is the secretariat of the federal cabinet and is, in essence, the Prime Minister’s “department.” The PCO’s function is to provide the Prime Minister with non-partisan advice on a wide spectrum of government matters. Its main focus is the routine co-ordination of issues within government, and managing the federal cabinet’s decision-making apparatus, i.e., preparation and administration of legal instruments and departmental policy proposals. PCO is one of the most influential bodies in the federal construct, so it was a significant breakthrough for the enforcement community when a senior member of PCO was appointed as the nation’s first National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister in 2005. By this appointment, the government finally acknowledged the that security could no longer be relegated “to the back burner” as it had been in the past.202Although each federal department or agency will differ in its approach to decentralisation, each has its national headquarters in Ottawa. Each department or agency reports to an elected member of Parliament who is appointed by the Prime Minister as “the Minister” for the specific line department. With the exception of a Minister’s personal staff, the department or agency is made up of bureaucrats who execute the department’s specific mandates.Each department is headed up by a career civil servant known as the Deputy Minister, who reports directly to the Minister. The role of the Deputy Minister is to provide sound public service advice to the Minister on policy development and implementation of policy within the individual Minister’s portfolio and the government’s overall policy and legislative agenda.202 The National Security Advisor’s purpose is to co-ordinate integrated threat assessments, help strengthen interagency co-operation, and assist in the development of an integrated policy framework for national security and emergencies.203Deputy Ministers are responsible for the maintenance of effective management frameworks within their departments, and for providing the strategic direction necessary to achieve the government's priorities. Deputy Ministers use their national headquarters for establishing national departmental objectives, policies, procedures and standards. Departmental headquarters in Ottawa also administer certain national programs and they monitor departmental activities across the country to ensure the quality and consistency of service delivery. Within a department’s national headquarters, individual directorates at the national headquarters are managed by high-ranking civil servants known as Assistant Deputy Ministers (ADM). It is at this level, within DND and the RCMP, that uniformed senior officers find themselves from time to time appointed as ADMs alongside their civilian counterparts. It is also at this level that the line between the political and bureaucratic realms first begins to blur.Almost all federal departments and agencies execute their programs throughout the rest of Canada in a “regional” construct. The number of regions varies depending upon the individual department. Each region is headed by a senior civil servant known as a Regional Director General. Like Assistant Deputy Ministers in Ottawa, Regional Directors General report directly to the Deputy Minister of the individual department. Within the national headquarters construct, Deputy Ministers, Assistant Deputy Ministers and Regional Directors General are expected to work closely together in manage a department’s operations. However, what should be apparent in this discussion of headquarters structure is that a department’s national headquarters focus will be on national policy development and feeding of the political machine through the department’s Minister, whereas a department’s operations tend to be relegated to its respective regions.This brief synopsis illustrates the political and bureaucratic environment at the national level of government in Canada. The next few pages will discuss the nature of interdepartmental relationships at the strategic level.2046.4.1 Informal and Formal RelationshipsInformal liaison occurs across the broad spectrum of government affairs. This liaison may be simply a matter of staff sounding out their counterparts at the same level in another department about a routine issue or pending initiative. At a national headquarters, it could be various staffs chatting unofficially about upcoming policy deliberations or changes to programmes. Informal co-operation is highly dependent upon individual personality and networking skills. Usually the liaison concerns a particular issue for which one or more departments have an interest or a line responsibility.By contrast, formal co-operation is that which is established through official appointments, secondments, and memberships in various committees or working groups, ad hoc or otherwise. In many cases, the official nature of this liaison is captured in an incumbent’s job description or terms of reference. For example, the Canadian Forces have a Liaison Officer permanently assigned to RCMP national headquarters to provide advice on the use of military resources for counter-narcotics operations. As well, military officers are assigned to supplement the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre operated by CSIS. Canadian naval officers have been seconded in the past to Transport Canada’s national headquarters to assist in the formulation of marine security policy. The Canadian Forces also appoint an admiral-level officer to the staff of the Privy Council Office to provide high-level advice to the federal cabinet. As well, the Navy has seconded another senior naval officer to PCO who can advise the National Security Advisor on marine security issues.6.4.2 Proactive EngagementGovernment authorities deal with the management of their departmental mandates and emergent crises through both proactive and reactive means. In general, proactive measures reflect the interdepartmental working group and committee structure that convenes periodically to resolve issues spanning departmental mandates, as well as existing Memoranda of Understanding between selected departments.205Proactive co-operation takes many forms and occurs as part of normal daily activities. Longstanding relationships have ensured that lines of communication remain open so that contact leading to action can be made easily when the need arises. These relationships have been created and maintained through day-to-day liaison, through participation in official working groups and committees and, in some instances, national or bi-lateral strategic exercises.6.4.2.1 Day-to-day LiaisonDay-to-day liaison at the strategic level in federal government departments is directed for the most part at the development of pan-national government policy. However, given a headquarters’ notional proximity to Parliament Hill, Deputy Ministers are called upon continually to feed the political “beast;” thus, headquarters staffs expend considerable time, effort and resources supporting their Ministers for briefing and responding to the House of Commons.It is important to acknowledge the significant difference between the way the military and other government departments function at the strategic level. While policy development and staffing in support of the MND also are core activities at National Defence Headquarters, the military also directs domestic and international operations from Ottawa. Certain aspects are delegated to military commanders in the various regions throughout Canada, but overall command and control is retained centrally. No other department directs routine operations from the strategic level.There is a heavy emphasis in the civilian bureaucracy on gaining consensus before committing to a plan of action whereas the concept of hierarchical command and control is central to military operations. Indeed, military personnel are comfortable with shifting command and control functions; this is more difficult for civilians to accept. Even the term “command and control” has a negative connotation for many bureaucrats. One senior public servant observed that the term implies that the military seeks to control all aspects of a situation without input from other stakeholders. She also added206that the term invokes the image of a person controlling a toy aircraft or car using a radio controlled remote.203 From the mission-oriented military officer’s perspective, the civil servant is more concerned about consensus building rather than actually getting the job done. Thus, the differences in public service and military cultures manifest themselves in the day-to-day interchange and liaison.The cultural difference between the civil service and military manifests itself in two ways. It is often difficult to progress operational issues because strategic-level OGD staffers are far removed from operations, and are less inclined to understand the pressing nature of some situations. Second, in some cases from DND perspective, there is no opposite number at the strategic level in a given department - the day-to-day contact that the military staff needs to connect with may be at a lower level out in one of the regions.6.4.2.2 Inter-agency Committees and Working GroupsWhile day-to-day liaison between various departmental staffs may be sporadic and unstructured, that is less the case for inter-agency committees and working groups. However, attempting to outline a formal working group structure at the strategic level can be tricky. Normally, an ADM-level committee is stood up for most memoranda going to federal Cabinet, the purpose of which is to support the memorandum’s progress. The committees might exist for a single meeting or perhaps weeks. In many instances these committee meetings may last years, and sometimes are never articulated publicly. Usually, committees are disbanded after the issue makes it to Cabinet but sometimes morph into regular working groups at lower staff levels.204Notwithstanding the apparent ephemeral nature of some of the national level committees, there indeed are a significant number of these formal bodies that cover a host of governance issues across the broad spectrum of public sector policy. With respect to the marine sector, the Navy has a clear interest in203 Diane Giffin-Boudreau, Regional Director General Atlantic, Canada Border Services Agency, interview by author, 22 June 2007.207oceans policy development and is represented by the Director of Maritime Strategy at national committees that deal with these issues. Working groups that benefit from naval participation include the Interdepartmental Marine Protected Areas Working Group, the Interdepartmental Working Group for Canada's Oceans Strategy and multiple Interdepartmental Offshore Oil & Gas Working Groups.205 However, for the purposes of this thesis, only the committees and working groups that have relevance to either marine security or maritime enforcement will be discussed further.In order to understand better how government committees and working groups contribute to the overall security framework, it is worth stepping back a decade and a half to review a significant government study that set the wheels in motion for greater co-operation in the marine sector. What is important to note is the broad spectrum of issues that required addressing by the federal departments that operated ships and boats on the government’s behalf, as evidenced by the number of sub-committees that were spawned from the study’s final report. The large range of issues is indicative of the lack of sharing of information and resources at the time, resulting in a “stove-piped” approach to government maritime operations and fleet management.6.4.2.2.1 The Osbaldeston Report: “All the Ships that Sail”Although interdepartmental co-operation appears to have become topical in the context of national and maritime security only since 11 September 2001, co-operation has existed to varying degrees since the since Confederation in 1867. However, it was the watershed 1990 Treasury Board study led by Senator Gordon Osbaldeston that provided the major impetus for change. The Senator undertook a major review (referred to as the Osbaldeston Report) to identify opportunities for enhancing the efficiency and improving delivery of federal marine fleets programs.206204 Shauna Grant, Directorate of Maritime Strategy, Department of National Defence, interview by author, 23 June 2003.2C* Ibid.208Participating departments and agencies in the study included Transport Canada, the Department of National Defence, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO), the Solicitor General of Canada and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.207 A unique aspect of this study was the primary emphasis it placed on compiling a comprehensive inventory database of the federal fleet. The data accumulated were used to identify the capacity of federal fleets to respond to present and future demand as well as a means for improving their utilisation.208In the Osbaldeston study full consolidation of all maritime vessels under DND was not considered a viable option. However, it was recommended that DND increase its support for other government departments in the areas of sovereignty, fisheries, search and rescue and the environment.209 Consolidation of the two civilian federal fleets (at the time DFO and CCG) was considered but this was rejected in light of the considerable financial and human resource costs that would be accrued.210 However, from the perspective of determining more effective and efficient ways of utilising all federal government marine resources, the study’s recommendation to create an interdepartmental steering committee was groundbreaking for the time.6.4.2.2.2 Interdepartmental Program Co-ordination and Review CommitteeThe Osbaldeston Report recommended that an Interdepartmental Program Co-ordination and Review Committee (IPCRC), consisting of representatives of the (then) three major federal fleet operating departments (DND, DFO and CCG), be established on a two-year trial basis. The trial was to determine if the three departments could find effective ways to operate and206 Canada, Treasury Board of Canada. All the Ships That Sail: A Study of Canada’s Fleets, by G.F. Osbaldeston. Report of the Study on the Utilization of the Federal Government’s Marine Fleets. Ottawa, 15 October 1990, p. 66.207 In 1990, the Canadian Coast Guard’s parent department was Transport Canada.208 Treasury Board of Canada. All the Ships That Sail,. 88.209 Ibid., 58.209interact. In the event that they were unsuccessful, the study recommended examining the potential consolidation of the two civilian fleets.211IPCRC held its first meeting in June 1991 met every year until 2001. IPCRC acted as a forum for identifying government program requirements for ship support and for coordinating the tasking of the government’s fleets of seagoing vessels to promote their efficient utilization. However, it had no role with respect to fleet management. To the extent that the departments cooperated, existing bilateral Memoranda of Understanding were the prime method of meeting “supplier-demander arrangements”.212IPCRC reports were tabled formally with the Treasury Board. In terms of rank, IPCRC members were ostensibly at the Assistant Deputy Minister level. They were expected to ensure that the common database recommended and established after the Osbaldeston Report was maintained and updated regularly by the primary fleet operator and that the costing and utilization data was updated annually.213IPCRC established a Working Group chaired by a representative (at the Director General/Director level) of the same department as the IPCRC chair. This Working Group met more frequently than IPCRC, and initially established two operationally-related activities, namely the Interdepartmental Co-ordination of Vessel Utilization Subgroup (ICVU) and the Concept of Operations Subcommittee (COSC). The Working Group provided direction to, reviewed and approved the Terms of Reference (TOR) for its various sub-committees to ensure that they remained true to the intent of the original Osbaldeston recommendations.214211 Ibid., 59-60.212 Ibid., 59.213 Art Silverman, Chairman, “Record of Decision - Meeting of the Organizing Committee for the Interdepartmental Program Co-ordination and Review Committee 24 May 1991” (Ottawa: 10 June 1991).214 Ibid.; Canada, Department of National Defence, National Defence Headquarters, 1735-5 (CMDO) Delegation of Duties and Responsibilities Associated with the Interdepartmental Program Co-ordination and Review Committee, 23 March 1992.210At the national level, the Interdepartmental Co-ordination of Vessel Utilization Subgroup was composed of representatives from the departments that owned fleets and from those departments who wanted to use them. It sought to establish and coordinate an annual matching process of ship requirements versus ship availability on an interdepartmental basis. It focused on maximizing the efficiency of vessel utilization. To that end, regional committees were established (Pacific, Atlantic and Central/Arctic) to coordinate vessel availability with both identified and unforeseen demands for vessel support, to compile a three-year plan for multi-tasking of ships to meet demands and to provide feedback to ensure the right ship for the task. This three-year plan was developed in parallel to the Multi-Year Operations Planning (MYOP) process employed by DND. The committee also maintained an historical record of utilisation.The other body, the Concept of Operations Sub-committee, was charged to develop the Interdepartmental Concept of Maritime Operations (ICMO) working document. This publication detailed the concept of operations necessary to accomplish maritime-related tasks requiring the involvement of more than one government department. ICMO captured the protocols of existing interdepartmental MOUs and outlined the procedures to successfully accomplish the mission or task. The concept of ICMO was that any operational protocol could be extracted from it and used as a stand-alone document to suit the training and operational needs of individual departments.215The IPCRC Working Group acknowledged the need for other subcommittees. A Communications Sub-committee (CSC) was set up to identify communication requirements to support interdepartmental operations and to make recommendations to IPCRC for equipment and procedures to meet those requirements.216 In addition, a surveillance Sub-committee (SSC) was created to improve the efficiency of surveillance of the Canadian maritime approaches. Its objectives were to establish jointly manned surveillance co-ordination and215 Canada, Department of National Defence, National Defence Headquarters, 1735-5 (CMDO)Delegation of Duties and Responsibilities Associated with the Interdepartmental Program Coordination and Review Committee, 23 March 1992.211operations centres on both the Pacific and the Atlantic coasts of Canada. However, other than DND, participating federal government departments did not wish to finance jointly-manned operations centres. As a consequence, the objectives of the Surveillance Subcommittee were amended to simply establishing a means for concerned departments to have access to existing operations centres when necessary, and to develop a method to disseminate a Recognized Maritime Picture (RMP) to automated data processing equipment in individual departments.217 Interestingly, in 2004 the National Security Policy directed the creation of Marine Security Operations Centres (MSOC) east, west and on the Great Lakes. These MSOCs will fulfill the needs that the IPCRC Working Group sub-committees had identified a decade and half earlier.Other sub-committees to the IPCRC Working Group included a Hydrographic Operations Sub-committee (HOSC) that was established to coordinate the acquisition of hydrographic and bathymetric data, to develop the use of new technology, and to ensure a co-ordinated plan to meet pangovernment requirements for hydrographic products and services.218 The IPCRC Working Group also set up a Vessel Design Requirements Subcommittee to review new designs and modernization plans for increasing federal fleet interoperability. This sub-committee also considered issues such as sharing other infrastructure such as bases among government departments.219Two years after IPCRC’s inaugural meeting, its membership was expanded to include Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, Environment Canada, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, and Indian Affairs and Northern Development. The membership was later expanded to include Natural Resources Canada (NRCAN), the National Research Council of Canada (NRCC), and Public Works (PW).216217218219Ibid.Ibid.Ibid.Ibid.212In early 1994, a two-year assessment recommended by the Osbaldeston study was carried out to validate the effectiveness of IPCRC as a tool of interdepartmental governance. The assessment reviewed government processes with three major criteria in mind. The first criterion was that the participating departments were satisfied with the results of the IPCRC process. The second was that excess capacity, i.e., availability of resources that went unused, had been significantly reduced on an annual comparative basis. The third criterion was that unmet demand for fleet resources had been significantly reduced on a year-over-year basis.220 The two-year assessment recommended that the IPCRC organization and supporting infrastructure be maintained as a co-operative interdepartmental body to increase the effectiveness of the federal fleets and to measure their efficiencies on an annual basis. It was generally believed that the IPCRC process was producing useful results in terms of fleet effectiveness and that potential existed for further gains in efficiency.221Although the two-year assessment in 1994 did not recommend consolidation, by 1995 it was decided to combine the two non-military federal fleets (DFO and CCG) under the aegis of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans. In light of this, IPCRC was again reviewed and it was determined that the IPCRC organizing committee at the Assistant Deputy Minister level should be stood down, and that its responsibilities be taken over by the IPCRC Working Group. The organizing committee was renamed simply the IPCRC (DG level).222A decision was also taken to combine the Surveillance, Communications, Concept of Operations and Vessel Design Requirements Sub-committees into one national Operations Sub-committee (OSC). To facilitate better regional co-operation it was rationalised that the OSC should have three regional sub-committees. These sub-committees would be220 Canada, Interdepartmental Program Co-ordination and Review Committee. All the Ships That Sail: Two Year Assessment. Ottawa, 18 January 1994, p. 2.221 Ibid., 12.213responsible for co-ordinating operational issues in the Atlantic, Pacific and Central/Arctic. It was decided that the Hydrographic Operations Sub-committee and the ICVU Subgroup would remain intact with their work being co-ordinated at the national level.223From 1995 to 2001, the IPCRC Working Group and its the national-level Operations Sub-committee continued to function in conjunction with the three regional operations sub-committees. These were known as the Pacific Region Operations Sub-committee (PROSC), the Central and Arctic Zone Operations Sub-committee (CAZO) and the Atlantic Operations Sub-committee (AOSC). The Interdepartmental Co-ordination of Vessel Utilization Sub-group was subsumed by the OSC, whereas in 1998 the Hydrographic Operations Subcommittee began reporting directly to the IPCRC Working Group. It seemed as though the federal partners were well on the way to cracking the code to real interdepartmental co-ordination and effective employment of maritime human and materiel resources.What, then, happened to IPCRC?Over the course of ten years, IPCRC fulfilled its mandate with mixed success. As is the nature of such things, the departure of key individuals over time resulted in a diminution of IPCRC’s importance in the departments that both maintained and needed the services of fleets. The consolidation of the two non-military fleets under one department reduced the flexibility possible within three fleets while concomitantly reducing the size of all. The absorption of the Canadian Coast Guard by DFO during an era of resource reduction diverted both departments’ energies to the detriment of IPCRC. The 1990s saw the stagnation of interdepartmental relationships and, over time, meetings ceased to be conducted. The increased number of departments associated with IPCRC, with the multiplicity of departmental endeavours, made difficult the task of educating of federal employees about IPCRC and its contribution to222 Canada, Department of National Defence, National Defence Headquarters, 1150-110/J257-3 (DNR4) Interdepartmental Program Co-ordination and Review Committee (IPCRC) - Reorganization, 13 December 1996.214interdepartmental co-operation. Consequently, branches of departments returned to embarking in isolation on programs that would have better been served through the IPCRC process.224The Interdepartmental Concept of Maritime Operations document, inspired in its conception, was allowed to whither. New federal employees, often pressed for time and ignorant of the founding principles of IPCRC, did not maintain the level of staff effort required to ensure its usefulness. Staffs in the various departments frequently embarked on operations that involved more than one department without reference to this document.By the late 1990s, there was little funding available to progress interdepartmental issues, and public sector managers’ priorities turned inwards to their own departmental needs during periods of budgetary constraint. Occasional spikes of activity that demanded multi-departmental responses, such as the Turbot Crisis in 1995 and the Swiss Air Flight 111 disaster of 1998, buoyed relations with other government departments. However, in general terms, many of the benefits set in motion by the Osbaldeston study and IPCRC simply stopped dead in their tracks. Sadly, IPCRC was stood down on 17 September 2001.The Committee’s final meeting aptly sums up the story of this genuine attempt at high level interdepartmental co-operation. Of the original list of invited OGD members (24 in total), only four individuals in addition to the two naval representatives were present. They were the IPCRC Co-Chair, IPCRC OSC Chair, CAZO Chair, and the HOSC Secretary, all of whom represented either DFO or CCG. The other IPCRC Co-Chair, the Director General Maritime Plans and Readiness represented DND, and was assisted by a naval staff224 The acquisition of communications equipment is an example. The national OSC would have been the place for each department to consult prior to one of them buying equipment that might not be compatible with that of other government departments.215officer. The RCMP, TC, CCRA, NRCan and Public Works chose not to attend, even though the fate of IPCRC was to be decided at that meeting.225In answering the question, “Is IPCRC still needed?” the Committee felt that the original mandate and impetus of IPCRC had long been surpassed and was no longer meeting the needs of any of the participants at the national level. It was argued that the situation described in Osbaldeston Report represented a completely different maritime fleet environment, with excess surplus in resources in 1990. This was in stark contrast to the state of reduced numbers in OGD assets and the climate of budgetary constraint by 2001. Moreover, the members felt that IPCRC forum was not providing any useful oversight for the regions to effect their day-to-day operations. In taking the decision to disband IPCRC, the members agreed not to interfere or cancel any previous initiatives instituted by the regions or sub-committees. It was felt that day-to-day cooperation in the regions would be able to continue without the need for the terms of reference or oversight of the national level IPCRC organisation.226Retired Vice-Admiral Gary Garnett, one of the founding member of the IPCRC organising committee, downplays the effect of reduced budgets on the demise of IPCRC. Garnett, in a rebuttal to the researcher’s summation of the causes of IPCRC’s failure, argues that “the process was so dependent on the good will and professionalism of bureaucrats to move it forward, it leads one to wonder if this informal approach might not have also been a factor in this pause.”227 Garnett makes a valid observation, but it is obvious from the minutes of the IPCRC meetings leading up to the 17 September 2001 gathering, that funding concerns weighed heavily on the minds of the committee members and, in particular, the Canadian Coast Guard.225 Lieutentant-Commander Scott Godin, “IPCRC - Record of Decision 17 Sep 01," office email (18 September 2001).26 Ibid.227 Gary Garnett, “Whither Canada?” In Continental Security and Canada-U.S. Relations: Maritime Perspectives, Challenges and Opportunities, edited by Robert H. Edwards and Graham Walker, Halifax: Dalhousie University, 2003, p. 187. (21 August 2007).216Why then, has so much space been allotted in this chapter to describing IPCRC and for that which it stood? The very fact that IPCRC was created showed that, up to that point, departments with similar mandates and challenges had not been learning from the experiences of other departments with the same problems. More importantly, IPCRC demonstrated that at the federal level, departments could work together to eliminate redundancies and make use of excess capacity, and could resolve mutual challenges. IPCRC showed that, with the right mindset, co-operation among disparate, complex bureaucratic agencies was within the realm of the possible, after all.IPCRC also demonstrated the utility of specialized sub-committees to tackle unique aspects of interdepartmental co-operation. IPCRC’s subcommittee structure was genesis of the regional operations committees, working bodies that have survived the demise of the national umbrella organisation, and remain thriving and useful organs that have sponsored true collaborative planning at the regional level. This is the enduring legacy of the Interdepartmental Program Co-ordination and Review Committee.6.4.2.2.3 Cabinet Committee on Security, Public Health and EmergenciesThe Cabinet Committee on Security, Public Health and Emergencies is a follow-on committee to high-level group that was assembled shortly after the 9/11 attacks. In late September 2001, the Prime Minister created the Ad Hoc Cabinet Committee on Public Security and Anti-Terrorism (PSAT) to coordinate the strategic government response in the emergent uncertain security climate. The PSAT committee’s objectives were to protect Canadians from terrorist attacks, to keep the borders with the United States open, and to contribute to international efforts to combat terrorism. On the PSAT committee was minister-level representation from the Privy Council Office, PSC (then OCIPEP), CBSA, CRA, DFO, CCG, TC, DND and various police agencies.PSAT, like many other ad hoc Cabinet committees, addressed time- sensitive issues that cut across the mandates of several departments. PSAT provided general policy direction, but it did not make policy decisions. Rather, issues were referred to permanent committees of Cabinet for decision. Once217formed in 2001, PSAT provided Cabinet with advice on proposed marine security measures and their priority for implementation, as well as advice on broader security initiatives.228The Ad Hoc Cabinet Committee on Public Security and Anti-Terrorism was replaced by a different body, the Cabinet Committee on Security, Public Health and Emergencies, in December 2003. This occurred at the same time as major changes were introduced to the structure of parliamentary committees, departments, and agencies that created new entities such as CBSA and PSEPC. The Cabinet Committee on Security, Public Health and Emergencies has a broader mandate than PSAT, and endeavours to manage at a strategic level national security issues and activities and, in addition, government-wide responses to public health, national disasters, and security emergencies.2296.4.2.2.4 Interdepartmental Marine Security Working GroupAs Senator Colin Kenny observed incredulously in Canada’s Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World, the IPCRC was terminated in 2001 only six days after the terrorist attack on North American soil. The disbanding of the committee occurred precisely at a time when more coordination of related interdepartmental at sea activities was needed, not less. Thus it should have come as no surprise that within the year, the federal government recognised this need and constituted a new interdepartmental body, the Interdepartmental Maritime Security Working Group (IMSWG). The IMSWG’s mandate was to “coordinate federal response to marine security, analyze our marine systems for security gaps, and develop possible mitigation initiatives to address these gaps.”230 Senator Kennedy observed that the IMSWG was “simply the resuscitation of the Interdepartmental Program Coordination and Review Committee” but this is not entirely accurate. Whereas228 Canada, Department of Justice, Public Safety And Anti-Terrorism (PSAT) Initiative, Summative Evaluation, 23 July 2007 (21 August 2007).29 Canada, Office of the Auditor General Canada, “Federal Response to September 11, 2001,” Exhibit 2.1 to 2005 Report o f the Auditor General of Canada, 5 April 2005 (21 August 2007).230 SCONSAD, Canada’s Coastlines: The Longest Under-defended Borders, *\ 10-113.218IPCRC was established to rationalise and manage fleet resources, the coordination of operational issues evolved as a logical progression from that. On the other hand, the IMSWG was created with an operational security mandate at the outset, and its participants included many who were not party to IPCRC.From its inception, the Interdepartmental Maritime Security Working Group (IMSWG), was designed to be a working body that furnished the Ad Hoc Cabinet Committee on Public Security and Anti-Terrorism with fully staffed conclusions and policy recommendations on maritime security issues.231 The IMSWG’s function was to identify federal government actions in support of a national marine security plan and Canada’s international marine security obligations. The IMSWG was given licence to facilitate co-operation and coordination among IMSWG member departments and agencies and “to promote the breaking-down of barriers to information exchange and the improvement of interoperability among the departments.” Its main functions though, were to develop national policy recommendations for presentation to Cabinet and to provide integrated and interdepartmental recommendations on the prioritisation of marine security enhancements. These recommendations included the resource requirements of the federal government Marine Security Co-ordination Fund established in 2001. Lastly, IMSWG was charged with facilitating communication with federal departments and agencies, other levels of government and the private sector, and regional-based committees with interest in or responsibilities for marine security.The IMSWG is chaired by Transport Canada, and has as members representatives from 14 departments and agencies. These are PSC, DND, RCMP, CSIS, DFO, CBS A, CRA, DFAIT, DOJ, and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency. Ex-officio members include the Privy Council Office, the Treasury Board Secretariat, and Finance Canada. Representation to the working group is at the Director General level from federal departments and agencies with policy, regulatory and/or enforcement mandates dealing with marine security. In addition, subject matter experts of those organisations219having a broad mandate touching on aspects to marine security (such as Agriculture Canada, Health Canada and Environment Canada) may be requested to attend IMSWG or its subordinate committee meetings.As in the case of IPCRC, the Interdepartmental Maritime Security Working Group created several sub-committees to enable it to carry out its mandate. The first of these, the Information Sharing Sub-Committee, is chaired by DND and is responsible for identifying interdepartmental marine security information synergies and roadblocks to the effective sharing of that information between departments. The RCMP chairs another group, the Armed Ship Boarding Protocol Sub-Committee that has been developing a national protocol concerning the armed boarding of ships for national security purposes.Given that there is a significant amount of seaborne commerce that uses the St Lawrence River and Great Lakes waterways, a third sub-committee has been stood up. Chaired by Transport Canada, the Canada-U.S. Seaway Vessel Security Screening Sub-Committee is establishing a co-ordinated approach for security-related information sharing and procedures to address ships using the Canada/U.S. St. Lawrence Seaway system.At present, the IMSWG provides advice to the National Security Advisor and Cabinet committees on the four pillars of marine security: domain awareness, responsiveness, safeguarding and collaboration. Through the IMSWG, Transport Canada administers the Marine Security Co-ordination Fund,. This fund provides money for one-time or limited-period federal projects that improve the co-ordination of marine security efforts across the federal government and with other jurisdictions. In 2001, for example, the federal government allocated 60 million dollars for marine security initiatives over a six- year period. This commitment was increased to 172 million dollars in 2003 in order to fund 13 different but related marine security initiatives. These projects included the purchase of increased hours for DFO-contracted surveillance aircraft, an Automatic Identification System (AIS) and Long Range Vessel231 Peter Avis, “Surveillance and Canadian Maritime Domestic Security,” Canadian Military220Identification and Tracking project, a High Frequency Surface Wave Radar (HFSWR) project, increased resources to support police Emergency Response Teams (ERT), and the acquisition of static and portable explosive, nuclear, chemical and biological scanning equipment for shipborne containers. The funds are dispersed to whichever department has the lead for a particular project. For example, in 2006, the IMSWG approved funding for interdepartmental projects proposed by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Canada Border Services Agency, Transport Canada, Health Canada, and the Canadian Space Agency.2326.4.2.2.5 Integrated Threat Assessment CentreIn the American public’s collective mind, the attack on the World Trade Center by Muslim extremists in 2001 was the direst manifestation of a failure of intelligence. In the post-attack analysis a number of open source reports cite prior knowledge by a small number of US government authorities of extremists’ intentions to target New York. However, the sharing of this information by government agencies and the ability to synthesise that intelligence was insufficient to thwart the attacks. North of the border, the ability of Canadian authorities to meet the same challenge has attracted greater scrutiny by the public and government alike. As one senior police official put it in this wry understatement, “the open and proactive sharing of law enforcement information was inconsistent and not as well co-ordinated as it could have been.”233 In this climate, it was assessed that Canadian departments and agencies with security mandates continued to operate in “stovepipes,” and would be more effective if a multi-agency intelligence assessment group wereJournal 4, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 9-14.232 Canada, Transport Canada, “Transportation Security,” Transportation in Canada 2006, 14 August 2007 (1 September 2007); Canada, Department of National Defence, “Enhancing the Security of Canada's Marine Transportation Station: Canada’s Marine Transportation System,” Issues and Challenges, 28 September 2006 (3 September 2007).233 Testimony of Mr. Julian Fantino, Commissioner of the Ontario Provincial Police, before the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Issue 17 - Evidence 18 June 2007 (20 August 2007).221established to integrate all-source intelligence analyses and disseminate them to the government authorities charged with responding to them.In 2004 the National Security Policy articulated the need for such anorganisation, calling for the establishment of the Integrated Threat AssessmentCentre (ITAC). The function of ITAC is the collation and analysis of intelligencefeeds from multiple agencies, and the generation of comprehensive threatassessments. These threat assessments are disseminated in a timely andeffective manner so that risks to public safety can be either prevented ormitigated in some fashion.234 John MacLaughlin, the Director of ITAC,describes the role of Centre in this manner:“You could think of ITAC as a mixing bowl that provides the environment for integration. Integration, in this context, has three dimensions: integration of access to information; integration of departmental or agency analytical cultures; and integration of the assessments themselves.”235CSIS provides the framework for ITAC but it is not staffed exclusively by CSIS personnel. Additional staff members from other security and enforcement agencies are seconded to ITAC, normally for a two-year period. There are roughly a dozen agencies represented at ITAC at the time of this writing. These include CSIS, PSC, CBSA, DND, TC, RCMP as well as the Privy Council Office, the Communications Security Establishment, Foreign Affairs and International Trade, the Correctional Service of Canada, and the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada. Also included are the provincial police forces of the two provinces in which the RCMP does not have contracted provincial policing duties. These services are the Ontario Provincial Police and La Surete du Quebec. The core members of ITAC bring expertise of their respective organisations to the table, and furnish a pipeline through which intelligence and information can be pulled from the various agencies. ITAC is also the formal link to international threat assessment centres in the United States, UK, Australia, and New Zealand.234 Canada, Canadian Security and Intelligence Service, The Integrated Threat Assessment Centre, 13 April 2007 (20 August 2007).2226.4.2.2.6 Arctic Security Working GroupThis body was established by the Canadian Forces in 1999 as the Arctic Security Interdepartmental Working Group, and brought together representatives from 15 federal departments and territorial government representatives. Having dropped “interdepartmental” from its title in recognition of the increased membership by NGOs and academics, the Arctic Security Working Group meets semi-annually to provide a forum to share information and intelligence and to generate synergy among departments and organisations in the North. Sub-committees to the working group have been established recently for Arctic sovereignty, security, interoperability and the environment.236While the group discusses a broad range of issues ranging from science and research to delivering the mail, recent discussions have highlighted concerns increased air traffic in the North that is forcing a rewrite of the Canadian Forces major air disaster plan.237 The Arctic Security Working Group has championed several joint operations in the Arctic such as a 2005 simulated terrorist attack on the Mackenzie Delta gas industry.While there has been little linkage between this working group and broader marine security and enforcement initiatives to date, one can expect this body to take on a greater role as activities in the Arctic increase. At present there continues to be renewed interest in scientific exploration in the Arctic with the aim of bolstering claims by other nations of extensions to their continental shelves, such as by Denmark in the vicinity of Hans Island, and by the Russians in regard to the Lomonosov ridge.238235 Chris Thatcher, “Integrating Terrorism Intelligence Resources,” Vanguard (February 2006) (20 August 2007).236 Colonel Norris Pettis, Chairman, “Minutes of Arctic Security Interdepartmental Working Group Meeting 18-19 November 2002” (Yellowknife, N.W.T.: December, 2002).237 There at least 315 flights per day that overfly Canada’s Arctic, according to MARLANT intelligence sources.238 “Russia plants flag under N Pole,” BBC News, 2 August 2007 (22 August 2007).2236.4.3 Reactive EngagementUp to this point, the discussion has treated proactive interdepartmental activities at the national level through the lens of working groups and committees. However, from time to time, situations develop that require strategic level government response. These scenarios would be those that are too large in scope or too politically sensitive for the Regional Directors General to manage alone. When these types of situations arise, the set of protocols that form the Federal and National Emergency Response Systems are expected to resolve them.6.4.3.1 Federal Emergency Response SystemIn the Canadian system of government, the Prime Minister retains overall responsibility for national security and the safety of its citizens. Until relatively recently, there was no other minister below the Prime Minister who had sole responsibility for national security. Rather, federal organisations with security mandates reported directly to their respective ministers, who were accountable for activities within departmental silos. With the creation in 2003 of what is now known as Public Safety Canada, a single minister became responsible to support Prime Minister in matters of public safety and emergency preparedness. In addition, the National Security Advisor supports the Prime Minister for issues of national security.In conjunction with the appointment of the National Security Advisor and the stand-up of the new department, there was recognition that in order to provide leadership in emergencies of national significance, a formalized set of procedures needed to be established for strategic federal response. Moreover, there was a need for a system to ensure that alert and warning systems across government could respond effectively to threats, and that the system could provide 24/7 co-ordination and support to government officials and key national stakeholders in the event of national emergency. To meet this challenge, Public Safety Canada proposed the Federal Emergency Response System (FERS). It should be borne in mind that the premise of FERS was for relief from natural disaster or pandemic, and this remains the mindset of many of the224architects of the FERS and, in particular, PSC. However, the FERS structure lends itself equally well to human-induced threats to security.The overall aim of the Federal Emergency Response System is to provide effective leadership ensuring a “whole of government” federal response to any emerging, imminent or occurring incident that affects the national interest. This includes all manners of incident, not just those that are enforcement or security related. As such, the FERS has three major objectives. The first is to ensure early detection of any incident that may require a federal response. The second is to provide information and briefs to facilitate ministerial policy direction and decision-making as required. The third objective is to develop and implement incident specific strategic “whole of government” national security and public safety response plans that are harmonized among federal departments and agencies.Figure 6-2. Security Response Process FlowThe FERS aligns federal co-ordination structures, capabilities, and resources into a unified all-hazards response to major events of national interest or significance that affect national security and public safety. The term “all hazards” implies an approach that integrates the security incident and disaster emergency responses into a seamless response flow that can deal with both national security, including enforcement, and the consequence management aspects of a potential or actual event.Monitoring & ReportingSituationAwarenessPotential or Actual Event IdentifiedData Collection & Modellingimpact/ConsequenceAnalysisConfirmation of Vulnerabilities & Risk ToleranceStrategic Contingency & Action PlanningStrategicOperationsCo-ordinationProcess Row225Activities that are undertaken under the FERS construct occur mainly within the Government Operations Centre (GOC). Housed in PSC facilities in Ottawa, this Centre provides strategic coordination and direction to federal departments and agencies and, as required, interfaces with provincial, territorial and international agencies. The GOC has a mandate for both domestic and international incidents. In developing the concept of the GOC, it was determined that the Centre should be action biased, conducting both preemptive as well as reactive strategic operations, and that the Centre needed to fuse both crisis and consequence management. The GOC should be the single point of contact for international events affecting the national interest, and be capable of round-the-clock operations with immediate access to expert knowledge in areas of national security, consequence management, cyber and public communications. Moreover, the GOC required full time connectivity with federal and provincial operations centres in the regions.The GOC supports the decision-making process of the federal Cabinet Operations Committee and appropriate Assistant Deputy Minister level committees by providing a series of incident-related information and decisionmaking products. Of note, when the FERS is activated, PCO and the National Security Advisor are represented in the Government Operations Centre as well.The majority of security and enforcement situations that arise on a routine basis fall within the mandate of a single department or agency, or can be dealt with by federal authorities alone. For example, CBSA often boards commercial vessels inbound for Halifax Harbour when the agency suspects that there may be a security concern aboard a particular ship. CBSA embarks its personnel through the use of the pilot boats of the Atlantic Pilotage Authority. The RCMP and CBSA frequently collaborate to investigate suspicious containers in the Port of Halifax facilities. However, from time to time, these types of operations may be driven by information gleaned at the strategic level, or they may ordered by higher authority. Figure 6-3 depicts the relationships that exist in a single mandate scenario as described above.226Noting that policy development, not operations, tends to be the focus at strategic level OGD headquarters, individual federal departments and agencies differ considerably regarding the amount of involvement that their Ottawa offices have in any given event. For most OGDs, if Ministerial involvement is necessary, the Minister might deal directly with the appropriate Regional Director General rather than engage the national level departmental headquarters in the operation. This concept is foreign to military officers, and adds yet another dimension to interdepartmental co-operation.— iDepartment Operations Centre (EOC)Prime MinisterMinisterStrategic Level Dept or AgencyRegional Dept or AgencyFigure 6-3. Single Mandate Scenario - National / Regional RelationshipsWithin the FERS, there are three activation levels. The first level is an initial risk assessment and incident monitoring. If warranted, the incident controller may choose to go to the next level, which involves contingency planning and a limited government response. The third level is the full Government of Canada response.2276.4.3.2 National Emergency Response SystemTo have a truly strategic system, the federal component of the emergency response system has to effectively complement and interact with the various existing provincial and territorial response systems to ensure timely and effective federal support in time of crisis or emergency. In situations in which a combined federal/provincial response to an event is warranted, the National Emergency Response System (NERS) is activated. The NERS addresses the interface between the federal/regional organisations and associated FERS process mechanisms, and those of the provinces and territories, i.e. a different level of government with similar but separate departments and processes.S'S 5 2 o a OProvincialMinisteris)DM Mirror Committee Provincial OMsProvincial ADMsFederal Liaison✓ t, ' »icialsCo-ord Group Provincial Ops \ .U ' '_ Centre (EOC) / ✓Figure 6-4. Multiple Mandate Scenario - Federal / Provincial RelationshipsThe NERS adheres to an almost identical sequence of procedures and protocols as the FERS but they are amended as appropriate for the provincial or territorial legal framework. Figure 6-4 shows the linkages between national policy direction, strategic co-ordination and regional level co-ordination in a multi-agency federal/provincial scenario.228PSC has produced a draft Federal Emergency Response Plan (FERP) that is intended to become the nation’s “all-hazard, whole of government coordination plan for responding to single and/or multiple mandate events or emergencies involving one or more federal departments and agencies.”239 The purpose of the FERP is to provide guidance to managing the grey area between events for which a single department or agency has a mandate to address and those that require multiple agencies and are national in scope.”2406.5 The Regional Setting (Operational Level)Although the main study area for this thesis is the Atlantic region, up to this point the discussion has treated federal government interdepartmental relationships at the national level. This was necessary in order to comprehend the strategic framework with which the regional authorities must interact so that linkages between various operations centres, committees and working groups can be better understood.Outside of the nation’s capitol, federal departments are headed by a Regional Director General in a regional headquarters. However, because OGDs at the strategic level concern themselves largely with policy, and operational decision-making and authority for resource expenditure are delegated to the regions, the RDGs are the true powerbrokers in terms of interagency co-operation.241As mentioned in Chapter Four, not all departments organise their respective regions in the same manner. In the Atlantic study area, some departments combine all four provinces to create one large region and have only one RDG to manage the four provinces. Other departments use provincial boundaries for delimitation and employ four RDGs in four separate regions in239 Canada, Public Safety Canada, Federal Emergency Response Plan (FERP) Volume 1 - 8 November 2006 (Draft 6) (Ottawa: Department of Public Safety Emergency Management and National Security Branch, Government Operations Centre Directorate, 8 November 2006), 23.240 Ibid., 22-23.241 Most federal departments employ the title Regional Director General. The are some exceptions: the senior CCG officer in the region is called an Assistant Commissioner, the senior regional RCMP officer is called the Deputy Commissioner, and each province has its own Commanding Officer.229the Atlantic area. Yet other departments use non-political geographic criteria upon which to establish their regions, resulting in three regions with three RDGs to administer the same area as other departments with one or four RDGs. The significance of these organisational differences means that interagency co-operation will be inherently more complicated on a regional basis because a greater number RDGs and their bureaucracies must be engaged than would be required at the strategic level.The remainder of this chapter will address interaction between government agencies and departments in the Atlantic study area.6.5.1 Informal and Formal RelationshipsJust as at the national level, informal liaison occurs in the region across the full spectrum of government affairs. The nature of the liaison is less politically or policy driven, and focussed more on delivery of a federal government service or program. In the regions, informal liaison often drops to the tactical level. As well, informal co-operation at the regional level is just as dependent upon individual personality and networking, acknowledging that different skill sets will be needed in an operational environment as opposed to a policy-oriented atmosphere.Similar to the Ottawa construct, formal co-operation at the regional level is that which is established through official appointments, secondments, memberships in various committees and working groups. However, the emphasis of the co-operation favours “hands on” resolution of issues. Further, in the regions, there are a greater number of OGD representatives in each others operations centres than there are at the strategic level. Moreover, there is a greater likelihood that operations centres in the regions will be joint ventures, such as the Joint Regional Co-ordination Centre in which DND and CCG co-manage search and rescue cases in the Atlantic and Arctic areas. Another example is the Marine Security Operations Centre, which is hosted and run by DND, but has representation from five other federal partners.2306.5.2 Proactive EngagementAs at the strategic level, government authorities in the Atlantic provinces deal with the management of their departmental mandates and emergent crises through an interdepartmental working group and committee structure. From a maritime enforcement perspective, the regional interdepartmental bodies that concern themselves with oceans management as well as marine security and maritime operations are of prime interest to the Navy. This proactive framework, especially since 9/11, has become the foundation upon which departments manage their individual and joint responses to reactive operations.The Atlantic region is also where the operational elements of Memoranda of Understanding between selected departments are put into practice. It is at the regional level where federal departments and agencies have a vested interest in delivering the programs and activities to the taxpayers. The impetus for resolving problems is not the same in the rarefied atmosphere of national headquarters, as it is looking eye-to-eye with the citizens of the regions.6.5.2.1 Day-to-day LiaisonAt the regional level, there is considerably less emphasis on policy development and greater focus on operational execution of departmental mandates. There are countless ways in which a department may carry out day-to-day liaison in a marine security or maritime enforcement context. Using the case of Maritime Forces Atlantic (MARLANT) as a single department having relationships with many others, the following are examples of proactive day-to-day liaisons being undertaken on a year-round basis:a. Liaison with the Conservation and Protection staffs of DFO to coordinate naval support to fishery patrols in accordance with DND/DFOMOU;231b. Liaison with the Oceans Management Branch of DFO to provide surveillance information to assist with the scientific study, management, and potential enforcement of the Sable Gully Marine Protected Area;c. Liaison with Environment Canada (EC) for assistance in detecting and investigating pollution incidents. Naval vessels have also carried Canadian Wildlife Service scientists during fishery patrols to assist with ongoing pelagic bird surveys;d. Liaison with the RCMP to provide support for counter-narcotics operations in accordance with DND/RCMP MOU. MARLANT also provides logistical support in the form of transportation to assist the RCMP with its Coastal Watch program;242e. Liaison with Health Canada to co-ordinate support of the Navy’s Nuclear Emergency Response Team during visits to Halifax by nuclear- powered vessels;f. Liaison with various agencies for intelligence sharing and monitoring of designated Vessels of Interest, as well as joint security efforts such as the G7 Finance Ministers’ Conference;g. Liaison with United States Navy commands such as the Commander- in-Chief Atlantic Fleet, Commander Second Fleet, and the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) on naval matters of Homeland Defence; andh. Liaison with the United States Coast Guard First District (Boston) on matters of safety, security, and Homeland Security.It can be seen then, that there are a broad spectrum of operational issues that generate considerable day-to-day liaison among the federal departments that have security and enforcement mandates.242 Refer to Chapter Five for greater detail on the RCMP Coastal Watch programme.2326.5.2.2 Interdepartmental Committee and Working Group StructureIn the Atlantic region, there are a number of committees and working groups that contribute to governance across a variety of public sector domains. As is the case at the strategic level, the Navy has a clear interest in oceans management and security concerns and is represented regionally by the Maritime Forces Atlantic surface operations staff on committees and working groups that address these issues. While the intent of this chapter is to examine only those committees and working groups that are either operationally or security oriented, there are others that are worth noting due to their participants.6.5.2.2.1 Oceans Management Committees and Working GroupsThree interdepartmental or non-government bodies are worthy of mention in this section. The groups concern themselves with the broader scheme of oceans management rather than the more focussed topic of maritime security. These are the Eastern Scotian Shelf Integrated Management group (ESSIM), the Atlantic Coastal Zone Information Steering Committee (ACZISC), and the Interdepartmental Committee on Oceans (ICO). There is little direct relevance to this discussion except that many of their participants are the same representatives that regional OGDs send to the various security working groups and, as such, use the opportunities afforded by oceans management venues to further foster longstanding relationships. The downside of this approach, in which a department essentially designates a single representative for all manner of interdepartmental meetings, is that the participants can over-extend themselves and not be available for meetings that may be of a higher priority than others. Moreover, employing only one or two departmental representatives usually results in participation at meetings in a note-taking capacity, rather than in a decision-taking capacity. Thus, the decision-makers in a department are far less likely to be engaged, than had they participated in the meetings themselves.2336.5.2.2.2 Integrated Border Enforcement Teams / Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams I National Port Enforcement TeamsOriginally conceived in British Columbia in 1996 to address cross-border crime, Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBET) have been established in 15 locations across the country, including the Atlantic region. These teams comprise representatives from the RCMP, CBSA and other police agencies in Canada, and their American counterparts in the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), US Customs Protection/Border Patrol (CBP/BP), and the US Coast Guard. The focus of IBET is on potential threats of terrorism, impeding the smuggling of drugs, humans, contraband cigarettes, or other illegal substances.243CBSA is working to set up Joint In-Transit Targeting Teams (JITT) with other agencies and American officials in Halifax, Montreal, Vancouver, Newark, and Seattle to monitor and intervene suspicious sea and air cargos and containers both in Canada and at international points of departure.Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams have been established to increase the capacity for the collection, sharing and analysis of intelligence among the RCMP, CSIS, CBSA, and other police agencies regarding individuals or groups that are deemed threats to national security. As well, as part of the RCMP’s National Port Strategy, there have been four National Port Enforcement Teams (NPET) established in the ports of Halifax, Montreal, Hamilton and Vancouver. These teams are comprised of individuals from federal, provincial and municipal law-enforcement agencies whose aim is to target organized crime and other threats to national security that might be present at or passing through major ports.At present, there is little direct interaction between DND and the IBETs, INSETs and NPETs; rather, the Navy’s link is an indirect one through the intelligence channels that these organisations feed. That said, the naval234intelligence personnel assisted in concept of operation development when the I BETS was established in the Atlantic region several years ago.6.5.2.2.3 Eastern Canada Interdepartmental Maritime Operations CommitteeAt the operational level in Atlantic Canada, there are two key bodies that have the greatest influence on how enforcement and maritime security are managed within the region. The first is the Eastern Canada Interdepartmental Maritime Operations Committee (ECIMOC).244 This committee is comprised of federal departments that either conduct, or have an interest in, operations in the maritime environment. Principal members include Maritime Forces Atlantic, DFO including representatives from the CCG Maritimes and Newfoundland and Labrador Regions, CBSA, CRA, TC, EC, and PSC. Health Canada as well has participated since their major involvement in the merchant vessel Wadi Alarab anthrax incident of 2003.245EClMOC’s aim is to identify and develop the most practical means of applying operational resources to facilitate joint and effective employment. It is through ECIMOC that a link to the strategic-level IMSWG has been established through the distribution of each group’s records of discussion. Examples of items for discussion at ECIMOC are departmental operations briefs, departmental training requirements, opportunities for interdepartmental training and exercises, communications and information sharing requirements, and reports from ECIMOC sub-committees.6.5.2.2.4 Nova Scotia Federal Council Security Sub-CommitteeThe other significant organ is the Nova Scotia Federal Council’s Security Committee. This committee, comprised of Regional Directors General of243 Canada, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Canada / U.S. Integrated Border Enforcement Teams, 21 November 2003 (15 December 2003).244 ECIMOC is what was formerly known as Atlantic Operations Sub-Committee prior to IPCRC’s demise in 2001.245 Testimony of author before the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Issue 20 - Evidence 16 June 2003 (30 October 2003).235federal departments with enforcement or security mandates, meets every two months to discuss a broad range of security-related issues. In the aftermath of the September 11th attacks in New York City, it was this committee that recognised that the federal departments in the Atlantic region needed to improve their ability to work together in order to respond to future security incidents. This committee initiated a series of table top and command-post exercises, designed to stimulate and, if necessary, to force interaction between departments through the resolution of complex scenarios containing both terrestrial and marine elements.6.5.2.2.2 Atlantic Region Security CommitteeIn 2006 another interdepartmental security committee was established in the Atlantic Region. Known as the Atlantic Region Security Committee, it meets to address issues of national and provincial security with implications for Atlantic Canada as a whole, linking closely to provincial and national activities. Clearly, it is similar to the NSFC Security Committee in that it is comprised of federal officials representing departments with security, intelligence, and law enforcement roles. However, what is different about this committee is that provincial departments have seats at the table. Commander MARLANT, in his capacity as Commander Joint Task Force Atlantic is a member of this committee as are the Deputy Ministers of the New Brunswick Department of Public Safety, Nova Scotia Attorney-General, Newfoundland Attorney-General, Prince Edward Island Attorney-General, as well as the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Atlantic Region. Additionally, the Regional Directors General for CSIS, CBSA, TC, PSC, Health Canada, and Justice Canada are represented, as are the Assistant Commissioners of the Newfoundland and Maritimes regions of the Canadian Coast Guard. The objectives of the Atlantic Region Security Committee are to align inter-agency policy and priorities, progress intergovernmental communication protocols, carry out strategic coordination of joint exercises and, most importantly, to develop a common understanding of the security threat environment.2366.5.2.3 Inter-agency Exercises and SimulationsThere have been several interagency exercises held in the Atlantic region since 11 September 2001. The first of these was held in May, 2002. This two-day exercise, ATLANTIC GUARD was championed by the members of Nova Scotia Federal Council Security Committee, sponsored by OCIPEP (pre-PSEPC) and hosted by DND’s Land Force Atlantic Area (LFAA). ATLANTIC GUARD challenged 13 federal and three provincial agencies with three different scenarios that presented security, health and environmental disaster problems. The ATLANTIC GUARD Final Report, prepared by an independent assessor from outside of government, highlighted the requirement to regularly exercise interdepartmental co-operation in order to standardise such things as telecommunications, public affairs and command and control.246A similar exercise, ATLANTIC GUARD II was conducted 28-31 October, 2003. This command-post exercise met the basic interoperability objectives, but reiterated the need for continued effort in resolving joint command and control issues among many departments. Since 2003, at least one ATLANTIC GUARD type of exercise has been conducted in the maritime provinces per year.Another multi-agency exercise undertaken in the Atlantic region post- 9/11 was a CCRA Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Table Top Exercise on 24 September 2002. This exercise was one in a series of table top exercises held across the country by CCRA. The scenario presented was that of a “dirty bomb” entering Halifax by container ship.Several interagency exercises followed CCRA’s CBRN exercise in 2002. The first of these, Exercise ATLANTIC SPEAR, was held from 18 to 22 November, 2002. Hosted by LFAA, the scenario was a G8 meeting to be convened at very short notice at Campobello Island, NB. While primarily an LFAA initiative to train its headquarters staff, it included participation from246 Jim Bruce, Exercise Atlantic Guard Final Report (Halifax: Science Applications International Corporation Canada, Emergency and Safety Services Division, 2002).237several federal government departments such as DFAIT, RCMP, CIC, and Health Canada. Maritime Forces Atlantic staff provided a maritime component.Exercise ATLANTIC SHIELD followed on 12 May 2003. Hosted by the Halifax Port Authority, this exercise was designed to test the response to a bomb threat against a visiting cruise ship. The exercise served two purposes. First, it satisfied the Port Authority’s need to demonstrate a specified level of security to the cruise industry in order to secure continuing visits to Halifax. Second, it presented an opportunity to determine the level of response required from the Halifax Regional Municipality, the province and from federal departments.A number of similar interdepartmental exercises have been carried out in the region over the few years, but only recently have they taken on an international flavour. Recently, from 24 to 27 June 2007, Exercise Frontier Sentinel 07-02 was conducted to examine the command and control relationships between Canada and the United States in the context of a marine security event. Exercise Frontier Sentinel was a co-ordinated joint inter-agency multi-national and private (JIMP) exercise that attempted to employ a “whole- of-government” approach to resolving a marine security incident.In Exercise Frontier Sentinel 07-02, a vessel of interest was monitored by US authorities when it was believed to have become a significant maritime security threat due to an established link and proximity with a cruise ship that had been high-jacked in international waters. The vessel of interest’s next intended port of call was to be on the Eastern Seaboard of the United States, and the cruise liner’s next port was to have been at Halifax. The exercise was designed to require collaborate planning between military and law enforcement agencies to facilitate the execution of a bi-lateral Canada-US response. Exercise participants included US Coast Guard, US Navy, US Custom Border Patrol, and Canadian naval and air assets. In addition, Public Safety Canada, the RCMP, Transport Canada, CBSA, CSIS, DFO, CCG, and the Department of Justice Canada had active roles in the exercise.2386.5.2.4 Regional Interdepartmental Concept of Maritime OperationsUnder the aegis of ECIMOC, a sub-committee is drafting the procedures necessary to accomplish maritime-related tasks requiring inter-departmental co-operation in one umbrella document called the Regional Interdepartmental Concept of Maritime Operations (RICMO). These guidelines include, but are not limited to counter-terrorism operations, environmental responses, illegal migrants, counter-drug operations, preventative patrols, and surveillance operations. As well, RICMO will contain regional interdepartmental communications and points of contact, inventories of air, sea and shore-based assets, an inventory of Memoranda of Understanding among departments, and legislative or regulatory mandates, and statutory authorities, including the use of force.6.5.2.5 Summary of Key Regional Proactive RelationshipsThe relationships among Canadian interdepartmental committees and working groups with marine security and enforcement mandates at the regional level as well as the strategic and national levels are depicted at Figure 6-5. Shown in this figure at the national level are the Cabinet Committee on Security, Public Health and Emergencies (CCSPHE), the Arctic Security Working Group (ASWG) and the Interdepartmental Maritime Security Working Group (IMSWG). At the regional level, the oceans management bodies are depicted with dotted lines to indicate indirect linkages to the main security and enforcement committees. While each individual department has its own internal reporting chain, the dotted arrow between the IMSWG and the Eastern Canada Interdepartmental Marine Operations Committee (ECIMOC) represents the exchange of meeting minutes between these two bodies that provides awareness of each others main issues.In Figure 6-5, the Atlantic Regional Security Committee (ARSC) symbol is positioned over the provincial Federal Council Security Committees (Prov FC SC) to symbolise the guidance function that this committee provides. The interdepartmental exercise program is shown linked by an arrow to the provincial Federal Council Security Committees; in practice there is a subcommittee that develops the agreed-upon exercise regional exercise schedule.239Arrows link the ARSC and the provincial Federal Council Security Committees to the marine security and departmental operations centres (MSOC and OpCen). These arrows represent the capacity to deal with unforeseen or emergent crises through the experience, insight, and contacts gained in multiagency problem-solving in a proactive programme of scenario-based exercises. In addition, in Figure 6-5, an arrow represents the procedural foundation that the Regional Interdepartmental Concept of Maritime Operations (RICMO) contributes the operational response to an emergent crisis. In the future, with the continued refinement of the FERP, RICMO may cease to be of any further utility.Proactive Activities Reactive ActivitiesStrategic LevelCCSPHEIMSWG ASWGRegional LevelMSOCOpCenARSC Emergen ̂Security Situation - Regional / Tactical "ESSIM—► ExercisesProv FC SC-► RICMOICO ECIMOC OperationalResponseTactical LevelFig. 6-5. Interdepartmental Working Group Contribution to Operational Response.6.5.3 Reactive EngagementReactive engagement by departments at the regional level was captured in the overall discussion of the FERS and NERS earlier in the chapter. However, that discussion focussed more on vertical processes between the different levels of government as opposed to the collaborative processes that240occur more or less horizontally within the levels. The next few paragraphs will elaborate on the evolving protocols for operations at the regional level.Figure 6-6 depicts the elements that are in place to enable authorities to respond to an emergent situation based on information garnered through the various intelligence networks. The diagram shows departmental intelligence sections represented at all three levels, linked with each other, and with international intelligence agencies at the strategic and operational levels. The main departments contributing to this community within Canada are CSIS, RCMP, CBSA, DND, the Communications Security Establishment (CSE). As well, there is a linkage among the departments through the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre. Allied connections in the United States include ONI, the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), the US Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination Center, and the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) South. Information is shared with departments depending upon the recipient’s need to know and, in most cases, departments can respond effectively within individual department mandates.6.5.3.1 Threat Assessment Group / Federal Co-ordination GroupThe intelligence networks uncover large numbers of items requiring investigation and determination of credibility, level of threat, and so on. The ability to “filter” this information varies among departments, as does each department’s understanding of what is of significance to another. In the fall of 2002, a vessel with a suspect container arrived in Halifax. Four departments or agencies were aware of this container, but the information about the container and potential responses to it were interpreted differently by each department. This lack co-ordination pointed to a need to formalise a process to transition from compiling information, to determining whether a operational response is required, to mounting the actual operation.As a direct result of this particular incident, the RCMP sponsored the development of a body in the Atlantic region known as the Threat Assessment Group (TAG). A TAG meeting became the genesis of a co-ordinated interdepartmental operational response to an emergent issue that transcended241the mandate of any one department. The TAG also assisted with the determination of a lead agency. TAG members belonged to four principal departments: CSIS , RCMP, CBSA, and DND. Other departments were called if the issue was obviously relevant to a particular department. TAG members included both intelligence analysts and operators, and the aim of the TAG was to ensure that a common understanding of a potential event was reached, so that each agency could then plan and co-ordinate its response.247By September 2007, the development of the draft FERP and the discussions pertaining to marine security among the Atlantic Regional Directors General had matured to the point that it was agreed that the functions of the TAG could be carried out by the regional Federal Co-ordination Group (FSG). Federal Co-ordination Groups are bodies of designated federal officials who regularly come together to discuss safety and security issues in the regions. While they were originally conceived to advise and co-ordinate the allocation of resources during emergencies as part of the NERS process, it has become apparent that they can be employed in the role that the TAG fulfilled during safety and security response scenarios. As such, it has been agreed among the Atlantic RDGs that the FCG will convene as required to carry out the functions of the TAG, and the TAG will no operate in the Atlantic region.2486.5.4 Maritime Domain AwarenessThere is an inherent need to develop and maintain an understanding of what activities are happening in Canada’s coastal zones and its approaches. This situational awareness is required by multiple government departments with overlapping mandates and interests in our maritime security environment. The Navy uses a specific tool to acquire this domain awareness, and shares it with other government departments. It is known as the “recognized maritime picture.” The term “recognized” is used to indicate that the picture has been247 Testimony of Chief Superintendent Ian Atkins, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, before the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Issue 22 - Evidence 22 September 2003 (30 October 2003).248 Announced at a meeting of the Atlantic Regional Directors General of PSC, CBSA, DFO/CCG, CSIS, RCMP, and DND that was hosted by Commander Maritime Forces Atlantic,13 August 2007. The author was a participant at the meeting.242evaluated prior to its dissemination. In other words, rather than having stations simply pass data between themselves, there is a central authority to whom data is forwarded for compilation, evaluation and dissemination as a recognized picture - a analyst’s evaluation of what is happening in a given area. Generation of the RMP is worthy of discussion here due to its inherent relationship to intelligence, and as a good example of inter-agency cooperation.The RMP compiled by the Navy is produced for an ocean area that encompasses Atlantic waters well past the 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone, extending north to the Pole and west to the end of the Great Lakes and encompassing the entire St. Lawrence Seaway, following the Canada-U.S. border where appropriate. This area has been adopted for picture management purposes, not to suggest a legislated mandate for control within that area. Although this arbitrary area of responsibility is assigned for management purposes, the various databases supporting the picture actually contain data for the entire globe.At present, sufficient resources would not available for comprehensive surveillance of the large area of responsibility were only military assets to be used. Accordingly, the RMP is compiled in co-operation with many other agencies that possess data on maritime activity. The benefits of this are clear - a wider collective awareness and links through which to share information, plus a growing ability to reduce duplication of effort and use resources efficiently. As such, the picture combines data from a variety of government and non-government sources. The development of the RMP will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Seven; it is sufficient at this juncture to understand that its compilation requires active engagement by a host of national and international agencies and technical systems.6.4.4.1 Marine Security Operations CentresThe requirement to maintain maritime domain awareness has always been a defence task undertaken by the Canadian Navy, only relatively recently has there been broad recognition across government that this is a national243security requirement, not just a defence mission. The National Security Policy of 2004 articulated the need for multi-agency Maritime Security Operations Centres (MSOC) to meet both marine and national security challenges of the post 9/11 security environment.The origins of the MSOCs lie within the Navy’s own Maritime Operations Centres in Esquimalt and Halifax. These operations centres, in conjunction with the naval intelligence commands on each coast, attempted to produce actionable intelligence and a recognized maritime picture that provided the Maritime Commanders with the appropriate situational awareness needed for defence purposes. In 2002, the Navy began work on a project called MOSIC (Maritime Operations Surveillance and Information Centre) intended to upgrade the capabilities of the joint ocean surveillance and information centres on both coasts. When the National Security Policy was tabled post 9/11, it was decided to leverage the efforts already underway with the MOSIC project and to channel them into the creation of an interdepartmental capability on both coasts, and along the St. Lawrence Seaway.The Maritime Security Operations Centres are secure physical locations where regional representatives of select federal departments can collect, fuse and analyse departmental "need-to-share" information to enhance the government of Canada's situational awareness of the ships, cargoes and people who use Canada's marine environment and marine infrastructure. Personnel at the MSOCs continue to work for their respective Departments but use the collaborative work environment of the MSOC to enhance their information-sharing and analysis capability. MSOCs have been established at the existing operations centres at Halifax and Esquimalt. Operational oversight and infrastructure support are provided by the Navy at these two sites. As well, an interim MSOC has been established for the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Seaway. Situated at Niagara-on-the-Lake, the interim MSOC is led by the RCMP with some DND personnel assigned to assist.The core membership of the MSOCs are employees of Canadian Border Services Agency, Canadian Coast Guard, Department of National Defence,244Royal Canadian Mounted Police and Transport Canada. Other Departments that are involved in marine security operations or may be key contributors during contingency operations may participate on an as required basis. The MSOC Concept of Operations does not usurp extant departmental authorities or responsibilities, nor does it change the nature of lead agency or support departments for operations and incidents.The goal of the MSOC is to create data collection, fusion and analysis centres where the sum of all departmental input and analysis will be greater than the analysis that can be generated by a single department. The core functions of the MSOCs are routine operations and contingency operations. For routine operations the MSOCs must produce actionable intelligence and must disseminate it appropriately so that departments have adequate warning to coordinate and respond to a marine security incident before it affects Canada or its allies. In the event of the requirement for a proactive or reactive response to a marine incident, the MSOCs may facilitate the planning, co-ordination and execution of contingency operations in support of the lead agency.In order to be able to fulfil the MSOC mandate, the centres must be robustly networked with the national level Government Operations Centre, the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre, the CCG’s Marine Communications and Traffic Services (MCTS), CCG’s Regional Operational Centres (ROC) and the CCG’s National Co-ordination Centre; DND coastal maritime operations centres, and United States government American Government marine security operations and intelligence organisations.In Figure 6-6, the intelligence network is symbolised by grey boxes linked with arrows. A circular symbol represents the Recognized Maritime Picture, and is linked by arrows to the regional level intelligence operators at DND. Figure 6-6 shows the process flow of a relatively low-level activity that can be handled through the resources or interdepartmental connections at the Marine Security Operations Centre or another departmental operations centre (OpCen).245Proactive Activities Reactive ActivitiesStrategic LevelRMPRegional LevelMSOCk Emergent Security Situation - Regional / Tactical ^OperationalResponseIntelTactical LevelOpCen,IntelITACFig. 6-6. The Relationship of Intelligence to Operational Response.Reactive ActivitiesProactive ActivitiesITA CStrategic LevelAllied j i f f 8' IntelFCGRMPRegional LevelMSOCOpCen, Emergent/ Security Situation - Regional / Tactical ^OperationalResponseIntelTactical LevelFigure 6-7. Relationship of Intelligence to Operational Response - Multiple Agencies.Figure 6-7 depicts the process flow of a response to an emergent situation based on actionable intelligence, but of a greater magnitude. In other246words, multiple agencies might be involved, or the nature of the potential situation is such that that a response requires the intervention of the Federal Co-ordination Group to determine the scope of the response and the lead agency.Figure 6-8 depicts the process flow required when intelligence calls for an operational response to an emergent situation that is truly national in scope, and may require a national contingency operation to be entertained.Proactive Activities Reactive ActivitiesITA CStrategic LevelGOCIntel OperationalNational Contingency r OperationResponsePSCFCGRMPRegional LevelMSOCGpCen, Emergen ̂Security Situation - Regional / Tactical ^OperationalResponseIntelTactical LevelFig. 6-8. Intelligence-initiated Strategic and Operational Response.6.6 SummaryInter-agency co-operation is a functioning reality that spans three levels of interaction: strategic, regional, and tactical. What differentiates the character of interaction at the strategic versus the regional levels is the focus at national headquarters in tending to the political and policy aspects of a given issue, whereas at the regional level the emphasis is effect “on the ground.”The strategic-level Osbaldeston Study of 1990 provided the impetus for greater inter-agency co-operation in the conduct of maritime operations among federal departments. This study spawned the Interdepartmental Program Co247ordination and Review Committee, from which regional operations subcommittees were established, and continue to this day notwithstanding the demise of the parent strategic-level committee.At the regional level, there are multiple federal working groups and committees that form a framework for inter-agency co-operation in oceans management and marine security and enforcement. However, the interdepartmental co-operation described in this chapter exists despite a previous lack of Government of Canada strategic security and surveillance policies. This policy vacuum set in motion the evolution of the ad hoc structure. It works adequately due in large part to the professionalism and influence of a small number of individuals in key departments, and their genuine desire to do what is right for Atlantic Canadians despite limitations imposed by various bureaucracies.Frequent multi-agency exercises have been conducted in the Atlantic region for the past several years that contribute to the long-term education process of staffs at all levels. Although initially premised on emergent disaster relief situations, the relationships cultivated through informal and formal initiatives have enabled departments to deal with maritime security issues with greater confidence and ability. Greater clarity is likely to be achieved as the Public Safety Canada-led Federal Emergency Response System matures, and a subordinate Marine Security Response System is agreed-upon by federal partners.Maritime security continues to be viewed by all levels of Canadian government as a law enforcement responsibility rather than a defence issue. This posture shapes government security response systems, with the result that the Canadian Navy functions in a support role to those departments and agencies with enforcement mandates. The National Security Policy assigns the Navy the task of co-ordinating the on-water response to a marine threat in the Canadian maritime zones. Moreover, the Navy is required to establish Marine Security Operations Centres to facilitate co-ordination among government departments. This allows the Navy to influence the marine security248response system as it evolves so that the significant collaborative planning, coordination, command and control capabilities that are resident within the Navy can be used to full effect.Chapter Six has identified how government agencies and departments with maritime security and enforcement responsibilities are able to interact through working group structures and reactive processes, spanning national and regional levels, to carry out their general mandates. The next chapter will narrow the focus to just the Canadian Navy. Chapter Seven will quantify exactly what the Navy contributes to maritime enforcement in Atlantic Canada, and what benefits the Navy derives from this contribution.249Chapter SevenNAVAL CONTRIBUTION TO MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS 7.1 IntroductionThe intent of this next section is to shift the discussion of previous chapters from the political, legal, and interdepartmental frameworks for interaction to a narrower focus on the operational capabilities that the Navy brings to maritime security and enforcement in Canada. The aim of this chapter is to examine the first of the remaining three key themes of inquiry, the naval contribution to maritime domain awareness.The chapter opens with an explanation of the roles that navies fulfil in modern coastal states, and is followed by a review of the threats to maritime security in Canada. Leading on from this background, the constituent elements of domain awareness and the data sources will be reviewed. The analysis will further ascertain the level of government “presence” derived through aerial surveillance in Canada’s maritime zones, as well as determine the concentrations of marine activity in these zones. An assessment will be rendered of the appropriateness of the government presence in relation to marine activity. The chapter closes with a review of non-surveillance contributions that the Navy makes for maritime domain awareness.7.2 Naval Use of the Sea7.2.1 Roles of NaviesThe broad roles of the Canadian Forces were examined in Chapter Four in the context of evolving defence policy. However, the capabilities that navies can deliver to their governments were not discussed. Thus, the next few paragraphs will review the role that navies, as opposed to the other military services, play in domestic and international affairs.Any review of the roles of modern navies invariably makes reference to Ken Booth's Navies and Foreign Policy. In this 1979 work, Booth argues the use250of the sea is the unifying principle that underpins a navy’s three main roles: a military role, a diplomatic role, and a policing role. Within each of these roles, Booth asserts that navies can serve a large variety of subordinate functions.249Figure 7-1. Canadian Naval Roles and Functions fo r the 21st CenturySource: Canada. Department of National Defence. Securing Canada’s OceanFrontiers: Charting the Course from Lead mark (Ottawa: Directorate of MaritimeStrategy, 2005), 18.The military role is a navy's foundation; the ability to apply force coupled with a navy's military character is what lends it credibility in the other two roles. The exercising of foreign policy short of the use of force is what characterizes the diplomatic role of the navy. The policing or constabulary role is broken down into two broad categories: coastguard responsibilities and nation-building. In general terms, coastguard responsibilities are those of exercising sovereignty in the nation’s own maritime zones and approaches, resource utilization, and maintenance of good order. Booth argues that the military and diplomatic roles are well established, but the policing role is becoming of increasing importance to coastal states.250Some observers suggest that an additional dimension be added toOAQKen Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1979), 16.SUPPORT CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY• Preventive Depfoyraerts + Coercion /• Maritime Interception Operations• Peace SupporfOperations• Non-corrbaarl Evacuation Operrtions f• Civi-Mlilary Cooperation• Symbolic I be• Presence A• Hunanrtarian Assistance M• Confidence adding• Track Two diplomacySECURE CANADIAN SOVEREIGNTY• Sovereignty Patrols• Aid of the Owl Power• Assistancejo Other tkvemme rt Departments+ Search and ffescue• Disaster Relief• Oceans ManagementDEFEND NATIONAL & ALLIED COMMITMENTS» Sea Central .# Sea Denial• Fleet in Behg• MaiilimePowet Projection251Booth’s Triangle. This fourth side would represent the economic driver that navies provide to a nation’s industrial base through shipbuilding and ship repair. This effect is even more pronounced in countries that lack a national shipbuilding strategy, such as Canada. Here, the shipbuilding industry struggles for survival through boom and bust cycles but is kept solvent during the “busts” by contract awards for work on government fleets. The emerging argument for converting the triangle of roles into four-sided shape has yet to gather traction among scholars so, for the present, naval use of the sea will be discussed in the context of the triad of military, diplomatic, and constabulary roles.While the military and diplomatic roles are worthy of separate treatment in their own right and could easily form the basis of a separate thesis, the central theme of this research is maritime enforcement. Accordingly, the focus will be on the constabulary role.7.2.2 Constabulary Role of NaviesNaval analyst Eric Grove observes that while navies are established primarily for war, they find their main utility in peace.251 Current Canadian defence policy requires that its Navy be capable of mounting effective responses to emerging situations in Canadian areas of jurisdiction. To do so, the Navy must demonstrate regularly the capability to monitor and control activity within maritime zones and approaches. Moreover, the Navy’s key strategic document, Leadmark, identifies six functions that the Canadian Navy should expect to execute in fulfillment of the constabulary role:a. Sovereignty patrols. These are a “specific form of presence undertaken within a state's area of maritime jurisdiction, in support of nation-building, to reinforce claims in contested waters, or otherwise "to show the flag" in a domestic context;252250 Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy,16.251 Eric Grove, The Future of Sea Power (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1990), 187.252 Canada. Leadmark: The Navy’s Strategy for 2020 (Ottawa: Directorate of Maritime Strategy,252b. Aid of the Civil Power. Naval personnel may be called out in a Category 4 or 5 domestic operation in any case in which a riot or disturbance of the peace is beyond the powers of the civil authorities to suppress;253c. Assistance to Other Government Departments. These are both routine and extraordinary operations in which the Navy supports and assists other government departments in such areas as counter-narcotics, fisheries enforcement, prevention of illegal immigration and environmental protection;d. Search and rescue. In conjunction with the Canadian Coast Guard, the Armed Forces are mandated to maintain a national search and rescue capability;e. Disaster relief. The Navy is expected to be able to contribute to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief within 24 hours, and sustain this effort for as long as necessary;254f. Oceans management. This function implies a wide spectrum of interdepartmental and inter-agency measures conducted to facilitate the regulation of activities on, under and above the sea. Oceans management is both a domestic and international function.255So far throughout this thesis the terms maritime security and maritime enforcement have been used virtually interchangeably. However, maritime enforcement is a sub-set of maritime security, and relates to particular activities undertaken to support enforcement efforts that form part of the nation’s overall2001), 40.253 See Chapter Five, Section 5.4.2 for a discussion of the five categories of domestic operations carried out by the Canadian Forces.254 Canada. Leadmark: The Navy’s Strategy for 2020 (Ottawa: Directorate of Maritime Strategy,2001), p. 41.253255 Ibidmaritime security requirements. In a post-911 international security environment, the practical definition of maritime security is no longer constrained to historic threats of a naval or military nature. A state’s requirements for maritime security, sovereignty, and oceans management are increasingly interconnected. Thus a navy’s contribution to maritime security is equally a contribution to maritime enforcement.7.2.3 Spectrum of ConflictIn practice, navies seldom function exclusively in a military, diplomatic or constabulary role alone. In many cases there is considerable crossover between roles. For example, during the 1995 “Turbot Crisis” between Canada and Spain, existing maritime forces (the military role’s fleet-in-being) used the sea for the diplomatic purpose of presence, and the constabulary functions of supporting another government department (DFO) to enforce fishery law. As well, the use of force is not solely confined to the military role. The likelihood and magnitude of force to be employed in the various naval functions is referred to the Spectrum of Conflict, and is depicted in Figure 7-2.Even sovereignty enforcement, the quintessential constabulary role, could theoretically involve combat operations. Consider the apprehension in Canadian waters of a merchant vessel that has been seized by terrorists who possess a portable nuclear device. More than likely the terrorists would be non-compliant with law enforcement agencies, and the use of military force at sea might be the only means to prevent the ship from getting too close to coastal population centres. What the Navy brings to the table that is unique among government departments is the capacity to apply significant coercive force in emergent crises.254PEACEOPERATIONS O TH ER TH A N W ARSearch & RescueDisaster ReliefHumanitarian AssistanceSurveillance & control of Cdn T erritoi Evacuation of Canadians OverseasPeace Support Operations (Chapter 6) Aid of t îe Civil PowerNational Sovereignty / Interests Enforcement^^-NORAD - 9/11 Response'NON-COMBAT OPERATION------------- SAR - 3500 maritime calls- Winnipeg flood- Saguenay floods- Swiss A ir- Ice storm - Illegal immigration- APEC Summit- Sovereignty patrols- Fishery patrols- GTS KATIE- TurbotSupport O erations (ChaDterDefenceCollectivePeaceDefence of Canadian & USCOMBAT OPERATIONSFigure 7-2. Spectrum o f Conflict in the Maritime ContextSource: Kelly Williams, “Canada’s Maritime Strategy: A Naval Perspective,” in Continental Security and Canada-U.S. Relations: Maritime Perspectives, Challenges and Opportunities, ed. Robert H. Edwards and Graham Walker (11 March 2005).7.2.4 Maritime Threats and Maritime Domain AwarenessJoanne Lostracco posits that the interests of a coastal state’s security forces fall into four general categories: protection of fishing rights, prevention of illegal activity at sea, such as piracy or smuggling of contraband or human cargo; counter-terrorism, and protection of the environment.256 A more complete list of threats or activities of interest in Canada’s maritime zones would be search and rescue situations, illegal fishing, drug smuggling, pollution incidents, illegal immigration, unauthorized at-sea research, petroleum and natural gas industry monitoring, whale and seabird protection, eco-tourism, sightings of unusual activities in the Arctic, foreign intelligence collection, and extremist activity.257256 Joanne Lostracco, “What Force for Canada: A Theoretical and Practical Study of the Canadian Navy in the 1990s” (M.A. thesis, Dalhousie University, 1998), 21-23.257 Maritime Forces Atlantic, in its de facto role as surveillance coordinator for federal departments on Canada’s east coast, routinely monitors all of these activities.255These threats and vulnerabilities always have been of concern to the Navy and the other government departments with enforcement mandates, pre- and post-9/11. Organized crime and trans-state actors are a greater threat than before. Canada has had relatively recent experience on the west coast with smuggling rings and arrest of fishing trawlers with illegal Chinese immigrants. The experience on the east coast is slightly different; illegal migrants tend to be landed by large merchant ships, or stowaway in containers. However, the reasons that compel individuals to flee their homelands and to enter Canadian waters in search of safety or a better future are not forecast to decrease.The objective in maritime security is to know what is happening, where, and why in the maritime zones, with progressively better positional accuracy and information credibility as shipping and other activity nears the coast. The choice of security measures depends on the context and urgency of the challenge being addressed. Choices include safeguarding, collaboration, marine domain awareness, and reaction. Safeguarding refers to activities such as personnel screening, physical security, e.g. fencing and cameras, searching of containers and so on. All federal departments have interests in aspects of safeguarding, but it is largely other government departments and port authorities that have responsibility for these types of measures. Collaboration, in the maritime security context, refers to the sharing of database information and analysis for intelligence and data fusion purposes, as well as development of collaborative procedures. This aspect was treated in depth in the last chapter.The term “maritime domain awareness” was introduced in Chapter Six in the discussion about the importance of interdepartmental interaction. It is a relatively recent term; in security circles the term “recognised maritime picture” was used to describe the snapshot of activities in the maritime zones and approaches obtained through surveillance and monitoring efforts. However, the “snapshot” provided only part of the required situational awareness. When appropriate intelligence from a variety of civil and military sources is applied to the “snapshot” of the security problem, the result is full maritime domain awareness. The Navy, in exercising its military and constabulary roles, develops256maritime domain awareness in order to respond to a variety of threats to maritime security.7.3 Naval Contribution to Maritime Domain AwarenessWith a coastline of 243,00 kilometres and an area of responsibility over eight million square kilometres, Canada has a formidable challenge in addressing maritime security. There are 25 deep-water and 650 smaller ports in Canada and, on a typical day, there are some 1,700 reported ships in the Canadian maritime zones, with many more not self-reporting, being further out from the major ports and beyond the coverage of vessel traffic management systems. Against this backdrop are the challenges of generating maritime domain awareness from multiple government departments with overlapping mandates and interests in the maritime security environment, and limited ships, aircraft, radar stations and other collection assets needed to conduct effective surveillance or confirm self-reported positions.258The development of awareness of what is happening in the Canadianmaritime approaches has been a long-standing challenge, and from a “whole ofgovernment” approach has been deficient:“The process of integrating or fusing intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance information, data and products to generate situational awareness in the maritime realm in near real time is non-existent to a large extent due to technical and/or format incompatibility, personnel and procedural impediments, policy constraints and lack of fusion tools.”259The Navy has been the sole government body that has taken on the challenge, and has become the de facto lead agent for development of marine domain awareness in Canada. The stems from the assignment of a standing military task in the Defence White Paper of 1994 under the “Protection of Canada” mission. Essentially, the mission has two components: monitor activity for sovereignty258 Laurence M. Hickey, Testimony before the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Issue 18 - Evidence 16 June 2003 (3 April 2008).259 Canada, Government of Canada, MSOC - Maritime Security Operations Centre, Project Scope Statement, 17 October 2007 < http://msoc-cosm.gc.ca/document/background/scope/ over_e.asp > (3 April 2008).257purposes and assist other government departments, i.e., those with enforcement mandates, to achieve their goals. Building a plot of maritime activity is one of several activities that contribute to the Protection of Canada mission.7.3.1 The Recognized Maritime PictureIn the current global security environment, there are a bewildering variety of terms, definitions and acronyms referring to various types of picture building efforts. However, the fundamental goal does not change, that is to support maritime domain awareness through building a recognized picture. For simplicity, the acronym RMP or the term “maritime picture” will be used in the remainder of this chapter to refer to the recognised maritime picture developed by the Navy in the Atlantic region.The maritime picture is built from all data sources that can be accessed concerning maritime traffic in the area of interest. The collection of data can undertaken by satellite, aircraft, surface ship, submarine, land-based radar or by towed and fixed sonar arrays. Normally, a data source will provide geographic position and identity information pertaining to a given vessel and, increasingly, amplifying data such as the vessel’s owner, cargo and other background information is included. Assembled into the RMP, all of this data provide an awareness of the volume, location and nature of shipping activity and provides a background for deeper analysis of trends and vulnerabilities. Data sources are identified through actively seeking them out and then collecting and assembling the data in a format suitable for exchange between numerous partners.2607.3.1.1 Data Collection for the Recognised Maritime PictureAt present, there are insufficient military resources alone for comprehensive surveillance of the large area of interest and responsibility in the Atlantic region. Thus, the RMP is compiled in co-operation with many other agencies that possess data on maritime activity. The benefits of this are clear -260 Sam Bateman, “Maritime Surveillance and Information Exchange”, in Sam Bateman & Stephen Bates (eds), Calming the Waters: Initiatives fir Asia Pacific Maritime Cooperation, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 114, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 1996, p. 69.258a wider collective awareness and links through which to share information, plus a growing ability to reduce duplication of effort and use resources efficiently. As such, the maritime picture combines a plethora data described in the following paragraphs.Canadian naval ships operating on the East Coast are required to report their own positions and the details of contacts around them into the RMP at one- hour intervals. Military aircraft fly a number of hours each week for dedicated surveillance and conduct surveillance as a secondary task even when on training missions. Naval ships are also under standing orders to hail merchant vessels, and these communications result in further information being generated on each vessel. In turn, naval ships also use the RMP for cueing information for the area beyond the range of their own sensors. For the most part, data forwarded by ships can be received by the Regional Joint Operations Centre for inclusion into the maritime picture within minutes. Military aircraft, however, are currently less capable in this regard and often the results of their surveillance cannot be included in the RMP until a few hours after the end of their patrols.Reports are also received from aircraft contracted by Fisheries and Oceans Canada. The contractor, Provincial Airlines, flies these patrols with a well-equipped air platform that provides radar, infrared and photographic data. A key aspect of these flights is that the data can be forwarded in flight for integration in the RMP (except the photo data), resulting in the data’s appearance into the maritime picture within 15-20 minutes. This makes the fisheries patrol aircraft one of the most capable surveillance assets on the east coast of Canada. Although normally focused on fisheries surveillance, these flights report pollution incidents and, at times, merchant shipping as well. In 2007, an initiative allowed National Defence to purchase 565 hours of PAL surveillance time that equated to 112 sorties. This permitted the Navy to task these flights for broad maritime surveillance, rather than that focused narrowly on one departmental mandate.261261 Commander Ted Parkinson, “RMP and PAL Questions,” 14 April 2008, email to author.259The recognised maritime picture also incorporates reports from the Canadian Coast Guard, including mandatory reports required from commercial vessels at 96 and 24 hrs before reaching a Canadian port. This data is hosted in the Canadian Coast Guard’s servers and is accessed by a direct link between the Navy and Coast Guard systems. Data in the Coast Guard system, known as the Automated Information System for Marine Navigation (INNAV), is comprehensive and its timeliness increases with a vessel’s proximity to Canada. INNAV has become a fundamental cornerstone of maritime picture building in Canada; it contains the reports mandated by Canadian legislation, and is the data path for the transponder beacon data of the IMO-mandated Automated Identification System. Transponder beacons are important sources as they provide geographic position and identity automatically by radio signal, without the need for a surveillance asset to detect and physically identify the vessel.Transponder beacons also figure in reports received from certain fishing vessels. Automated radio signal reports from fishing vessels, with their positions and identities are received by Fisheries and Oceans Canada. This department receives these reports for European Union fisherman when those vessels are operating in specified areas near Canada’s EEZ, and the reports are forwarded to the Navy to be included into the RMP. Additionally, some Canadian vessels fishing in domestic areas began carrying these beacons in the summer of 2003, and their data are forwarded to the Navy for inclusion in the maritime picture as well.The recognised maritime picture incorporates reports on a global scale based on positions provided through merchant vessel voluntary weather reporting. Merchant ships at sea report weather in their local area, typically at 4- 6 hour intervals. This data is pooled by weather bureaus worldwide and Environment Canada receives the sum of all the data. Since these reports contain the call signs and positions of the vessels, they are of value to the maritime picture. These reports are forwarded to the Navy via Internet and converted to the format necessary for inclusion in the RMP. An additional database has also been developed to match ship names with the call signs260provided in the reports.Reports from various NATO sites also find their way into the Canadian RMP. The two main NATO centres each produce a maritime picture for their international region and share the picture with among themselves and other NATO allies.262 Although they do not report ships off Canada’s east coast, the data are included in the RMP for long-range cueing and to support naval ships when deployed. Although in the past NATO had not typically been a large reporting source for merchant vessels, the focus in this regard is changing for the better.Reports are also received from various centres in the US Navy. The US connection is a significant feed to the Canadian RMP. The data forwarded from the US contain locator messages for merchant vessel traffic on a global scale. As well, the US Navy shares its list of high interest vessels with Canada, and the names of these vessels are placed on an alert list. When a report on any of the vessels is received in the Canadian RMP, the information is passed on to the appropriate US agency.The recognised maritime picture also draws upon commercial sources. Many shipping companies maintain their own plots of where their ships are operating and often the data are posted to company sites on the Internet. These data are not routinely included in the RMP, but can be used to investigate vessels of interest, and will likely become a growth area for inclusion in the RMP in the future.The final category of report that is used to develop the RMP is that of national technical sensors, such as those that are space-based. The data from262 At present, there are only two NATO RMP Managers: MCC Northwood (for the Atlantic and Baltic), and MCC Naples (for the Mediterranean, and nominally the rest of the world). When the researcher commenced this study, there were four RMP managers: SACLANT,CINCEASTLANT, Baltic and Mediterranean. With the re-organisation of the Alliance in 1999 to 2000, the number of NATO headquarters and RMP Managers were reduced. Of course, like Canada, many NATO nations maintain a national RMP, and these feed to some degree into Northwood and Naples.261these sources are sensitive, and are not released to non-military agencies. Incorporation of this sensitive data is what creates complication in information- sharing among government departments, and requires the generation of both classified and unclassifed versions of the recognised maritime picture.To review, maritime domain awareness is derived through several components, but the two essential inputs are relevant intelligence and an accurate recognised maritime picture. The intelligence piece is co-ordinated through the Navy’s Joint Ocean Surveillance and Information Centres, known as Trinity in Maritime Forces Atlantic.263 The Centre integrates information from sensors, sources and organisations into a composite picture, and uses modern computer technology and information management techniques to process and disseminate this information. This process involves data warehousing, analysis, and fusion. The quality of data varies between each of the sources.A key concept in fusing and analyzing this data is that the data are almost always time late. The maritime picture is not a real-time picture; in other words each contact in the RMP only represents the last report received on the vessel, not necessarily its most up-to-date position. The overall time late of the RMP averages eight to twelve hours. This figure is decreasing, but timely data sources that provide high quality data with identity and full background information, are still scare in the overall surveillance effort.7.3.1.2 High Frequency Surface Wave Radar (HFSWR)For the two decades, as part of DND’s Technology Demonstration Program, the Department has funded a project that evaluated high frequency surface wave radar as a means of providing wide area, over-the-horizon coastal surveillance from shore sites. Work on the demonstration project commenced in 1996 with the construction of two full-scale high frequency surface wave radars installed at Bona Vista and Cape Race, Newfoundland. The project was a collaborative venture between DND and Canadian industry. Figure 7-3 depicts the two east coast sites.263 The Pacific region’s counterpart is called Athena.262Early research postulated that HFSWR would be able to detect large targets such as icebergs or large vessels in excess of 500 kilometres, small ships at a range of 370 kilometres and small low flying aircraft at 200 kilometres. DND assessed that such a capability would satisfy the national requirement for the continuous surveillance of the Canadian EEZs in support of national sovereignty, search and rescue, domestic naval and maritime enforcement operations and resource protection. The Senate Committee on National Security and Defence recommended in one of its studies that eight or more HFSWR sites be built to provide an all-weather, highly autonomous 24-hour, 7-day per week surveillance capability that would have the potential to facilitate the cueing of patrol vessels and aircraft to effect monitoring and control of Canada's maritime approaches.8NEW * ' B R U N S W iC I60°W 50 °WFigure 7-3. High Frequency Surface Wave Radar CoverageSource: Raytheon. Shaded areas show notional coverage of radar currently in operation. Other arcs indicate coverage of proposed sites.Figure 7-3 also depicts the locations of other potential sites that, if constructed and set into operation, would provide seamless HFSWR coverage of263the Atlantic maritime approaches.264The radar picture generated from Bona Vista and Cape Race was displayed in the operations centre at Maritime Forces Atlantic Headquarters starting in October 1998, and was used as input to the recognised maritime picture. In the following years, the utility of the surveillance data was evaluated by end users at the surveillance centres in collaboration with DND research scientists and members of the Navy’s Maritime Operational Research Team. Unfortunately, the technology did not live up to expectations. The HFSWR system did not perform well unless weather and atmospheric conditions cooperated. The evaluators noted that the detection ranges of HFSWR fell short of those specified in the Technical Statement of Requirements, and that the data fusion function was a time-consuming, onerous task. The evaluators observed that when HFSWR was combined with another sensor, there appeared to be a synergistic effect that improved the completeness of the RMP. However, the death knell for HFSWR on Canada’s east coast was sounded when Industry Canada received a complaint of frequency interference from the International Telecommunications Union. A decision was taken in 2007 to turn the HFSWR sites to the Assistant Deputy Minister for Science and Technology for research and development, but that they would no longer be used for operational purposes.2657.3.2 Contribution of Surveillance to Marine Domain AwarenessThus far in this chapter, the discussion has centred upon the components of the recognised maritime picture and how these components are collated to develop marine domain awareness. The next part of the investigation will examine the level of effort and spatial context of the government’s maritime surveillance operations conducted in the Atlantic region. The first element of the analysis will be a determination of the presence of military and other government department patrol assets in Canada’s maritime zones.264 Canada. Report of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence. Canada’s Coastlines: The Longest Under-defended Borders in the World. October, 2003, p. 57.265 Canada. Report of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence. Canadian Security Guide Book - 2007 Edition - Coasts. March, 2007, pp. 19-20.264To recap from earlier chapters, the main contributors to government presence are military patrol aircraft, DFO/CCG patrol aircraft, naval vessels, and DFO/CCG vessels. In a perfect world, all naval, Coast Guard and RCMP vessel tracks, as well as all aircraft flight tracks would have been reconstructed to provide a composite picture of federal government presence in the study area for a specified period. However, this research concentrated on reconstruction of surveillance aircraft patrols only. Two separate issues drove this decision. First, aircraft have a tremendous advantage over ships as surveillance platforms by virtue of their speed. The speed advantage enables aircraft to cover much more area than ships during the same time period. In addition, an aircraft can ascend in altitude, effectively increasing radar antenna height with a proportionate extension in radar range thereby increasing detection capability. Thus, the magnitude of contribution to the RMP by aircraft is considerably greater than that of ships limited, in relative terms, by their lower speed and fixed radar antenna heights.The second issue that affected the decision to concentrate the analysis on aircraft presence was a more practical one. Quite simply, access to full geographic positional information on all naval vessels at sea could not be obtained. This was a surprise, since the positions of all naval vessels are transmitted on a frequent and automatic basis to a contact history database at the Maritime Operations Centre in Halifax, and are shared via the Global Command and Control System with Canadian and allied warships and military aircraft. However, it was discovered that when the contact history database had been set up a decade earlier, it had been configured incorrectly. No one other than the researcher had requested unique “pulls’ from the database, so it was not until specific data was requested that it was determined that much of the vessel track data had been permanently lost, was corrupted, or was not retrievable. As for ship track data from the Coast Guard and RCMP, these departments simply would not provide the requested data.265In light of these circumstances, the determination of government presence in Canada’s maritime zones was undertaken by assessing the surveillance effort of military and DFO maritime patrol aircraft.7.3.2.1 CP-140 Aurora Presence (DND)As indicated in Chapter Two, the method I used to determine the cumulative presence of the patrol aircraft was to record the predefined sector in which the CP-140 Aurora aircraft flew, then determine the number of times aircraft flew missions in a given sector. The totals for each sector provided an indication of the relative presence of the CP-140 Aurora aircraft for the year 2002. This method was chosen once it had been determined that the CP-140 aircrew’s estimates of sector coverage were sufficiently accurate for the purposes of this research.In 2002, Canadian CP-140 maritime patrol aircraft flew 382 sorties in the study area. Not all of these sorties were mission-specific surveillance flights. However, when surveillance was not assigned as the primary mission, it was tasked as a secondary mission objective, and all vessels detected were recorded and provided as input to the recognised maritime picture.266 Table 7-1 summarizes the number of patrols flown in each area in 2002.It should be noted that the military tasking authority employed multiple co-ordinate grid systems to assign patrol sectors.267 The lack of a common grid for sector assignment made creation of the map that depicts CP- 140 aircraft presence more difficult to achieve. In order to create this map, the GIS technician had to identify overlaps common to multiple sectors in the different grid systems and weight them accordingly. This was accomplished using the Polygon Split, Union Features, and Intersect Features tools in ArcGIS to create new polygons from the area that is shared between the selected overlapping patrol sectors (polygons).266 The dates and missions for each flight are found in Table G-1 at Appendix G.267 Maps of the standing patrol grids are found in Figures 3-7 and 3-8 of Chapter Three.266TABLE 7-1DND CP-140 AIRCRAFT PATROLS BY AREA - 2002Areas Grid Used for Patrol No. of PatrolsUnicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zone 922H NAFO Area 270B NAFO Area 24A-67 ATC & Restricted Danger Zone 243L, 3M, 3N, 30 NAFO Area 2295/NFLD South CP-140 Patrol Area 22A-63 ATC & Restricted Danger Zone 212G NAFO Area 20A-62 ATC & Restricted Danger Zone 2094/NS South CP-140 Patrol Area 18A-12, A-13, A-17, A-18 ATC & Restricted Danger Zone 181F NAFO Area 17G1, G2, G3, G4 MARLOA Area 122J NAFO Area 1192/NS Outer CP-140 Patrol Area 7H1, H2, H3, H4 MARLOA Area 40A NAFO Area 493/NFLD Inner CP-140 Patrol Area 498/Belle Strait CP-140 Patrol Area 3A, B, D1, D2, D3, D4 MARLOA Area 21E NAFO Area 291/NS Inner CP-140 Patrol Area 2A-10, A-11, Zebra ATC & Restricted Danger Zone 2E2, E3 MARLOA Area 11D, 3P, 3S NAFO Area 196/Grand Banks CP-140 Patrol Area 197/NFLD East CP-140 Patrol Area 1Source: Maritime Air Component Commander (Atlantic) Staff, 2003.Figure 7-4 depicts CP-140 Aurora patrol aircraft presence in 2002. In the figure, the areas of darkest shading received the greatest number of CP-140 Aurora flights. As such, the presence of the patrol aircraft was deemed to be greatest in these areas.26750#WLeast Presancamm®N EW r B N U N S W tC l.N O V A ► C O T IAFigure 7-4. DND CP-140 A ircraft Patrols By Area - 2002Source: Maritime Air Component Commander (Atlantic) Staff, 2003.In 2003, a GIS technician, Sgt Richard Mayne, was transferred from Ottawa on a short-term assignment to the Maritime Operations Centre (MOC) in Halifax. During the period of his assignment, I gained the co-operation of the Wing Commander at the Greenwood airbase, and established the procedure for extracting flight track data from CP-140 surveillance flights. Figure 7-5 was drawn from data recorded by fourteen CP-140 Aurora maritime patrol aircraft that conducted airborne operations from 15 Dec 2003 to 15 January 2004. Geographic positions of the aircraft were extracted from the onboard tactical computers and forwarded as ASCII files to the MOC at Maritime Forces Atlantic Headquarters where the co-ordinates were entered into the GIS to recreate the aircraft tracks. A nominal buffer of 75 nautical miles was applied to the tracks to approximate the radar coverage during a normal flight profile at different altitudes.268Sgt Richard Mayne manipulated the raw data and rendered the draft version of the choropleth map. However, 13 different shades were represented on the first images. I chose to decrease the numbers of orders of magnitude to make interpretation of the map easier. A polarizing filter was applied to the draft image and reduced the number of shades from thirteen to five.The shades on map at Figure 7-5 represent the cumulative radar coverage and the level of presence by CP-140 Auroras during a 30-day period. The lightest greyscale represents areas that were in the radar coverage of one or two Aurora aircraft during the period. The next darker shade represents radar coverage of between three to six flights. The next darker shade represents coverage by seven to nine flights, and so on. Readers are cautioned that this map does not represent the tracks of Arcturus variant of the CP-140 aircraft that may have flown during the same time period because the avionics package of the Arcturus aircraft did not facilitate downloading of track data.Presence50° 45°Figure 7-5. DND CP-140 A ircra ft Patrols 15 Dec 2003 - 15 Jan 2004Source: Maritime Air Component Commander (Atlantic) Staff, 2004. Derived from data from 14 flights.269Figure 7-6 was created from data recorded by eighteen CP-140 Aurora maritime patrol aircraft that conducted airborne operations from 15 January to 15 February 2004. The map was rendered by the GIS technician in an identical fashion to Figure 7-5. However, seventeen different shades were represented on the first images. A polarizing filter was applied to the draft image and reduced the number of shades from seventeen to five. The lightest greyscale represents areas that were in the radar coverage of one to three Aurora aircraft during the period. The next darker shade represents radar coverage of between four to seven flights. The next darker shade after that represents coverage by eight to eleven flights, and so on.□ ii i__________________ i___________ i___________ i_________65° 60° 55° 50°Figure 7-6. DND CP-140 A ircra ft Patrols 15 Jan - 15 Feb 2004Source: Maritime Air Component Commander (Atlantic) Staff, 2004. Derived from data from 18 flights.Figures 7-5 and 7-6 demonstrate several things. The first is howsurveillance presence can be depicted when the actual flight tracks are used andthe creation of the map not constrained by use of defined sector boundaries.The second significant point to note is how the pattern of surveillance presencechanges in the space of just 30 days. This change is reflective of predictedmarine activity, such as fishery openings and closings, bad weather, pack ice,and aircraft availability and serviceability.270It is noteworthy that in both Figures 7-5 and 7-6, the darkest shades correspond to the littorals within 100 nautical miles of the airbase in Greenwood, NS. This makes perfect sense since this area would be overflown by each aircraft for every take off and landing. What is significant though, is that this pattern does not appear in Figure 7-4. Indeed the same littorals are depicted in relatively light greyscale. The reason for this is that Figure 7-4 was created from a summary of the areas patrolled by military aircraft once they arrived in their assigned sectors. What was not indicated in the post-mission reports (Forms Purple) were the areas covered during the aircraft’s transit from the point of take off to arrival at the assigned sector, nor the route taken to return to base. Thus, while Figure 7-4 paints a relatively accurate picture of CP-140 Aurora maritime patrol aircraft presence once on patrol, its method of compilation does not allow a completely accurate depiction of presence for the entire time the CP-140s were in the air. The method employed in the creation of Figures 7-5 and 7-6 provide a true depiction of military long range patrol aircraft presence.Regrettably, Sgt Mayne’s assignment came to an end before a full year’s worth of 30-day maps could be produced. As such, it was not possible to compare the patterns of CP-140 presence in 2002 derived by sector assignment with the 2004 patterns that could have been derived using the more accurate method based on flight track rather than sector assignment.7.3.2.2 Contracted PAL Aircraft Presence (DFO)As was the case for CP-140 aircraft, prior to 2003, there was no means by which the researcher could obtain track data on PAL flights, either by electronic data capture, or by manual recording of positional information by aircrew, such that data could be entered easily into a GIS system. Consequently, the method employed by the researcher was essentially the same one used for military surveillance aircraft. Based on the PAL post-flight report, a tally was compiled of the areas that the aircraft was tasked to patrol. Since the PAL aircraft were tasked by DFO using the NAFO grid for surveillance planning and reporting, the totals for flights flown in each NAFO area were recorded manually by staff at the271Maritime Operations Centre.In 2002, there were a total of 481 flights flown on behalf of the Newfoundland Region of DFO, 256 sorties on behalf of the Maritime Region (at the time known as Scotia-Fundy), as well as 63 flights for the Gulf Region. That year, Quebec Region accounted for 65 flights, the Canadian Coast Guard flew 80 anti-pollution patrol flights that were recorded and included in the totals for DFO. Table 7-2 summarizes the 945 PAL patrols flown in each NAFO subdivision in 2002. A single patrol may have entered into more than one subdivision during the flight.Figure 7-7 reflects the presence of PAL aircraft on patrol in the Atlantic region in 2002. As in the case of previous maps, the darkest shades indicate the areas in which PAL aircraft flew the most frequently and thus represent the areas of greatest presence by Fisheries and Oceans Canada.N E W F O U N D L A N DNE W < I R U N S W I C4VSt>4VSeFigure 7-7. DFO PAL Aircraft Patrols By NAFO Area - 2002 Source: Maritime Operations Centre Staff, 2003.272TABLE 7-2DFO PAL AIRCRAFT PATROLS BY NAFO SUB-AREA - 2002Area Fits Area Fits Area Fits3Lj 481 4Tn 34 3PN 134Wk 324 3PSf 33 3Ke 133Lg 355 4Xn 31 3Lf 114TI 235 4Tg 30 3Ka 113PSc 215 3Nc 26 3PSe 104Tf 131 5ZEj 25 3Kh 103Lf 115 4VSb 25 3PSa 94VN 110 3PSh 24 3PSd 94Xr 106 3Ne 24 3Ld 94Sz 105 4Xs 23 5Yf 84Xm 103 3Mb 23 2Hd 83Kd 99 3Nd 22 3Md 64Tj 93 4Wh 21 2Ji 63Lh 89 4Sy 21 2Jd 63 Li 76 4Rb 21 5Yb 54Sw 75 3 La 21 4Xx 43Ls 66 3PSg 20 4Tm 44Rc 65 4VSc 19 30c 43Le 65 4WI 18 3Kk 44Xo 56 30a 18 2Je 43Ma 54 30d 18 4Xi 43Ki 54 2Jm 18 4Wg 33Lq 50 4Wj 17 4Wf 33Lb 50 3Nf 17 4Tp 33Lt 50 4Tk 16 4Sx 34Xq 47 4Ss 16 4Sv 330b 45 4Rd 16 2Jb 34Xp 40 5ZEm 15 4Si 24To 40 3Mc 15 3Kg 24Ra 40 3Kb 15 2Ja 230e 40 3PSb 14 3Kc 13Lr 40 3Nb 14 2Jn 13Lc 40 4We 13 2Jf 13Na 35 4Wd 13 2Ha 1Source: Maritime Operations Centre Staff, 2002.As was observed in Figures 7-5 and 7-6, there are dark areas depicted in the littorals close to the airfields at which the PAL patrol aircraft are based. In this case, the airfields are located at St John’s NL, and in Nova Scotia, at the Halifax International Airport rather than at Greenwood. Thus the data indicate as shift in greater presence east along the coast. This also highlights the difference between CP-140 and PAL post-mission reporting; in the case of PAL, the report indicates all areas in which the aircraft flew, not just the assigned sector.273The areas of high PAL presence to the north and east of Cape Breton Island are surprising, given that the Gulf Region of DFO had only 63 flights assigned to it in 2002. The obvious conclusion is that a large number of the 256 flights allocated to the Maritimes (Scotia-Fundy) Region also overflew areas of the Gulf Region. A random inspection of Scotia Fundy mission printouts for 2002 confirmed this supposition.7.3.2.3 Spatial Aspect of Marine TrafficHaving determined where the government has placed its aerial surveillance effort in Section 7.3.2.2, the second element of the analysis is a determination of the concentration of marine traffic and activity in Canada’s maritime zones.As articulated in Chapter Two, the security classification associated with the source and nature of the some of the fixed, mobile and space-based sensors constrained what I could use to establish patterns of maritime activity. In light of this, I assessed that PAL aircraft under contract by DFO provided the best level of detailed contact data in an unclassifed format.For consistency of comparison, what will be presented are PAL surveillance data for the year 2002. The specific data collected were the mission designator, date, time, geographic co-ordinates, vessel name, nationality, and type of vessel. The staff of the Maritime Operations Centre extracted this information from post-mission reports posted to DFO’s Surveillance Information System server in St. John’s, NL. The next series of figures are both point plots and surface model maps for the year 2002, for the four seasons, and for each month in 2002.Figure 7-8 is a point plot of all radar contacts detected by PAL lights during the year 2002. The 2002 database from which the figures were drawn contains 20,153 contacts.268 Contacts that were identified by the PAL aircrews268 This figure is not the actual number of contacts that were present in the region in 2002. Many of these contacts would have been detected and recorded by flights on sequential days. What is important is the spatial relationship between these contacts and others recorded on the same274as icebergs, bergy bits, and other non-vessel contacts are not reflected in this or subsequent figures. However, where aircrew were unable to visually identify the contact, or the contact was not exhibiting the characteristics of a vessel, i.e., the radar contact was not showing a course and speed made through the water, the contact was recorded as an “unknown” and is reflected in Figure 7-8, as well as subsequent figures.Figure 7-8. Cumulative Vessel Detections by DFO A ircraft - 2002Source: Maritime Operations Centre Staff, 2003.Figure 7-8 clearly depicts concentrations of marine activity in the offshore fishery, especially on the Nose and the Tail of the Grand Banks, as well as the Flemish Cap. The inshore fishery is reflected within 100 nautical miles to the southeast of Newfoundland, and the substantial lobster fishery to the south and southwest of Nova Scotia is readily apparent. Another area of concentration shows the inshore fishery in the Gulf of St. Lawrence to the east of New Brunswick and north of PEI. Surprisingly, the merchant vessel traffic lanes through the Gulf of St. Lawrence to the St. Lawrence Seaway are not well defined, although there is a faint pattern of a fine trail of contacts leading southeast of Anticosti Island.— ----------------- — ■CANADA*day.275Figure 7-9 depicts the same data, but as a surface model rather than a point map. In this case, the surface models are representations of the densities of individual point data. Density plots are useful for showing where point features are concentrated, particularly in cases where a large number of points are clustered in the same location such that the points blend into one another. Surface models were chosen because they allow changes in patterns due to seasons to be seen more readily.The ArcGIS software allowed two choices for density calculation: simple and kernel. In the case of a simple density calculation, the software sums all of the points that fall within a search area grid cell, then divides the total by the search area size by to arrive at a density value for each cell. The kernel density calculation works the same way except that the points found at the centre of the grid cells are weighted more heavily than those found towards the edges of the cells. Kernel density calculations normally provide smoother distribution plots269 The GIS technician and I experimented with both methods, and settled on the kernel method. We also spent considerable time experimenting with the ArcGIS software and the criteria that generated the graduations, or “classes” in greyscale. The aim was to assign criteria that would generate no more than six scales of shading, yet show discernable pattern changes. The reason for this choice was that humans find it difficult to differentiate between more than five or six shades of grey on thematic maps.270The GIS technician and I also experimented with the features that would create the classes of values that would equate to shades of grey. In the end, the natural breaks algorithm was selected, and the criteria adjusted to best display the changes in patterns.269 A. Stewart Fotheringham, Chris Brunsdon, and Martin Charlton, Quantitative Geography (London: Sage Publications, 2000), 45-46;Trevor C. Bailey and Anthony C. Gatrell, Interactive Spatial Analysis (Essex: Prentice Hall, 1995), 84-88.David J. Cuff and Mark T. Mattson, Thematic Maps: Their Design and Production (New York: Methuen, 1982), 36-37.27660-W 50°WK E W f O U N O t A N ON E W ^ B R U N S W I C i60°WFigure 7-9. Cumulative Vessel Detections by DFO Aircraft - 2002 Surface ModelSource: Maritime Operations Centre Staff, 2003.Figures 7-10 and 7-11 are two from a series of maps that break down vessel concentrations by month and by season for the year 2002. The complete series are found at Appendix D. The maps in the series are presented as both point plots and surface models. A comparison of the figures will demonstrate how the patterns of vessel concentration change throughout the year. Figures 7- 10 and 7-11 were selected because they depict distinct changes in marine activity during the passage of only two months.Figure 7-10 shows an active inshore fishery in the Gulf of St. Lawrence during April, yet by the end of June this fishery has closed and the only vessel activity of note is the merchant traffic enroute to the St. Lawrence Seaway. The magnitude of activity on the Grand Banks in April is high, but diminishes significantly by June. However the inshore fishery of southwest Nova Scotia remains relatively constant.27760°WN EW F O U N D IA N O *NEW ' BRUNSWtClNOVA ►CO Ti AFigure 7-10. Vessel Detections by DFO A ircraft - April 2002 Surface ModelSource: Maritime Operations Centre Staff, 2003.60°W 50°W60°WFigure 7-11. Vessel Detections by DFO A ircraft - June 2002 Surface ModelSource: Maritime Operations Centre Staff, 2003.7.3.3 Comparison of Marine Activity and Government PresenceHaving established the federal government’s aerial surveillance presence in 2002 as well as where the concentrations of marine activity were located during that time frame, the third element of the analysis will be to determine278whether the government’s presence targeted the appropriate areas in Canada’s maritime zones. The method to do so will be a visual map comparison with a view to identify patterns of marine activity by month and season against the backdrop of patrol effort for the entire year.To recap, concentrations of vessel activity occur in the offshore fishery on the Nose and the Tail of the Grand Banks, as well as the Flemish Cap. Inshore fisheries concentrate vessels on the southeast coast of Newfoundland, and to the south and southwest of Nova Scotia, and on the west side of the Gulf of St. Lawrence. The merchant vessel traffic lanes through the Gulf of St. Lawrence to the St. Lawrence Seaway are less distinct.The PAL presence map, Figure 7-7, shows that DFO spends much of its effort in patrolling the entire Grand Banks and the Flemish Cap. PAL also has a moderate presence in the fishery of southwestern Nova Scotia. Figure 7-7 also suggests a focus of effort to patrol the inshore fishery in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, which has the added benefit of conducting surveillance on merchant traffic as it passes through the choke point between the tip of Cape Breton Island ant the southwestern tip of Newfoundland. It appears from Figure 7-7 that few, if any, PAL flights are tasked with patrols beyond 100 nautical miles southeast of Nova Scotia.All three of the military aerial presence maps (Figures 7-4, 7-5, and 7-6) depict a greater presence to the immediate south of Nova Scotia. The vessel detection maps depict no substantive concentration of traffic in this area. Why would this increased presence be indicated? In fact, it is entirely logical because it is in the naval exercise areas, the MARLOAs, to the south where the Navy conducts its main training exercises that integrate naval surface and sub-surface forces with naval aviation and long-range maritime patrol. As such, to support these exercises, CP-140 Aurora aircraft would be expected to fly in these MARLOAs frequently.Figures 7-4, 7-5, and 7-6 also show a moderate level of military presence279south and southeast of Cape Breton Island in the approaches to Cabot Strait. This is the result of collaborative surveillance planning between DND and DFO staff. DFO PAL flights tend to focus on areas where fishing activity is located, and tend to overfly the approaches to Cabot Strait less frequently. DND surveillance planners recognise this, and task CP-140 flights to patrol the areas in which merchant vessels are converging to enter the gateway to the St. Lawrence Seaway. The three figures also depict military aerial presence along the entire southeastern coast of Nova Scotia.The comparison of concentration of vessels to patrol presence suggests that, on the whole, the two main departments with surveillance mandates are tasking their assets to monitor the areas that demand the most attention. However, acknowledging the fact that the vessel concentration maps are based on data collected from actual missions flown, it is possible that there are concentrations of activity in areas over which no PAL aircraft were tasked to fly. The area of concern is directly south and southwest of Sable Island. Indeed, military surveillance aircraft did fly in this overall area; there is no standing or seasonal fishery in this area, and CP-140 aircraft reported widely dispersed merchant traffic and infrequent sword-fishing vessels that tend to follow linear depth contours rather than congregate in specific areas. This contact data could not be parsed efficiently from the classified RMP for the purposes of this thesis.As further confirmation of the relatively light amount of traffic south of Sable Island, one can review a study commissioned by DFO in 2002 to determine merchant vessel activity, patterns and trends in Canada’s Atlantic region. The study produced vessel movement transect and density maps for 1990, 1995, and 2000 that were based on RMP data compiled by Maritime Forces Atlantic from a variety of public sources. Figure 7-12 is representative of the inbound and outbound transect maps that show that the majority of the merchant traffic is dispersed beyond 100 nautical miles of the Nova Scotia coast (and beyond Sable Island). The figure shows that the traffic tends to follow the coastline as it converges to round Cape Breton Island to enter the Gulf of St. Lawrence. This area is well patrolled by CP-140 Auroras, and to a lesser extent,280by PAL aircraft.Kilometers1995 Ecareg Inbouna Tanker Ship Tracks (486) v S ! Std Artsr Course - Caps Race ' ] 18 M ay-30 Nov.Figure 7-12. Merchant Traffic Inbound to A tlantic Canada - 1995 FilteredSource: Bernard Kelly, Marine Commercial Vessel Traffic Activity in Canada’s Atlantic Region, Geocentric Mapping Consulting, June 2002.7.3.4 Other Contribution to Maritime Domain Awareness7.3.4.1 Canadian Maritime NetworkThe Canadian Maritime Network (CANMARNET) is an unclassified but restricted, Canadian government interdepartmental computer system for sharing maritime operational information. Its genesis was the 1990 Osbaldeston Report that recommended that a means to facilitate greater information sharing between departments be established. The CANMARNET system was developed as a prototype in 1994, and originally linked Maritime Forces Atlantic Headquarters, Fisheries and Oceans regional office in St John’s NL, and the Coast Guard offices in Dartmouth, NS. The system was configured to link several different departments through dial-up connections employing Internet web technology. At present, the CANMARNET is hosted on the Government Enterprise Network (GNet) and is protected by firewalls and password controls. Dial-up access remains for users without access to the GNet. The network consists of a collection of E-mail, Web/HTML, databases, and file servers hosted by DND at Maritime Forces Atlantic Headquarters. Although CANMARNET was conceived for the benefit of all government departments, it was and remains the Navy that281provides the funding and human resources to allow the system to continue to operate.CANMAItNt. \ Index Netscapel l f il 11f&rgi«t net mjhq. dr*dtoctv*“ 3 £ # 'V A a l*fM m d■ G overnm ent G o u v em e m en t■ m ■ of Canada du Canada C anM arN etCanadian Mantime Network Rdseau mantime CanadianDNO/MDN RCMP/GRC OFO/MPO EC/EC CSlS/SCPS CAE/OEE CIC/CIC RCCCCSLast updated 01/18/011046:12General Information° System Overview 0 Interdepaitmental Co-ordination for Compliance and Enforcement o Interdepartmental Concept of Maritime Operations (Change 5)« Atlantic Region Operations Sub-Committee « User Registration forms ° What's NewLinks<■ Transport Canada Ship Registry = Small Craft Harbours ® The Eastern Scotian Shelf Integrated Management System (ESSIM)- Products° Products (overview)® Fishmg Vessel Database ° Lloyds Seadatao V iew Recent Queries ® HF Surface Wave Radar® Recognized Maritime Picture (ELVIS) o Help® GCCS Overlays ° Harbour Guard 2000Figure 7-13. CANMARNET Home Page in August 2001The CANMARNET system has evolved to include well over 100 users, representing all departments in the Atlantic region with maritime interests, as well as selected offices in the nation’s capital and elsewhere in Canada. At present, the network hosts information and databases from several government departments such as DFO’s Fishing Vessel and Small Craft Harbours databases, Transport Canada's Ship Registry, and MARLANT’s Merchant Ship Database. As well, concerned OGDs can submit via CANMARNET email reports of ship movements. These reports are captured and displayed on the Enhanced Link Virtual Information System (ELVIS). This provides an unclassified portion of the RMP that is releasable to all government departments that are connected to CANMARNET.282aPNTPHi. n w h R?;PhCkhe .i 'y '• »U r > t u ‘a rt-M . I.LL , s-LLL CL.?-}'.* tU»:: H* r.l if;-H, »-„rpv.' ::h or ir T F P i i f :•r-IMHHl : fh-.T T V<£U0P‘.■:,uj w m trVFTi rr-> tun cllniiO M££TI f. PiXtFJP c r / . . .•«L ?•£Jhttp ('.vinvvrjrt* gc CA900(Vc^twvtVlS_l.<*jr>| Map Options *11 Medium Display i r ft ™ o, , j,'i OPTIONS 1REFWES^lFigure 7-14. ELVIS Unclassified RMP Page - 2001CANMARNET has proven its worth as an effective, low cost information- sharing tool through repeated use in inter-departmental enforcement and SAR operations. However, security challenges and low data rates continue to be seen as limitations to the system.7.3.4.2 Route SurveyMarine domain awareness is three-dimensional requiring analysis of the aerospace, sea surface, and undersea environments. So far the discussion has revolved around the surveillance patrol effort, and collection and sharing of data at the surface of the water and, to some degree, in the super-adjacent airspace. What is left for discussion is the underwater dimension.Some defence analysts have been critical of the Canadian Navy’sdecision to maintain an anti-submarine warfare capability, with its inherentrequirement for sophisticated patrol aircraft, ships, submarines and ship-bornehelicopters. However, it is precisely this capability that enables, with theassistance and support of allies, the Navy to monitor and control the sub-surface283portion of Canada’s maritime zones. In Canada, only the military has this mandate, and only the military has capability to execute it. While anti-submarine warfare is clearly a defence rather than security task, there is another aspect of underwater situational awareness that implications for maritime enforcement. The Navy exercises seabed monitoring and control through its route survey and seabed intervention capabilities. These capabilities are derived from the Navy’s mandate to maintain a limited but credible mine counter measures capability.Route survey enables the Navy to produce highly-detailed seabed maps. These map are produced in stages. Detailed bathymetric data are gathered initially on a specific area, usually by Fisheries and Oceans Canada, then an image of the seabed is produced using multiple sweeps of a high-resolution side scan sonar system towed astern of a minor war vessel or locally contracted small craft. Seabed objects of interest can then be investigated in detail using the Navy’s remotely-operated vehicles (ROV) or clearance divers. The information gathered during these stages is fused together to produce the map. This process is repeated periodically for the area, the frequency of repetition determined by threat level, so that changes to the seabed can be detected. Although the Navy is interested primarily in monitoring the seabed for mine warfare purposes, the route survey capability can contribute to marine domain awareness in other ways. Unclassified seabed data is shared with other government departments and route survey and ROVs have been used for disaster response, such as the search for the downed Swiss Air Flight 111, as well as support to law enforcement.Route survey has attained greater visibility since the asymmetric terrorist attacks of 9/11. The maritime security concern is that of naval mines. Almost any vessel can lay these explosive devices, and it only takes the threat of one mine to tie up vast mine clearance resources to ensure safe passage of marine traffic Even if terrorists can not obtain sophisticated naval mines, crude mines are easily fabricated. Mining can cause loss of life and economic disruption far out of proportion to the resources invested in the mines. Consider economic and public confidence impact of a cruise ship in the St. Lawrence Seaway that strikes284a mine. Due to Canadian and American co-dependence on certain coastal and inshore seaways, Canada and the United States since 9/11 have embarked on a co-operative route survey effort for shared and adjacent waters. Segments of the St Lawrence Seaway system, which traditionally had been considered safe, have recently been surveyed as part of this effort.7.4 SummaryModern navies fulfill three main roles is support of government objectives. These are the military, diplomatic, and policing roles. The military role is a navy's raison d’etre; the ability to apply coercive force in concert with a navy's military character is what enables it to achieve the other two roles. Moreover, it is the capacity to bring force to bear that is what differentiates the Navy from other departments with enforcement mandates. As more and more maritime claims are extended throughout the world, the policing role for navies is becoming of increasing importance to coastal states.Canadian naval policy identifies six functions that its Navy should expect to execute in fulfillment of the constabulary role. These functions are sovereignty patrols, Aid of the Civil Power, assistance to other government departments, search and rescue, disaster relief, and oceans management. The Canadian Navy’s operations fulfill all of these mandates; this chapter highlighted the Navy’s contribution to maritime domain awareness. Domain awareness, which incorporates the presence element of sovereignty, also demands cooperation and assistance to other government departments through sharing of data and intelligence. The Navy’s contribution to maritime enforcement is also a contribution to oceans management.The Canadian Navy was engaged in developing maritime domain awareness long before the terrorist attacks of 9/11 or the promulgation of the National Security Policy in 2004. Canadian defence policy required that the Navy be capable of monitoring activity in Canada’s maritime zones for the purposes of national defence. In order to meet this obligation, the Navy established coastal surveillance centres, and became the de facto lead for285development of maritime domain awareness. This occurred because other government departments with maritime surveillance interests carried out their monitoring efforts in isolation from each other. Only the Navy attempted to integrate the data, information, and intelligence from all sources. The operational and technical contribution to the recognised maritime picture by the Navy is significant. The Navy facilitates co-ordination of all of government maritime surveillance planning through the Marine Security Operations Centres, and provides the backbone for electronic information sharing systems such as the Canadian Maritime Network.The two key departments with surveillance mandates, DND and DFO, expend considerable resources to achieve aerial presence in the Canadian maritime zones and approaches. When the presence of military and DFO maritime patrol aircraft is estimated and presented in a spatial context, and then compared against the concentrations of marine vessel activity, one concludes that the government surveillance effort is directed to the areas of greatest interest for maritime enforcement and sovereignty protection.The next chapter will examine the patrol and response aspect of the constabulary role, with emphasis on assessing the Navy’s role in maritime search and rescue and assistance to other government departments in the form of fisheries patrols.286Chapter EightNAVAL CONTRIBUTION TO PATROL AND RESPONSE 8.1 IntroductionThe previous chapter identified the Navy’s role in both contributing to the recognised maritime picture as well as being a crucial enabler of whole of government maritime domain awareness. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the Navy’s contribution to maritime enforcement in the context of patrol and response activities.The chapter opens with a discussion of the structure of the search and rescue system in Canada, with reference to the resources assigned to the Atlantic region. This is followed by an examination of the spatial distribution of SAR incidents, an analysis of SAR operations in the year 2002, and how the Department of National Defence contributed to that SAR mission.Next, the Navy’s support to fisheries enforcement through patrol activities is examined. An analysis of patrol patterns is offered, as well as spatial analyses of at-sea inspection data. The chapter closes with a synopsis of the naval enforcement patrol effort.8.2 Contribution to Search and RescueIn all locations on the globe, the activities of work and recreation often produce situations in which individuals find themselves in distress. In urban areas, this assistance is normally provided by municipal emergency services. However, beyond the populated areas, it normally the remit of government agencies to perform these search and rescue activities, the objective of which is to prevent loss of life and injury. Incidents that generate the need for rescue occur on land, on the water, or in the air. In broad terms, search and rescue is broken into these three categories, each referring to the medium in which the incident is initiated: ground SAR, marine SAR, and aeronautical SAR. In many cases there will be an obvious overlap; for example, an aeronautical incident will eventually become either a marine ground SAR incident depending upon the geographic location of an aircraft when the effects of gravity are fully287realized.8.2.1 Search and Rescue Structure in CanadaCoverage for SAR in Canada includes the nation’s landmass, and extends approximately 1,000 nautical miles into the Atlantic, 800 nautical miles into the Pacific, and north to the North Pole. Under Canada's constitutional arrangements, coastal and ocean search and rescue has been assumed by the federal government, and inland ground and water searches are the responsibility of provincial and territorial governments.There are six federal departments or agencies involved in SAR response. These are the Department of National Defence, Environment Canada (Meteorological Service of Canada), Fisheries and Oceans Canada (Canadian Coast Guard), Parks Canada Agency, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and Transport Canada.Ground SAR is treated differently the other two categories of SAR, and is the responsibility of individual provinces and territories. Operational authority for ground SAR is delegated to the RCMP everywhere except Ontario, Quebec, and parts of Newfoundland and Labrador. In those provinces, the provincial police forces have operational authority, and the operational response is normally delegated to the police service of the jurisdiction in which the ground SAR incident has occurred. The Canadian Navy plays no real role in ground SAR; accordingly, only marine and aeronautical SAR will be examined further.In Canada, the federal government is the authority for marine and aeronautical SAR. This responsibility was conferred first upon the Royal Canadian Air Force in 1947. Later, in 1976, the Minister of National Defence was designated as the Lead Minister for SAR (LM-SAR). Cabinet reconfirmed this appointment in 1982 and again in 1986.271 In 1986, the federal government established the National SAR Program to co-ordinate, promote, and review the activities of departments and agencies that deliver SAR services, with the271 Canada, Department of National Defence/Fisheries and Oceans Canada,B-GA-209-001/FP- 001 DFO 5449, National Search and Rescue Manual (Ottawa, May 2000), Ch. 1, p. 4.288overall aim of improving SAR prevention and response. The focus of the National SAR Program is on research, provision of information, application of technology, and saving of lives through prevention of SAR incidents.272There are two independent bodies that provide advice to the Lead Minister for SAR. The first of these is the Interdepartmental Committee on SAR (ICSAR), made up of senior officials representing departments and central agencies that execute the National SAR Program. The Committee facilitates interdepartmental co-ordination, and is the primary forum for development of advice to the LM-SAR in the areas of SAR policy and planning.273The second is an independent body outside of the departmental line authorities for SAR delivery. This body is the National SAR Secretariat (NSS), and it serves to co-ordinate, promote and review the National Search and Rescue Program among federal authorities, and to develop and standardize provincial and territorial SAR service.274Under the federal SAR structure, DND is required to provide the aircraft and aeronautical services for SAR. Although DND has overall responsibility for marine and aeronautical SAR, the Canadian Coast Guard component of Fisheries and Oceans Canada is responsible under the Oceans Act to coordinate maritime search and rescue with DND, and is responsible for the provision of the maritime component of the federal SAR program. Moreover, within the joint rescue co-ordination centres (RCC), military and CCG personnel operate together as a team to co-ordinate and control marine and aeronautical SAR responses.The Commander of a Search and Rescue Region (SRR) is appointed to co-ordinate, control and conduct SAR operations within his SRR. These SRRs272 Canada, National Search and Rescue Secretariat, Who We Are: National Search and Rescue Secretariat, 9 September 2007 (27 December 2007).Canada, National Search and Rescue Secretariat Who We Are: International Committee on Search and Rescue, 6 July 2007 (27 December 2007).274 National SAR Secretariat, Who We Are: National Search and Rescue Secretariat, 9289are established in accordance with the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) agreements. In Canada, there are three SRRs: Victoria, Trenton, and Halifax. The SRR Commander may appoint a Senior Military Officer to oversee on his behalf the Officer-in-Charge of the Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre.275Smaller maritime rescue sub-centres (MRSC) have been established in the Halifax SRR to reduce the JRCC’s workload and to maximize local knowledge and resources for SAR response.276 MRSC St. John's is responsible for an area 200 nautical miles adjacent to Newfoundland and Labrador, and MRSC Quebec is responsible for an area that includes the St Lawrence River and the northern Gulf of St. Lawrence. These two centres report to Halifax and Trenton respectively.Within DND, responsibility for the execution of SAR rests with the Commander, Canada Command. The Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) is responsible for providing search and rescue aircraft to the Commander, Canada Command to whom all of the SRR Commanders report. The CAS also is responsible for strategic SAR policy within DND, liaison with the National SAR Secretariat, providing a DND representative to ISCAR, and liaison with other national and international SAR departments. A simplified organization chart depicts these relationships at Figure 8-1.September 2007.275 The researcher exercised the duties of Senior Military Officer for the Halifax SRR from July 2001 to August 2003.276 Figures 3-9 and 3-10 in Chapter Three depict the SRRs and MRSCs in the Atlantic region.290Chief of the Defence StaffI Chief of the Air Staff Ii~i Canadian Coast Guard |Commander Canada CommandL. -> SRR Commander <- ._JSAR aircraft SAR vesselsOperationsSenior Military OfficerPolicy Officer-in-Charge JRCCFigure 8-1. Search and Rescue Structure w ithin DND8.2.2 Search and Rescue ResourcesFor maritime SAR, both air and marine resources are designated as primary and secondary SAR assets. In the case of air resources in the Halifax SRR, primary resources are one helicopter each at the two SAR squadrons in the Atlantic region, holding at 30-minute response times during normal working hours, and two hours notice during quiet hours. Secondary air assets are all federal government aircraft available for tasking, such as military CP-140 Aurora long range patrol aircraft and ship-borne Sea King helicopters, as well as CCG, RCMP, DFO, and TC aircraft, in addition to the resources of the Civil Air Search and Rescue Association (CASARA).The primary fixed wing SAR aircraft is the CC-130 Hercules transport plane. Based in Greenwood, NS, and Trenton, Ontario, a Hercules can cruise at 300 knots out to 3,600 nautical miles and stay in the air for 12 hours. This aircraft is used for localization of persons in distress in a large area, and can parachute drop lifesaving equipment such as rafts, other supplies, and SAR personnel. The Hercules has no capability to rescue persons who have been located. The Hercules' SAR crew consists of two291pilots, a navigator, a flight engineer, a load master and two SAR technicians.The primary rotary wing SAR aircraft, CH-149 Cormorant helicopters, are based in Greenwood, NS and Gander, NL. A Cormorant can cruise at 130 knots out to 200 nautical miles and stay on station for one hour. The helicopter can in the air for 6 hours, landing with a 30-minute reserve. Refueling at the Hibernia oil platform on the Grand Banks extends the helicopter’s range even farther. Cormorant helicopters are capable of dropping lifesaving equipment and supplies, and can hoist persons in distress for evacuation to safety. The Cormorant's crew consists of two pilots, one flight engineer and two SAR technicians.The CH-146 Griffon helicopters based in Gander, NL are also an often used SAR resource. The Griffon’s main missions are to support the Army as tactical troop transports, and as SAR support to the Air Force’s F-18 fighter squadrons. Griffons are tasked routinely to respond to any SAR incident. In its SAR configuration, a Griffon's crew consists of two pilots, one flight engineer and one SAR technician.Although not designated as primary SAR assets, CP-140 Aurora maritime patrol aircraft respond to SAR incidents, and are capable of dropping life-saving equipment, marking the location of a persons in distress, and coordinating the arrival of other SAR assets to the scene.On the water, primary marine SAR resources are CCG lifeboats and CCG ships multi-tasked to SAR duties that are on a 30-minute standby posture. Secondary marine assets include all vessels of the federal government that are not specifically dedicated to SAR, but which may be tasked to aid in the resolution of a SAR incident. Usually these are naval and DFO/CCG vessels, and boats of the Canadian Coast Guard Auxiliary.The primary marine SAR vessels in the Halifax SRR are five large CCG292cutters (over 180 feet), nine 16-metre Arun lifeboats, eight 14-metre lifeboats, and nine 8-metre inshore rescue boats. The disposition of the cutters is normally one in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, one to the east and one to the south of Nova Scotia, and two to the east of Newfoundland. The lifeboats are based in various locations around the region to provide minimal gaps in SAR coverage as depicted in Figure 8-2. The inshore rescue boats are based in the Newfoundland communities of Notre Dame Bay, Conception Bay, Bonavista Bay, and the Nova Scotian communities of Pictou, Mahone Bay, Halifax. There are also inshore rescue boats in Saint John and Shediac New Brunswick, and Charlottetown, PEI. The circles in Figure 8-2 represent the approximate range of the vessels from their home bases.Figure 8.2. Coast Guard Lifeboat Locations - Atlantic RegionSource: Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre Halifax, 2007.8.2.3 Search and Rescue Activity ResultsHaving reviewed the SAR structure and resources allocated to the Halifax SRR, the next several paragraphs will examine the region’s SAR incidents in a spatial context.8.2.3.1 Spatial Aspect of Search and Rescue SupportFigure 8-3 is a point plot that shows the distribution of all categories of29360°W 50°W0RON6WV260°WSAR incidents in Atlantic Canada in during the period 1999-2002. Visually inspecting the map, one sees that the majority of the incidents appear to be very close to the coasts of all of the Maritime provinces, and the incidents disperse farther away from the coastline.Figure 8-3. SAR Incidents in Atlantic Canada - 1999 to 2002Source: Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre, Halifax, 2002.In addition, SAR incidents are in clusters that correspond to coastal communities. In particular, there is a large concentration off southwest Nova Scotia in the vicinity of Yarmouth and Cape Sable Island. This dense cluster corresponds to the major lobster fishery in southwest Nova Scotia. Other concentrations appear along the NS, PEI and eastern NB coastlines and the Magdelene Islands. Again, these clusters are associated with fishing communities. There are small concentrations of SAR incidents on the east coast of Newfoundland that correspond with the inshore fishery there but, surprisingly, there are very few incidents in comparison to Nova Scotia. In the waters off of Newfoundland, there are relatively few incidents that appear beyond the Canadian EEZ and, in particular, the Grand Banks. This is intriguing because there was considerable fishing activity on the Grand Banks, but it has not caused a corresponding number of SAR incidents. The most likely explanation is that the fishing vessels that ply the Grand Banks tend to be60 °W 50°W§294larger ocean-going trawlers from foreign nations rather than the much smaller Canadian inshore fishery vessels. The smaller vessels that fish inside of the Canadian EEZ are more susceptible to the effects of the rough sea states common in the continental shelf waters of the North Atlantic.Figure 8-4 depicts the same data, but as a surface model rather than a point plot. This figure and provides a much clearer picture of the “hot spots” where the concentrations of SAR incidents have occurred over the period. The concentrations correlate to the general coastline of NS, NB and in particular Yarmouth and Cape Sable Island. Also more apparent in this figure than in the point plot are concentrations of incidents in St. Margaret’s Bay, Mahone Bay and Halifax, as well as Sydney, Louisbourg and Canso on Cape Breton Island. There is also concentrations in the Northumberland Strait on both the NS and southern PEI coastline. In New Brunswick, the Saint John River is the source of a number of incidents, and there are clusters in the Bay de Chaleur and Magdalene Islands. With the exception of the Saint John River that is a popular waterway for recreational boating, the concentrations of SAR incidents correspond mainly with coastal inshore fishing communities.60°WN E W F O U N D L50 °W60°WFigure 8-4. SAR Incidents - 1999 to 2002 Surface ModelSource: Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre, Halifax, 2002.295Maps containing point data for each individual year 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002 were examined to determine whether there are changes in incident pattern by year. Visual inspection shows essentially the same pattern of clusters year after year, and there don’t appear to be any major differences based upon a specific year. SAR incidents broken down by year are found at Appendix E, Figures E-3, E-4, E-5, and E-6.The corresponding surface models for each year are found at Figures E- 7, E-8, E-9, and E-6-10. The surface models do not reveal any discernable change in pattern on yearly basis.Figures 8-5 and 8-6 are point data maps that show search and rescue incidents by season. For the purpose of this study, summer is defined as the months of June, July, and August. The months of September, October and November constitute the fall season. December, January and February are winter. The spring season is made up of the remaining months of March, April and May.Figure 8-5 shows all of the SAR incidents that took place from 1999 to 2002 that occurred in the summer months, and Figure 8-6 depicts those that occurred during the winter months of the same period. These two figures effectively demonstrate differences in SAR incident patterns based on season. Clearly, by the simple measure of the number of incidents, Figure 8-5 shows that the summer months are when the vast majority of SAR incidents occur. This is fairly obvious by looking at the point data. It also makes sense if one considers that it is during the summer months when the majority of the fishing seasons are open in Atlantic Canada, and is also the period when most recreational boaters, kayakers, and canoe enthusiasts are active. To some degree as well, there is more commercial activity undertaken on the water during the summer months when the weather normally is better.29660“W 50”WN S W fO U NO UND1000m60°WFigure 8-5. SAR Incidents 1999-2002 - Summer MonthsSource: Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre, Halifax, 2002.50“Wz960"W 50°WFigure 8-6. SAR Incidents 1999-2002 - W inter MonthsSource: Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre, Halifax, 2002.The point data concentration in Figure 8-6 shows that during the winter months there are far fewer incidents, and there appears to be only one major297concentration, that being the Yarmouth area with minor clusters of incidents occurring off of Halifax. The surface models in Figures 8-7 and 8-8 corroborates these findings.60°W 50 °WFigure 8-7. SAR Incidents 1999-2002 - Summer Months Surface ModelSource: Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre, Halifax, 2002.N E W F O U N D I A60°WFigure 8-8. SAR Incidents 1999-2002 - Winter Months Surface ModelSource: Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre, Halifax, 2002.298Figures 8-9, 8-10, and 8-11 depict the search and rescue incidents for 1999 to 2002 broken down by category of air, marine and humanitarian incident. Of the three categories, it can be seen that there are far fewer humanitarian incidents; the clear majority of SAR incidents are of a marine origin. In terms of air incident concentrations, Figure 8-9 reveals a generally random pattern with clusters at the St. John’s, and Gander Airports in Newfoundland, and the Sydney Halifax Airports in Nova Scotia.In terms of marine incidents, the pattern in Figure 8-10 corresponds to the overall pattern depicted in Figure 8-3. Indeed, the patterns are virtually identical. This correlation makes sense because 84 percent of the total SAR incidents are marine in origin.With respect to humanitarian SAR incidents, Figure 8-11 shows that there are fewer at sea, and the majority of these are clustered in the Halifax and St. John’s areas, the Magdalene Islands, and the entrance of the Saint John River in New Brunswick.60*W 50*WN€W v 8RUNSWIC'50*WFigure 8-9. SAR Incidents 1999-2002 - AirS ou rce : Jo in t R e s c u e C o -o rd in a tio n C e n tre , H a lifa x , 2 0 0 2 .29940*NC A H A D ,QUEBECBRUNSWiCFigure 8-10. SAR Incidents 1999-2002 - MarineSource: Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre, Halifax, 2002.QUEINEWFOUNDLANDNEW * ' 8R U N SW IC I1000m50°W60 °WFigure 8-11. SAR Incidents 1999-2002 - HumanitarianSource: Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre, Halifax, 2002.Additional maps of SAR point data and surface models can be found at Appendix E.3008.2.3.2 Search and Rescue OutputHaving examined the SAR structure and resources, and the spatial aspect of SAR incident distribution, the discussion will turn to the operational execution of the SAR task in 2002, and the military’s contribution to it.As was seen at Figure 3-9, in terms of overall area, the Halifax SRR is the second largest of the three Canadian search and rescue regions, but generally has slightly fewer incidents due to the region’s lower population density. In 2002, the Halifax SRR responded to 2,328 SAR cases. As can be seen at Figure 8-12, this was a normal caseload, one that followed the normal distribution for SAR incidents handled by JRCC Halifax and the Maritime Rescue Sub-Centres at St. John’s and Quebec City.600 i500 -400 -300 -200 -100 -Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec- - - 2000 — 2001 2002Figure 8-12. Monthly SAR Caseload in Halifax SRR - 2000 to 2002Source: Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre, Halifax, 2002.For statistical purposes SAR cases are recorded in numerous categories. The first series of categories deals with the urgency of the situation. Category 1 incidents are distress cases in which there is clear and present risk for loss of life. Category 2 cases are emergencies in which there is strong potential for loss of life. Category 3 incidents are less serious situations such as vessel breakdowns. Category 4 covers false alarms and hoaxes. Figure 8-13 depicts the Halifax SRR incidents by category. The percentages for each category during that period are consistent with the other SRRs in the country and imply no trends or irregularities. Category 3 cases, the less serious301incidents, form the majority of cases in the Halifax SRR, again consistent with Trenton and Victoria SRRs.■ Category 1■ Category 2□ Category 3□ Category 4Figure 8-13. SAR Incidents by Urgency - Halifax SRR 2002Source: Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre, Halifax, 2002.SAR incidents are also categorised for statistical purposes based on whether they originate as air or marine SAR cases. In cases of medical evacuation, the event is recorded as a humanitarian SAR case. In some cases, the category of the incident cannot be ascertained before it is resolved and is recorded as “unknown.” For example, an emergency position indicating radio beacon (EPIRB) may be inadvertently activated in a garage, hangar, or at dockside and the signal is detected. SAR resources may be brought to bear to search for the transponder, but the EPIRB may be switched off before SAR assets launch. Figure 8-14 breaks down the 2002 SAR incidents in the Halifax SRR by type. For comparison, Figure 8-15 does the same for the period 1997 to 2002.■ Air□ Marine■ Humanitarian□ UnknownFigure 8-14. SAR Incidents by Type - Halifax SRR 2002Source: Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre, Halifax, 2002.302300025002000 □ Unknown■ Hum anitarian H Marine■ Air1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002Figure 8-15. SAR Incidents by Type - Halifax SRR 1997 to 2002Source: Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre, Halifax, 2002.The number of SAR incidents in 2002 was fewer by two percent from the year previous and even fewer than the years 1999 and 2000. However, a five- year trend suggests that 2002 was an “average” year; thus, the total number of SAR incidents in 2002 represent normal fluctuations in marine activity.Figure 8-16 depicts the type of vessel associated with marine SAR cases in 2002. Fishing activity continues to be the source of the majority of cases in the Halifax SRR, which is not surprising given the fishing industry’s significance to the economy of the Atlantic region. The relationship between fishing vessel SAR cases and other user categories in the Halifax SRR has remained relatively constant in recent years.303OtherCommercial7%Power13%Pleasure3%Fishing_____55%Figure 8-16. SAR Incidents by User Type - Halifax SRR 2002Source: Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre, Halifax, 2002.Interestingly, the predominance of fishing vessel SAR cases is not replicated on Canada’s West Coast. There the relatively sheltered inside passages and more temperate climate encourage a greater number of recreational boaters. Accordingly, the majority of SAR incidents in the Victoria SRR are caused by power-driven pleasure craft. Fishing vessels account for only 14 percent of the cases on the West Coast.277The JRCC also compiles statistics pertaining to the source of the indidents to which they respond. Figure 8-17 shows that mechanical and equipment breakdowns are the root cause of the majority of marine SAR cases in the Halifax SRR.277 _ —Power-driven pleasure craft account for 53 percent of all SAR cases in the Victoria SRR. See Appendix R for the breakdown by user group.304Human Error 9%Mechanical67%Weather7%Unknown17%Figure 8-17. SAR Incidents by Root Cause - Halifax SRR 2002Source: Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre, Halifax, 2002.Most marine SAR activity is concentrated in the Nova Scotia area of the SRR, and since marine cases comprise the majority of total incidents, Nova Scotia records the majority of total incidents. Table 8-1 shows that Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island dominate the marine cases while Quebec is the leader in air incidents. Nova Scotia and Newfoundland record the greatest number humanitarian incidents, most of which require aerial medical evacuations in NL.TABLE 8 - 1DISTRIBUTION OF SAR CASES - HALIFAX SRR 2002Province Marine Air Humanitarian OtherQC 7 38 10 11NL 54 23 27 17NS 707 40 28 44NB 0 11 3 12PEI 529 4 10 20Offshore 93 10 2 4Source: Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre, Halifax, 2002.The summer months of July and August generate the largest number of SAR incidents. This is to be expected, given the larger number of people participating in recreational activities such as pleasure boating, kayaking, sail boarding, and private aircraft operation. Figure 8-18 shows that January, February and March of 2002 recorded the fewest incidents largely due to the severe winter weather that normally reduces marine activity levels. Indeed, the305SAR incidents that occur during the winter months tend to be serious ones because of the bad weather in which both the distressed vessel and responder find themselves. Figures 8-18 depicts the monthly SAR caseload and Appendix R shows the same for a four-year period from 2002 to 2005. This monthly pattern is a known phenomenon and seldom changes significantly from year to year.450 -I 400 - 350 - 300 - 250 - 200 - 150 - 100 - 50 -0 i i i i i i i i i i i iJan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov DecFigure 8-18. Monthly SAR Cases in Halifax SRR - 2002Source: Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre, Halifax, 2002.Table 8-2 lists the type of vessel that responded in support of SAR incidents in the Halifax SRR. The table and Figure 8-19 below it clearly show that Canadian Coast Guard assets responded to the majority of incidents in 2002.278 The Canadian Coast Guard Auxiliary was the next most active organisation in terms of both SAR taskings and hours engaged in SAR activities. The 2002 statistics are consistent with data recorded for the years prior to and after 2002.278 The two CCG Marine categories includes light station keepers, the Inshore Rescue Boat program, and all vessels belonging to DFO/CCG.306TABLE 8 - 2MARINE RESPONDERS IN SAR CASES - 2002Halifax SRR Marine Resources Taskings HoursCCG Marine (SAR) 947 3,418CCG Marine (non-SAR) 164 855CCG Auxiliary 146 397Federal Vessel (Other) 1 1Provincial Vessel 1 1Police Vessel 10 9Commercial Vessel 16 266Fishing Vessel 90 278Other 163 446Pleasure Craft (Private) 9 24Source: Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre, Halifax, 2002CCG Auxiliary 9%CCG Marine72%Naval Vessels 0%All Other Vessels 19%Figure 8-19. Marine Responders in SAR Cases - Halifax SRR 2002Source: Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre, Halifax, 2002.Table 8-2 and Figure 8-19 were compiled from records obtained from the Canadian Coast Guard national headquarters, and reflect the SAR incidents as reported by JRCC Halifax staff. There is one statistic in Table 8-2 that implies that only one federal vessel other than those of the CCG or CCG Auxiliary was tasked for SAR support, and it was on task only for one hour in the entire year. This statistic was considered suspect. Accordingly, the 2002 Halifax JRCC daily SAR message summaries were retrieved from the National Library and Archives office and a review of the 365 daily summaries revealed that naval vessels were tasked to respond to several SAR incidents in 2002. This naval support to SAR is reflected in Table 8-3. These revised statistics307would increase in Figure 8-19 the percentage that naval vessels responded to SAR incidents from zero percent to one percent based on hours on task. The whole number figure of total number of taskings would be unchanged. Although these figures are more accurate, they do not alter the weight of the relative participation of Canadian naval vessels in SAR incidents in the Atlantic.TABLE 8 - 3 NAVAL RESPONDERS IN SAR CASES - 2002Date Warship Type Nature of Response Hours27-May-02 Toronto FFH Medical evacuation from fishing vessel 25.325-Jun-02 Kingston MCDV Tow of pleasure craft 1.825-Jun-02 Summerside MCDV Tow of pleasure craft 1.828-Sep-02 Moncton MCDV Search for overdue fishing vessel 4.829-Oct-02 Toronto FFH Investigate "ball of fire" on water 1.18-Dec-02 Halifax FFH Assist disabled fishing vessel 16.0Total 50.8Source: Halifax JRCC Daily SAR Summary Message Logs for 2002.The anomaly in statistics was brought to the attention of the Officer-in- Charge of JRCC Halifax. He explained that the method of recording is neither consistent among JRCC staff in Halifax, nor among rescue co-ordination centres across the country. This is a long-standing problem that requires the Coast Guard and DND to agree to a common set of standards for interpretation of incidents to be employed nation-wide.279As it can be seen in the table, naval vessels played a very minor role in SAR response in 2002. However, naval ships frequently respond to SAR incidents even though they are not specifically tasked by the JRCC for a particular case. Usually, this entails a warship suspending whatever activity it is undertaking at the time, and altering course and closing the SAR scene at best speed. Normally a tasked SAR aircraft will arrive at the scene long before the warship; as such, the warship will return to its previous activities, and the diversion will not be recorded by the JRCC as a statistic for tasking or hours.279 Major John Van Oosten, QIC JRCC Halifax, interview by author, 7 December 2007.308The 2002 statistics for warship responses to SAR incidents are slightly higher in the Pacific than in the Atlantic. In the Victoria SRR, naval vessels were tasked with 33 incidents and participated for 48 hours in SAR events as compared to six taskings for 50.8 hour in the Atlantic. However, in terms of the overall percentages, naval vessels on both coasts made up less than one percent of the SAR taskings.280Table 8-4 lists by category the type of air asset that responded in support of SAR incidents in the Halifax SRR. Primary SAR air units provided response to the majority of incidents, garnering support from other secondary aircraft from time to time. CH-124 Sea King helicopters from Shearwater, NS and CP-140 Aurora maritime patrol aircraft based at Greenwood, NS provided SAR contribution when primary SAR aircraft were unavailable.Table 8-4 and Figure 8-20 below it clearly show that in 2002 Canadian Forces aircraft responded to the majority of SAR incidents in the Halifax SRR. The Civil Air SAR Association (CASARA) was the second largest contributor with respect to hours flown. The 2002 statistics are consistent with data recorded for the years prior to and after 2002.TABLE 8 - 4AIRCRAFT RESPONDERS IN SAR CASES - 2002Halifax SRR Air Resources Taskings HoursCanadian Forces (SAR) 281 933Canadian Forces (non-SAR) 36 101CASARA 14 23Chartered Aircraft 21 3Commercial Aircraft 2 9Federal Aircraft 2 3United States Coast Guard (Air) 1 1Source: Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre, Halifax, 2002280 In the Halifax SRR, naval vessels were tasked 6 times out of 1553 taskings (0.04 percent) and in the Victoria SRR naval vessels were tasked 33 times out of 3726 taskings (0.9 percent).309CASARA A11_ .All OtherAircraft7%CanadianForces89%Figure 8-20. Aircraft Responders in SAR Cases - Halifax SRR 2002Source: Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre, Halifax, 2002.The spatial distribution of SAR incidents throughout the region, as well as the operational responses recorded for the year 2002, lead to the conclusion that SAR resources are geographically positioned appropriately to respond to public need. Indeed, if Figure 8-2 is overlaid onto Figure 8-3, it is apparent that CCG lifeboats are stationed to provide full coverage of the coastline. The exception is the northeast coast of Newfoundland, but two large CCG cutters cover this area.6CTW 5ffW6CTW 5ffWFigure 8-21. SAR Asset Location in Relation to SAR Incidents - 2002310The preceding material has shown that the Navy plays an important role in search and rescue in the region. The Armed Forces assign aircraft and ships to respond to SAR incidents; military aircraft are used in almost 90 percent of search and rescue operations, whereas naval vessels respond to less than one percent. However, the Navy’s key contribution to search and rescue is through the provision of the leadership, infrastructure, and joint (CCG) command and control apparatus to respond effectively to all SAR events.8.3 Contribution to Fisheries EnforcementThe first half of this chapter has concentrated on the significant effort that the Department of National Defence expends in providing oversight, coordination, and resources to search and rescue in Canada. The remaining pages of the chapter will focus on the Navy’s other main contribution to maritime enforcement.The objective of this part of the study is to examine the naval contribution to fisheries enforcement through spatial analysis and determination of level of effort of naval fisheries in Chapter Seven, the research will look at three aspects of enforcement support in Canada’s maritime zones and approaches. These are the patterns of naval vessel presence and level of effort in enforcement support, the patterns and level of effort in the inspection of fishing vessels, and the relative contribution of naval vessels to the inspection effort.This aspect of the analysis spans over two decades. In order to conduct an inquiry that covers such a lengthy timeframe, two periods were examined. The first period was from 1980 to 1997, and drew heavily on archival data extracted from naval ships’ logs. From this data individual tracks of warships on fisheries patrols were reconstructed and primary data on inspections of vessels, SAR responses, and helicopter operations during naval fisheries patrols were gathered. The second period was 1999 to 2003. This period reflected recent fisheries patrols and allowed me to acquire a greater variety of data for analysis than would have been recorded in the ships’ logs only.311The data from these two periods allowed maps to be created that depicted the individual tracks of naval ships over a 23-year period, as well as showed the cumulative tracks of naval ships during the periods 1980 to 1996 and 1999 to 2002. From these maps the patterns indicated the relative enforcement presence of naval vessels on fisheries support operations.In order to show the locations of inspections conducted by both DND and DFO vessels over an extended period, a data “pull” from the Canadian Fisheries Information Network System (CFINS) was achieved for the years 1990 to 2002, This allowed an analysis of cumulative inspections over a 12- year period and facilitated the analysis of the spatial relationship between the fisheries inspections and the 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone, as well as the relationship between inspections and the bases for patrol aircraft and ships.8.3.1 Enforcement Contribution to Maritime Domain AwarenessThere is a symbiotic relationship between maritime surveillance for fisheries enforcement and that conducted for overall maritime domain awareness. The Navy’s significant aerial surveillance contribution and provision of the architecture to support whole of government MDA was discussed at length in Chapter Seven, and will be given no further treatment. Naval vessels at sea also feed information about marine traffic encountered to the Maritime Operations Centre, and thereby advance the recognised maritime picture. Thus, any naval vessel at sea in support of fisheries enforcement contributes to maritime domain awareness, but that contribution was not examined in this project because of the likelihood that any marine traffic detected by naval vessels would have already been reported by the aerial surveillance effort.8.3.2 Naval Fisheries PatrolsIn addition to the surveillance and maritime domain awareness aspects, there is another component of support to fisheries enforcement that warrants a detailed examination. This element is the support to fisheries patrols, a longstanding and traditional commitment that the Canadian Navy has undertaken since its inception.3128.3.2.1 Historical ContextIn the examination of the naval contribution to maritime enforcement it is worthwhile to review, from a historical perspective, the relationship between the Navy and Fisheries and Oceans Canada, the lead federal department responsible for the management of Canada’s fisheries resources. Indeed, it was the need for fisheries protection from American interests in the waters of the Dominion of Canada that was a major driving factor in the creation in 1910 of a home-grown naval service.281The establishment of a Canadian marine fleet came about with the rejuvenation of the Fisheries Protection Service in 1885, and it continued to expand under the aegis of the Department of Marine and Fisheries, originally instituted in 1868. By 1904, this department had become the largest in the Canadian government, and operated eight armed cruisers and over two dozen other large vessels.282 Of note, when the Naval Service Act of 1910 officially established the Royal Canadian Navy, the Minister of Marine and Fisheries was appointed to a concomitant post as Canada's first Minister of Naval Services. Moreover, with the ratification of the Act, the new Navy assumed responsibility for fisheries enforcement, tidal survey and hydrography, although in the ensuing ninety-two years since, these responsibilities have vacillated among the Navy and various departments.283 The lengthy sequence of administrative changes among departments is listed at Table 8-5.281 Marc Milner, Canada's Navy: The First Century (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 8 .282 Nigel D. Brodeur, "L.P. Brodeur and the Origins of the Royal Canadian Navy" in The RCN in Retrospect, 1910-1968, ed. James A. Boutilier (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1982), 15.283 Charles D. Maginley and Bernard Collin, The Ships of Canada's Marine Services (St. Catherines: Vanwell Publishing, 2001), 15.313TABLE 8 - 5CHRONOLOGY OF CHANGES TO DEPARTMENTAL RESPONSIBILITYDate_________________________________ Event___________________________1868 Department of Marine and Fisheries established.1884 Marine and Fisheries split into separate Departments.1892 Marine and Fisheries amalgamated. Assigned responsibility forhydrography and tidal surveys.1904 Canadian Hydrographic Survey established.1910 Department of Naval Service established. Fisheries patrol, lifeboatservice, hydrography, tidal survey, and wireless telegraphy transferred to Royal Canadian Navy.1920 Fisheries patrol and lifeboat service returned to Marine andFisheries.1922 Hydrography, tidal survey, and wireless telegraphy returned toMarine and Fisheries.1927 Marine and Fisheries become separate branches.1930 Marine and Fisheries split into separate Departments.1936 Department of Transport is established. Takes over Department ofMarine fleet, except Hydrographic Service vessels that go to Department of Mines and Resources.1939 Majority of fisheries patrol vessels taken over by the Navy for use aspatrol craft.1946 Requisitioned vessels returned to original departments.1962 Department of Transport's Canadian Marine Service fleet becomesCanadian Coast Guard.1971 Department of Environment takes over fisheries responsibilities. In1976 renamed Department of Fisheries and the Environment.1979 Department of Fisheries and the Environment splits into separateDepartments.1995 Canadian Coast Guard subsumed by Department of Fisheries and_________Oceans._____________________________________________________Source: Charles D. Maginley and Bernard Collin, The Ships of Canada'sMarine Services (St. Catherines: Vanwell Publishing, 2001), 15, 119.As articulated in Chapter Five, at present the level of naval support to DFO is formalized in a Memorandum of Understanding. Every year for the past few decades, the MOU is re-negotiated to plan the number of ship-days and flying-hours allocated to fisheries enforcement by DND. However, the actual execution of this MOU differs between the east and west coasts.In the Atlantic, the Navy provides the agreed-upon number of sea days to DFO for either frigates or the smaller maritime coastal defence vessels (MCDV) in which Conservation and Protection officers embark for enforcement duties that constitute dedicated fisheries patrols. In the Pacific, an alternate arrangement exists. The waters of Canada's West Coast are divided into three zones for the administration of search and rescue. The Canadian Coast Guard314maintains a vessel as SAR standby in each of those zones. Rather than provide ships for fisheries patrols, Maritime Forces Pacific fulfils its traditional obligation of thirty sea days to DFO by scheduling coverage by an MCDV of the three SAR zones at mutually-agreeable times with the Coast Guard. This permits the Coast Guard to re-task some of their ships during that period, providing that department with better flexibility for other maritime tasks.2848.3.2.2 Level of Effort in Support of Fisheries EnforcementOver the past decade on the Atlantic coast, Canadian naval vessels spent between 1500 to 2500 days at sea per year, many of them on overseas deployments, but the majority of them within the Exclusive Economic Zone. While many of the sea days were devoted to training and exercises, they provided many “eyes on the water” and constituted a distinct federal presence in Canada’s maritime approaches. In recent years, the trend for naval vessel days at sea has been a decreasing one due to a reduction in the size of the naval fleet, and annual budgetary constraints. Table 8-6 shows the downward trend in naval sea days in general.TABLE 8 - 6NAVAL VESSEL TOTAL DAYS AT SEA - ATLANTICVessel Type 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004Destroyer 659 512 367 284 157 254 166 178 115 205 128Frigate 794 827 753 718 718 552 620 839 824 636 735Submarine 264 275 242 228 169 85 58 25 0 88 76Minor Warship 664 531 562 521 741 592 611 600 608 634 607Other types 133 110 118 103 100 57 117 168 90 16 0Totals 2514 2255 2042 1854 1885 1540 1572 1810 1637 1579 1546Source: Maritime Forces Atlantic Sea Operations staff, 2004.Note: Destroyer totals include Annapolis-class and Improved Restigouche-c\ass destroyers prior to 1999. Minor warship totals include Kingston-class Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels (MCDV) and, prior to the year 2000, HMC Ships Anticosti, Cormorant, and Moresby, as well as Gate vessels used for naval reserve training.Table 8-7 shows the annual number of sea days allocated to DFO support. These totals are based on the MOU targets of 125 sea days and between 500 to 720 aircraft hours. Note the reduction of fishery patrol days by284 Captain(N) Richard Harrison, Plans and Operations Officer - MARPAC, interview by author,315major warships in 2002 and 2003, the years that Canadian major warships were deployed to the Arabian Sea on Operation APOLLO. Notwithstanding this requirement for expeditionary operations, from 1990 to 2004 the Navy delivered 99 percent of planned ship days to DFO; the Armed Forces provided DFO with seven percent more aircraft hours than the MOU required.TABLE 8 - 7DND FISHERIES PATROL ASSET ALLOCATION - ATLANTICFiscalYearAShip Days (Planned)BShip Days (Actual)CAircraft Hours (Planned)DAircraft Hours (Actual)1990 65 78 420 4061991 65 83 420 6911992 125 138 720 8061993 125 145 720 7331994 125 115 700 8221995 125 141 700 7451996 125 150 700 7311997 125 124 700 6301998 125 108 700 7331999 125 121 539 5492000 125 125 539 5402001 125 101 539 5392002 125 97 400 3982003 125 99 400 4032004 125 110 539 539Totals 1755 1735 8736 9265Sources: Column A - Canada. Department of National Defence. 1990- 91 Estimates, Part III: Expenditure Plan. Ottawa, 1990. Followed byeach annual report thereafter. Column B - Annual totals kept by Maritime Forces Atlantic Sea Operations staff for all ship classes. Columns C and D - Annual totals kept by Maritime Air Component (Atlantic) Operations staff for Aurora maritime patrol aircraft.Note: In Column A, from 1994 to 1997, HMCS Cormorant and her submersibles supported fisheries research for DFO.The distribution of sea days between major and minor warships in support of DFO varies year to year depending upon the demand for major warships in defence tasks. The breakdown in the number of days allocated is shown at Figure 8-22. Note the increased percentage of minor warship days in support of DFO in the post-911 timeframe, when the Canadian Navy directed its major warships into the Persian Gulf.13 March 2001.316180 -|E3 Minor Warship ■ Major Warship1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005Figure 8-22. Naval Fisheries Patrol Sea Days - AtlanticSource: Maritime Forces Atlantic Sea Operations staff, 2005.8.3.2.3 Spatial Aspect of Fisheries Patrol EffortThe next few paragraphs will examine the spatial context of the naval support to fisheries enforcement in the Atlantic region. The first element will be a discussion of the patterns of typical patrols for minor and major warships. This will be followed by an analysis of the presence of these patrol vessels for fisheries enforcement.8.3.2.3.1 Typical Warship Fisheries PatrolIn the Atlantic region, most fisheries patrols are of two weeks duration.285 In the case of frigate fisheries patrols, the DFO Conservation and Protection officers embark aboard the warship in Halifax, and sail directly for DFO’s designated area of interest on the Grand Banks. Typically, the frigate patrols a specific area of the Grand Banks, then proceeds to St. John’s to allow the Conservation and Protection officers to return to home port for the weekend. The ship normally sails early Monday morning, and either returns to the area previously patrolled, or a new area of interest designated by the Conservation and Protection officers. Figure 8-23 is the track of a typical frigate fisheries patrol that took place in May 2000. HMCS Toronto sailed from Halifax, passed north of Sable Island, and proceeded directly to the Tail of the Grand Banks.285 Table J-3 at Appendix J contains the length of days for each patrol studied for this project.317m 3 nautical milesN E W F O U N D L A N DNOVAIC OT1 AAfter inspecting several fishing vessels on the Tail, the ship steamed for St. John’s for the weekend. On departure from port, Toronto went directly to the Flemish Cap, and then patrolled the Nose of the Grand Banks, working its way towards the Tail again. At patrol’s end, the ship proceeded directly to Halifax where the Conservation and Protection officers disembarked. Of note, the Conservation and Protection officers were from the DFO Newfoundland region, and expressed no interest in any fishing vessel once Toronto was inside the DFO Maritime region administrative jurisdiction, notwithstanding the presence of several fishing vessels that could have been inspected.Figure 8-23. Typical Frigate Fisheries Patrol - 1999 to 2002Sources: Derived from data collected on 16 frigate fisheries patrols.The 15 nautical mile buffer shown in Figure 8-23 depicts the average range at which a small fishing vessel will be detected by a frigate’s navigation radar. The 15 nautical mile figure is based on records kept by 16 frigates that conducted fisheries patrols during the period 1999 to 2002. Interestingly, the data show that ships tended to overestimate their ability to detect fishing vessels by as much as an additional 15 nautical miles. The 15-mile figure also reflects all atmospheric conditions and technical states of radar; in many cases fishing vessels were detected at 20 to 30 nautical miles.318■ 1 1 0 nautical miles!N E W F O U N D L A WNEW r BftUN SWtCNOVAiCOTIAFigure 8-24 depicts a typical MCDV fisheries patrol. Normally the vessel departs Halifax and proceeds to a small port in Newfoundland where the Conservation and Protection officers are embarked. The minor warships then conduct a patrol of the inshore fishery. From time to time, MCDVs are tasked for patrols on the Grand Banks, but they are not as well suited for the offshore patrols due to lesser ability for sea keeping, and they do not have the speed advantage that the frigates possess. In addition, DFO Conservation and Protection officers prefer frigates for the offshore for reasons of connectivity with shore authorities and personal comfort.Figure 8-24. Typical MCDV Fisheries Patrol - 1999 to 2002Sources: Derived from data collected on 9 MCDV fisheries patrols.The 10 nautical mile buffer in Figure 8-24 reflects the average detection range of an MCDV’s navigation radar against a small inshore fishing vessel. It is based on data collected during nine MCDV fisheries patrols during the period 1999 to 2002. The 10-mile figure also reflects all atmospheric conditions and technical states of the MCDV’s radar; in many cases fishing vessels were detected at much greater ranges than 10 nautical miles.8.3.2.3.2 Naval Fisheries Patrol PatternsHistorically, the Navy has focussed its fisheries patrol effort on the Grand Banks of Newfoundland, although periodically patrols are conducted319along the Hague Line on Georges Bank. Figure 8-25 is a reconstruction of the raw tracks of all classes of naval vessels that conducted 119 fisheries patrols between 1980 to 2003. Clear patterns emerge in Figure 8-25; there is obvious attention paid to the Tail of the Grand Banks, as well as to some parts of the Nose and the Flemish Cap. The departure and return transits from and to Halifax appear as well worn paths passing to the north and south of Sable Island, and there appears to be a focus on St. John’s as well. Figure 8-25 also shows individual ship tracks straying from the main concentration of tracks; these are fisheries patrols that were interrupted by search and rescue events that required the ships to leave their normal patrol sectors.While Figure 8-25 provides a graphic illustration of the basic pattern, it suffers from the same shortcomings as did the point plots of surveillance effort and SAR point plots earlier. Note that the area on the Tail is almost black with lines and it is impossible to tell how many tracks have contributed to that concentration. To better appreciate the patrol presence, Figures 8-26 and 8-27 are presented as surface models. Each covers a different period that is based on the source from which the patrols were reconstructed.60°W 50°WFigure 8-25. Naval Ships on Fisheries Patrol: 1980 to 2003Source: National Library and Archives of Canada and shipboard data (119 tracks).320Figure 8-26, covering the years from 1980 to 1997, shows a concentration of patrol effort on the Tail of the Grand Banks, with increased presence on the routes to and from Halifax and St. John’s. The focus on the Tail was due in large measure to the plethora of foreign vessels attracted to this particularly abundant fishing ground, and then later in the 1990s to the requirement to enforce the moratorium imposed on the Tail as a result of plummeting groundfish stocks.Figure 8-26 was drawn from data recorded by 87 warships that conducted fishery patrols during the period from 1980 to 1997. Geographic positions of the warships were extracted manually from the ships’ logs. These co-ordinates were imported into the ArcView 3.2 geographic information system software, and the Spatial Analyst module was used to measure the relative densities of the positions of the warship tracks, and a choropleth map was rendered that depicted track density in five orders of magnitude. The shades on this map represent the amount of enforcement presence by naval vessels over a 17-year period.sNOVAFigure 8-26. Naval Ships on Fisheries Patrol: 1980 to1997Source: National Library and Archives of Canada (87 tracks).32160 °W 50°Wn c w f o u n o l a m ofe£W v B R U N S W I C I. N O V AiCOTM60 °WFigure 8-27. Naval Ships on Fisheries Patrol: 1999 to 2003Source: Ship track logs (33 tracks).Figure 8-27 map was drawn from data recorded by 33 warships that conducted fishery patrols in support of the Fisheries and Oceans Canada during the period from 1999 to 2002. Geographic positions of the warships were recorded at sea once per hour into electronic logs in MS Access and then processed by the ArcView software in the same manner. The shades on this map represent the amount of enforcement presence by naval vessels over a 15-month period. Figure 8-27 captures the shift in concentration away from the Tail where, by 1999, there was only a small total allowable catch allocated by the North Atlantic Fisheries Organization. The shift was towards the Flemish Cap where other species such as shrimp and crab were and still are commercially viable.8.3.2.3.3 Hague Line Fisheries PatrolsThere are many anecdotes that suggest that the Canadian Navy maintained a considerable presence along the international maritime boundary to the southwest of Nova Scotia. Surprisingly, from official records there were very few naval fisheries patrols that deployed from Halifax and proceeded along the Hague Line that delimits George’s Bank. Figure 8-28 contains all of the naval fisheries patrols that spent a segment of patrol time in the vicinity of322Georges Bank, to which I was able to locate an official reference and which I was able to reconstruct. There are a few tracks along the south coast of Newfoundland that represent minor warships that undertook patrols in the inshore fishery. As well, there are one or two patrols that went along the southwest coast of Newfoundland, noting one that passed north and then west of Anticosti Island in the Gulf of St. Lawrence. Figure 8-28, in conjunction with earlier figures, demonstrates clearly that the concentration of enforcement effort by the Navy has been on the Grand Banks, in particular the Tail.Figure 8-28. Hague Line Fisheries Patrols: 1980 to 1997Source: National Archives of Canada (7 tracks).8.3.2.3.4 Naval Enforcement PresenceThe analysis of the reconstructed tracks shows that over twenty years there was little or no naval enforcement presence that was not in a direct path from Halifax to the Tail of the Grand Banks, or from St. John’s to the Nose or the Tail of the Grand Banks. There was no naval enforcement presence in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and limited presence to the northeast of Newfoundland. As well, there was virtually no naval enforcement presence in the EEZ directly south of mainland Nova Scotia. However, that is not to say that naval vessels were not present at all. Far from it, in fact. As depicted in Figure 3-6, the main naval exercise and operations areas lie directly south of Halifax and are used extensively by naval vessels and aircraft. So while there may have been fewMEW r B-jR UN S W fC I323warships on fisheries support operations in this area, there was a strong naval presence in this section of the Canadian EEZ.8.3.2.4 Boardings / InspectionsFisheries and Oceans Canada undertakes several measures to control and regulate fishing activity in the Canadian maritime zones. To ensure compliance, DFO’s key tools are its aerial surveillance, dockside monitoring, at- sea observers, and at-sea inspection programs.The relevant aspects of the aerial surveillance were discussed in the previous chapter. In the case of dockside monitoring, Conservation and Protection officer carry out random and directed dockside inspections to confirm that all licences are correct, and that catches being unloaded comply with extant regulations. The at-sea observers embark aboard fishing vessels to monitor fishing practices, and to educate vessel crews on the regulations for sustainable fishing. The Canadian Navy has no connection with the dockside monitoring or at-sea observer programs.The at-sea inspection program is the link between DFO and the Navy. It is through this program that the patrol and response capabilities of the Navy are brought to bear for fisheries enforcement. DFO uses naval vessels as platforms from which its Conservation and Protection officers can mount boardings and inspections of a wide range of fishing vessels.286Table 8-8 contains the total number of at sea fisheries inspections that were carried out by Conservation and Protection officers in the Maritimes/Scotia-Fundy and Newfoundland regions by all government agencies during the period 1990 to 2002. The CFINS extract obtained through DFO records 7,193 inspections during that period.286 The Navy uses the term “boardings” whereas DFO employs the term “inspections”324TABLE 8-8FISHING VESSEL INSPECTIONS BY DEPARTMENT - 1990 TO 2002Platform 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002DFO NF Ships 347 546 464 396 461 280 341 249 309 254 127 240 204DFO SF Ships 204 470 274 487 327 356 214 - - - - - -DND Ships 10 62 23 58 29 64 53 57 25 60 53 68 18Charter Service - 17 36 -RCMP Ships - - 2 -NAFO Patrol 4 - - - - - . _ 1 - . -Other - - 1 2Total 565 1095 798 943 817 700 608 306 334 315 180 310 222Source: Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Newfoundland Region, 2002.Notes: In the table above, Newfoundland Region is abbreviated to NF, Scotia-Fundy is abbreviated to SF. The vessel engaged in DFO Charter Service was the Casaco. The RCMP vessel that conducted the inspections was the Simmonds. The NAFO patrol vessel Commandante Blaison conducted 4 of the 5 inspections; the Commander Amalie conducted the fifth.Of the total number, Conservation and Protection officers conducted 3,883 at-sea inspections under Canadian jurisdiction (54 percent), another 2,264 under NAFO jurisdiction (31 percent), and the records did not indicate the authority under which the remaining 996 were carried out. Table 8-9 shows the breakdown by country of registration of fishing vessels subjected to the inspections. Over the 12-year period examined, the country of registration of most likely to be inspected by Canadian authorities in the study is Canada (50 percent).TABLE 8-9FISHING VESSEL INSPECTIONS BY NATIONALITY - 1990 TO 2002Country Number Country Number Country NumberCanada 3,568 Latvia 64 Belize 13Spain 1,552 U.S.S.R. 45 Poland 5Portugal 567 United States 44 Vanuatu 5Russia 279 SIL 43 Caymans 2Faroes 167 Panama 41 Italy 2Estonia 151 Greece 26 New Zealand 2Norway 148 Honduras 23 Antigua 1Cuba 115 France 21 Morocco 1Lithuania 93 Korea 20 Ireland 1Iceland 92 Germany 19 Unknown 4Japan 79 Total 7,193Source: Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Newfoundland Region, 2002.Over the past several years DFO has begun to rely increasingly on the Navy for support, notably since DFO reduced its offshore enforcement fleet.325Figure 8-29 shows the number inspections carried out each year by Conservation and Protection officers using naval vessels as the transport medium. Of the 7,193 inspections carried out during this period, Canadian naval vessels were used in 580 at-sea inspections (8 percent). Of the 580 in total, major warships were used in 364 inspections (63 percent), minor warships took part in 184 inspections (32 percent), and naval auxiliary vessels were employed for 32 inspections (5 percent).Figure 8-30 depicts the slight upward trend in the overall percentage of inspections that are carried out by naval vessels. While the number of inspections carried by DFO officers embarked aboard naval vessels remains relatively constant, the overall percentage of inspections instigated by fisheries officers embarked in naval vessels is increasing. Fisheries and Oceans Canada is facing a major challenge in dealing with the “rust out” of the DFO/CCG fleet and acquiring replacement vessels, so it is reasonable to expect that Fisheries and Oceans Canada will continue to rely heavily on naval vessels to support its inspection goals.Table 8-10 shows the number of inspections attributed to each warship during the 1990 to 2002 timeframe. With the exception of HMCS Anticosti, all of the naval vessels that carried out 30 or more boardings were major warships, i.e., frigates or destroyers. Regrettably, the DFO statistics for 2003 onwards were unavailable; they would show an increased percentage of boardings carried out by minor war vessels as the larger combatants deployed abroad to the Persian Gulf.326801990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002Figure 8-29. Boardings by Fisheries Officers aboard Naval Ships -1990 to 2002Source: Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Newfoundland Region, 2002.3530 2925201510501990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002Figure 8-30. Navy’s Percentage of Total DFO Boardings for Nfld RegionSource: Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Newfoundland Region, 2002.327TABLE 8 - 1 0NAVAL FISHERIES PATROL BOARDINGS BY SHIP - 1990 TO 2002Ship 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002Anticosti - - 1 1 1 6 3 4 1 6Athabaskan - ..........................................................................................................5 - -Chartottetown - - _ - . _ - . 1 5 5 - - .Cormorant 7 1 0 - - - 8 ............................................................................Fredericton - ........................................................................ 2 - 9 - - 7Gatineau - 5 - 13 13 20 ...................................................................Glace Bay - ............................................................... 22 - - 1 - 2Goose Bay - ......................................................................................................... 13 1 0 -Halifax - . . . . 12 - - 2 - - - 3Kingston 6 2 8 - - 2Margaree - 3 . . . ...............................................................................Moncton - ...............................................................................................2 1 - -Montr6al - .........................................................................6 - 1 5 8 9 -Moresby - - - 7 - 9 4 .........................................................Nipigon - 6 1 0 5 - 1 2 ...........................................................................Ottawa - 9 .................................................................................................................Riverton - 3 8 .....................................................................................................Skeena - 5 5 22 ...........................................................................................St. Charles - 2 1 ................................................................................................................St. John's - ..............................................................................................11 4Summerside - ...........................................................................................................25 4Terra Nova 3 - - - - - 15 1 4 ..............................................Toronto - - - - - 30 - - - 18 -Ville de Quebec - - - - - - - 6 - 1 0 3 24 -Totals____________10 62 23 58 29 64 53 57 25 60 53 68 18Source: Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Newfoundland Region, 2002.8.3.2.4.1 Spatial Aspect of Inspections I BoardingsFigure 8-31 maps the locations of all government inspections of fishing vessels at sea that took place in the Maritimes (Scotia-Fundy) and Newfoundland DFO administrative regions over the 12-year period. The map clearly demonstrates that the heaviest concentration of inspections took place on the Flemish Cap and on the Nose of the Grand Banks, with some concentration on the Tail. DFO enforcement effort also was undertaken to the southwest of Nova Scotia. These inspections correspond to the lobster fishery discussed earlier. The concentration of boardings to the east and southeast of Newfoundland correspond to the ground fish, shrimp and crab fisheries beyond the EEZ. There are some inspections that take place in the inshore fishery off of eastern Newfoundland, but the number of these is not of the same magnitude as those inspections that are undertaken beyond the EEZ. Figures3288-33 and 8-34 are surface models of the same data, and depict the same concentrations.60°W 50°WC A NNEWFOUMOLANNEW ' SR U N S W IC !60”W 50°WFigure 8-31. Cumulative Boardings by Government Vessels - 1990 to 2002Source: Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Newfoundland Region, 2002.z8zb60°W 50°WFigure 8-32. Cumulative Boardings by Naval Vessels - 1990 to 2002Source: Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Newfoundland Region, 2002.329Figure 8-32 shows concentration of inspections that were undertaken from naval vessels only. In comparing Figures 8-31 and 8-32, there are differences in the number and location of inspections. Naval vessels conducted virtually no boardings during the 12-year period in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, nor on George’s Bank. All of the inspection effort was expended on the Grand Banks with a lesser effort to the south of the Burin Peninsula, and to the east of Saint-Pierre et Miquelon. Specifically, the main concentration of inspections by naval vessels has been on the Tail of the Grand Banks and the western part of the Nose, with some effort on the Flemish Cap. These maps confirm that the southwest area of the Canadian EEZ is being enforced almost exclusively by Fisheries and Oceans Canada. The figures also show that the thrust of the Navy’s support to enforcement is directed at the NAFO fishery beyond the 200 nautical mile limit, rather than the national fishery inside the EEZ.60 °W 50°Wz8z350°WFigure 8-33. Boardings by Government Vessels - 1990 to 2002Source: Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Newfoundland Region, 2002.33060 °W 50°Wmz8zIFigure 8-34. Boardings by Naval Vessels - 1990 to 2002Source: Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Newfoundland Region, 2002.8.3.2.4.2 Proximity Analysis of BoardingsTwo proximity analyses were conducted with the objective of determining whether there was a correlation between where fishing vessels are boarded and inspected, and their proximity to the bases of government patrol assets, as well as the major maritime political boundary that defines the outer Canadian maritime zone. A proximity analysis was performed on the inspection data sets using the Nearest Feature Extension of ArcGIS. This tool was used to calculate the distance in kilometres from each fisheries inspection to DND and DFO airfields and vessel home ports. A similar proximity analysis was performed using the Nearest Feature Function that calculated the distance from each fisheries inspection to the Canadian EEZ, both inside and outside the line of demarcation.8.3.2.4.2.1 Distances from Patrol Bases to BoardingsOn land, few people become victims of armed robberies on the steps of the village police station. The likelihood of being robbed increases with distance from the base of the local constabulary. Can the same be said in a maritime context? The proximity analysis tested the supposition that the probability of a boarding / inspection increases the farther that a fishing vessel is from the331home airfield or homeport of known government patrol assets.Figure 8-35 shows the locations of the “police stations” from which surveillance aircraft and enforcement vessels would deploy for patrol activities. One military airfield is not shown; Goose Bay, Labrador lies just beyond the northern neatline of Figure 8-35, but is incorporated in the next map.'Gander*New x 8 * U N S W C I‘SydneyS W ^S nea rwater * ^ HalifaxGi?Dartmouth90 Wecrw so wFigure 8-35. Locations of Patrol Asset Airfields and Home PortsFigure 8-36 depicts the software’s calculation of the straight-line distance from the position of each inspection to the various bases of DND and DFO patrol assets. Inspections carried out by all federal departments were included in this calculation. A total of 2,972 inspections were used in this analysis that covered the period 1995 to 2002.332Figure 8-36. Distances from Inspections to Patrol Asset BasesFigures 8-37 through to 8-41 are graphs of the distances between the 2,972 at-sea inspections and the various airfields and home ports of DND, DFO and CCG patrol assets. Visual inspection of the results show that in all cases, there is no consistent trend for increased likelihood of inspection by enforcement authorities the farther away one fishes from a patrol base. The exception, one could argue, is the airfield in Goose Bay, Labrador at Figure 8- 40. However, the number of inspections is more or less the same from Goose Bay until roughly 650 nautical miles, and then there is an exponential increase.By contrast, all of the graphs are punctuated by spikes that correspond to the distances from patrol bases to the inner and outer limits of the Tail of the Grand Banks, and the inner and outer dimensions of the Flemish Cap.The distances from inspections to the PAL facility at the Halifax International Airport and the naval base in Halifax Harbour are portrayed in Figure 8-37. The two graphs are similar because the distance to from the sea bases to the airport is only 17 nautical miles. In Figure 8-37, the first spike at approximately 200 nautical miles corresponds to the distance to the Hague Line scallop fishery on Georges Bank and the lobster fishery off southwest333Nova Scotia. The next spike occurs at 550 to 600 nautical miles, the distance from Halifax to the Tail of the Grand Banks, and also the same distance to the inshore fishery off of the northeast coast of Newfoundland. The large number of inspections occurring 780 to 880 miles from Halifax corresponds to the inner and outer reaches of the Flemish Cap.300] Halifax Air250H 200£ 150100- i . I I I . I I I I i I. 600Distance from base (nm)200 1200400 800 1000300250I 200•R 1501001000 1200200 400 800Distance from base (nm)Figure 8-37. Distance from Inspections to Halifax Patrol BasesFigure 8-38 contains the graphs of distances from the Coast Guard base in Dartmouth, Nova Scotia, and from the military airfield in Gander, NL. The Dartmouth graph appears identical to the Halifax graphs in Figure 8-37 because the Coast Guard base and the naval dockyard are within two miles of each other in Halifax harbour. As such, my observations on Figure 8-37 are applicable to the Dartmouth graph. With respect to the Gander graph, the inshore fishery to the northeast of Newfoundland is reflected by the frequency of inspections between 50 to 200 nautical miles. The large concentration 50 to 75 miles either side of the 400 nautical mile mark reflects the inspections carried out on both the Flemish Cap and the Tail of the Grand Banks. The spike at 650 miles from Gander is the fishery on Georges Bank.334300Dartmouth25012 200 n100x i l200 12001000400 600 800Distance from base (nm)| MB Gander [Distance from base (nm)Figure 8-38. Distance from Inspections to Dartmouth and Gander Patrol BasesFigure 8-39 depicts the distances from sites in Nova Scotia: the military air base in Shearwater, and the Coast Guard ship base in Sydney. Shearwater is only 4 nautical miles from the bases in Dartmouth and Halifax, ergo the resemblance to these two. Thus, Shearwater graph will be affected by the same influences. The Sydney results are interesting. What the graph shows is the concentration of inspections that start on the Tail at approximate 350 nautical miles and continue through to about 475 miles, then at 520 nautical miles the inner part of the Flemish Cap becomes apparent right out to 750 miles. The spike at 360 miles is the where the concentration on Georges Bank and southwest Nova Scotia coincide with the large concentration of inspections on the Tail.335300~~] Shearwater250i? 200 -150100200 1200600Distance from base (nm)8004000)300L100200 400 600 800Distance from base (nm)[ iM S y d n e y l1000 1200Figure 8-39. Distance from Inspections to Shearwater and Sydney Patrol BasesFigure 8-40 contains the graphs of distances from the military air bases in Goose Bay, NL and Greenwood, Nova Scotia. The Goose Bay graph is interesting because the Georges Bank, and the inner and outer reaches of the Tail and Flemish Cap are all roughly the same distance from the military airfield. That is the cause of the concentration on the graph at 680 to 780 nautical miles. The spike at approximately 750 miles occurs because it is at that distance that the concentration of inspections along the EEZ on the Tail coincide with heavy enforcement activity on the inner part of the Flemish Cap.3361000i iGoosebaym 800600400 -r2001200200 1000800400 600Distance from base (nm)300HHH Greenwood25013 200£ 15010050600Distance from base (nm)12001000200 400 800Figure 8-40. Distance from Inspections to Goose Bay and Greenwood Patrol BasesThe distances from inspections to the PAL facility at the St. John’s Airport and the Coast Guard base in St. John’s Harbour are portrayed in Figure 8-41. The two facilities are only 3.5 nautical miles apart, so the graphs should appear almost identical as was the case with Halifax. From St. John’s the inner edge of the Tail is approximately 220 nautical miles and concentration of inspections on the Flemish Cap is roughly the same distance. This coincidence explains the large number of boardings that appear on the graph from 240 to 350 nautical miles. The spike at 700 miles corresponds to the distance from St. John’s to Georges Bank.337600ISt. Johns Air500V. 400■ft 300| 200 3100200 400 1000600Distance from base (nm)1200600t. Johns Sea5001 400300200100200 400 600Distance from base (nm)1200800 1000Figure 8-41. Distance from Inspections to St. John’s Patrol BasesThe shortcomings of this type of proximity analysis must be borne in mind when analysing these results. In the case of airfields, straight line distances would have included some portion over land, meaning that an at-sea inspection would not have been possible for this segment of the line. However, had the overland segments been subtracted from the overall distances, the result would have been the same. The graphs would not have portrayed a scaled increase in boardings over distance. This is because, as visual inspection of the maps at Figures 8-31 and 8-32 demonstrated earlier, at-sea boardings occur in well-defined clusters anchored around specific geographic features. There appears to be no correlation between the location of a patrol base and where Conservation and Protection officers choose to conduct inspections.8.3.2.4.2.2 Distances from EEZ to BoardingsSince the 1977 declaration of Canada’s 200 nautical mile Exclusive Fishing Zone that later became the Exclusive Economic Zone, distant water fleets have fished in close proximity of this maritime boundary on the Nose and338the Tail of the Grand Banks. In the mid-1990s, a moratorium was placed on harvesting ground fish on these two geographic features. An exception to the moratorium permitted certain vessels a NAFO-set quota to fish particular species on the Nose and Tail outside of the Canadian EEZ, but Canada did not allow ground fish to be taken inside of the EEZ. Soon, foreign fishing vessels were taking ground fish right up to the EEZ, but could not legally cross that political boundary and continue to fish.Fish do not respect political boundaries. A fishing vessel within ten nautical miles of the EEZ could easily cross to the other side of the maritime boundary, even with its trawls in the water, and be back into legal waters quickly. Fisheries and Oceans Canada stepped up monitoring and enforcement efforts on the Grand Banks, and were concerned that foreign fishing vessels were not respecting the Canadian EEZ. Some extraordinary measures were undertaken to patrol the EEZ, including the use of naval submarines to determine whether unscrupulous fishing boat captains were using the cover of darkness or fog and reduced visibility to slip across the line to fish illegally.287 This leads to the supposition that since the mid-1990s, DFO and naval patrol assets focussed greater effort on boarding fishing vessels to the area immediately adjacent to the Canadian EEZ.The proximity analysis tested the supposition that there is a correlation between the location of an at-sea inspection and its distance from the EEZ. As in the previous section, this analysis used 2,972 inspections carried out by all federal departments between 1995 to 2002. Figure 8-42 is a map that depicts the GIS software’s calculation of the straight line distance from the geographic position of each inspection to the closest point along the Exclusive Economic Zone. Figures 8-43 through to 8-45 are graphs of the distribution of distances between the at-sea inspections and the EEZ.287 In 1994,1 commanded the submarine HMCS Okanagan during fisheries patrol of the Grand Banks. See Laurence M. Hickey “The Submarine as a Tool of Maritime Enforcement,” Integrated Coastal Zone Management 1 (Spring 2000): 117-122.339Figure 8-42. Distances from Boardings to Exclusive Economic ZoneFigure 8-43 shows the distribution of distances between inspections and the 200 nautical mile limit, both inside and beyond that maritime boundary. While it appears that the frequency of inspections increases towards the EEZ on the outside of the maritime boundary, there are three features on that part of the graph that warrant explanation. The first is the concentration of boardings that occur between 5 to 35 miles from the EEZ. These distances correspond to the to the majority of inspections that were conducted on the Tail of the Grand Banks. The Flemish Cap is also discernable on the graph, with the spikes at 50 through 65 nautical miles. Those distances correspond to the inner edge of the Flemish Cap and the outer edge is distinguishable at 120 nautical miles.Referring to the inside the EEZ part of Figure 8-43, there is a marked spike of over 200 inspections at 60 nautical miles from the EEZ. This corresponds to the distance from the Hague Line to the inshore lobster fishery close to the southwest coast of Nova Scotia.C A N A340250200 -1503 100i___ j All boardings inside 200nm— All boardings outside 200nmDistance from 200nm EEZ boundary (nm)Figure 8-43. Distances from Boardings to Canadian EEZ - 1995 to 2002Figure 8-44 shows the distribution of distances based on region in order to separate the Georges Bank and southwest Nova Scotia fisheries from those of the Grand Banks. There are very few inspections that are conducted by Scotia-Fundy region beyond the Hague Line that separates the maritime zones of Canada and the United is less than 200 nautical miles from coast the Canadian coast. Thus, what is displayed on the Scotia-Fundy graph at Figure 8-44 are those inspections undertaken inside of the EEZ. The spike at 60 nautical miles discussed earlier is evident in this figure.The other graph in Figure 8-44 depicts the inspections that occurred in the Newfoundland administrative region. In this region, DFO Conservation and Protection officers carry out inspections under the authority of Canadian law inside the EEZ. Beyond the 200 nautical mile limit, the same fisheries officers take down their national flag, hoist the NAFO pennant, and conduct inspections on behalf of the North Atlantic Fisheries Organisation. Depicted in Figure 8-44 are the inspections carried out under national jurisdiction, inside the EEZ. The graph shows two main features. The first is a large concentration at roughly3413442100 nautical miles inside of the EEZ that corresponds to the inshore fishery to the northeast of Newfoundland. There also is a number of boardings within 15 miles of the EEZ. These do not correspond with any particular cluster, and are simply inspections that have occurred close to the EEZ over the 12-year period.200| L—J Scotia Fundy region£ ioo--250 -200Distance from 200nm EEZ boundary (nm)-150 “100 -50Newfoundland region^ 20-200 -150 -100Distance from 200nm EEZ boundary (nm)Figure 8-44. Distances from Boardings to Canadian EEZ - By RegionThe distribution of distances beyond the EEZ is found at Figure 8-45. The upper graph depicting national jurisdiction boardings shows that the inspections were spread out from 5 to 275 nautical miles. The median distance is 158 nautical miles. The spikes in the graph at 125 and 175 nautical miles correspond to the cluster in the middle of the Flemish Cap and the Cap’s outer edge.The lower graph in Figure 8-45 paints a different picture, with a large number of boardings carried out relatively near to the EEZ, decreasing in number farther afield. The median distance in this case is 50 nautical miles. This graph suggests that when Conservation and Protection officers conduct inspections on behalf of NAFO, they do indeed conduct more boardings closer342to the EEZ.JCanadian inspections outside 200nm•5 2050 100Distance150 200 from 200nm EEZ boundary (nm)300250@ 8 ! NAFO inspections outside 200nm£ 500 40te 3010 I50 250 300150Distance from 200nm EEZ boundary (nm)Figure 8-45. Distances from Boardings to 200 nm Limit from Beyond EEZAs with the previous analysis of the distance to patrol bases, there are shortcomings to this type of proximity analysis that must be considered. Distances were calculated along the entire length of the EEZ contained within the study area. There are areas in which relatively little commercial fishing activity occurs such as the near Arctic, yet the few inspections recorded in these areas were included in the overall calculation. It could be argued that it would have been better to divide the EEZ into sections in the vicinity of inspection clusters, carry out the calculations, and then compare the sections. This process would have likely yielded results that could be considered more accurate. This approach was not pursued because the greater degree of granularity would have offered little more insight into the results than had been already obtained.From the perspective of allocation of naval resources, an understanding of where inspections are likely to occur assists in the planning of enforcement support, particularly with regard to minor war vessels less capable of sustained operations on the edge of the continental shelf. The analyses in this chapter343demonstrated that proximity to patrol bases had no impact on where fishing vessels are boarded. Proximity to a maritime boundary had a limited influence on the location of inspections, but only when DFO functioned on behalf of NAFO. A review of Figure 8-31 reveals that inspections are carried out in geographic clusters, and while depth of water is an indicator, the main factor is whether or not there is a legal fishery, i.e., an area that is “open” for fishing. An open season attracts commercial fishing vessels that, in turn, require monitoring and enforcement presence. The best way to plan enforcement support is to use historic data that depict the inspection clusters in conjunction with a knowledge of what areas will be open for which seasons. While developing an ability to predict where best to position military surveillance and enforcement assets, in the final analysis, the Navy remains in a support role, essentially providing a “taxi service” for Conservation and Protection officers. While the Navy may influence the location of the enforcement effort, ultimately the final decision for execution rests with the lead department, Fisheries and Oceans Canada.8.3.2.5 Naval Fisheries Patrols StatisticsSo far, in this section of the thesis, the Navy’s contribution to fisheries enforcement has been presented in the geographic context of naval vessel patrol presence and the disposition of at-sea inspections. A study of patrol and response would not be complete without having some measure of the outcomes of fisheries patrols by which achievement of mission goals might be assessed. Tables 8-11 and 8-12 contain statistics compiled in the reconstruction of the fisheries patrols for this project.Table 8-11 contains the averages of patrol statistics taken from 87 individual ship’s logs held in the National Library and Archives. The length of the each patrol was determined by reviewing the start and stop days of the each patrol, and subtracting the number of days mid-patrol that a vessel spent on a port call. Distance of each patrol was calculated by summing the distance run recorded on each page of the ship’s log. Number of helicopter hours flown was determined by noting in the narrative of the ship’s log the time at which a helicopter was launched and later recovered. The number of boardings carried344out was determined by noting in the narrative of the log when a ship’s boat was launched and recovered, with an accompanying annotation that the boat was being used for transporting DFO officers to a fishing vessel. The number of arrests was determined by review of the narrative of the log and noting entries that indicated that an arrest had been carried out. The number of search and rescue missions undertaken on fisheries patrol was determined by review of the narrative of the log. Time spent on SAR activities was subtracted from the figure for patrol length. Statistics for each patrol can be found in Tables J-3 and J-4 at Appendix J.TABLE 8 - 1 1NAVAL FISHERIES PATROL AVERAGES - 1980 TO 1997MajorWarshipMinorWarshipPatrol Length (days) 15.0 22.4Days in port 1.7 2.2Distance (nm) 3,112 3,517Helicopter Hours 20.1 0Boardings / Inspections 6.1 9.2Arrests .07 < .01Search and Rescue Events .35 < .01Note: An arrest is an event in which a fishing vessel was diverted under escort to a Canadian port for further judicial processing.TABLE 8 - 12NAVAL FISHERIES PATROL AVERAGES - 1999 TO 2002MajorWarshipMinorWarshipArea Covered (krn^) 218,022 73,327Contacts Detected 115 24Boardings / Inspections 7.1 5.5Violations Detected 1.1 1.0Fuel ($) 104,991 17,090Coverage per dollar (km ) 2.1 4.3Cost per Detection ($) 913 712Cost per Violation ($) 91,855 17,090Cost per Arrest ($) 771,587 N/ANote: Costs for fuel based on price paid by Navy at time of patrol. Violations are offences for which, at minimum, a warning or citation was issued by fisheries officers.345The patrol averages in Table 8-12 are drawn from the data collected aboard 11 frigates and 8 minor war vessels on fisheries patrol from 1999 to 2002. Electronic templates were provided to warship Commanding Officers for the collection of positional information, fuel consumption, detection ranges of vessels, location of inspections and other related information. The templates for this data collection are found at Appendix L.One of the objectives in collecting data from naval vessels conducting current patrols was to develop an appreciation for the amount of ocean area that major and minor warships were actually monitoring in comparison to the theoretical. One naval analyst had postulated that Canadian frigates could monitor 32,000 km2 (12,335 square miles) for eight to ten days without refueling.288 In discussion with this analyst, I learned that he arrived at that figure by calculating the distance that a frigate would travel in a straight line over 10 days at a medium cruising speed. He used that distance as length of a rectangle, and double the ship’s estimated radar range as the width, then employed the basic mathematical formula for determining the area of the rectangle.Naval vessels never patrol in a straight line. Normally they favour one part of an area, passing several times over the same ground. I believed that a more realistic assessment would be obtained by averaging the observed coverage of several patrols over a multi-year period. Thus, the area coverage of naval fisheries patrols at Table 8-12 was obtained by using the GIS to reconstruct the ship’s tracks at using hourly positions supplied by the ships, then connecting the positions with a straight line. The GIS was employed to create a “buffer” corresponding to the measured radar detection range on either side of the track, then the software carried out an area calculation. A buffer of 30 miles was used initially to test the method. This figure was based on the frigates’ estimation of the maximum detection range of a small fishing boat by navigation radar at the frigates’ antenna height. The buffer was changed once the actual detection range for each patrol was ascertained based on analysis of288 peter T. Haydon, “Canadian Naval Policy: Still Stalled, Still Contentious, and Still Political,” Canadian Defence Quarterly 26 (Summer 1997): 6-13.346the researcher’s contact log maintained by the operations staff aboard the ships. While almost every frigate estimated an ability to detect a fishing vessel at 30 nautical miles, the actual detection ranges varied from 6.5 to 18.8 nautical miles, with a mean of 14.7 nautical miles. These results showed that frigates were over-estimating their ability to detect fishing vessels. In fact, they were detecting the contacts at only half the range that they’d anticipated.Minor warships also over-estimated their ability to detect fishing vessels. Most MCDVs reported that they expected to gain contact by radar at 15 nautical miles. The contact logs revealed that actual detection ranges varied from 6.7 to 14.2 nautical miles, with a mean of 10.4 nautical miles.The mean figure for area coverage of the 1999 to 2002 frigate fisheries patrols was 218,465 km2. To put this in perspective, it could be said that on a fisheries patrol, a Canadian frigate monitors an area the size of the country of larger than Syria, but slightly smaller than Uganda. For minor warships, the mean figure for area coverage was 73,327 km2, an area larger than Ireland but smaller than Panama. Area coverage by individual patrols is found at Table J-7 in Appendix J.The cost metrics contained at Table 8-12 are not those used for performance measurement of operational activity. However, they are useful to demonstrate how expensive it is for a government to maintain a serious monitoring and enforcement regime. The figures also show the benefits and disadvantages of employing major combatants for constabulary operations, as opposed to smaller coastal patrol vessels. In the conduct of fisheries patrols, minor warships are roughly six times less expensive to operate yet they cover about one third of the territory as a frigate. However, they detect about one fifth of the number of contacts, bearing in mind that they tend to patrol the inshore fishery rather than the offshore fishery that is the realm of the frigates. The costs per violation detected and per arrest were calculated by summing the fuel costs for all of the patrols studied during 1999 and 2002, and dividing by the number of violations and arrests made. Arrests by Conservation and Protection officers embarked aboard naval vessels are rare and, as such, drive347the cost per arrest to approximately three-quarters of a million dollars in 2002 currency.Although not reflected in the 2002 search and rescue statistics, it is interesting to note that, based on data spanning a 20-year period, a major warship on a fisheries patrol has a 35 percent chance of being dispatched on a SAR mission at some time during the patrol. While the positioning of a major combatant for the purposes of SAR alone is not a cost -effective proposal for maritime planners, the statistic nevertheless underscores the how the conduct of one type of enforcement activity has tertiary benefit to another.8.4 SummaryThis chapter examined the Navy’s contribution to maritime enforcement in the context of patrol and response. Within the framework of maritime enforcement, search and rescue is considered a response activity, and the provision of vessels for the embarkation of fisheries officers to sea clearly constitutes a patrol activity.The federal government is the authority for marine and aeronautical SAR. Under the federal SAR structure, the Department of National Defence provides aircraft and aeronautical services for SAR. Although DND has overall responsibility for marine and aeronautical SAR, the Canadian Coast Guard is responsible co-ordinate maritime search and rescue with DND, and is responsible for the provision of the maritime component of the federal SAR program. Joint rescue co-ordination centres bring together military and CCG personnel operate as a team to co-ordinate marine and aeronautical SAR responses. SAR fixed and rotary wing aircraft are based at two locations in the Atlantic provinces, and several lifeboats are stationed strategically in ports throughout the region. Five large Coast Guard cutters augment the SAR coverage of these lifeboats.The majority of SAR incidents originate on the water, and tend to be clustered around small inshore fishing communities throughout the region. Most marine search and rescue incidents occur while local fishing seasons are348open, and the majority of calls for assistance take place in the summer months when fishing, recreational, and other commercial activities are at their peak. The geographic distribution of SAR incidents varies from season to season, but is consistent from year to year.The Navy contributes to SAR in four ways: command and control, infrastructure, provision of SAR aircraft, and provision of naval vessels. The Canadian official responsible for SAR in the Atlantic region is a senior naval officer. The Navy provides an operations centre and communications capability for the command and control of all SAR operations. Military aircraft are tasked with the lion’s share of SAR responses, and participate in almost 90 percent of all SAR incidents. This is not the case in the utilization of ship resources. Canadian Coast Guard vessels respond to just under three quarters of marine SAR cases, whereas naval vessels participate in less than one percent of these incidents. Analysis indicated that marine SAR resources are distributed effectively around the region.Commercial ocean fishing activity is concentrated in six main locations in the study area. There are a string of inshore fisheries that extend from the coast to approximately the outer limit of the contiguous zone, most notably along the northeast coast of Newfoundland, and in the Northumberland Strait area of Nova Scotia and PEI. The other significant area of inshore fishing is to the southwest of Nova Scotia extending from the coast to the Hague Line. In the offshore fishery, there are three areas of concentrated activity. These areas lie on the continental shelf beyond the Canadian Exclusive Economic Zone, and are referred to as the Nose and Tail of the Grand Banks, and the Flemish Cap.Fisheries and Oceans Canada is the lead federal department for fisheries management in Canada, but is assisted by DND for support to fisheries enforcement. In addition to aerial surveillance, the Navy provides major and minor warships for fisheries patrols, from which DFO Conservation and Protection officers board and conduct inspections of fishing vessels in Canada’s maritime zones and the waters enforced by the North Atlantic349Fisheries Organization.A geographic analysis of DFO/DND enforcement practices shows that the government effort has been characterized by clusters of at-sea inspections in southwest Nova Scotia, as well as the Grand Banks, and the Flemish Cap. A multi-year review of fisheries patrol data demonstrates that the Navy has concentrated its resources in the offshore fishery on the Grand Banks and Flemish Cap, and analysis of reconstructed ship tracks show that limited or no naval enforcement presence was demonstrated away from these geographic features. Analysis also shows that the proximity to the EEZ or to patrol bases have little influence on where government at-sea inspections are conducted.Fisheries and Oceans Canada is becoming increasingly reliant on the Navy to assist with enforcement tasks. Over a 12-year period, the Navy conducted eight percent of at-sea inspections throughout the Atlantic provinces, and as much as 29 percent of the inspections for the Newfoundland region of DFO.Analysis of data collected from warships during the 1999-2000 timeframe demonstrate that over a two-week fisheries patrol, a frigate typically maintains surveillance over an area of nearly 200,000 square kilometres, and a minor warships averages roughly half of that. Major combatants are six times more costly than minor warships to employ in a fisheries support role, but or more effective due to their speed advantage, better sea-keeping ability, and superior detection and communications capabilities.Thus far, the Navy’s commitment to developing maritime domain awareness for the whole of government, maintaining a robust search and rescue posture, and provision of support to fisheries enforcement have been explored in detail. The next chapter will examine what benefit the Navy accrues from its involvement in domestic maritime enforcement, and whether the status quo is a forgone conclusion.350Chapter NineNAVAL BENEFIT FOR SUPPORT TO MARITIME ENFORCEMENT 9.1 IntroductionUp to this point in the study, the research has examined how the Navy contributes to domestic maritime enforcement operations as part of the grander scheme of marine security in Canada. Put another way, the emphasis so far has been on what the Navy puts in to the equation, and not what it gets in return. This chapter will explore that aspect; what benefit does the Navy derive from its support to maritime enforcement?This issue will be examined through two exploratory studies that address the perceived deterrent value of naval support to fisheries enforcement, and public opinion as it pertains to naval support to constabulary operations. In addition, the effect that fisheries support has on the combat readiness of warships, i.e. the ability of ships to complete combat readiness training on patrol will be examined to determine whether the Navy obtains any training benefit from this type of employment.9.2 Estimation of Deterrent Effect of Naval Forces in EnforcementA recurring theme throughout this project is the Navy’s key role in the maintenance of Canadian sovereignty through its maritime enforcement activities. The previous chapter identified the level of effort expended in support of fisheries enforcement by a variety of measures, including the allocation of a number of days at sea, and the relative expense per fisheries patrol. However, Canadian frigates and destroyers were built with sea combat as the primary design factor. Speed and firepower are important characteristics in the design of successful warships, but the achievement of these attributes in greater magnitude usually demands higher fuel consumption, or greater initial cost at build. Thus, from an accountant’s perspective, the employment of frigates and destroyers for relatively benign patrol duties is not a cost effective means of contributing to maritime enforcement, unless the overall effect of their patrols outweighs the cost of this type of employment.351How can the effect of patrols be measured? A simple tally of the number of citations issued or violators arrested provides some indication, but caution must be exercised in interpreting these numbers. Canadian naval vessels do not act independently during fisheries patrols; they respond to the direction of embarked DFO Conservation and Protection officers. Thus, violations or arrests attributed to naval vessels are a sub-set of the overall DFO effort, and do not constitute a true picture of the independent effect of naval vessels to the enforcement effort.Earlier in this thesis, the policy framework and departmental responsibilities were discussed, as well as legal limitations for law enforcement by the Armed Forces. The naval enforcement presence and surveillance effort were covered in Chapters Seven and Eight. What is not readily apparent, though, is the impact of this naval presence, both ships and aircraft, on those who would challenge national sovereignty by violating Canadian law. In essence, the question is, “Are military aircraft or naval vessels a deterrent to law-breaking?” If the deterrent effect is minimal, then it can be argued that a review of the employment of naval assets for this type of sovereignty operation is overdue.9.2.1 Prior Studies on Deterrence in Canadian FisheriesAs explained in the methods chapter, to address the issue of the deterrent effect, views were sought of those individuals who spend considerable time on the water in the Canadian maritime zones. These persons could comment upon the perceived presence of maritime patrol ships and aircraft, as well as the observed effect of this presence on those who would be inclined break the law. For the reasons identified in Chapter Two, the individuals chosen to provide the data for this aspect of the research were commercial fisherman.There is a limited amount in the literature pertaining to deterrence offisheries violations by commercial fishermen in the Canadian context. In themid-80s, Fisheries and Oceans Canada conducted evaluations of fisheries352enforcement programs in on the east and west coasts of Canada to determine the extent to which the programs deterred non-compliance. One such study found that non-compliance was a real problem in fisheries management, one that had the potential for depletion offish stocks through over-fishing, reduced long-term yields, and long-term economic losses for the region.289 In 1985, DFO-sponsored researchers consulted with the RCMP and other government departments that had enforcement responsibilities and learned that, until then, no government department had attempted to measure deterrence in the fisheries.290The DFO studies defined deterrence as a “non-event,” or the amount of illegal activity that does not take place because of the threat of sanctions. Edwin Blewett notes that in the case of the fisheries, fishermen find themselves with opportunities to violate the law but, on weighing all the alternatives, decide that breaking the law is simply not worth it. He suggests that the commission of any offence presents a set of perceived gains and losses to the offender. There is always the possibility of being caught and prosecuted, so a violator’s attitude towards risk is an important factor in the decision to commit an offence.291Most law enforcement agencies use probability of arrest as a performance measure where the output of law enforcement is interpreted as the number of crimes not committed because of the threat of punishment. Blewett states that this cannot be done in the fisheries because the number of offences is not known as they would be in the case of an offence such as homicide. In the fisheries, the number of offences not committed is unobservable since the majority of them occur at sea, there are seldom witnesses and, as Blewett remarks, “fish don’t squeal.”292 He adds that the extent of non-compliance with fisheries regulations cannot be directly289 Canada. Department of Fisheries and Oceans. Optimization and Implementation Plan for Offshore Fisheries Surveillance, by Donald J. Clough, Ottawa, 9 June 1980, p. P-2.290 Canada. Department of Fisheries and Oceans. Program Evaluation Branch. Canada’s Experience in Measuring the Deterrent Effect o f Fisheries Law Enforcement, by Edwin Blewett, William Furlong, and Peter Toews, Ottawa, 1985, 2.291 Ibid., 3.292 Ibid., 4.353measured, but rather must be estimated.293Federal enforcement activities attempt to provide a credible deterrent through three main methods: aerial surveillance, sea patrols, and observers aboard fishing vessels. Each method has its own attributes. Aerial patrols provide photographic and eye-witness evidence of violations as well as acting as a visible deterrent due to the requirement to decrease altitude in order to read the vessel name off the hull.294 The deterrent effect of aerial patrols depends on the potential violator’s perception of the potential gain from committing the offence, the likely penalties if the offence is detected, and the chance that the fisherman will be detected breaking the law. One DFO study suggests that aerial surveillance can prevent short-term violations such as crossing a political boundary to fish illegally, then return quickly to legal waters.295Both vessel and aerial patrols demonstrate national presence on and above fishing grounds. Earlier studies indicate that vessel patrols provide a different deterrent than aerial patrols. Rather than commit an offence such as temporarily fishing in a restricted area close to a boundary for a short time, a fisherman might decide to increase revenue by using illegal gear over longer period, perhaps a couple of weeks. Vessel patrols exercise the capability to intercept suspected violators at sea and board them with fisheries officers. At sea inspections discourage such practices such as prolonged use of illegal gear.296In order to gauge the deterrent effect of DFO’s enforcement programs, Blewett conducted personal interview surveys with fishermen in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Quebec regions. The Pacific study was conducted first. Blewett found that the sample size was too small, and he had no way of correlating enforcement effort with deterrent effect on anything but a local basis. When294 While the Automatic Identification System (AIS) makes identification of vessels easier, to successful prosecute a violator, the positive identity of the vessel must be established. Visual identification remains the best method.295 Clough, Optimization and Implementation Plan for Offshore Fisheries Surveillance, P-2.354the study team conducted the Atlantic study, they chose to focus on several fisheries, and sample those intensively, rather than sampling a wide population but with little depth. Blewett interviewed 150 lobster fishermen out of a population of 8,000 lobster licences in the region. He found that expectation of apprehension was very low, only three percent across the Atlantic DFO regions.297TABLE 9 - 1FISHERIES VIOLATIONS - EXPECTATIONS OF CONSEQUENCERegion Perceived Probability of Apprehension and PunishmentPerceived Probability of Licence Suspension1st Offence 2na OffenceScotia-Fundy 2.9 % 40 % 100 %Gulf 2.1 % 91 % 100%Newfoundland 4.0 % 75% 98%Source: Edwin Blewett et al. Measuring the Deterrent Effect, p. 13.In Blewett’s survey, fishermen were asked questions about the probability of being caught by a fisheries officer and, if caught, what was the likelihood of being prosecuted and convicted. Blewett’s research was very much concerned with the economic consequences of an offence, and he summarized the study by offering strong support for the economic model of criminal behaviour, with the underlying assumption that lawbreakers weigh the costs against benefits.2989.2.2 Deterrence Survey for this Research ProjectTo ascertain the deterrent effect of naval patrol assets, as opposed to those of other government departments, it would be necessary to determine whether the visual or radar presence of a maritime patrol vessel or aircraft in the immediate area would deter a person from committing a serious violation. The perception of presence was not an element of the either the Blewett or Clough studies, in which legal and illegal revenue from fishing were weighed against the probability of loss of income from detection or prosecution, irrespective of which department’s enforcement resource had made the296 Ibid., P-3.297 Edwin Blewett, et al, Measuring the Deterrent Effect, 13.298 Ibid., 30.355apprehension.In deciding on the best manner to approach the research question, a number of methods were considered. Personal interviews such as Blewett had used were one approach. The benefit of personal interviews is the face- to-face contact that provides an ability to probe for clarification or expansion, and thus is a versatile and flexible method.299 The disadvantage of this research technique is that respondents are not anonymous to the researcher, and they may be reluctant to provide sensitive information to another person.300 Telephone interviewing was not considered an option for this project. The type of questions required for this survey would not be as nonthreatening as would be for a researcher who might ask for which candidate the respondent intended to vote in the next election. Rather, the subject matter of the interviews would be about potential law breaking. In addition, since the human and fiscal resources that Blewett had at his disposal were not available for this project, it was decided that another method would be employed to attempt to gauge the deterrent value.William Zikmund identifies the self-administered mail questionnaire as a potential method for gathering this type data. The two advantages of this research method are that mail questionnaires can reach a geographically dispersed sample simultaneously, and at relatively low cost. Respondents in isolated or difficult areas to reach can easily be contacted by mail, such as the case of coastal fishing communities, particularly in out ports in Newfoundland. Mail questionnaires can be filled out at the respondents’ convenience, whenever they have the time. Moreover, he suggests that there is a better chance that respondents will put more thought into their replies than theyOfl1would in a personal or telephone interview.Zikmund asserts that a mail survey is the best medium for gathering extremely sensitive information because it is anonymous. The main299 William G. Zikmund, Business Research Methods (Orlando: Dryden Press, 1997), 232.300 Ibid., 235.301 Ibid., 244-245.356disadvantage of this survey method is that higher non-response rates are experienced with mail surveys than personal or telephone interviews.302 Accordingly, for the reasons above, as well as financial resource constraints, it was decided to employ a mail questionnaire to collect the data. The process for developing the questionnaire was outlined in Chapter Two.9.2.3 Purpose of Key Questions in Deterrence QuestionnaireA copy of the questionnaire used for the deterrence survey is found at Appendix P. The next few paragraphs will explain the intent behind the most important questions of the questionnaire.Questions 1 through 8 solicited background information on the respondent, and were structured to put the respondent at ease, as well as determine two things. First, did the respondent spend a lot of time on the water in pursuit of his or her livelihood? If so, the credibility of the respondent’s observations in the questionnaire would be greater since he or she would have been more likely to have seen patrol assets while fishing than a person with little cumulative experience, or one who spent little time on the sea. Second, did the respondent fish in the inshore or offshore fishery? This was important information since most of the DND surveillance and enforcement effort is dedicated to the offshore fishery. If the majority of the respondents worked the inshore fishing grounds only, the results would be less conclusive since the respondents would be less likely to see the patrol assets, and thereby formulate opinions about enforcement presence.Question 9 was designed to determine the presence of patrol assets from the respondent’s perspective. This question presented the respondent with ten photographs of naval and other government department ships and aircraft, then asked the respondent how many times per week each type of patrol asset was visually observed. Having determined in Chapter Seven what the actual military presence had been, it would be possible to compare the respondents’ perspectives of the type of patrol asset they observed most302 Ibid., 205.357often, and how often DND patrol assets in particular had been observed?Central to the issue of deterrence, Question 11 was structured to determine relative deterrent value of patrol assets from the fishermen’s perspective. In Question 11, the respondent was presented with the same ten photographs of naval and other government department ships and aircraft, then asked in each case whether the visual or radar presence of the vessel depicted in the photo would deter someone from committing a serious offence. From the answers to this question it would be possible to determine what type of patrol asset respondents considered the best deterrent. The responses would also indicate to what degree fishermen perceived DND patrol assets as being a deterrent.Questions 12a through 12h were designed to determine from the fishermen’s perspective the adequacy of monitoring and enforcement efforts. Respondents were asked to either agree or disagree that various government departments were conducting the “right number” of patrols in their fishing areas. If respondents answered that they disagreed, they could elaborate further by choosing “more” or “fewer” patrols. From these questions it would be possible to know whether the respondents believed the government is doing enough surveillance and patrol activity, and whether the respondents felt that the Navy, in particular, should be doing more or less of these activities.Question 13 was core to the issue of deterrence, and was probably the most important question in the questionnaire. The intent of this question was to determine whether or not respondents believed that law enforcement personnel were carried aboard naval vessels frequently. If so, it could be inferred that naval vessels are a legitimate deterrent. However, if respondents believed that enforcement officers are seldom aboard, then it could be argued that the ships have no deterrent value.This question asked the respondents what percentage of time theybelieved that DFO Fisheries Protection officers were embarked aboard naval358vessels for enforcement purposes. The respondent was presented with percentages in five-degree increments from 0 to 100 percent, and was asked to circle the number closest to the respondent’s estimate of the percentage. The respondent was then presented with a second set of percentage choices and asked to repeat the process with RCMP officers in mind. Question 14 was identical to Question 13, except it requested respondents’ estimates of the amount of time that DFO and RCMP officers were embarked in Air Force aircraft for enforcement purposes.Question 15 was another core question to the issue of deterrence. In this question, respondents were asked directly which department they considered to be the most effective at deterring illegal activities. Five choices were presented: Canadian Coast Guard, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Department of National Defence, Environment Canada, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.Questions 16, 17 and 18 were of no real significance to the matter of deterrence, and were included to allow the respondents to express their opinions on broader issues of conservation and protection, in case the respondents had become uneasy with the thrust of the questionnaire up to that point. It was felt that this would increase the likelihood of questionnaire completion and subsequent return by post.Question 19 asked respondents to list all of the NAFO sub-areas and Canadian regional districts that they fished. This question was necessary for a couple of reasons. First, the survey was expressly designed to be anonymous; therefore it would be impossible to infer in which geographic areas the respondents had fished on an individual basis. While the mailing addresses of the fisheries associations gave some indication regarding the geographic distribution of the survey, many respondents fished in vessels that had the capability to travel far beyond their local fishing areas.303 Thus,303 Most respondents fished from boats less than 45 feet in length (82.4 percent). However 9.8 percent fished in boats 45 to 65 feet in length, and 7.8 percent fished from boats greater than 100 feet.359determining the actual areas fished would indicate whether the survey was representative of the entire Atlantic region in both inshore and offshore fisheries. The NAFO sub-area and Canadian regional district data would show whether the sample population was clustered in areas that received no DND patrol presence, which potentially might correlate to a low number of sightings in Question 9.9.2.4 Response to QuestionnaireFisheries associations are organizations of individuals from various fisheries groups that are concerned with the development, conservation, and management of commercial fisheries, and the economic prosperity of their members. There are 88 fisheries associations in the Atlantic region: 54 in Nova Scotia, 12 in New Brunswick, just 7 in Newfoundland and Labrador, and only 2 in Prince Edward Island. Since some fisheries associations in New Brunswick are in French-speaking areas, the initial letter soliciting participation in the study was provided in both English and French. These 88 fisheries associations represent 10,671 core licence holders in the Atlantic region. Table N-2 at Appendix N provides a breakdown of licences by province.In response to the letter solicitation, 14 fisheries associations agreed to participate in the survey. This number comprised 11 associations in Nova Scotia, none in New Brunswick, only 1 in Newfoundland and Labrador, and 2 in Prince Edward Island. The participation rate of Atlantic region fisheries associations overall was 15.9 percent. A list of fisheries associations and those that participated is found at Appendix N, Table N-1.Based on the return cards posted back to the researcher, 144 questionnaires were distributed to the 14 fisheries associations. Of this number, 51 completed questionnaires were received back, for a fisheries association questionnaire response rate of 35.4 percent. However, in terms of the 10,671 core licence holders, questionnaires were sent to 1.3 percent of the total number of licence holders rendering only a 0.5 percent response rate in terms of total licences.360In the literature, it is stated that a mail survey is not considered reliable unless it has a minimum of 50 percent response, or unless it demonstrates with some form of verification that the non-respondents are a similar population to those did respond. Zikmund adds that the problem with mail surveys is that it is never really known whether non-respondents have refused to participate or are just indifferent to the subject matter.304 Thus, the low response rate in terms of overall licences means that there is little inference that can be drawn from the deterrence data because the sample size is small.It is also worth commenting on the geographic distribution of the respondents. By soliciting over 85 percent of all the fisheries associations in the maritime provinces, it was hoped to attract responses by those who fished throughout the entire Atlantic region, so that conclusions could be drawn about the region rather than just certain geographic sectors. Indeed, if one inspects Figure 9-1, one will note that respondents fished in virtually every NAFO sub-area, except those in the Gulf of St. Lawrence. However, the Canadian fishing districts fished by respondents are depicted in Figure 9-2 and this figure paints a different picture. The majority of respondents fished primarily around the island of Cape Breton on the northern part of Nova Scotia.304 Paul L. Erdos, Professional Mail Surveys (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970), 144; Zikmund, Business Research Methods, 205.36160-W 50°W4RC/HE. N E W F O U N D L A N DNOVA -k C O T I V V! * T " 4\ —|4WHr4WmI 1-------- 1--------- !---------! ■ . | I................. ....... ...................................60°W 50"WFigure 9-1. Areas Fished by Survey Respondents - NAFO AreasNote: Grey shading indicates area was fished by at least one respondent.60 °W 50°WaufifrecM C W F O U K O U A N OMew >_ e S U N S W i C lMO VA i C O T M60°W 50°WFigure 9-2. Areas Fished by Survey Respondents - Canadian DistrictsNote: Grey shading indicates area was fished by at least one respondent.District 27 is adjacent to the east of District 30, and not where labeled.Table 9-2 shows that although almost all NAFO sub-areas were reported as being fished in 2003, only five respondents identified the offshore as being their principle fishing destination. The majority of the respondents, over 70 percent of them, reported being inshore fishermen. Almost 18 percent362of the respondents claimed to fish the inshore zones, but recorded NAFO sub- areas that are in the offshore fishery. The most probable interpretation is that they fish the inshore primarily but ventured out to 4X and 4W for flounder (33 percent) based on species licences reported in the questionnaire.TABLE 9 - 2 AREAS FISHED BY RESPONDENTSRespondents Areas Fished Percent5 Offshore (2J,3K,3M,3N,30,4Vs) 9.837 Inshore (4T,4Vn,3Ps) 72.59 Both 17.751A comparison of where the majority of respondents fished in Figure 9-2 and the presence of aerial surveillance aircraft presence at Figures 7-4 and 7- 7 shows that military aircraft had relatively little presence in the Cape Breton area, whereas PAL aircraft patrolled frequently. In terms of naval vessel presence around Cape Breton, Figure 8-26 reveals that there was very little. One could expect that a low perception of military enforcement presence would be registered in the questionnaire, and that might have an effect on perceptions of the deterrent value of military assets.9.2.5 Validity of the SurveyAside from the small sample size, another issue that prevents statistically supportable conclusions from being drawn from the survey is that it is not a true random sample of all fishermen in the region. This is because of the self-selection bias inherent in the manner in which the mail survey was administered. In the first instance, fisheries associations self-selected themselves for participation. In the second instance, individual respondents belonging to the fisheries associations self-selected themselves for participation. Zikmund points out that self-selection will bias a survey because it allows extreme positions to be over-represented while those who are indifferent are under-represented.305A true random sample allows statistical theories to hold. In this363deterrence survey, the sample size is 51 of a population of 10,671 core licences. If the sample were truly random, at a 95 percent confidence level the results would be +/- 14 percent. However, because this is not a true random sample of all fishermen, standard confidence levels that would normally be used cannot be applied in this case.In view of the small sample size that lends little statistical significance to this data, and the relatively light presence of military patrol assets in the geographic areas fished by the majority of the respondents, this deterrence study should be interpreted as an exploratory study only.9.2.6 Results of Exploratory Deterrence SurveyAs shown in Table 9-3, the majority of respondents had fished for 21 years or more (80.4 percent). Few respondents (2 percent) had 15 or fewer years of fishing experience. Since the majority of the respondents were experienced fishermen, one can deduce that the respondents would be able to recognize and identify the patrol assets if observed.TABLE 9 - 3 FISHING EXPERIENCE OF RESPONDENTSFishing experience PercentMore than 25 years 49.021 to 25 years 31.416 to 20 years 17.611 to 15 years 2.0Table 9-4 shows that the majority of respondents had fished between 17 and 32 weeks of the year (62.8 percent). This equates to 4 to 6 months of working on the water, and would have provided ample opportunity for the respondent to observe the activities of government ship and aircraft patrols.305 Zikmund, Business Research Methods, p. 205.364TABLE 9 - 4TIME SPENT FISHING PER YEARWeeks fishing per year Percent17 to 24 weeks 47.18 to 16 weeks 21.625 to 32 weeks 15.733 to 40 weeks 15.7Table 9-5 shows that the majority of respondents were lobster fishermen (86.3 percent). This result correlates with those who identified themselves as inshore fisherman, as well as with the geographic areas identified as being fished. Not all respondents reported a secondary licence; the percentages in Table 9-5 are calculated from the total of 51 responses, not the percentage of just those who reported a second licence.TABLE 9 - 5LICENCES HELD BY RESPONDENTSLicence Primary(%)Secondary(%)Lobster 86.3Groundfish 7.8 3.9Clam 3.9 -Tuna 2.0 11.8Crab - 41.2Oyster - 3.9Scallop - 3.9Turbot - 3.9Table 9-6 lists the areas that the respondents fished by NAFO sub- area or Canadian district. The greatest number of respondents frequented NAFO sub-areas 4Vn and 4T, as well as Canadian District 27. When Figures 9-1 and 9-2 are cross-referenced, it can be seen that these three areas are immediately adjacent to Cape Breton Island.365TABLE 9 - 6 AREAS FISHED BY SUB-AREA OR DISTRICTNAFO No. District No.4Vn 28 27 224T 15 24 84W 4 22 44Vs 3 26A 33N 2 26B 23M 2 19 130 2 23 13PS 2 25 12J 1 30 13K 1 29 03L 14V 14WD 1All 51 respondents answered Questions 1 through 8 of the questionnaire. However, once finished the general background questions, at Question 9 the number of responses dropped from 51 to between 41 to 44 responses. It is possible that at this point in the questionnaire some respondents became uncomfortable with the thrust of the questions and opted to skip the sensitive questions that focussed on deterrence. Only one of the 51 respondents quit the questionnaire entirely at Question 9.Table 9-7 lists by type of patrol asset the number of sightings per week that respondents reported observing the ships and aircraft. The numbers in the columns are the raw counts from the questionnaire. The most significant observation from the table is that the majority of respondents reported having never sighted any of the patrol assets of all types. The patrol asset sighted by the greatest number of respondents (27 percent) was the PAL aircraft in the DFO paint scheme, followed by the DFO inshore multi-task patrol vessel (18 percent). The military patrol asset sighted most often by respondents was the DND CP-140 aircraft (16 percent). In all of these cases, respondents reported sighting the ships and aircraft only once or twice per week. Three respondents reported sighting the DFO offshore multi-task patrol cutter five times or moreper week. These three were respondents who self-identified as offshore fishermen who fished out to a maximum of 100 nautical miles from shore.TABLE 9 - 7NUMBER OF SIGHTINGS PER WEEK OF PATROL ASSETSPatrol Asset 0 1 to 2 3 to 4 5 to 6 >7CCG PAL Aircraft 44 0 0 0 0DFO PAL Aircraft 32 12 0 0 0DND CP-140 Aircraft 38 7 0 0 0DND Sea King Helicopter 41 0 0 0 0RCMP Patrol Boat 40 2 0 0 0DFO Offshore Cutter 36 4 0 1 2DND Naval Frigate 39 3 0 0 0DFO Small Patrol Cutter 35 7 0 0 0DND Naval Minor Vessel 41 1 0 0 0DFO Inshore Vessel 34 8 2 0 0Table 9-8 lists by type of patrol asset the perceived deterrent value for each on a 7-point scale, with zero representing no deterrent value, and six representing the maximum deterrent value. Forty-three percent of the respondents rated the DFO inshore multi-task patrol vessel as having the greatest deterrent effect, with 69.2 percent of respondents rating the deterrent value of this vessel at 4 or higher. The RCMP patrol boat also fared well, with 76.2 percent of respondents rating the deterrent value of the RCMP craft at 4 or higher. However, only 28.6 percent of respondents rated this platform as having the greatest deterrent effect. The patrol asset judged to have the least deterrent value was the DND Sea King helicopter (43.9 percent), followed naval frigates and minor warships (33.3 percent).The percentage of time that respondents perceived enforcement officers to be aboard naval vessels or military aircraft is presented at Table 9- 9. Between 40 to 49 percent of respondents believed that enforcement officers were never embarked aboard military patrol assets. For these respondents, military ships and aircraft are clearly not a deterrent to law breaking.367TABLE 9 - 8PERCEIVED DETERRENT VALUE OF PATROL ASSETSPatrol Asset Least (Values in % ) Most0 1 2 3 4 5 6CCG PAL Aircraft 12.2 26.8 19.5 12.2 26.8 2.4 -DFO PAL Aircraft 11.9 14.3 11.9 11.9 14.3 23.8 11.9DND CP-140 Aircraft 21.4 19.0 23.8 7.1 9.5 14.3 4.8DND Sea King Helicopter 43.9 17.1 12.2 14.6 4.9 2.4 4.9RCMP Patrol Boat 2.4 - 4.8 16.7 28.6 19.0 28.6DFO Offshore Cutter 19.5 24.4 4.9 19.5 - 14.6 17.1DND Naval Frigate 33.3 17.9 15.4 12.8 5.1 10.3 5.1DFO Small Patrol Cutter 14.6 24.4 4.9 4.9 14.6 9.8 26.8DND Naval Minor Vessel 33.3 16.7 19.4 5.6 11.1 8.3 5.6DFO Inshore Vessel 5.1 5.1 5.1 15.4 5.1 20.5 43.6As indicted in the previous chapter at Table 8-7, for the past several years, the naval operations schedules assign 125 sea days to DFO each year for fisheries support. From Table 8-6, it can be observed that the total number of sea days of Maritime Forces Atlantic ships varies between 1600 to 1800 days for all types of operations. Thus, the actual amount of time that enforcement officers are aboard naval ships is between 7 to 8 percent of the total operations schedule. In 2003, the year that the deterrence survey was carried out, actual sea days devoted to DFO were lower than normal. Only 99 of the planned 125 DFO sea days were executed, set against the total operations schedule of 1,579 sea days in total. Thus, in 2003, fisheries officers were embarked at sea in warships 6.2 percent of the time.From Table 9-9 it can be seen that 39.8 percent of respondentsbelieved that DFO enforcement officers might have been aboard navalwarships 10 percent of the time or more. Almost a quarter of all respondentsbelieved that naval vessels could have been on enforcement missions 25percent of the time or more. In the case of aerial surveillance, 37.6 percent ofrespondents believed that DFO enforcement officers might have been aboardCP-140 aircraft 10 percent of the time or more. Twenty-eight percent of allrespondents believed that military maritime patrol aircraft could have been onenforcement missions 25 percent of the time or more. It is clear from Table 9-3689 that respondents believed that RCMP officers seldom embarked aboard military patrol assets.TABLE 9 - 9ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS EMBARKED ON MILITARY PATROL ASSETSDept / Platform Perceived Percentage of Time Enforcement Officers Embarked_______________ 0 5 10 to 20 25 to 50 55 to 70 70 to 95 100DFO on Warship 41.9 18.6 16.3 18.8 - - 4.7DFO on Mil Aircraft 37.2 25.6 9.4 9.4 9.4 - 9.3RCMP on Warship 48.8 31.7 4.9 14.7 - - -RCMP on Mil Aircraft 48.8 26.8 9.8 9.8 4.9 - -From Table 9-9, it is clear that 60 percent of respondents believed that enforcement officers were aboard warships and military aircraft five percent of the time or less. Since the actual figure in any given year is between six to eight percent, the majority of respondents believed military patrol assets were engaged in enforcement activity less than the actual time devoted for this support. Even among the 25 to 30 percent of respondents who believed that Conservation and Protection officers were embarked more than 10 percent of the time, the majority felt that the fisheries officers were aboard no more than 50 percent of the time.In Question 15, when asked to choose among federal departments,55.3 percent of respondents replied that Fisheries and Oceans Canada was considered the most effective at deterring illegal activities in the Canadian coastal zones. DFO was followed by the RCMP at 31.9 percent, DND by 8.5 percent, and the Canadian Coast Guard at 4.3 percent. Although Environment Canada was listed as a choice, not a single respondent indicated that department being perceived as effective at deterring contraventions to Canadian law.Based on the data presented at Tables 9-8 and 9-9, as well as the results of Question 15, it is reasonable to suggest that, at least to the 44 lobster fishermen who responded to the questionnaire, Canadian military369patrol assets have little deterrent effect on law-breaking in the inshore fishery around Cape Breton Island. However, this suggestion does not have the statistical robustness upon which to draw a firm conclusion, and it cannot be extrapolated across the Atlantic region for the reasons cited earlier.9.3 Public Opinion ValueFrom the exploratory study in the previous section, it was suggested that employment of naval assets in support of fisheries enforcement produces only a limited deterrent effect. The purpose of the next section is to explore whether support to government departments, including fisheries patrols, provides inherent value to the Navy from the perspective of enhancing positive public opinion. Anecdotally, federal departments receive “good press” for their efforts to control the illegal flow of drugs, and to control foreign fishing activities, especially in parts of Canada that have depressed economies tied to the fishing industry.A media content analysis was employed to answer the question, "How is the Canadian Navy portrayed in its support of other government department operations, in particular, fisheries enforcement?” The rationale and design of this method were covered in Chapter Two; what will be presented here are the results.9.3.1 Media Content Analysis ResultsFrom 1 Jan to 31 December 2002 the DND Director General Public Affairs website was accessed by a research assistant who read the articles that had been automatically “tagged” by DGPA’s software and list of naval key words as having naval subject matter (Appendix Q). The research assistant determined in which of 10 themes the article belonged and, if the subject matter related to naval support of other government departments, the research assistant then categorized the article into one of six types, as listed in Table 9-10. The decision to categorize an article into a specific theme was based on whether the majority of the text or the emphasis was on a particular theme, although other themes might have been present in a minor capacity.370TABLE 9 - 10MEDIA CONTENT ANALYSIS - THEMES AND TYPESArticle Theme OGD Article Type1 OGD Support 1 Search and rescue2 Naval operations 2 Environment/pollution3 Naval exercises 3 Fisheries support4 Capital projects 4 Counter-narcotics5 Defence spending 5 Illegal immigration6 Quality of life 6 Arctic sovereignty7 Misconduct8 People stories9 Op APOLLO0 MiscellaneousThe research assistant categorized each article based on how the print media had portrayed the Canadian Navy in its support of other government department operations, and recorded the article as having a positive, negative, or neutral bias towards the Canadian Navy.During 2002, the media content analysis reviewed 852 new stories that contained a naval thread. Of these, 377 had a positive bias (44.2 percent), 171 had a negative bias (20.1 percent), and 304 were neutral (35.7 percent).Of the 852 articles, there were far fewer about naval support to other government department than had been anticipated. Only 73 articles touched upon any of the six OGD sub-themes (8.6 percent). Table 9-11 lists the number of articles by theme and bias, and Figure 9-3 shows the percentages in graphic form.371TABLE 9- 11MEDIA CONTENT BY THEME - 1 JANUARY TO 31 DECEMBER 2002Story Theme Percent Total Neutral Positive NegativeSupport to other govt depts 8.6 73 32 35 6Naval operations - general 10.4 89 35 20 34Naval exercises 2.7 23 6 17 -Capital projects 10.0 85 40 8 37Defence spending 11.4 97 87 4 6Quality of life issues 6.5 55 7 9 39Misconduct / harassment 2.0 17 2 2 13People stories 15.1 129 17 111 1Operation APOLLO 18.4 157 18 135 4Miscellaneous 14.9 127 60 36 31TOTAL 100.0 852 304 377 171Misconduct2% /Operation APOLLO 19%People Stories 15%Capital Projects 10%Miscellaneous15%Naval Operations 10%Defence Spending 11%Personnel Naval Exercises 3%Quality of Life 6%OGD Support 9%Figure 9-3. Media Content By Theme -1 January to 31 December 2002Of the 73 OGD-related articles, search and rescue accounted for 38 articles (52.1 percent), and there were 13 environmental or pollution new stories that pertained to naval operations (17.8 percent). The next most common of the sub-themes were articles about military counter-narcotics operations of which there were 10 (13.7 percent). Support to fisheries372enforcement registered only two new stories (2.7 percent). Table 9-12 lists the number of OGD-related articles by type and bias, and Figure 9-4 shows the percentages in graphic form.TABLE 9 - 12M EDIA C O N TE N T - SUPPO R T TO OGD - 1 JANUARY TO 31 DECEMBER 2002Story Theme Percent Total Neutral Positive NegativeSearch and rescue 52.1 38 10 28 -Environment / pollution 17.8 13 3 4 6Fisheries 2.7 2 1 1 -Counter-narcotics / terrorism 13.7 10 9 1 -Illegal immigration 2.7 2 2 - -Arctic sovereignty issues 11.0 8 7 1 -TOTAL 100.0 73 32 35 6Environment18%Arctic Sovereignty 11%Search and Rescue 51%FisheriesSupport3%Illegal Immigration 3%Counter- 14%tFigure 9-4. Media Content - Support to OGD -1 January to 31 December 2002Figure 9-5 shows that three-quarters of the new stories about search and rescue activities had a positive bias to them. This was expected, since search and rescue normally involves saving people in distress, and the rescuers are generally viewed positively. Occasionally, when there is loss of life, new stories can question decisions made during the search and rescue operation, portraying SAR personnel or processes negatively. The research assistant logged no negative stories about SAR in 2002.373Negative0%Neutral26%Positive74%Figure 9-5. Naval Search and Rescue New storiesFigure 9-6 depicts a large percentage of negative stories pertaining to the Navy and environmental or pollution matters (46.1 percent). The amount of negative coverage in this category in 2002 was atypical, and reflects a series of new stories instigated by a single individual who generated significant publicity about unexploded ordnance and ocean dumping of mustard gas after the Second World War.NeutralNegative46%Figure 9-6. Naval Environmental/Pollution NewstoriesFigure 9-7 shows that the overwhelming majority of new stories about naval support to counter-narcotics efforts were neither positive nor negative.Positive31%374Positive 10% 0/1Neutral90%Figure 9-7. Naval Counter-Narcotics New storiesAs in the case for counter-narcotics operations, Figure 9-8 shows that the overwhelming majority of new stories about naval linkages to Arctic sovereignty were neither positive nor negative.Negative Positive o% 13%Neutral87%Figure 9-8. Naval Arctic Sovereignty New storiesFigure 9-9 shows that there were no negative new stories relating to naval support to the fisheries, and that the stories were evenly split between positive and neutral articles. However, there were only two new stories in this category for an entire year; no inference can be made regarding positive or negative bias on such a small sample.375Negative0%Positive5 0 %Neutral50%Figure 9 -9 . Naval Fisheries Support New storiesThe results of this year-long media content analysis counters the supposition that support to fisheries enforcement is of significance to the Navy for public relations value. Only 8.6 percent of the total number of stories concerned support to other government departments, and of this small percentage only 2.7 percent pertained to support to fisheries. Put another way, fisheries patrols accounted for 0.002 percent of all new stories carried by the print media in 2002. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the impact of naval fisheries patrols on public opinion in 2002 was insignificant.In relation to other OGD-naval linkages, with the exception of the environment /pollution category, the majority of new stories were neutral in their portrayal of the Navy and thus likely did not diminish public opinion about the Navy, but neither is it likely that opinions were improved. However, it is clear that search and rescue articles undoubtedly created a positive impression of the military in the public mind.The overall assessment is that support to other government departments by the Navy does not enhance to any great extent public opinion of the Navy.3769.4 Benefit of Fisheries Patrols on Warship Crew ReadinessSo far in this chapter, the potential benefits of support to enforcement operations has been discussed in the broad context of deterrent value and the effect on public opinion to the entire Navy. The next section will narrow the focus to the individual ship level, and examine the value of fisheries support in terms of the opportunity for training and maintaining an assigned state of readiness for operations.There are many metrics used by the Navy to track training progress. Some rest with the individual sailor and pertain to the level of training required to perform specific functions at a particular level in a specific trade within the organization. They may be training requirements that are prerequisites for individuals to attend advanced career courses. However, for the purposes of this research, it is not the readiness of individual sailors that will be examined, but rather the readiness of the ship as a single entity that will discussed, and what is the value of employment on a fisheries patrol on this readiness.The basic supposition is that employment of a warship on a fisheries patrol will improve the level of combat readiness of the ship. The rationale for this is that the pace of activity during fisheries patrols is slower than that of military exercises, and should allow the ship to focus more effort on completing the individual and small team CRRs that are frequently difficult to achieve in a normally schedule of exercises and operations.9.4.1 Combat Readiness Requirement AnalysisThe Canadian Navy maintains a system of measurable training objectives called Combat Readiness Requirements (CRRs) for all classes of warships. These CRRs are reported every month to the Operational Readiness staff at Maritime Forces Atlantic Headquarters. The CRRs are reported as percentage completed during a particular month. For example, if there are 15 seamanship CRRs, and the ship has satisfied the criteria for only 11, the ship would report that it is 73 percent up-to-date in seamanship readiness.377The nature of these CRRs is tailored to the roles and capabilities of each class of ship. Moreover, there are three levels of CRR. The lowest level are periodic lectures and training activities to keep specific skill-sets of individual sailors and small teams refreshed at a periodic interval, skills that are needed for fighting of shipboard fires, small arms training, first aid training, etc. Depending upon the class of vessel, there might be over 250 CRRs that are tracked on a monthly basis.Combat Readiness Requirements also vary depending upon the ships readiness status as assigned by the Commanding Admiral. Understanding that it could no longer afford to train, maintain, and sustain every ship in the Fleet to a high readiness standard due to diminished budgets, several years ago the Navy adopted a tiered-readiness program. Accordingly, the majority of ships are assigned “standard” readiness status, meaning that they need only achieve roughly 75 percent of CRRs. The ships that form the national and contingency task groups are assigned high readiness status, and are expected to achieve the highest level of CRRs possible. Thus, the overall CRR status of a warship will vary depending upon where the ship is in its tiered-readiness cycle.Table 9-13 lists some of the lower level CRRs for surface vessels. The intermediate level CRRs are aimed at maintaining a whole ship capability for a particular task on a generic mission. Examples of these are displayed at Table 9-14. The advanced level CRRs are aimed at integrating the ship into a task group, demonstrating the vessels capability for multi-ship combat operations. Examples of advanced CRRs are listed at Table 9-15.378TABLE 9 - 13EXAMPLE INDIVIDUAL AND SMALL TEAM CRRSCombat Readiness Requirement Validity Period (days)Standard First Aid Training 1095NBC Team Training 730Contamination Control Organisation 365Naval Fire Fighting 730Flood Control Refresher 730Rules of the Road for Officers-of-the-Watch 90Bridgemanship Exam 180Non-Ionising Radiation Hazards Lecture 365Fuel/Oil Spill Response Lecture 365Anchoring Procedures 180Hazardous Materials Lecture 365Source: CFCD 102(H).TABLE 9 - 1 4 EXAMPLE INTERMEDIATE LEVEL CRRSCombat Readiness Requirement Validity Period (days)Lost Diver Search 90Cleansing Station Procedures (Nuclear) 365Search and Rescue Simulation 120Bomb Threat 180Nuclear Defence 365Refugee Assistance 730Intelligence Collection 365Blind Pilotage (Navigation by Radar) 60Evidence Gathering Team 180Maritime Interdiction Operations - Hailing 120Source: CFCD 102(H).379TABLE 9 - 15 EXAMPLE ADVANCED LEVEL CRRSCombat Readiness Requirement Validity Period (days)Sea Sparrow MissileFiring 365Sea-Skimming Target Acquisition & Tracking 180Intermediate Multi-Ship Air Defence Exercise 120Target Acquisition Missile Scenario 180Intermediate Surface Firing Exercise 120Advanced Surface Firing Exercise 180Encounterex 120Mk 46 Torpedo Firing 365Combined Anti-Submarine Warfare Exercise 180ASW Detection & Tracking 90Source: CFCD 102(H).In order to determine what effect the employment of warships on fisheries patrols had on combat readiness, the Operational Readiness staff was contacted to provide combat readiness statistics on warships that had participated in naval fisheries patrols. Specifically, the staff was asked for CRRs percentages achieved during the patrols, and for one month prior to the patrols, as well as one and two months after the patrols. In addition, the staff was requested to provide the same information on ships that had taken part in the two major national maritime exercises in 2001. These were Canadian Fleet Operations Exercise 2/01 (CFO 2/01) and Canadian Fleet Operations Exercise 3/01 (CFO 3/01). Both CFOs were multi-ship exercises involving Canadian and Allied ships, submarines, and fixed and rotary wing aircraft. The CRR status of the ships that participated in the multi-ship exercises provided a useful comparison set against single ship naval fisheries patrols.The Operational Readiness staff at Maritime Forces Atlantic Headquarters compiled CRR data on 29 warships that had conducted fisheries patrols during the years 1999 to 2001. These data were arranged in 9 categories based upon the definition of the CRR in the Navy’s ordering directive, CFCD 102(H). The categories were Combat (CBT), Communications (COMMS), Anti-Air Warfare (AAW), Surface Warfare (SURF), Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), Command/Control/Communications/380Computers (C4), Combat Systems Engineering (CSE), Marine Systems Engineering (MSE), Seamanship (SEA), and Air Department (AIR). Minor warships also have an additional category, Coastal (COAST).Table 9-16 contains the summary of CRR data provided by headquarters staff, minus the AIR and COAST categories. There are three activities represented in this table. The first section lists the CRR averages for all 29 ships that had conducted fisheries patrols. The second section provides the CRR averages for the three ships that participated in CFO 2/01, and the third section contains the data (CRR averages) for the three ships that took part in CFO 3/01. The numbers in the table are the percentages of CRRs that were reported by ships as having been completed either the month before the patrol or CFO, the month of the patrol or CFO, one month and two months after the patrol or CFO.306From Table 9-16 it can be seen that, for the average ship in 1999 to 2001, one month before a fisheries patrol 55.8 percent of all CRRs were reported as complete. During the month of the fisheries patrol the figure increased to 59.5 percent, then dropped to 56.7 percent complete one month after the patrol. Two months after the fisheries patrol, the number of CRRs complete had risen to over 60 percent. This was a reflection of the ships’ programmes providing opportunities to complete CRRs that were not possible during the fisheries patrols.306 Ships that participated in CFO 2/01 were Iroquois, Ville de Quebec, and Preserver. The CFO 3/01 ships were Halifax, Toronto, and Preserver.381TABLE 9 - 16COMBAT READINESS REQUIREMENT COMPLETION PERCENTAGES - 1999 TO 2001A V G ALLS H IPC B T C O M M A A W S U R F A S W C4 C S E M SE SEAFisheries Patrol Ships1 month before 5 5 .8 5 5 .9 65.4 74.2 4 0 .5 31.5 46.1 0.0 65.2 70.3 58.2Month of patrol 5 9 .5 5 9 .0 6 8 .2 74.1 4 4 .2 37.4 4 9 .0 0.0 69.0 80.8 58.11 m onth after 5 6 .7 5 8 .0 6 5 .4 71.0 4 0 .6 39.4 4 4 .4 0.0 68.0 78.0 56.92 m onths after 6 1 .2 6 3 .6 81.4 87.0 4 7 .4 49.0 4 9 .8 75.0 82.1 81.9 65.43 m onths after 6 2 .2 6 0 .5 76.4 83.7 4 2 .3 4 2 .8 4 4 .9 62.3 73.1 80.1 63.5CFO 2/01 Ships1 month before 6 2 .0 6 0 .3 77.7 8 0 .0 4 4 .0 57.7 48.7 22.3 75.7 79.3 70.7Month o f C F O 6 5 .7 6 4 .3 8 4.7 8 7.0 6 6 .7 50.0 4 6 .3 55.0 73.7 79.3 73.01 month after 7 2 .0 6 5 .7 93.3 8 7.3 83.3 6 9.3 4 6 .3 36.7 83.0 74.3 78.02 m onths after 7 2 .7 6 5 .0 87.7 8 5.3 81.0 6 9.3 39.0 68.3 88.7 75.3 71.03 m onths after 7 1 .7 6 6 .7 84.3 76.7 73.7 77.0 32.0 68.3 86.3 87.0 69.0CFO 3/01 Ships1 month before 6 7 .0 6 9 .5 8 0.0 80.1 59.3 64.3 55.5 51.0 90.8 87.5 78.5Month of C F O 7 0 .0 6 7 .5 8 4.5 9 0.8 64.3 55.3 64.8 46.3 87.3 77.5 73.31 month after 7 1 .0 7 1 .0 8 9.8 8 9.8 62.3 47.3 65.3 52.0 88.5 91.3 69.32 months after 6 5 .0 6 4 .5 85.8 6 7 .5 56.8 4 6 .3 44.8 45.8 89.0 86.5 63.8Source: Maritime Forces Atlantic Operational Readiness staff, 2001.Figure 9-10 depicts the same information in graph form for the average of all CRR categories. The axis along the bottom of the graph indicates the months before and during the patrol, as well as one, two and three months after the patrol. The graph shows that on average a ship goes from 55 percent CRRs complete to 60 percent complete during a fisheries patrol, an increase of only five percent. Figure 9-10 also shows the average of all CRR categories for the high readiness ships that participated in the two major CFO exercises. Note that in the months prior to the exercises, the six ships already had higher rates of CRR completion (62 and 67 percent) due to their assigned high readiness posture. Note also that the CFO ships did not suffer an immediate drop in CRR status immediately following the two exercises, although the CFO 3/01 ships experienced a 6.5 percent decline two months after CFO 3/01.382100CFO 2/01FISHPATS 1999-20015040BEFORE DURING AFTER PLUS 2 PLUS 3Figure 9-10. Combat Readiness Requirements - Average of All CategoriesIf one examines the CRR completion status by individual category, the curves are even more dramatic. Figure 9-11 depicts the Combat CRRs. One can see a drop of roughly three percent post-fisheries patrol, then two months after the patrol an increase by 16 percent in CRR completion. This same effect is not registered with the CFO ships that experienced no decline in Combat CRRs the month after the exercise. Their decline commenced two months after the exercise. This again was a reflection of ships’ programmes providing opportunities to complete CRRs that were not possible during the fisheries patrols.383100CFO 2/01CFO 3/01FISHPATS 1999-200140BEFORE DURING PLUS 2 PLUS 3AFTERFigure 9-11. Combat Readiness Requirements - CombatThe curves representing Anti-Air Warfare CRRs in Figure 9-12 show how little this warfare discipline can be practised during a fisheries patrol. This is in marked contrast to the ships that participated in CFO 2/01. These ships were, on average, only 3.5 percent ahead of the average fisheries patrol ship the month before the exercise, yet achieved 66.7 percent during the exercise and peaked at 83.3 percent one month afterwards. Of interest, although one month before the two CFO exercises the Anti-Air Warfare readiness status of the six ships varied by 15 percent, both groups of ships in the major exercises achieved roughly 65 percent CRR completion during the months of each exercise. The CFO 2/01 ships went on to conduct live missile firings after the major exercise, and the CFO 3/01 ships did not.38410090CFO2/01CFO 3/0FISHPATS 1999-200130 1— ----- ,---------------------- ,---------------------- ,----------------------BEFORE DURING AFTER PLUS 2 PLUS 3Figure 9-12. Combat Readiness Requirements - Anti-Air WarfareFigure 9-13 depicts a category in which fisheries patrol employment is not disadvantageous to CRR completion, whereas multi-ship exercises and operations might be a hindrance. The curves for Marine Systems Engineering are shown in Figure 9-13. MSE CRRs involve practising emergency propulsion and power generation scenarios that have a ship-wide impact, and are not suited for scheduling at the same time as warfare scenarios. In Figure 9-13, it can be seen that fisheries patrols allow ships to increase their MSE CRRs by 10 percent, and remain relatively constant in the months after. On the other hand, the intense nature of the multi-ship exercises may impede the ability of ships to improve in this category of CRR, as seen in the curve for CFO 3/01.385100 r ....... .........CFO 3/0.1FISHPATS 1999-2001605040BEFORE DURING AFTER PLUS 2 PLUS 3Figure 9-13. Combat Readiness Requirements - Marine Systems Engineering9.4.2 Additional Training ValueIn addition to Combat Readiness Requirements completed, the fisheries patrol allows ships to complete a number of miscellaneous training requirements. These include on-job training packages that required sea time, Officer-of-the-Watch bridge watch keeping by day and night for junior officers pursuing bridge watch keeping certificates, Engineering Officer-of-the-Watch certification endorsements, several marine systems engineering Head-of- Department and naval officer Certificate of Competency pre-boards, junior officer shiphandling practice, Captain’s Rounds, unit disciplinary training and radiation safety lectures. These are in addition to the normal non-CRR recurring training such as casualty clearing training, boarding stations, gun functioning, and so on.307The training value of a fisheries patrol is highly dependent on its timing. Often it is the focussed training during a fisheries patrol that allows the ship to complete a great deal of individual training and some team training, preparing the crew to take full advantage an upcoming multi-ship exercise. Fisheries307 Captain(N) Drew Roberston, Commanding Officer HMCS Athabaskan, interview by author, 1 December 2000.386patrols are a useful opportunity that is integral to the ship’s combat readiness. Almost any ship can benefit from one quiet period in a year to enhance training.3089.4.3 Assessment of Enforcement Support on Combat ReadinessTable 9-16 and Figures 9-10 through 9-13 show consistently that, on average during fisheries patrols, Combat Readiness Requirements can be increased by about 5 to 10 percent depending upon category, but there is a corresponding decline in the month immediately following the patrol. In addition, on average, Combat Readiness Requirements can be increased if the ship trains with other warships and aircraft present. This is because most of the advanced Combat Readiness Requirements require multiple ship interaction to satisfy the criteria for sign off. Few advanced CRRs can be achieved on single ship operations, and at least 30 percent of CRRs are in the advanced category. So unless a ship is able to orchestrate the participation of other maritime forces in the vicinity of a fisheries patrol, the best that a fisheries patrol ship can hope to achieve is an average of 70 percent completion of CRRs.While gains might be made in individual categories of CRRs during fisheries patrols, an across-the-board improvement of only five percent for all departments is insignificant, and the consistent decline in readiness immediately following the patrols suggest that there is no inherent benefit to combat readiness derived from support to fisheries enforcement by warships.9.5 SummaryThere have been a limited number of previous studies pertaining to fisheries enforcement and the possible deterrent effect of government patrol assets. The prior research has tended to emphasize the economic model of criminal behaviour; the concept of patrol presence was not an element of these studies. In terms of contribution to knowledge, the deterrence survey presented in this thesis should be interpreted as an exploratory study only.308 Ibid.387This is due to its small sample size that renders the data statistically insignificant. Since there was limited presence of military patrol assets in the geographic areas fished by the majority of the respondents, the reliability of observations pertaining to patrol frequency is called into question. With those cautions in place, the deterrence survey conducted for this thesis suggests that, at least to some inshore fishermen, Canadian military patrol assets have little deterrent effect on law breaking.A media content analysis undertaken for the year 2002 found that less than 10 percent of new stories pertained to naval support to other government departments. Naval support to fisheries enforcement accounted for only 0.002 percent of all new stories carried by the print media in that year. The majority of new stories that had naval linkages were neutral in their portrayal of the Navy. In view of these three elements, it is likely that new stories about naval support to other government departments had little impact on public opinion of the Navy.One of the key measures of the status of training of a naval vessel as a whole is the Combat Readiness Requirement. Warships that are assigned fisheries patrol duties have the opportunity for focused training without the distraction of other ships in company. Data reported on CRRs from 1999 to 2001 indicate that readiness for combat can be increased by only about 5 to 10 percent during fisheries patrols, but immediately after the patrol ends there is a loss of readiness. Thus, employment by warships on fisheries patrols offers no substantial value to naval commanders in terms of an increased readiness posture for their naval vessels.The ephemeral increase in combat readiness during the fisheries patrols, the apparent lack of a deterrent effect, and the insignificant effect on public opinion suggest that there is no inherent benefit derived to the Navy from the employment of warships on fisheries patrols.388Chapter TenANALYSIS OF THE NAVAL ROLE IN MARITIME ENFORCEMENT 10.1 IntroductionThis chapter presents an analysis that suggests that the Canadian Navy could take on a greater role in domestic enforcement, but that there are many impediments and a lack of will that prevent it from doing so. The chapter describes how the Navy’s role in maritime security and enforcement continues to evolve, and how the Navy is charting the course for a whole-of-government approach in this domain. This discussion includes the potential for enhanced legal powers, the Navy’s key function in the Marine Security Response System, and improvement in surveillance planning. The chapter closes with a short recap of naval contributions to oceans management that are related to, but separate from its maritime enforcement support efforts.10.2 Threats and SecurityWhen any government has insufficient resources with which to fulfill its multiple mandates, prioritization must occur, and choices must be made as to what receives attention and what does not. These choices are made by either by commission or omission; failure to take a decision is a decision in and of itself. Over the past half century, the area that the Canadian government has chosen to place little emphasis has been precisely where oceans, security, and defence policies trisect.The question is will this trisection continue to be a gap in government attention and, by extension, the necessary resources to maintain sovereignty and national security?389OceansPolicySovereigntySurveillanceEnforcementSecurityPolicyDefencePolicyFigure 10-1. Trisection of Federal PoliciesThe threats and activities of interest in Canada’s maritime zones will continue to be search and rescue, illegal fishing, drug smuggling, pollution incidents, illegal immigration, unauthorized at-sea research, petroleum and natural gas industry monitoring, whale and seabird protection, eco-tourism, foreign intelligence collection, and extremist activity. An emerging challenge for Canada though, is the implication from global warming and its effect on Arctic sovereignty. W armer temperatures will likely result in the Northwest Passage becoming more navigable, with an inherent increase in marine traffic, and the increased likelihood of enforcement issues in the north.289Jeff Tasseron and George Lindsey observe ironically that the greatest threat to Canadian sovereignty could well be the superpower to the south, and caution that Canada alone is responsible for defending its sovereignty.290 Indeed, the November 2005 transit to the North Pole by USS Charlotte, an American nuclear submarine, became an election issue for the sitting government in 2006 because it was suggested that the vessel had entered289 Rob Huebert, “Climate Change and Canadian Sovereignty in the Northwest Passage,”Isuma 2 No. 4 (Winter 2001): 86-94.290 Tasseron, “Facts and Invariants,” 20; Lindsey, et al., “Canada’s Security Policies,” 9.390Canadian territorial waters during its submerged passage without informing Canadian authorities.291The security climate changed with the fall of the Berlin Wall. It is unlikely that North America will face a conventional military threat as had been the case during the Cold War. However, globally non-state actors have threatened larger powers with asymmetric capabilities.292 It is reasonable to assume that terrorist groups are prepared to use merchant vessels to transport their personnel and weapons. Any number of scenarios can be imagined here, including attacks upon cruise liners. Intelligence sources indicate a large number of merchant vessels controlled by Al-Qaeda; unclassified sources place the number at just over a dozen.293 To combat these vulnerabilities, many security analysts agree on the need for greater surveillance of Canadian territory, maritime and aerial approaches.294Dr. James Boutilier, testifying before the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, identified the lack of sufficient resources to execute the maritime security piece, in particular the weaknesses inherent in the existing federal government structure:At the national level, virtually all of the organizations involved directly or indirectly in maritime security appear to have significant capacity problems. The escalator phenomenon prevailed during the 1990s fewer and fewer dollars chasing greater and greater responsibilities.”295This concern should be serious to Canadians, in view of the dire condition of the Coast Guard and Fisheries and Oceans fleets given the age of the vessels and their state of “rust out.” It also supports the case for increased291 Canadian Press,“Martin offers “necessary measures” in Arctic,” 19 December 2005. http://www.ctv. ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20051216/ELXN_arctic_051219?s_name =election2006&no_ads=> (26 December 2005).292 Ralph Peters, “Constant Conflict,” Parameters (Summer 1997): 4-14.293 David Pugliese, “Al-Qaeda’s Naval Fleet,” Ottawa Citizen, (17 March 2004): A1-A2.294 Lindsey, et al., “Canada’s Security Policies,” 5.; Bland and Maloney, Canada’s Defence Policy at the Turn of the Century, 205.295 Testimony of Dr. James A. Boutilier, before the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Issue 19 - Evidence 9 June 2003 (7 February 2005).391use of naval vessels for maritime sovereignty and security tasks.10.3 Wariness for Increased Naval Role?Peter Haydon points out that the place of navies in maritime security is clear, but increasingly naval forces are taking on a greater role in oceans management despite nations fielding coast guards for this express purpose. Haydon explains that the trend for many states to use their navies in this manner is that the capabilities needed for maintaining maritime security, specifically surveillance, presence and response, are precisely the same capabilities required for oceans management and sovereignty protection.296Indeed, it is easy to understand what the sovereignty protection role of the Navy is when the triggering incident is some form of armed aggression towards Canada. This is clearly a defence scenario, and the Navy’s role in it is obvious. However, what is more difficult to divine what the Navy’s contribution should be in routine sovereignty tasks, in which the threat to Canada is contravention of Canadian law, and in which the lead agency is invariable another federal department. In routine sovereignty protection, the Navy is just one of several players.The reality is that no single government department or agency on its own can assure the safety, security, or sovereignty of Canada, even in the post-911 environment with the greater visibility that these issues have received. Senator Colin Kennedy, in his 2004 Senate committee report The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World, observes that the Canadian Coast Guard, the Canadian Navy, and by extension the RCMP, are not defending Canada’s coasts in “any meaningful way.297” Kenny opined that during the 37th Parliamentary hearings for the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, the Committee was surprised to discover that:296 Peter T. Haydon, “What Naval Capabilities Does Canada Need?” in Maritime Security in the Twenty-First Century: Maritime Security Occasional Paper No. 11, ed. E.L. Tummers (Halifax: Dalhousie University, December, 2000), 136.297 SCONSAD, Longest Under-defended Borders in the World, 108-109. See also Kelly E. Williams, “The Canadian Navy: In the Vanguard of Canadian Foreign and Defence Policy,” in The Canadian Navy and the New Security Agenda: Proceedings of the Maritime Security and Defence Seminar, Toronto, 26-27 April 2004, ed. Ann L. Griffiths (Halifax: Dalhousie University,392the Canadian navy is not defending Canada’s coasts - other than assisting with surveillance - and that the navy has no jurisdiction over interior waters, such as the Great Lakes. The Navy prefers to do its defending on waters far away. We learned that, despite its name, the Canada Coast Guard does not guard Canada’s coasts. Nor does it guard our interior waters.298The committee concluded that no one department or agency in Canada was taking the lead in maritime security or in the protection of maritime sovereignty.Senator Colin Kenny observes that the key federal departments with responsibilities for maritime security, Canadian Coast Guard, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and Canadian Navy are not funded adequately to fulfill their mandates in the offshore, inshore, and internal Canadian waters, including the Great Lakes and St Lawrence Seaway.299In the post-9/11 environment, there has been considerable debate pertaining to the need for greater numbers of ships to patrol in Canada’s offshore estate. The Senate Committee on National Security and Defence criticized the Navy for “abandoning” coastal patrols by its ships.300 The misplaced emphasis on patrolling in ships also manifested itself as an element of the National Security Policy’s six-point plan for maritime security. A short think-piece at Simon Fraser University’s web-site Canadian American Strategic Review places emphasis on the need for many patrol vessels in the maritime approaches; in fact, there is even a proposal to employ the Navy’s slow-moving maritime coastal defence vessels under the aegis of an invigorated Coast Guard with constabulary powers.301It would appear that the authors of these proposals don’t understand the sheer enormity of the area inside the 200 nautical mile Canadian EEZ. A lone2004), 9.298 Colin Kenny, “Defending Canada’s Coastal Waters: The King Canute Approach,” Toronto Star, 29 October 2003 (20 March 2004).299 SCONSAD, Longest Under-defended Borders in the World, 14-27.300 Ibid., 17.301 “A Modest Proposal - Maritime Security and Canada’s Economic Exclusion Zones: MCDV for an Interim Maritime Security Force?” Canadian American Strategic Review, 1 October 2004 (28 February 2005).393ship, even with the speed of a frigate, in such a vast featureless territory is a poor use of a resource if the aim is solely surveillance and detection of violations of Canadian law. The analogy of a police car making patrols of city streets and keeping the peace simply doesn’t fit in the maritime context. An ocean area is best covered by a combination of fixed arrays, aerial surveillance, and space-based assets. Patrol vessels are most efficient when vectored in to an area. The greatest benefit of a patrolling vessel is simply the demonstration of “presence,” particularly in remote areas, rather than an expectation that the vessel would actually detect wrongdoing. Presence is also useful for supporting claims of sovereignty; the Danes send ice-capable ships that conduct Davis Strait patrols every year to reinforce their contested claim to Hans Island.The Canadian Navy maintains a significant presence in Canada’s maritime zones; moreover, naval vessels and supporting maritime patrol aircraft maintain presence in certain sections of the EEZ that other government departments do not. Presence also supports the argument for enhanced law enforcement powers, so that naval vessels could act when violations are encountered on routine operations.While Canada’s Navy has always been active in the nation’s maritime affairs, there is a case to be made for expanding the naval role in domestic maritime enforcement in support of safeguarding national security and the exercise of Canadian sovereignty. A more comprehensive role for the Navy is both practical and necessary. The Navy should have all the legal tools required to enforce Canadian law in those areas. This is not to suggest that the Navy would shift its primary emphasis from preparing for combat at sea to coast guard duties. Rather, it is an appeal for powers that would enable the Navy to act upon violations detected while carrying out its fundamental military role. As was shown earlier, other government departments have become increasingly reliant on the Navy during a decade of government-wide retrenchment.The Canadian Navy is fully engaged in safeguarding national security394and the exercise of Canadian sovereignty. In a period when patrol activities by other government departments has been waning, the Navy continues to maintain a not insignificant “on-the-water” presence in Canada’s maritime zones. The Navy’s tendency to revisit areas of high activity and traffic density coupled with its sophisticated modern sensor capability predisposes its vessels to detect breaches of domestic and international law. However, at present, unless a peace officer from another government department is embarked, there is little recourse open to a naval vessel other than to report it to the appropriate law enforcement authority and to wait for action to be taken by another department. Why then, has Canada been so reticent to take the next step, as have many other nations, to employ the Navy in enforcement of federal statutes in all Canadian maritime zones in a more primary manner than relegating it to a support role, as is the current situation?10.4 Reticence to Use Armed Forces for Domestic Maritime EnforcementThe answer to the question posed above is found in a number of separate but related issues. The more significant of these can be summarized as follows:a. public perceptions of the Army and a general unease with the use of the Army for law enforcement on land;b. the question of the legitimacy of the use of the Canadian Forces for law enforcement;c. the public’s inability to distinguish between the Army and the Navy, andd. the concepts that constabulary duties are non-traditional, detract from the status of a navy, and erode its war fighting capability.These will be examined in further detail and, in so doing, it will become evidentthat these issues do not present such an insurmountable obstacle as may first395be thought.10.4.1 The Army and Law EnforcementAs instruments of national power, most Western armed forces have been conceived and maintained to execute state policy abroad, although they can be employed domestically in certain situations where their unique military attributes can be employed with great effectiveness. The skills and aptitudes derived from training for combat make armed forces highly suitable to assist local authorities in dealing with dangerous or violent confrontations. Equally, armed forces are a natural pool of disciplined, highly trained talent to assist in times of disaster.302While armed forces may seem suited for the execution of domestic policy, in practice democratic governments constrain the internal use of their militaries, usually to avoid potential political fallout and to maintain the legitimacy of their democratic governance. Canada is no exception, and this tradition has its roots in British legal heritage, imported to British North America before Confederation.303It is argued that the perceived unwillingness to employ the Canadian Army in law enforcement roles during modern times comes from long-standing prejudices resulting from misuse of the Army in foregone times. To better understand how attitudes have been shaped regarding this issue, it is useful to review the historic record, starting in Great Britain. Steven Haines observes that the British Bill of Rights of 1688 is the point of departure for an analysis of civil-military relations in the British Isles and, by extension, the Dominion of Canada. This Act rendered the Army subordinate to Parliament and restricted its use by the Crown.304 Haines notes also that the Bill of Rights of 1688 makes no reference to the Royal Navy, a powerful arm of the state during that particular period of empire building. Clearly, it was not viewed as a threat to the302 Steven W. Haines, “The Provision of Military Aid to Civil Authorities in Britain’s Maritime Domain” (Ph.D. thesis, University of Aberdeen, 1992), 210.303 Ibid., 213.304 E.C.S. Wade and A.W. Bradley, Constitutional and Administrative Law (London: Longman, 1985), 406.396domestic political structure of the era. After the Bill of Rights a series of Acts followed to provide statutory authority and funding for armed forces to operate on land.305For well over two centuries, the army remained an important tool in the execution of domestic policy largely because it was the only organized body of men that the Crown could call upon for its coercive ends. Consequently, well into the nineteenth century, soldiers were employed to maintain public order, notwithstanding the potential risk to liberty. However, the activities of working class movements during the Industrial Revolution often instigated riots and demonstrations, and frequently necessitated the use of the Army to maintain public order. Over time, public figures in Great Britain began to question the means employed to maintain law and order and the appropriateness of the use of the Army for this purpose. This evaluation coincided roughly with the creation of Great Britain’s fledgling police forces, first in Scotland, then Ireland, and then in England. The Metropolitan Police Act of 1829 created an unarmed force of civilians that was based on the long established and generally accepted appointment of constable. These specific prerequisites were aimed at reducing public concern that a centrally controlled police force might pose the same threat to public liberty that had previously been the case with the Army.306These attitudes towards the use of the army in the domestic context ultimately migrated to Canada, where the nation’s inaugural police force came into being in 1841 at Kingston, Ontario. Thereafter, across the country the concept of law enforcement by civilian authorities became institutionalized. That said, the Army was used on many occasions since the birth of the nation in 1867 to prior to World War Two, in order to quell disturbances, to suppress election disorder, and to put down uprisings such as the Riel Rebellion of 1885. Many of these were not, as we would say today, public affairs successes. For305 P. Rowe, “The British Soldier and the Law,” in The Defence Equation: British Military Systems - Policy, Planning, and Performance since 1945, ed. M. Edmonds (London:Brassey’s, 1986), 175-190; quoted in Steven W Haines, “The Provision of Military Aid to Civil Authorities in Britain’s Maritime Domain” (Ph.D. thesis, University of Aberdeen, 1992), 214.306 F. Gregory, “The British Police System - With Special Reference to Public Order Problems,” in Police and Public Order in Europe, J. Roach and J Thomaneck (London: Croone Helm,1985), 37.397example, the federal government enacted the Military Service Act of 1917 to permit conscription of men for service in Europe during the First World War. Opposed in Quebec, its passage divided the country along linguistic lines. When protests against conscription turned ugly in Quebec City 1 April 1918, troops were called in to quell the riots. Four persons were killed and 70 were wounded when the military forces opened fire. Some argue that the memory of this action remains with the population today, resulting in resentment towards using the Canadian Army to quell civil disorder.307To gauge more recent public attitudes, if one looks at the most intrusive use of military force in the domestic context, Aid of the Civil Power, there have only been four instances of this type of employment by Canadian military forces since 1945.308 In 1969, the Army was called out during the Montreal general police strike. A year later in 1970, the FLQ crisis resulted in the invoking of the War Measures Act and the callout of the Army again to maintain order in the province of Quebec. The third instance was the 1976 case of a sniper in Alberta, and the most recent experience with Aid to the Civil Power was gained in 1990, again in Quebec, with the Oka crisis.It is difficult to determine the real public sentiment towards the use of the Army for law enforcement purposes. In the case of both the FLQ and Oka crises, the armed forces were praised for the calm and disciplined manner in which they contained the crisis and prevented escalation.309 If there is truly lingering resentment towards use of Canadian Forces for law enforcement tasks, it is difficult to explain why visible military assistance is requested for major politically charged events such as the G8 ministers’ conferences in307 Serge Durflinger, Les Purs Canayens: French Canadian Recruitment during the First World War, 27 September 2001 (7 February 2005). See also Canadian Military History Gateway, Military Service A c t, 21 June 2004 (7 February 2005).308 Aid to the Civil Power is a type of domestic operation in which military forces are called out to suppress a riot or disturbance of the peace because it is beyond the civil authorities to control.309 Superintendent A. Antoniuk, Speech to RCMP officers at RCMP Training Academy, Regina Saskatchewan, 27 September 1990; Desmond Morton, Understanding Canadian Defence (Toronto: Penguin, 2003), p. 158.398Halifax (1995) and Kananaskis (2002), or the Summit of the Americas in Quebec City (2001).This section has discussed possible origins of reticence for employing the Army in law enforcement roles, but has not addressed to the issue of naval enforcement. However, before that topic can be taken up, the issue of the legitimacy of the use of armed forces in such a role must first be explored.10.4.2 Legitimacy of the Canadian Forces for Law EnforcementContrary to what many might wish to think, law enforcement is indeed a legitimate function of the Canadian Forces. Parliament has clearly indicated both its acceptance and expectation that its armed forces have a role in law enforcement in certain circumstances. This statutory basis can be found in the National Defence Act. This Act codifies the principles for control of the armed forces, as well as providing the legal framework for the provision of military support to provinces or other government departments for maintaining public order.310Parliament has two major expectations vis-a-vis the armed forces and law enforcement. The first is that the Canadian Forces be capable of a broad spectrum of provision of services in both crisis and non-crisis scenarios as discussed in Chapter Five. Through the National Defence Act, Parliament empowers the Minister of National Defence or the Governor-in-Council to authorize the armed forces to “perform any duty involving public service,” including the “provision of assistance in respect of any law enforcement matter.”311 At the low end of the spectrum, this takes the form of routine support to community activities. This is, by far, the most frequent type of domestic operation undertaken by the Canadian Forces and pertains to noncrisis provision of services. Humanitarian assistance is also covered by this section of the National Defence Act.The “provision of assistance in respect of any law enforcement matter”310 National Defence Act, R.S.C. 1985 c. N-4. Part XI.311 National Defence Act, R.S.C. 1985 c. N-4. s. 273.6.399clause in Section 273.6 of the National Defence Act also encompasses assistance to law enforcement agencies. Assistance rendered by the armed forces covers a broad spectrum of activities from provision of ranges or training areas for police use, to the suppression of prison disturbances.Parliament’s second expectation vis-a-vis the armed forces and law enforcement is that the Canadian Forces be capable of taking responsibility for restoring public order when necessary, that is, be capable of coming to the aid of the civil power. Pursuant to the National Defence Act, military “service” can be furnished “in any case in which a riot or disturbance of the peace, beyond the powers of civil authorities to suppress, prevent or deal with and requiring that service.”312 The Chief of the Defence Staff is accorded the discretion to determine the scope and nature of military “service” in these situations. Under aid of the civil power, armed forces members possess the powers and duties of “constables” but remain under military command and control.Aid of the civil power is a “service” that some might argue is the most controversial since it conjures up in the public’s eye images of soldiers with rifles patrolling Canadian streets and, as far as some are concerned, the idea of a police state with the threat of concomitant suspension of civil liberties. Sean Maloney asserts that employing military forces domestically is a ’’politically provocative act, one that carries much weight regardless of the situation.”313 Further, argues Mathew Hammond, the use of military forces for law enforcement purposes obfuscates military and civilian roles, undermines civilian control of the armed forces, and is not an appropriate use of resources.314 Notwithstanding this criticism, the reality is that the concept of the police state has never been acceptable in Canada, and the requisitions for aid to the civil power are always undertaken as means of last resort. Moreover, as stated earlier, recent examples of armed forces employment in aid to the3 National Defence Act, R.S.C. 1985 c. N-4. Part XI.313 Sean M. Maloney, “Domestic Operations: The Canadian Approach,” Parameters (Autumn, 1997): 135-152.314 Matthew Carlton Hammond, “The Posse Comitatus Act: A Principle in Need of Renewal,” Washington University Law Quarterly 75 (No. 2, Summer, 1997) (6 February 2005).400civil power met with overall approval.315 More importantly, though, Parliament has demonstrated through various legal instruments that it both accepts and expects Canada’s military to play a role in law enforcement.Are there constitutional issues that prevent the Navy, as opposed to the Army, from enforcing Canadian law? Understanding that this enforcement would take place offshore in Canada’s maritime zones, a review of the Constitution Act indicates otherwise. Section 91 of the Act states that “the exclusive Legislative Authority of the Parliament of Canada extends to . . . Militia, Military and Naval Service, and Defence . . . Beacons, Buoys, Lighthouses .. . Navigation and Shipping . . . Sea Coast and Inland Ferries.” 316 All of these subjects are clearly related to maritime activities on or beyond the coasts, and the Act codifies federal responsibility for each. Section 92 of the Act lists the exclusive powers of the provinces. These are focused on activities and issues that affect provincial territory, i.e., land. For example, “in each Province the Legislature may exclusively make Laws in relation to . . . Direct Taxation within the Province . . . Management and Sale of Public Lands . . .Establishment, Maintenance and Management of Hospitals . . . Tavern Licences . . . Property and Civil Rights.317 Thus, the Constitution Act clearly implies that Canada’s ocean zones are federal jurisdictions. As such, appropriate organs of the federal government may enforce Canadian law within these jurisdictions, provided they have the legal mandate. What would be required for the Navy to enforce, rather than just assist in enforcement, would be relatively minor amendments to various maritime-related enabling statutes.Having established the legitimacy of the Canadian Forces and, by extension, the Canadian Navy for law enforcement tasks, it is time to examine potential biases.10.4.3 Lack of Distinction between Army and Navy in “DomOps”Notwithstanding the success of Kananaskis, Halifax and other fora in315 Antoniuk, Speech at RCMP Training Academy, 27 September 1990; Morton, Understanding Canadian Defence, 158.316 Constitution Act, 1867, s. 91.401which the Canadian military has been employed at domestic operations in high profile support of law enforcement agencies, in the public realm the perception is that “traditional” military law enforcement operations are those in which the Army is agency “of last resort.” For many there is no distinction between the Navy dealing with narcotics smuggling, pollution, and fisheries violations at sea, and the Army conducting aid to civil power operations on land. The latter are very visible, affect large numbers of citizens, and can be intrusive on normal life whereas naval enforcement operations are largely invisible to the majority of Canadians. Due to this lack of distinction, negative biases derived from perceptions of the Army’s operations are unconsciously applied to those of the Navy.10.4.4 Enforcement as Non-Traditional EmploymentWhen the question of naval law enforcement is raised, policy-makers, lawyers, and senior bureaucrats are reticent to concede that there might be a case for enhancing the Navy’s constabulary role because such activities are “non-traditional.” It can be argued that MOU-based counter-narcotics, fisheries, customs, and immigration law enforcement operations carried out by the Navy are not considered in the same category as the “force of last resort” missions. Rather, these types of operations are deemed more to fall into the realm of support to law enforcement agencies. That these operations are seen to be a “non-traditional” role for the Navy is both unfortunate and misinformed. Indeed, the need for fisheries protection from American interests in the waters of the Dominion of Canada around the turn of the century was a major factor in the creation of our homegrown Canadian naval service.318Among naval analysts, the employment of navies for constabulary tasks is not a universally popular concept. A former head of the Navy, Vice-Admiral Gary Garnett stresses the importance of maintaining a distinction between the enforcement roles of the Canadian military and civilian authorities. He notes, as have many other analysts, that in Canada law enforcement traditionally has317 Constitution Act, 1867, s. 92.318 Marc Milner, Canada's Navy: The First Century (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 8 .402been a civilian function, although it is accepted that the armed forces may provide support to assist civilian agencies when circumstances warrant. With respect to naval law enforcement, there are disadvantages to employing naval vessels in these roles. The most apparent is that navies are designed for war- fighting, not constabulary tasks. In fact, during the Cod Wars with Iceland, Great Britain’s frigates proved to be too “over-sophisticated” for the task.319 Garnett’s principal concern is to avoid the watering down of combat skills of naval personnel and his point is well taken. However, the intent would not be to convert the Canadian Navy into a fleet of coast guard cutters. Rather, naval ships would continue to train for their primary combat roles, and small teams would receive additional specialized training for them to become proficient at their secondary constabulary duties.Peter Haydon argues that the Navy should be the key contributor to sovereignty and security patrols of Canada’s maritime zones, in all parts of the water column and super-adjacent airspace,320 because it is the sole department that has the capability to do them properly and efficiently, and the only organization that understands and can implement the concept of sea control.321 Haydon also notes that the notion that the Navy should take on greater constabulary roles will always be contentious. He argues that, given the diminished state of the Canadian Coast Guard, consideration should be given to turning over northern sovereignty patrols to the Navy over time. Likewise, he posits that increased naval fisheries patrols make sense, with the actual inspections to be carried out by dedicated Conservation and Inspection Officers assigned to the warships.322But Haydon also cautions against too much “constabularization” to the point that the nation has only a coast guard. In that scenario, he argues that Canada would find itself excluded from multinational naval operations. Both he and Garnett suggest that sending forces perceived to be of a constabulary319 Elizabeth Young, “Policing Offshore: Civil Power or Armed Forces,” RUSI Journal 122 (No.2, June 1977): 18-22.320 Super-adjacent airspace is a legal term used to define the airspace immediately above the surface of the water in the water column in question.321 Haydon, Canadian Naval Future, 13-14.403law is invoked against a single vessel and not against a state, there should be no provocation.” Likewise, he adds, so many other countries use their navies for fisheries protection, it can be argued that there is a strong prima facie case for Canada to follow suit.325Garnett is not the sole naval commander to express reservations about enhancing the Navy’s constabulary role. Why are so many Canadian flag officers opposed to the Navy taking on a more active domestic maritime enforcement posture? The idea should not be discounted that there could be simple deep-seated biases at play. In his book Sea Power and the Law of the Sea, Mark Janis described five classes of navies, with the US and Soviet superpowers ranked at the top of the pecking order. The navies of Great Britain and France formed the second tier, but remained categorized as first- class “blue-water navies.” The remaining classes are described as “coastal” by Janis due to their lack of naval power in comparison with the navies of the first two tiers.326 Closer to home, Canadian naval planners, drawing heavily from Eric Grove’s Future of Seapower, expanded the number of classes to nine in their 2001 naval policy document Leadmark: The Navy’s Strategy for 2020. In this typology, the number one category, i.e., “major global force projection navy (complete)” is reserved for the United States. At the lowest rungs of the ladder are the “constabulary and token” navies. Canada ranks its navy in the third category far away from those navies described as being “constabulary.”327 Measured against yet another generally accepted scale, Canada meets the criteria to earn the label “medium-power navy” as defined by Rear-Admiral Richard Hill.328Why is this relevant? Simply put, there is generally a correlation between325 Colin S. Gray, Canada’s Maritime Forces Wellesley Paper 1 (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, January, 1973), 46.326 Mark W. Janis, Sea Power and the Law of the Sea (Lexington, Mass: Heath, 1976), 63-64.327 Canada, Department of National Defence, Leadmark: The Navy’s Strategy for 2020 (Ottawa: Directorate of Maritime Strategy, 2001), 43-45. The nine categories in this classification system are: 1) major global force projection navy (complete), 2) major global force projection navy (partial), 3) medium global force projection navy, 4) medium regional force projection navy, 5) adjacent force projection navy, 6) offshore territorial defence navy,7) inshore territorial defence navy, 8) constabulary navy,7) token navy.328 Hill, Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers, 20.405ranking of a nation’s navy and the nation’s status in the international system. The majority of navies of developed countries occupy the upper tiers of the ranking system, whereas the developing countries’ navies, those of a more constabulary nature, are found in the lower end of the ranking spectrum.329 While some might argue that the reluctance to take on enforcement tasks reflects a desire to devote the Navy’s limited resources to combat functions, it may well be that the senior naval leadership perceives a certain stigma if its fleets are associated with constabulary tasks rather than power projection or more war-like functions that rank them higher on the international stage. The Canadian Navy, given its early roots as a fisheries protection force, wished to shed that image and become a “real” navy. The attitudes of modern naval officers might well be a legacy of concern over image.As discussed earlier, both Garnett and Haydon have cautioned against “non-traditional,” that is, law enforcement employment of Canada’s naval forces. However, they have not stated their case as categorically as did one witness who appeared before the Senate Committee on National Security and Defence. A former Commissioner of the Canadian Coast Guard, Mr. John Thomas, argued passionately against any increase in law enforcement powers for the Navy, citing cost and the need to maintain the option of a graduated response:I do not think that DND should have the role of coastal security.DND's ships, aircraft and trained personnel are very expensive, perhaps as much as 10 times the cost of Coast Guard equipment and personnel. Navy personnel are trained for war and navy systems are developed for war, not to fulfill a policing role on the coast. . . the navy should be called upon only when the police force cannot do the job. . . when a situation arises that police officers cannot deal with, you escalate the action up to the next level, but you do not start at the highest level. I must emphasize that point. There is a need for a flexible response.The military should be seen, from a policy perspective, as a force of last resort, in the same way as they are for land-based police operations. We do not call in the military to work with, say, the Toronto police unless the police are facing a significant situation that is beyond their capacity. The military is not called329 Michael A. Morris, “Military Aspects of the Exclusive Economic Zone,” in Ocean Yearbook 3 (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1982), 336.406in as a first step.330Thomas and, to a lesser extent, Haydon and Garnett speak to a bipolar world of a bygone era during which Canada’s Navy was structured to counter symmetric threats. It is unlikely that North America will face a conventional military threat as had been the case during that era of the Cold War. The maritime security environment changed with the fall of the Berlin Wall, and its continuing evolution was punctuated with the terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center in 2001. Globally, societies are witnessing an increased emphasis on asymmetric capabilities by organized crime and a variety of transstate actors. It is reasonable to assume that terrorist groups are prepared to use merchant vessels to transport their personnel and weapons; any number of scenarios can be imagined here. Intelligence sources indicate that there are a large number of merchant vessels that are controlled by Al-Qaeda; unclassified sources place the number at just over a dozen.331In addition to counter-terrorism, the protection of fishing rights, the prevention of illegal activity at sea, such as piracy or the smuggling of contraband or human cargo, and the protection of the environment will continue to require vigilance on the part of the federal government.332 The National Security Policy, calls for effective integrated multiple agency threat assessment, protection and prevention capabilities.333 However, it is no longer easy to understand what the sovereignty protection role of the Navy is when, as observed in Canada’s International Policy Statement, “the boundary between the domestic and international continues to blur.”334 The International Policy Statement Canada’s continues with the assertion that “defence and security policy must change.”335 Thus, while the thinking of Thomas et al may have been adroit at one time, the point has been reached to discard old paradigms330 Testimony of John F. Thomas before the Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Issue 19 - Evidence 9 June 2003 (7 February2005).331 Pugliese, “Al-Qaeda’s Naval Fleet,” A1-A2.332 Lostracco, “What Force for Canada,” 21-23.333 Privy Council Office, Canada’s National Security Policy, 5.334 Canada, Privy Council Office, Canada’s International Policy Statement (Ottawa: 2005), 12.335 Ibid.407about traditional employment for the Navy and to consider what is practical and relevant for the future maritime security environment. Other nations have already done so.10.5 European Example of Naval EnforcementIf one looks to European nations for comparison, one notes that many employ their navies in limited law enforcement capacities. Fisheries protection has long been a traditional role for European naval and coast guard forces. The experience of Great Britain’s Royal Navy in this role dates back to the 16th century.336 At present, in the United Kingdom, law enforcement is defined as military aid to the civil authority, and the Royal Navy undertakes the following missions: quarantine enforcement; fishery protection; contraband operations; drug interdiction; oil and gas field patrols; anti-piracy operations; support to counter-insurgency operations; and maritime counter-terrorism.337 Moreover, the Royal Navy maintains a Fisheries Protections Squadron with eight offshore patrol vessels.338In other parts of Europe the French Navy, for example, acquired patrol vessels several years ago for policing tasks.339 Farther north, the Norwegian Coast Guard forms part of the Royal Norwegian Navy, and has been given enforcement powers for over 25 laws through the Norwegian Coast Guard Act. These include fisheries, customs, immigration and safety-at-sea laws. Denmark has no coast guard; the Danes do not distinguish a maritime task as being coast guard or naval in nature. The Danish Navy exercises police authority for enforcement of sovereignty issues.340European navies generally furnish law enforcement services directly to national authorities through MOUs. Usually what these navies provide are naval platforms and facilities. In some cases, such as the Danish model, the Navy carries out constabulary and traffic-police duties, whereas the appropriate336 Pugh, “Policing the Seas,” 111.337 Ibid., 109.338 Ibid., 108.339 Michel d’Oleon, “Policing the Seas: The Way Ahead," in The Role of European Naval Forces after the Cold War, edited by G. de Nooy (Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 1996), 144.408civil authority conducts the criminal investigations.341 From a European perspective, naval participation in law enforcement is a significant contribution to good governance at sea.”34210.6 United States Experience with Posse ComitatusIt is useful to compare the Canadian position towards naval enforcement vis-a-vis those of our neighbour to the south where the use of the armed forces for domestic enforcement has, until recently, been prohibited by law. By way of background, the Posse Comitatus Act was passed in 1878 to prevent the US Army from carrying out law enforcement tasks in the United States. The enactment of this legislation was a reaction to the use of military forces in the confederate states for the maintenance of peace and good order, enforcement of policies for post-Civil War reconstruction, and to ensure that rebellious sentiments did not re-ignite. The US Congress became concerned when the Army stationed troops at political events and polling stations under the premise of ensuring civil order. As Craig Trebilcock points out, the intent of this federal statute was to prevent the Army from becoming “the national police force” of the United States. Accordingly, the Posse Comitatus Act was enacted to return the Army to its proper role in defence of US territory, and to make it illegal for US troops to be used for civilian law enforcement, except in very specific circumstances.343In the era that the Posse Comitatus Act was passed, it was much easier to distinguish between defence tasks and civil law enforcement tasks since the military threat of the day was posed by standing military forces of foreign powers. As noted earlier, with the advent of modern technology facilitating the increased prominence of asymmetric threats, the distinction between these two subsets of national security becomes somewhat blurred.Interesting is the fact that the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 did not apply340 Pugh, “Policing the Seas,” 105.341 Ibid., 130.342 Ibid., 108.343 Craig T. Trebilcock, The Myth of Posse Comitatus, October 2000, (6 February 2005).409to the US Navy, only the US Army. It is possible that, as with Great Britain’s Bill of Rights of 1688 that likewise made no reference to naval forces, the US Navy was not viewed as a threat to the domestic political structure of the era. In 1956, an amendment to the Posse Comitatus Act caused the same restrictions to be applied to the US Air Force, but curiously made no mention of the US Navy. It was interpreted though that the implied purpose of the act was to prohibit military forces in general from conducting civilian law enforcement. Thus, in 1974 the US Secretary of the Navy issued a formal instruction that stated that although the act did not specifically apply to the Navy, its principles were to be upheld. That said, the instruction also gave the US Navy a loophole; the directive stated that the Navy could be employed for civilian law enforcement purposes with the express permission of the US Secretary of the Navy, a civilian official. Thus, the principle of civilian control over military forces could be maintained.344The “get tough” anti-drug campaign of the Reagan administration in the early 1980s resulted in a law being passed and a Defense directive issued that eased the way for US Navy involvement in at-sea counter-narcotics enforcement by enabling the US Secretary of Defense to provide equipment and facilities to civilian law enforcement personnel and provided approval for US Navy and Marine Corps personnel to participate in maritime interdiction operations against ships and aircraft in violation of US law.345 In 1982, at the request of the US Department of Transport, the US Secretary of Defense approved US Navy support to the US Coast Guard for law enforcement purposes. Specifically, the US Navy could conduct surveillance, tow or escort seized vessels, transport prisoners, provide logistic support to Coast Guard units and embark Coast Guard personnel to conduct boardings of American and stateless vessels.346 In addition, according to Trebilcock, the United States has also developed an interesting legal procedure whereby a Navy vessel344 Michael R. Adams, “Navy Narcs,” United States Naval Institute Proceedings (September, 1984): 35.345 See the US Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1982 (Public Law 97-86) and Department of Defense Directive 5525.5 (22 March 1982).346 Memorandum from US Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, to US Secretary of Transport, John Lehman, as quoted in Michael R. Adams, “Navy Narcs,” United States Naval Institute Proceedings (September, 1984): 37.410becomes a Coast Guard vessel when required:. . . the USS Kidd intercepted a drug-smuggling boat in 1983.When the smugglers refused to yield without force, the problem of passive versus active law enforcement was handled by lowering the Navy ensign on the ship and raising the Coast Guard ensign. The Coast Guard asset USS Kidd then fired on the smugglers’ ship, rendering it immobile and leading to its seizure, along with 900 bales of marijuana.347These powers and procedures mark a considerable departure from the outright prohibition on US naval involvement in law enforcement and indicate American acceptance of this role for their Navy.Having established the legitimacy of the use of the Navy for law enforcement purposes, and challenged some perceptions about constabulary and non-traditional naval employment, what remains to be discussed is what an enhanced mandate for naval law enforcement would really entail.10.7 Proposal for Naval Enforcement in Canadian Maritime ZonesAt present, Canadian naval forces are relegated to a support function only, essentially providing a glorified taxi service for enforcement officers from other federal departments, except under special circumstances when coercive force is required, and is requested by the appropriate Minister. I believe that the Canadian Navy should be empowered with the legal authority to enforce directly selected federal statutes on a routine basis throughout the maritime zones of Canadian jurisdiction.Were these legal powers granted, what would this new role entail? The basic premise is that the Navy’s fundamental mission would remain the “generation and maintenance of combat-capable, multipurpose maritime forces to meet Canada's defence objectives.”348 That said, were naval vessels to detect violations to Canadian law while conducting their defence or sovereignty missions, they would have the requisite legal tools to act upon those discoveries. However, this is not to suggest that the Navy would be obliged to347 Trebilcock, “ The Myth of Posse Comitatus.”348 Department of National Defence, Leadmark: The Navy’s Strategy for 2020, 92.411cease its operations to deal with violations detected. Rather, the naval commanding officer’s decision whether to enforce would be shaped by the priority of his naval operations and the circumstances of the violation detected. In practice, this precedent already exists; throughout Canada police officers have similar discretion to choose when and where to enforce laws, with due consideration to the severity of the offences, the risk to the public, and so on. As well, the Navy would not be expected to enforce all federal statutes, only those that apply to specific activities on the seas. These would be limited only to those offences that are directly linked to the protection of Canadian sovereignty and this should allay concerns referred to earlier about police power in the hands of the military.The proposed new role would not see the Navy conducting investigations of violations detected at sea. Rather, naval personnel would carry out the preliminary work designed to contain the scene. Again, an analogy of normal police work is useful. Throughout Canada general duty police officers are normally first at the scene, then turn over difficult or serious cases to the general investigative services, or detectives as they are commonly known. The general duty officer is trained on basic policing functions i.e., understanding how an investigation is carried out, how not to contaminate a crime scene, how to maintain care and custody of evidence, and how to deal with suspects, etc so that the detectives can investigate the case in detail. This basic knowledge is necessary so that the Crown’s case is not derailed by procedural errors at the outset. In the model proposed in this paper, naval personnel would act as the general duty officers, and would turn over the case for investigation by Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Environment Canada, or the Royal Canadian Mounted Police as appropriate. Moreover, the support to enforcement already established by interdepartmental MOU would not change. Thus routine patrols with fisheries or RCMP officers embark would continue, and reactive operations, such as counter-drug interdictions would be carried out with the appropriate enforcement officers embarked.Some argue that the Navy would not be competent to undertake a moredirect enforcement role, primarily because naval personnel are not in tune with412the requirements for the prosecution of a court case. Essentially, this is a question of training and shipboard organization. One solution would be toconfer peace officer status to all watch-keeping officers and a small cadre ofsailors.349 These people would train specifically for law enforcement duties, and become the ship’s experts at the use of force, care and custody ofevidence etc. The logical choice for these teams would be the personnel whoform the Navy’s existing naval boarding parties. At present, naval boarding party team training is very similar but shorter to that received by Canadian police officers, and would require minimal adjustment to cater to at-sea enforcement requirements, mainly to become familiar with the minimal number of federal statutes that would be enforced by the Navy, and to augment the team’s understanding of requirements for court.350In my view, there is little doubt that the Navy could execute an enhanced enforcement role, given its considerable experience in maritime interdiction operations abroad. Whether it will be given that chance remains an open question.10.8 Champion and Enabler for Marine Security ProcessesCaptain(N) Peter Avis, naval representative to the Interdepartmental Maritime Security Working Group from 2001 to 2003, compared the practices of three western nations in terms of domain awareness, safeguarding, responsiveness, and collaboration. His examination of the cases of Australia, Norway, and the Netherlands allowed him to reach conclusions about “best practices” for maritime security.In his 2004 study, Avis identified a “whole-of-government approach” that emphasizes collaboration as the foremost best practice for maritime security. He found that by cultivating an expectation to collaborate across all levels of government, especially with regard to crafting of legislation and intelligence349 This idea was proposed as a means of preparing the Canadian Coast Guard for constabulary duties. See Thomas, Testimony before SCONSAD, 9 June 2003; See also Canada. Report of the Standing Senate Committee on Fisheries and Oceans. Safe, Secure, Sovereign: Reinventing the Canadian Coast Guard. March, 2004. p. 48.413coordination with law enforcement, Australia achieved an integrated national security effort that has proven successful in dealing with a number of terrorist and anti-migration incidents in the recent past. Avis posits that adoption by Canada of a whole-of-government approach would resolve many of the shortcomings identified by the Senate Committee on National Security and Defence.351A whole-of-government approach is prescribed in the National Security Policy; moreover, there is a presumption by the Canadian taxpayer that a whole-of-government approach is being employed already for maritime security and enforcement. However, the taxpayer does not recognize the self-imposed constraints that shape government department operations, or the “stove-piped” method of conducting business that continues to be the modus operandi in the federal apparatus. While a laudable objective, at this juncture, the “whole-of- government approach” remains in its infancy, and requires continual reinforcement by politicians and senior bureaucrats at all levels during operations and exercises to ensure that the concept takes root.Avis’ study remarked on another collaborative best practice, a “common risk assessment methodology.” This approach calls for applying a common language among departments such that they can compete for resources in an equitable fashion acceptable to all maritime security stakeholders. The use of this methodology facilitates the allocation of resources based on current intelligence assessments, allowing the right resources to be focused in the right area at the right time. In Australia, the use of this approach has resulted in a dramatic decline in illegal maritime activities.352Both best practices identified by Avis are at the heart of the fledgling federal Marine Security Response System, an initiative being developed among key departments and being championed by the Navy to integrate better the Federal Emergency Response System, National Emergency Response350 Based on author’s experience and training as a former member of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.351 Avis, “Comparing National Approaches to Maritime Security,” 65-66.414System, and Marine Security Operations Centres.10.8.1 Marine Security Response SystemSince the requirement for the Marine Security Operations Centres was identified in the National Security Policy, their development has been pursued in parallel with the establishment and evolution of Public Safety Canada, and the development and approval of the Federal Emergency Response Plan. As discussed in Chapter Six, the FERP identifies the role of Public Safety Canada and the Government Operations Centre, and further defines structures for the Federal and National Emergency Response Systems.Lessons learned from interdepartmental exercises as well as operational experience within the Atlantic region over the past two years indicated that there was a requirement to align MSOC operations, the roles and functions of Public Safety Canada, and relevant elements of the Federal Emergency Response Plan. The creation of a single Marine Security Response System (MSRS) was the manifestation of this alignment effort. The Commander of Maritime Forces Atlantic, on behalf of the Navy, has been the chief advocate of the MSRS, and has facilitated a number of strategy meetings with Regional Directors General and their planning staffs to develop the template for this response system.353Commander MARLANT, Rear-Admiral Dean McFadden, observed that when the National Security Policy was signed, the Navy had two tangible contributions to offer the federal partners. The first was a near real-time “picture” of the maritime environment, the Recognized Maritime Picture. The second was an operations centre run on a 24/7 basis, where the RMP could be enhanced with intelligence data then shared, and from where an on-water response could be coordinated.354352 Ibid., 66.353 Randy Wyatt and Commander Russ Stuart were the two staff officers who developed the MSRS template for Commander MARLANT. Figures 10-2 to 10-3 are adaptations of figures created by Wyatt for the members of the Federal Co-ordinating Steering Committee.415When the MSOCs were first stood up, the view held by many in the federal marine security sector was that the MSOC functions were intelligence collation and data fusion only. In addition to being a living laboratory in examining technologies, intelligence, methodologies, information exchange and operational capabilities, McFadden believed that the MSOC’s role extended well beyond the development of situational awareness. He argued that the MSOC organizational structures and processes be optimized for integration:It is not sufficient that we collaborate better, that we improve cooperation as an adjunct to individual mandates, whatever they may be; it is essential that collaboration be a prime driver of how we are structured, how we train and how we conduct our operations.355In the Marine Security Response System construct proposed by the Navy, the MSOCs remain distinct entities within the system for providing maritime domain awareness, conducting threat assessment and alerting and, when deemed necessary, conducting collaborative operations planning for a whole-of-government response. Collaborative operations planning is conducted by a multi-departmental team appropriately selected to ensure that required authorities, subject matter expertise, and resource authorities can work together on the response, while maintaining the required level of operational security. This is referred to in Figures 10-2 and 10-3 as “variable geometry.”356When an on-water response is necessary, a separate and distinct Military Operations Centre (MOC) is engaged as the means to co-ordinate the conduct of the operation. The appropriate military commander co-ordinates the on-water response. This does not imply lead agency status or overall control of all sea and air assets. Rather, the military commander is the enabler that provides the lead agency with the infrastructure and command and control architecture necessary for the conduct of complex maritime operations. However, the military commander does exercise command and control of all354 Rear-Admiral P.D. McFadden, Speech to Dalhousie University Master of Public Administration Program, 19 November 2007.355 Ibid.416military forces, thereby requiring a secure operations centre separate from the MSOC.In introducing the Marine Security Response System, the Navy has persuaded other government departments that the planning effort must be collaborative in principle and execution, rather than each department approaching the security or enforcement problem in isolation. In addition to concept development, the Navy has facilitated the conditions for collaborative planning through the allocation of physical space and information technology resources for a Marine Security Operations Centre where real collaborative planning can take place under one roof.The federal emergency response systems are set up to cope with natural disasters, and pandemics. They were not created with human-induced national security issues in mind. Public Safety Canada co-ordinates with provincial, territorial, municipal, and private agencies to effect the broad whole- of-government response to the consequences of an incident in an unsecured environment.357 Movement from the secure to non-secure domain is very much risk-dependent. Understanding this, Commander MARLANT pressed hard for the creation of the regional Federal Coordinating Steering Committee to provide oversight and direction in those incidents when the security threat is deemed to be complex by its nature or magnitude, and could result in severe consequences ashore or at sea. In those scenarios, the risks of maintaining operational security (normally inhibiting information sharing) must be balanced with the risks to public safety. The Federal Coordinating Steering Committee assesses the overall risk, determines the variable geometry, selects members and provide direction to collaborative operations planning team based on the variable geometry; and through Public Safety Canada and the Government Operations Centre, maintains federal government situational awareness.Figure 10-2 is the proposed marine security functional template356 Term coined by Wyatt and Stuart.417championed by the Navy to the other government departments, but in particular to Public Safety Canada. In the figure the two security domains are distinguished; the non-secure domain in which consequence management of natural disasters is carried out, and the secure domain in which threats of human origin are managed. The two operations centres are pictured, the military operations centre for command and control of military forces and coordination of other government department assets, and the marine security operations centre with its intelligence and data fusion function. The dotted pink ellipse joining the two operations centres represents their linkage by co-location as well as by function, in terms of collaborative planning.Marine Security Operations CentreTC MDACF/DND ^RCMP - DFO/CCG ^CBSAy Ops Planning / ' **.%(Variable geometry)Military Operations CentreFederal Coord Group (Equivalent)RiskManagedMCC (E) / MCC (W)Coordinate mil / assigned forces to execute an on-water response.Coordinated, whole of government response (Variable geometry)DomainThreat ReGovernment Operations Centre (GOCMaintain Fed Gov’t SACoord whole of gov’t responseFederal ^ *•***..Prov/Ter I .Municipal f A9enciesFigure 10-2. Proposed Marine Security Functional TemplateSource: Randy Wyatt, Briefing Note for Commander MARLANTBy virtue of its military character, and well-established inter-Service and inter-Allied operational planning process, the Navy brings discipline to the domestic marine security response system. The participation and leadership of357 What is meant by “unsecured” is that the matter is not of such a grave risk to national or Allied security that increased security precautions must be taken to prevent disclosure. In other words, this is the “unclassified” realm.418naval officers in multi-departmental consequence management influences other federal partners to follow agreed-upon protocols rather than adopting different and usually ad hoc process each time a marine security incident developsFigure 10-3 is a graphical representation of the proposed whole-of- government decisions support process that spans both the regional and national levels. Each federal department with a security or enforcement mandate is shown as a column. On the right of the figure are the various governance bodies and committees."M inu te r o f Public Safety J l Emergency Preparednessfw id e n t CanacTtep 1Border Services Vtom m issioner RCI Agency ^Deputy M in isterI Commander Canada ComRCMPAssistCommissionerlollaborative Ops Planning - Variable Geomel'hreat assessment - Assess extent I complexity of threat - Variable Geometiy■-ji- ------------ 'li - - — - - r i ----------------- - t i ------------- — — r* 4 - j r - !»'•»------------; J:':-; All Domain Awareness;(Geographical)R e g i o n a l D i r e c t o r,1 L Security (RDS) /Regional Directo , Security (RDS)CROPFCSCFCGRoutine OperationsCabinet / ParliamentMinister o f ^ —s & O ceans ̂ - * * '— Minister Minister o? Transport FisheriesMat tonal Defence Headquarters (NDHQy Chief o f efence Staff (CD!Deputy MintsGoC Coordinating Bodies at the Centre (Ottawa) and in the RegionsPrrvy CouncilOffice...CabinetCommittee(Operations)Deputy Ministers CommitteeMarine Security Operations Centre (MSOC)Discrete Ops Centres (Jurisdictional)DND/CFCJTFFederalCoordSteelingCommitteePSCRDGADM Emergency Management CommitteeGovernment Operations Centre (GOC)National Ops CentresDFORDGCCGAssisttommissioneFigure 10-3. Whole-of-Government Decision Support Process - Marine SecuritySource: Randy Wyatt, Briefing Note for Commander MARLANTAnother key role in the evolution of marine security that has been taken on by the Navy is to act as the engine that drives other government departments through a series of realistic exercises forcing thorny legal problems to be addressed. Commander MARLANT has used a number of these command-post exercises, such as Frontier Sentinel 2007, to identify jurisdictional conflicts. In the case of Frontier Sentinel, an internationalexercise that involved the simulated arrest of a vessel carrying suspected419terrorists, lawyers representing various departments advised the senior leadership during the game play that certain actions could not be carried out. Normally when this happens, the advice is taken, and game play is adjusted so that the existing legal framework is respected. However, during Frontier Sentinel 2007, the lawyers were instructed simply to “red flag” the issue, but to carry on as though the proposed action had been sanctioned. This led to additional “red flags” being identified, but importantly, it finally achieved staff discussion on how to resolve the legal technicality for operational necessity rather than simply dismissing the action as being unachievable under the existing framework.Notwithstanding considerable effort by staffs at the federal level, the restrictions and challenges related to information sharing between the departments have changed little post-911. While some progress at the regional level is being made, and recent table top exercises in Canada and the United States have been fruitful in determining exactly what is allowed to be shared by whom, to whom and when, this aspect of marine security remains the Achilles heel to an effective whole-of-government marine security response system.10.8.2 Improved Surveillance PlanningWhen the work on this thesis commenced several years ago, maritime surveillance planning by National Defence and other government departments that possessed surveillance capabilities was done in isolation from one another. Fisheries and Oceans Canada planned and executed their fisheries surveillance flights without consultation with DND, Transport Canada, or Environment Canada. Within MARLANT, the Maritime Component Commander(Atlantic) scheduled CP-140 Aurora flights in consultation with a junior naval intelligence officer, but this consultation did not extend to DFO. This stove-piped method of surveillance planning is no longer the norm, and is the result of two specific initiatives: this thesis, and the National Security Policy’s direction to create marine security operations centres.The collection of data for this thesis, and the acquisition of ArcViewsoftware for the Maritime Operations Centre demonstrated to the operations420and surveillance planning staffs the power and analysis capability of a modern GIS. This allowed the senior naval leadership to be briefed in greater detail, and allowed for a greater number of questions pertaining to surveillance to be answered. With this analysis capability came the realization that surveillance assets were not being employed as effectively as they could be in concert with other government departments.The creation of MSOCs that required co-location of analysts from a number of departments also led to an understanding that each department was conducting its surveillance planning using its own geographic demarcation or grid system, and often without knowledge of another department’s patrol assets’ movements. This resulted in both gaps in coverage, and duplication of surveillance effort in some sectors of the maritime zones and approaches. This was not as evident on the west coast where the Exclusive Economic Zone is only a fraction of the size of the Atlantic EEZ. As well, there are fewer surveillance assets to harness. However, on the east coast, the surveillance effort was not orchestrated for the most effective use of available assets.In Maritime Forces Atlantic, defence scientists from operations research developed a new interdepartmental surveillance grid in consultation with naval operations, air operations, DFO and Transport Canada staff. This new grid divided the MARLANT area of responsibility divided into 12 areas. Five comprise the outer zone that is the area beyond the EEZ to the CANLANT boundary. Four areas are found between the coast and the EEZ. Two areas are defined for the eastern arctic, and the Gulf of St Lawrence is a designated surveillance area on its own. The interdepartmental surveillance grid is shown at Figure 10-4.In implementing the new surveillance grid in 2007 and commencingcollaborative surveillance planning among military, DFO and TC staffs,performance measurement was based on how often government patrol assetswere able to revisit sectors of the grid. This was premised on the fact thatalthough many sensor systems are available to detect vessels in the maritimezones, only surveillance aircraft can both detect and identify non-emitting421vessels in a large area.358Figure 10-4. New Interdepartmental Surveillance Planning GridSource: Joint Task Force Atlantic operations staff, 2008.After several months of using this method of performance measurement, it was determined that to have a high probability of identification of a nonemitting vessel, the surveillance effort in the inner and middle zones was sufficient with the resources of all of the departments, but it could not be achieved without co-ordination among departments. It was also determined that surveillance presence in the outer zones was insufficient. The CP-140s flew too flew sorties to provide a high probability of identification - this was a function of using CP-140s for missions close to the coasts when their best employment was in the outer zones where the OGD aircraft didn’t have the endurance. The outcome of this new system and performance measures was that emphasis was shifted on CP-140 flights to the outer zones only, and extra surveillance hours were purchased from PAL for the inner zones to make up for the CP-140 retasking.359358 Revisit rate is the time between successive surveillance flights in a given sector, and is based on the probability of identification of transiting vessel.359 Neil Carson, Briefing to Maritime Domain Awareness Working Group, Esquimalt, British Columbia, 27 February 2008.422ARCTICUPPERLAB UPPERARCTICLOWER LAB LOWERThe Navy will continue to champion collaborative surveillance planning as an essential element of the whole-of-government approach to marine security. Naval operational research scientists have demonstrated to the senior naval leadership that dynamic contour plots, similar to the surface model figures in this thesis, provide a more accurate measurement of performance than fixed grid planning boundaries alone, and are devising tools to enable these plots to be generated for routine use in the MSOCs.36010.9 Additional Naval Contribution to Oceans ManagementAll of the earlier material in this thesis has emphasized the Navy’s support to sovereignty protection, marine security and maritime enforcement in terms of in maritime domain awareness, and patrol and response activities. An examination of the naval role would not be complete without mention of the naval contribution to oceans management initiatives in support of Canada’s Ocean Strategy.The Navy supports the COS goal for developing an improved scientific knowledge base for estuarine, coastal, and marine ecosystems through the conduct of ongoing research into noise and marine mammals in an ongoing effort to minimize the impact of naval activities on the maritime environment. This includes research to better understand the risks posed to the environment and human health from ocean dumpsites of military materials, and the necessary mitigation to reduce these risks. The Navy also assists in the promotion of the development of a State of the Oceans Reporting system through its support of the Victoria Experimental Network Under the Sea (VENUS) project. VENUS is a network of instruments placed on the seabed to observe the seafloor waters off the West Coast. The Navy also supports NEPTUNE, a joint Canada/US interactive, real-time ocean observatory. In 2004, the Navy provided a remotely operated vehicle to Dalhousie University for deep-sea coral research off southern Nova Scotia.With respect to the COS goal to conserve and protect the marine360 Neil Carson, Briefing to Commander MARLANT, Halifax, 31 March 2008.423environment, the Navy co-ordinates with DFO to conduct surveillance and provide visible naval presence to help deter improper activities in the vicinity of Marine Protected Areas. Over the past five years, naval frigates have conducted at least three vessel traffic assessments of the Sable Gully MPA. As a concurrent activity, warships have embarked biologists from the Canadian Wildlife Service during fisheries patrols to support the ongoing study of sea-bird populations. These sea-bird counts are used as a means of identifying the effects of pollution on the marine environment. Naval vessels also routinely report whale sightings to Fisheries and Oceans Canada for sea mammal counting and tracking purposes.Naval ships and aircraft have standing orders to report observations of oil slicks or other forms of pollution. During the past five years, the Navy supported an Environment Canada-sponsored trial of using RADARSAT to detect pollution by corroborating RADARSAT observations of potential oil slicks.The North Atlantic Right Whale is a critically endangered species, most of which reside in the Bay of Fundy during the months of July through October, and share their habitat with a shipping lane and fishing activity. Over the past 10 years, collisions with ships were found to be responsible for nearly 40 percent of documented right whale deaths, and the occasional entanglement in fishing nets is an increased risk to the species.In July 1999, the Defence Research and Development Canada (Atlantic)collaborated with Dalhousie University and the Canadian Forces to investigatethe feasibility of acoustically locating whales based on their specificvocalizations. A trial occurred in the Bay of Fundy during which a field ofsonobuoys were air-deployed and monitored from a CP-140 aircraft, while ahydrophone was deployed by a ship-based team. This preliminary studyjustified further vocalization investigations and the collection of oceanographicdata using naval research vessel, sonobuoys and bottom-mounted sensors.The data gathered in these studies might lead to the design of a permanentsystem of hydrophones for the Bay of Fundy for use as an early warning device424for mariners and fishermen.While its emphasis remains maritime security and defence, the examples above show that the Canadian Navy contributes where possible to the broader spectrum of oceans management initiatives.10.10 SummaryPolicing Canada’s maritime zones and approaches presents no shortage of difficulties to overcome, particularly as the federal government struggles to allocate finite resources to a plethora of ministries charged with maintaining national security. While the Navy has always had a major part to play in protecting Canadian sovereignty, the burden of law enforcement has fallen largely upon other government departments. This reality reflects a Canadian tradition of law enforcement by civilian agencies. However, in light of the evolving post-911 asymmetric security environment, there is a case to be made for expanding the naval role in domestic maritime enforcement. Influenced to a degree by land-oriented aid to civil power operations, detractors question the legitimacy of this use of armed forces or denounce the idea as non-traditional. However, none of these issues present an insurmountable obstacle to developing an enhanced role for Canada’s naval forces.With federal enforcement departments becoming increasingly reliant on naval assets for support of their operations, the Navy’s significant presence in Canada’s maritime zones should be leveraged and the Navy, empowered with appropriate legal authority, should be granted the option to enforce Canadian law in those vast areas. Doing so would be yet another important step in realizing the goals articulated in Canada’s national security policy, specifically to provide maritime security for Canadians in an effective integrated manner.425Chapter Eleven CONCLUSION 11.1 IntroductionThe overall objective of this thesis was to evaluate the employment of the Canadian Navy in a maritime enforcement role within the Canadian maritime zones. The basic assumption of the thesis was that the Canadian Navy plays a key role in this specific aspect of the maintenance of Canadian sovereignty. As well, the research was intended to determine whether the employment of naval forces in support of enforcement operations is of value to the Canadian Navy itself.11.2 Policy FrameworkA credible sovereign state controls the management of renewable and non-renewable marine resources, the protection and preservation of the marine environment, the maintenance of maritime sovereignty and prevention of illegal activity, and the maintenance of marine safety. In Canada, the absence of clear political guidance by a series of successive governments has resulted in an ad hoc approach to development of oceans, security, and defence policies. As a result, sovereignty, surveillance, and enforcement responsibilities have not been well articulated and, at times, been ambiguous.Notwithstanding the seemingly convoluted policy development process, there are now several strategic policy documents that enable maritime enforcement operations to be conducted in the Canadian maritime zones. These documents are the Oceans Act, Canada’s Ocean Strategy, the National Security Policy, and the 2005 Defence Policy Statement. The first of these, the Oceans Act, provides federal departments with legal authority for security operations in the Canadian maritime zones. In addition, the National Security Policy provides the Navy with legitimacy to aggressively pursue marine security co-ordination initiatives with other government departments.Maritime security is the compilation of practices that a state observesto protect its maritime interests abroad, along its coasts, and in its maritime426approaches. In a post-911 world, a state’s requirements for maritime security, sovereignty, and oceans management are increasingly interconnected, and there is a blurring of defence and security tasks. Maritime security continues to be viewed by all levels of Canadian government as a law enforcement responsibility rather than a defence issue. This posture shapes government security response systems, with the result that the Canadian Navy functions in a support role to those departments and agencies with enforcement mandates.Maritime enforcement is a sub-set of maritime security that involves three basic tasks: detection, interception, and intervention of violators. In this construct, the Navy’s contribution to maritime enforcement is equally a contribution to maritime security and vice versa.Canadian naval policy identifies six functions that its Navy should expect to execute in fulfillment of the constabulary role. These functions are sovereignty patrols, Aid of the Civil Power, assistance to other government departments, search and rescue, disaster relief, and oceans management.11.3 Complexity of Enforcement ProblemThe challenge to achieve effective maritime security and enforcement in the Atlantic region is multi-faceted. Its main feature is the sheer size of the Atlantic maritime zones. As well, the four provinces, amidst three levels of government, create a complex jurisdictional and administrative morass. A lack of uniformity of water and air space delimitation, multiple grid systems and inconsistent boundaries results in duplication of responsibility for much of the same area. Regulatory regimes created by international, national, and provincial bodies make it difficult to apply a common framework in the execution of maritime security and enforcement tasks.There are a large number of departments and agencies involved inoceans management in the Atlantic region. Federal departments play thegreatest role in governance, and with these organs the Navy has the greatestinfluence and interaction. Only DND, DFO, CCG and the RCMP maintain427fleets of vessels, and only DND and DFO have any significant capability for deep-water intervention. In the context of maritime enforcement, the key Memoranda of Understanding that have an impact on the Navy are those with DFO for fisheries enforcement, the RCMP for counter-narcotic enforcement, and Environment Canada for environmental emergency incidents.There has been considerable churn in the organizational make-up of federal departments with security mandates during the past seven years. The frequency of departmental restructuring is cause for concern, and is indicative of the difficulty that government faces in dealing with the complex post 9/11 security environment. Also adding to the complexity are federal laws that have not adapted to the changing asymmetric threat environment, and impede the timely sharing of information between departments and agencies charged with enforcement mandates.11.4 Naval Contribution through Patrol and ResponseAlthough the government framework presents challenges to be overcome in the interest of greater effectiveness, the Navy contributes significantly to the sovereignty task. DND and CCG personnel operate as a team to co-ordinate roughly 2,200 marine and aeronautical SAR responses per year in the region. The Navy contributes to SAR through its ability for effective command and control, infrastructure, provision of SAR aircraft, and provision of naval vessels.Fisheries and Oceans Canada is the lead federal department for fisheries management in Canada, but is assisted by DND for support to fisheries enforcement. In addition to aerial surveillance, the Navy provides major and minor warships for fisheries patrols, from which DFO Conservation and Protection officers board and conduct inspections of fishing vessels in Canada’s maritime zones and the waters enforced by the North Atlantic Fisheries Organization. The Navy concentrates its support to fisheries in the offshore fishery on the Grand Banks and Flemish Cap, and maintains limited naval enforcement presence away from these geographic features.428The physical area over which a frigate can maintain surveillance coverage is huge. Indeed, Fisheries and Oceans Canada is becoming increasingly reliant on the Navy to assist with enforcement tasks. Over a 12- year period, the Navy conducted eight percent of at-sea inspections throughout the Atlantic provinces, and as much as 29 percent of the inspections for the Newfoundland region of DFO. While employment in fisheries support may be advantageous to Fisheries and Oceans Canada, this research suggests that the benefits of naval fisheries patrols are far less tangible for the Navy than they are for DFO.11.5 Naval Contribution through Maritime Domain AwarenessLong before the National Security Policy was released, Canadian defence policy required that the Navy be capable of monitoring activity in Canada’s maritime zones for the purposes of national defence. In order to meet this obligation, the Navy established coastal surveillance centres, and became the de facto lead for development of maritime domain awareness. While other departments had maritime surveillance mandates, only the Navy attempted to integrate the data, information, and intelligence from all sources. The operational and technical contribution by the Navy to whole-of- government maritime domain awareness is significant, and it can be argued that it is the most important contribution to maritime security and enforcement made by the Navy.The two key departments with surveillance mandates, DND and DFO, expend considerable resources to achieve aerial presence in the Canadian maritime zones and approaches. This research has demonstrated that that the government surveillance effort is directed to the areas of greatest interest for maritime enforcement and sovereignty protection.11.6 Naval Contribution as Champion for Co-operationInter-agency co-operation is a functioning reality that spans three levels of interaction: strategic, regional, and tactical. At all levels, there are multiple federal working groups and committees that form a framework for interagency co-operation in oceans management and marine security and429enforcement. The policy vacuum described earlier set in motion the evolution of the ad hoc structure that works adequately due in large part to the professionalism and influence of a small number of individuals in key departments. The Navy is a key “driver” in this framework through its support of mechanisms and bodies for oceans co-operation and collaboration, as well as promotion and participation in information sharing and lessons learned on maritime security. The Navy champions multi-agency exercises that contribute to the long-term education process of staffs at all levels. The relationships cultivated through informal and formal initiatives have enabled departments to deal with maritime security issues with greater confidence and ability.The National Security Policy assigns the Navy the task of co-ordinating the on-water response to a marine threat in the Canadian maritime zones. Moreover, the Navy is required to establish Marine Security Operations Centres to facilitate co-ordination among government departments. This allows the Navy to influence the marine security response system as it evolves so that the significant collaborative planning, co-ordination, command and control capabilities that are resident within the Navy can be used to full effect.11.7 Contribution to KnowledgeThis research was undertaken to address a gap in the literature pertaining to the constabulary employment of the Navy in the maintenance of Canadian sovereignty. It adds to writings by a small number of Canadian scholars, but is differentiated from earlier works in that it goes beyond the discussion of just maritime strategy and policy to assess, in a geographic context, exactly what the Canadian Navy does to support domestic maritime enforcement efforts.This thesis makes three main contributions to knowledge. The first isthe documentation of the Canadian Navy’s involvement in maritime domainawareness, and the importance to marine security of this key function ofaovernment. The research shows that how the Navy, as the de facto co-430ordinator of maritime surveillance and intelligence, has been carrying out this undertaking on its own for decades. The second major contribution is the documentation of the overall level of effort as well as the spatial aspect of naval fisheries patrols over two decades. The third element is the articulation of the key role that the Navy plays in furthering interdepartmental coordination and co-operation in the marine security framework in Canada.11.8 Future ResearchRegrettably, this thesis was unable to explore the full range of domestic maritime enforcement activities in which the Navy plays a role. It would have been revealing to measure the improvement in surveillance capability that an embarked helicopter brings to a major warship, and what effect the reduction in Sea King helicopter flight hours has had on enforcement effectiveness.This research presented one measure of presence for military and PAL aerial surveillance presence. Unfortunately, it was not possible to measure the contribution to maritime domain awareness of single warships not employed in fisheries support. The presence of naval vessels and aircraft on enforcement tasks was determined in the conduct of this research, but to evaluate the complete picture, the presence of CCG, DFO, and RCMP patrol vessels need also to be analyzed.While the naval contribution to fisheries enforcement has been well documented in this thesis, the spatial element of smuggling, illegal migration, and environmental law-breaking remain to be analyzed, as well as the relative contribution of naval assets in the enforcement of these maritime threats.The question of deterrence is worthy of further study. Lessons learned from the exploratory study in Chapter Nine could be incorporated into the research design of a future study to ensure that a larger sample of respondents is obtained. This would allow statistically-supportable inferences to be drawn about the actual deterrent value of naval patrol assets in enforcement employment.431The focus of this project has been on domestic maritime enforcement. Over the past thirty years, the Canadian Navy has been involved in maritime enforcement missions abroad, such as United Nations embargoes on weapons and oil to questionable regimes. A geographic study similar to this one, with its focus on expeditionary Canadian naval enforcement operations would be a worthy contribution to knowledge.11.9 Closing ThoughtsResearch is a journey that takes one down many paths, some of which are quite unexpected. This project has shown that the Navy’s shore-based efforts in support of domain awareness outweigh the patrol activities that are regarded as “traditional” maintenance of sovereignty employment for the Navy. 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Assistant Chief of Staff Plans and Operations,Maritime Forces Atlantic. Interview by author, 2 March 2007.Brownstein, Jeff. Maritime Fishermen’s Union - Local 6. Interview by author, 19 February 2003.Giffin-Boudreau,Diane. Regional Director General Atlantic, Canada Border Services Agency. Interview by author, 22 June 2007.Grant, Shauna. Directorate of Maritime Strategy, Department of National Defence. Interview by author, 23 June 2003.Harrison, Captain(N) Richard. Assistant Chief of Staff Plans and Operations, Maritime Forces Pacific. Interview by author, 13 March 2001.Rhynold, Pat. Guysborough County Inshore Fishermen’s Association. Interview by author, 19 February 2003.Robertson, Captain(N) Drew. Commanding Officer HMCS Athabaskan. Interview by author, 1 December 2000.Warman, Lieutenant(N) Colin. Fifth Maritime Operations Group. 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HickeyA thesis presented for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at Cardiff University2008List of AppendicesTitle PageA Canadian Oceans-Related Federal Legislation A1B Example Marine Security Scenarios B1C Naval Unit Capabilities for Domestic / Security Ops C1D Maps - Marine Traffic Vessel Patterns D1E Maps - Search and Rescue Activity E1F Maps - Naval Fisheries Patrols F1G CP-140 Aircraft Patrols Depicted in Figure 7-4 G1H PAL Aircraft Patrols Depicted in Figure 7-7 H1J Naval Fisheries and Preventative Patrols 1980 - 2003 J1K Naval Fisheries Patrols Depicted in Various Figures K1L Naval Fisheries Patrol - Data Recording Instructions L1M Naval Fisheries Patrol - Data Summary Sheet M1N Participation of Fisheries Associations N1P Deterrence Survey Questionnaire P1Q Tools for Media Content Analysis Q1R Miscellaneous Tables and Co-ordinates R1S Published Articles S1Appendix ACANADIAN OCEANS-RELATED FEDERAL LEGISLATIONThe tables presented at this Appendix summarise the main federal oceans-related legislation in Canada. Fisheries and Oceans Canada is designated by the Oceans Act as the lead department for oceans policy development; the first table reflects this precedence and, thereafter, departments are treated alphabetically. The tables draw heavily from DFO published and internal staff sources.1TABLE A-1FEDERAL LEGISLATION - FISHERIES AND OCEANS CANADA AS LEAD AGENTLegislation (year) Statutory Lead AdministrativeResponsibilityRelationship to OceansAtlantic Fisheries Restructuring Act (1980)Canada Shipping A ct( 1980)Minister of Fisheries and OceansMinister of Transport, Minister of Fisheries and OceansSameMinister of Transport, Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, M inister o f National DefenceAuthorizes investment in and the provision of financial assistance to the Atlantic fisheries for the purpose of restructuring fishery enterprises.Marine navigation, marine search and rescue,pleasure craft safety, marine ship-source pollution prevention and response, lighthouses, receiver of wrecks, support to other federal departments and agencies.Coastal Fisheries Protection Act (1985)Minister of Fisheries and OceansSame Relates to licensing with respect to the entry of foreign vessels into Canadian waters for fishing a processing.1 Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, The Role of the Federal Government in the Oceans Sector (Ottawa: 1997), 33-36. See also internal DFO draft oceans policy document Paper_D6_Fed Legislation Update_240500 17 April 2000, Skillen/Chudczak/McDougall/King.A1Appendix ATABLE A-1 (continued)FEDERAL LEGISLATION - FISHERIES AND OCEANS CANADA AS LEAD AGENTLegislation (year) Statutory Lead AdministrativeResponsibilityRelationship to OceansFisheries Act (1985)Fisheries Development Act(1978)Minister of Fisheries and OceansMinister of Fisheries and OceansMinister of Fisheries and Oceans, Minister of Environment (Sec. 36-42)SameConservation and management of fisheries and habitats, licensing, enforcement, international fisheries agreements.Relates to fisheries enhancement and development, aquaculture and resource development research as well as to the more efficient exploitation of fishery resources, and the exploration for and development of new fishery resources and new fisheries.Fisheries Improvement Loans Act (1955)Fisheries Prices Support Act (1978)Minister of Fisheries and OceansMinister of Fisheries and OceansSameChairman of the Fisheries Prices Support BoardRespects loans to assist fishermen engaged in a primary fishing enterprise.Relates to the support of prices of fisheries products and establishes the Fisheries Prices Support Board.Fishing and Recreational Harbours Act(1977)Minister of Fisheries and OceansSameGovernment Organization Act 1979)Prime Minister Minister of Fisheries and OceansRelates to the administration and development of certain fishing and recreational harbours in Canada, including use, management, maintenance and enforcement of regulations.Assigns responsibility for physical oceanography, chemical oceanography, marine ecology, and ocean policy development.A2Appendix ATABLE A-1 (continued)FEDERAL LEGISLATION - FISHERIES AND OCEANS CANADA AS LEAD AGENTLegislation (year) Statutory Lead AdministrativeResponsibilityRelationship to OceansNational Energy Board Act (1985)Navigable Waters Protection Act (1985)Oceans Act (1997)Members of the Queen’s Privy Council for CanadaMinister of TransportMinister of Fisheries and OceansResources and Technical Surveys A ct( 1985)Minister of Natural ResourcesNational Energy Board, Minister of Fisheries and Oceans (Section 108)Minister of Transport, Minister of Fisheries and OceansMinister of Fisheries and Oceans .Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Minister of JusticeMinister of Natural Resources, Minister of Environment, Minister of Fisheries and OceansOffshore oil and gas pipelines, including in submarine areas, internal or external waters, and territorial sea of continental shelf.Protects the public right of navigation by providing for removal of obstructions and provides an approval mechanism for planned obstructions.Declares Canada’s maritime zones in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS); provides for the development and implementation of a national oceans management strategy; and provides for the consolidation and clarification of federal responsibilities for the management of Canada’s oceans.Provides for, among others, hydro-geological and oceanographic surveys relating to mineral exploration, development and production, and the preparation and publishing of maps and other data necessary to illustrate those Acts.A3Appendix ATABLE A-2FEDERAL LEGISLATION - ATLANTIC CANADA OPPORTUNITIES AGENCY AS LEAD AGENTLegislation (year) Statutory Lead AdministrativeResponsibilityRelationship to OceansAtlantic Canada Opportunities Agency Act (1985)President of ACOA President of ACOA To increase opportunities for economic development in Atlantic Canada and toenhance the growth of earned incomes and employment opportunities in that region.______________TABLE A-3FEDERAL LEGISLATION - AGRICULTURE CANADA AS LEAD AGENTLegislation (year) Statutory Lead AdministrativeResponsibilityRelationship to OceansFish Inspection Act (1985)Minister of Agriculture and Agri- FoodSame An Act respecting the inspection of fish and marine plants. Includes fees, possession, and restrictions. Promotes and supports the value, wholesomeness and marketability of fish products produced or sold in Canada.A4Appendix ATABLE A-4FEDERAL LEGISLATION - HERITAGE CANADA / PARKS CANADA AS LEAD AGENTSLegislation (year) Statutory Lead AdministrativeResponsibilityRelationship to OceansNational Parks Act (1998)Minister of Canadian HeritageSame Provides for the establishment of national marine parks within the context of the national parks system.Parks Canada Agency Act (1998)Canadian Heritage - - Parks CanadaParks Canada AgencyEstablishes the Parks Canada Agency.Saguenay-St. Lawrence Marine Park Act (1997)Government of Canada and Government of QuebecParks Canada Establishment of the Saguenay-St. Lawrence Marine Park to protect the environment, flora andfauna and the natural resources of the area for future generations._____TABLE A-5FEDERAL LEGISLATION - CANADA TRANSPORTATION AGENCY AS LEAD AGENTLegislation (year) Statutory Lead AdministrativeResponsibilityRelationship to OceansShipping Conferences Exemption Act (1987)Commissioner of the Canadian Transportation AgencySame Exempts certain shipping conference (association of ocean carriers that has the purpose or effect of regulating rates and conditions for the transportation by those ocean carriers of goods by water) practices from the provisions of the Competitive Act.A5Appendix ATABLE A-6FEDERAL LEGISLATION - INDIAN AND NORTHERN AFFAIRS CANADA AS LEAD AGENTLegislation (year) Statutory Lead AdministrativeResponsibilityRelationship to OceansArctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act (1985)Minister of Natural ResourcesCanada Petroleum Resources Act (1985)Canadian Polar Commission Act(1991)Minister of Indian and Northern AffairsBoard of Directors of the Commission / Members of the Queen’s Privy Council (GIC).Yukon Waters Act (1992)Minister of Indian and Northern AffairsMinister of Natural Resources, Minister of Environment, Minister of Indian and Northern AffairsMinister of Indian and Northern AffairsBoard of Directors of the CommissionMinister of Indian and Northern Affairs, Yukon Territory Water BoardProvisions concerning natural resources in areas of the Canadian Arctic for which the Minister has administrative responsibility. Regulations controlling the deposit of waste north of 60 degrees latitude. Relates to the exploitation of natural resources of arctic areas, and the transportation of those resources to the markets of the world.Regulates interest in petroleum in relation to frontier lands.To establish the Canadian Polar Commission with the purpose of promoting the development and dissemination of knowledge in respect of the polar region by monitoring the state of knowledge and reporting on it, promoting the development of knowledge, providingRelates to the use of water resources in the Yukon Territory, including diversion or obstruction of waters, any alteration of the flow of waters, and any alteration of the bed or banks of a river, stream, lake or other body of water.____________A6Appendix ATABLE A-7FEDERAL LEGISLATION - DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CANADA AS LEAD AGENTLegislation (year) Statutory Lead AdministrativeResponsibilityRelationship to OceansDepartment of Justice Act (1985)Minister of Justice Same Conduct of litigation (including international).Oceans Act {1997) Minister of Fisheries and OceansMinister of Fisheries and Oceans, Minister of JusticeSome federal and provincial laws can be applied in some parts of the sea to regulate activities that fall under Canadian jurisdiction (e.g. oil and gas exploration and exploitation). Declares Canada’s maritime zones in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).TABLE A-8FEDERAL LEGISLATION - DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE AS LEAD AGENTLegislation (year) Statutory Lead AdministrativeResponsibilityRelationship to OceansEmergencies Act (1985)Minister o f National DefenceSame Permits temporary measures to ensure safety and security o f Canadians.National Defence Act (1985)Minister o f National DefenceSame Establishes Canadian Forces in law.A7Appendix ATABLE A-9FEDERAL LEGISLATION - ENVIRONMENT CANADA AS LEAD AGENTLegislation (year) Statutory Lead AdministrativeResponsibilityRelationship to OceansArctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act (1985)Minister of Natural ResourcesCanada Water Act(1985)Minister of EnvironmentCanada Wildlife Act (1985)Canadian Environmental Assessment Act (1992)Minister of Environment, Minister of Indian and Northern AffairsMinister of Environment / Canadian Environmental Assessment AgencyMinister of Natural Resources, Minister of Environment, Minister of Indian and Northern AffairsMinister of Natural Resources, Minister of Environment, Minister of Indian and Northern AffairsMinister ofEnvironment, Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs (Northern Pipeline)Canadian Environmental Assessment AgencyProvisions concerning natural resources in areas of the Canadian Arctic. Regulations controlling the deposit of waste north of 60 degrees latitude. Relates to the exploitation of natural resources of arctic areas, and their transportation to the markets of the world.Management of water resources, including research and the planning and implementation of programs relating to the conservation, development and utilization of water resources. Pollution and demands on water resources of Canada.Wildlife conservation, research and interpretation, especially through partnerships and establishment of protected marine areas for wildlife.Establishes a federal environmental assessment process to achieve sustainable development by conserving and enhancing environmental quality and by encouraging and promoting economic development that conserves and enhances environmental quality. Integrating environmental planning into decisionmaking processes, preventing the degradation of environmental quality, ensuring that economic development is compatible with environmental quality.A8Appendix ATABLE A-9 (continued)FEDERAL LEGISLATION - ENVIRONMENT CANADA AS LEAD AGENTLegislation (year) Statutory Lead AdministrativeResponsibilityRelationship to OceansCanadian Environmental Protection Act (1988)Minister of Environment, Minister of HealthMinister of EnvironmentRespects the protection of the environment and of human life and health; declares the protection of the environment as essential to the well-being of Canada.Fisheries Act (1985)Minister of Fisheries and OceansMinister of Fisheries and Oceans, Minister of EnvironmentSections 36-42. Control of pollution from land-based sources, toxic substances, offshore oil and mineral resources development.Government Organization Act (1979)Prime Minister Minister of EnvironmentAssigns responsibility for ice services, marine weather and marine climate.Migratory Birds Convention Act (1994)Minister of EnvironmentSame Relates to the implementation of a Convention for the protection of migratory birds and their nests in Canada and the United States.Resources and Technical Surveys A ct{ 1985)Minister of Natural ResourcesMinister of Natural Resources, Minister of Environment, Minister of Fisheries and OceansProvides for, among others, hydro-geological and oceanographic surveys relating to mineral exploration, development and production, and the preparation and publishing of maps and other data necessary to illustrate those Acts.A9Appendix ATABLE A-10FEDERAL LEGISLATION - FOREIGN AFFAIRS AS LEAD AGENTLegislation (year) Statutory Lead AdministrativeResponsibilityRelationship to OceansCoasting Trade Act (1992)Minister of Foreign Affairs and International TradeMinister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Minister of TransportGoverns the granting of authority to foreign vessels wishing to conduct marine research within Canada’s Exclusive Economic Zone.Foreign Affairs and International Trade Act (1985)Minister of Foreign Affairs and International TradeSame Maritime boundary disputes. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).International Boundary Waters Treaty Act (1985)Minister of Foreign Affairs and International TradeSame Respects the International Joint Commission established under the treaty of January 11, 1909, relating to boundary waters between Canada and the United States of America.Oceans Act (1997) Minister of Fisheries and OceansMinister of Fisheries and Oceans, Minister of Justice, Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (maritime boundaries)Part I of the Oceans Act establishes maritime boundaries (territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone). Declares Canada’s maritime zones in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).TABLE A-11FEDERAL LEGISLATION - HEALTH CANADA AS LEAD AGENTLegislation (year) Statutory Lead AdministrativeResponsibilityRelationship to OceansFood and Drugs Act (1985)Minister of Health Same Ensures safe use of marine species for human consumption.A10Appendix ATABLE A-12FEDERAL LEGISLATION - HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT AS LEAD AGENTLegislation (year) Statutory Lead AdministrativeResponsibilityRelationship to OceansMerchant Seamen Compensation ActMinister of HRDC Same Relates to medical and hospital expenses and other benefits, expenses or allowances for merchant seamen.TABLE A-13FEDERAL LEGISLATION - ■ INDUSTRY CANADA AS LEAD AGENTLegislation (year) Statutory Lead AdministrativeResponsibilityRelationship to OceansGovernment Organization Act, Atlantic Canada (1987)Prime Minister Minister of Industry Regional economic development.National Research Council Act (1985)Minister of IndustryPresident of the NRC Established the NRC, which includes marine engineering and marine biology research.Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Act (1977)Minister of IndustryPresident of NSERC Established NSERC, which provides grant support to universities.Telecommunications A ct( 1993)Minister of IndustryMinister of Industry Submarine cables.Western Economic Diversification Act 1985)Minister of IndustryPresident of WED Regional economic development.A11Appendix ATABLE A-14FEDERAL LEGISLATION - NATIONAL ENERGY BOARD AS LEAD AGENTLegislation (year) Statutory Lead AdministrativeResponsibilityRelationship to OceansNational Energy Board Act (1990)Member of the Queen’s Privy Council for CanadaNational Energy BoardOffshore oil and gas pipelines, including in submarine areas, internal or external waters, and territorial sea of continental shelf.TABLE A-15FEDERAL LEGISLATION - NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL AS LEAD AGENTLegislation (year) Statutory Lead AdministrativeResponsibilityRelationship to OceansNational Research Council Act (1985)Minister of IndustryPresident of the NRC Established the NRC, which includes marine engineering and marine biology research.TABLE A-16FEDERAL LEGISLATION - CANADA REVENUE AGENCY AS LEAD AGENTLegislation (year) Statutory Lead AdministrativeResponsibilityRelationship to OceansCustoms Act (1985) Minister of National RevenueDeputy Minister of National RevenueIncludes goods transported in internal waters.Special Import Measures Act (1985)Minister of National RevenueDeputy Minister of National RevenueApplies to goods imported across waters.Customs and Excise Offshore Application Act (1984)Minister of National RevenueDeputy Minister of National RevenueApplication of federal customs laws in respect of goods on their arrival within the limits of the continental shelf of Canada, and goods in respect of which all duties and taxes are paid under federal customs laws and that are moved directly from one place to another within the limits of the continental shelf of Canada.A12Appendix ATABLE A-17FEDERAL LEGISLATION - NATURAL RESOURCES CANADA AS LEAD AGENTLegislation (year) Statutory Lead AdministrativeResponsibilityRelationship to OceansArctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act (1985)Canada- Newfoundland Atlantic Accord Implementation Act(1987)Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord Implementation Act(1988)Canada Oil and Gas Operations Act(1985)Canada Petroleum Resources Act(1986)Minister of Natural ResourcesMinister of Natural Resources, Minister of Environment, Minister of Indian and Northern AffairsMinister of Natural ResourcesMinister of Natural ResourcesSameSameHiberniaDevelopment Project Act (1990)Minister of Natural ResourcesMinister of Natural Resources, Minister of Indian and Northern AffairsMinister of Natural ResourcesSameSameSameProvisions concerning natural resources in areas of the Canadian Arctic for which the Minister has administrative responsibility. Regulations controlling the deposit of waste north of 60 degrees latitude. Relates to the exploitation of natural resources of arctic areas, and the transportation of those resources to the markets of the world.Development of offshore resources in Newfoundland.Development of offshore resources in Nova Scotia. Implements an agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of Nova Scotia on offshore petroleum resource management and revenue sharing. Natural gas, petroleum, oil.Regulation of exploration and exploitation of oil and gas.Regulates interests in petroleum in relation to frontier lands, to amend the Oil and Gas Production and Conservation Act and to repeal the Canada Oil and Gas Act.Respects the Hibernia Development Project and to amend certain Acts in relation thereto.A13Appendix ATABLE A-17 (continued)FEDERAL LEGISLATION - NATURAL RESOURCES CANADA AS LEAD AGENTLegislation (year) Statutory Lead AdministrativeResponsibilityRelationship to OceansResources and Technical Surveys Act (1985)Minister of Natural ResourcesMinister of Natural Resources, Minister of Environment, Minister of Fisheries and OceansProvides for, among others, hydro-geological and oceanographic surveys relating to mineral exploration, development and production, and the preparation and publishing of maps and other data necessary to illustrate those Acts.TABLE A-18FEDERAL LEGISLATION - PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE AS LEAD AGENTLegislation (year) Statutory Lead AdministrativeResponsibilityRelationship to OceansCanadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board Act (1989)President of the Privy Council OfficeAny department of the Government of CanadaEstablishes the Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board.Canadian Polar Commission Act (1991)Any member of the Queen’s Privy Council for CanadaSee above Establishes the Canadian Polar Commission, which promotes the development and dissemination of knowledge in respect of the polar regions.Canada Ports Corporation Act (1981)Any member of the Queen’s Privy Council for CanadaSee above Establishes the Canadian Ports Corporation.A14Appendix ATABLE A-19FEDERAL LEGISLATION - PUBLIC WORKS AS LEAD AGENTLegislation (year) Statutory Lead AdministrativeResponsibilityRelationship to OceansDry Docks Subsidies Act (1985)Minister of Public Works and Government ServicesSame Provides for aid to the construction of any dry dock, for naval and general purposes.Department o f Public Works and Government Services Act (1996)Prime Minister Minister of Public Works andGovernment ServicesProvides for acquisition services for goods and materiel, major Crown projects, Crown assets distribution and disposal, marine architecture and engineering, dredging, fleet services, and other real property services.TABLE A-20FEDERAL LEGISLATION - TRANSPORT CANADA AS LEAD AGENTLegislation (year) Statutory Lead AdministrativeResponsibilityRelationship to OceansCanada Marine Act Minister of(1998) TransportCanada Ports Corporation Act (1981)Canada Shipping Act (1985)Member of the Queen’s Privy Council (GIC)Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, Minister of TransportCanadianTransportationAgencyMinister of TransportMinister of Fisheries and Oceans, Minister of Transport,Minister of National DefencePurpose to make the system of Canadian ports competitive, efficient and commercially oriented, to provide for the establishment of port authorities and to divest certain harbours and ports, for the commercializing of the St. Lawrence Seaway and ferry services and other matters related to maritime trade and transport.To establish the Canada Ports Corporation.Services for the safe, economical and efficient movement of ships in Canadian waters.Appendix ATABLE A-20 (continued)FEDERAL LEGISLATION - TRANSPORT CANADA AS LEAD AGENTLegislation (year) Statutory Lead AdministrativeResponsibilityRelationship to OceansCanadian Transportation Act (1979)Carriage o f Goods by Water Act (1993)Coasting Trade Act(1992)Government Organization Act(1979)Harbour Commission ActMarineTransportation Security Act (1994)NationalTransportation Act(1987)CanadianTransportationAgencyMinister of TransportCanadianTransportationAgencySameMinister of TransportSamePrime MinisterMinister of TransportMinister of TransportMinister of TransportSameSameMinister of TransportSameEstablishes the Canadian Transportation Agency.Carriage of goods by ship from one place in Canada to another place in Canada. Relates to the United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea(1978).Reserves cabotage in Canadian waters to domestic ships and provides for temporary use of foreign ships when no suitable Canadian ship is available. Applies to transportation of passenger and cargo and activities of a commercial nature.Includes control of ship- source discharge.Provides for the establishment of harbour commissions and a national port policy.Provides for the security of marine transportation, and applies to vessels and marine facilities in Canada, Canadian ships outside Canada, and marine installations and structures.Review of mergers and acquisitions of marine undertakings. Licensing of northern marine resupply. Dispute resolution mechanisms for shippers and carriers in the marine mode.A16Appendix ATABLE A-20 (continued)FEDERAL LEGISLATION - TRANSPORT CANADA AS LEAD AGENTLegislation (year) Statutory Lead AdministrativeResponsibilityRelationship to OceansNavigable Waters Protection Act (1985)Minister of TransportMinister of Transport, Minister of Fisheries and OceansProtects the public right of navigation by providing for removal of obstructions and provides an approval mechanism for planned obstructions.Pilotage Act (1985) Minister of TransportSame Marine pilotage in certain waters of Canada.Canada Marine Act (1998)Shipping Conferences Exemptions Act (1987)Minister of TransportCommissioner of the CTASameCommissioner of the CTA, Minister of TransportProvides for the management of public harbours and port facilities. Provides an exemption from Canadian competition law to national and international shipping lines to collectively set prices, terms and conditions for international marine transportation. Does not apply to domestic marine transportation.St. Lawrence Seaway Authority Act (1996)Minister of TransportSame Seaway operations.A17Appendix BEXAMPLE MARINE SECURITY SCENARIOSChapters Four and Five identified the large number of federal departments and agencies that have responsibility for marine affairs in Canada. The chapters also outlined the specific departmental mandates, jurisdictions and extant working groups and committee structures. The following scenarios demonstrate, in tabular form, the multitude of departments or agencies that may be implicated in a maritime security or enforcement incident in Canadian waters.TABLE B - 1 EXAMPLE MARINE SECURITY SCENARIOSPossible Nature of Initial Federal Federal ReferencesIncident Operational Support____________________ Lead_________ Organisations_____________________Scenario - Fire on a Merchant Ship in the Great Lakes (Canadian waters)-Search and Rescue DFO / CCG TC Canada Shipping Act-Safety CBSA Department of Foreign Affairs and-Environment CRA International Trade (DFAIT) ActCIC Oceans ActDFAIT Canadian Environmental Protection ActDND/CF Boundary Waters TreatyEC National Search and Rescue (SAR)RCMP ManualMOU between CCG and USCG Canada/US Joint Marine Pollution Contingency PlanScenario - Petroleum Blow-out on Oil Platform in Hibernia (24-200 nm from Cdn coast)-Safety DFO / CCG DFAIT Canada Shipping Act-Search and Rescue DND/CF Canadian Offshore Gas Lands Act-Environment EC Oceans ActNRCan Canadian Environmental Protection ActPSC Department of Foreign Affairs andRCMP International Trade (DFAIT) ActTC IMO International Convention on SAR Transport Publication 6472 “Standards Respecting Mobile Offshore Drilling Units”B1Appendix BTABLE B -1 (continued)EXAMPLE MARINE SECURITY SCENARIOSPossible Nature ofIncidentInitial FederalOperationalLeadFederalSupportOrganisationsReferencesScenario - Striking workers seize control of offshore oil rig and threaten its destruction unless their demands are met (24-200 nm from Cdn coast).-Law Enforcement (Criminal) -Safety -EnvironmentRCMP PSC Criminal Code of CanadaDFAIT Oceans ActDFO/CCG Royal Canadian Mounted Police ActDND/CF Canadian Environmental Protection ActEC Department o f Foreign Affairs andNRCan International Trade (DFAIT) ActRCMP Prescribed Places ofEmployment Order (P C. 1988-1520)Scenario - Intelligence reports that a container ship from Colombia destined for Halifax may contain a radiological bomb.-Terrorism RCMP/PSC DND/CF Canada Shipping Actco-leads CNSC Customs ActCSE Marine Transportation Security ActCSIS Oceans ActDFAIT Security Offences ActDFO/CCG Criminal Code of CanadaCRA Canadian Environmental Protection ActEC CSIS ActHC Department of Foreign Affairs andTC International Trade ActInternational Maritime Law and Conventions (SOLAS, SUA)CF Armed Assistance Directions (CFAAD)National Counter-Terrorism Plan National Support Plan Guidelines Concerning Cooperation on Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Counter- Terrorism Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of AmericaB2Appendix BTABLE B -1 (continued)EXAMPLE MARINE SECURITY SCENARIOSPossible Nature of Initial Federal Federal ReferencesIncident Operational Support____________________ Lead_________Organisations___________________________________Scenario - Intelligence determines that illegal immigrants may be stowed on a (foreign flagged) freighter 100 km offshore and moving north along the west coast of North America (24-200 nm from Cdn coast).-Illegal Immigration CBSA RCMP Customs ActCIC Immigration and Refugee Protection ActCSIS Marine Transportation Security ActDFAIT National Defence ActDFO/CCG Oceans ActHC Canada Shipping ActPSC CSIS ActTC Department o f Foreign Affairs andDND/CF International Trade ActScenario - A foreign trawler is reported to be fishing for cod on the Grand Banks without permission. (24-200 nm from Cdn coast).-Law Enforcement (Fisheries) -Conservation -Sovereignty issueDFO DFAIT Oceans ActDND/CF Fisheries ActRCMP National Defence ActPSC Coastal Fisheries Protection Act (andRegulations)Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade ActScenario - A re-supply ship in the Arctic reports it has hit an ice flow and is leaking oil.-Environment DFO/CCG DFAIT Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act-Search and Rescue DND/CF (and Regulations)-Safety EC Canada Shipping ActPSC Canadian Environmental Protection ActT C Department o f Foreign Affairs andInternational Trade ActScenario - A freighter carrying hazardous materials in Lake Superior loses power during a storm (in Canadian waters in the Great Lakes).-Search and Rescue DFO/CCG-Safety-EnvironmentDFAIT Canada Shipping ActDND/CF Transportation of Dangerous Goods ActEC Navigable Waters Protection ActHC Canadian Environmental Protection ActDOJ Department of Foreign Affairs andPSC International Trade ActTC Canada/US Joint Marine PollutionContingency PlanB3Appendix BTABLE B -1 (continued)EXAMPLE MARINE SECURITY SCENARIOSPossible Nature ofIncidentInitial Federal Federal Operational SupportLead_________ OrganisationsReferencesScenario - Terrorists seize control of a cruise ship after it leaves Halifax and it remains in Canadian waters.-Terrorism PSC/RCMP CBSA Customs Actco-leads DND/CF Criminal Code of CanadaCNSC Marine Transportation Security ActCSE Security Offences ActCSIS Oceans ActDFAIT CSIS ActCRA Department of Foreign Affairs andCIC International Trade ActDFO/CCG Immigration and Refugee Protection ActEC International Maritime Law andHC Conventions (SOLAS, SUA)TC CF Armed Assistance Directions(CFAAD)National Counter Terrorism PlanScenario - Terrorists seize control of a cruise ship after it leaves Halifax and it has left Canadian waters and is in international waters.-Terrorism DFAIT PSC Customs ActRCM P Criminal Code of CanadaCBSA Marine Transportation Security ActDND/CF Security Offences ActCNSC Oceans ActCSE CS/S ActCSIS Department of Foreign Affairs andCRA International Trade ActCic Immigration and Refugee Protection ActDFO/CCG International Maritime Law andEC Conventions (SOLAS, SUA)HC CF Armed Assistance DirectionsTC (CFAAD)National Counter Terrorism PlanScenario - A civilian passenger aircraft crashes off the coast near Machias Island in the Bay of Fundy (0-12nm in Canadian waters).-Search and Rescue DFO/CCG RCMP Customs ActTC Oceans ActCRA Aeronautics ActDFAIT CSIS ActDND/CF Department o f Foreign Affairs andInternational Trade ActB4Appendix BTABLE B -1 (continued)EXAMPLE MARINE SECURITY SCENARIOSPossible Nature ofIncidentInitial FederalOperationalLeadFederalSupportOrganisationsReferencesScenario - A passing ship reports a suspicious rendezvous between a freighter and a fishing trawler at dusk just beyond 12 miles off of Canadian/US territory.-Unknown-Possible criminal or terrorist activity.RCMP CBSA Criminal Code of CanadaCRA Environment ActCIC Immigration and Refugee Protection ActCSIS Excise ActDFAIT Oceans ActDFO/CCG Customs ActDND/CF Controlled Drugs and Substances ActPSC Marine Transportation Security ActTC CSIS ActDepartment of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Act Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act RCMP Prescribed Places ofEmployment Order (P.C. 1988-1520)Scenario - A passing RCMP has been informed that a ship spotted sailing in the Great Lakes is transporting drugs to Canada.-Law Enforcement (Criminal)RCMP CBSA Customs ActCIC Controlled Drugs and Substances ActDFAIT Criminal Code of CanadaDFO/CCG Oceans ActDND/CF National Defence ActTC Canada Shipping ActImmigration and Refugee Protection Act Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Act DND/RCMP MOU on Counter Drug OperationsScenario - Two ships collide in the Gulf of St. Lawrence.TC ( if minor-Search and Rescue-Safety-Environment DFO/CCG ( if major)TCECCBSACRADFAITDFO/CCGDND/CFCustoms Act Canada Shipping Act Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade ActB5Appendix CNAVAL CAPABILITIES FOR ENFORCEMENT AND DOMESTICOPERATIONSTable C-1 summarizes the core capabilities that Atlantic-based naval vessels and shore units could bring to bear for maritime enforcement or domestic operations. These are generic capabilities that may be lessened or enhanced depending on the state of readiness of a particular unit at a given time.TABLE C -1NAVAL UNIT CAPABILITIES FOR ENFORCEMENT/DOMESTIC OPERATIONSUnits Capability RemarksIROQUOIS Class Destroyers HMCS Athabaskan HMCS IroquoisMax Speed : 29 kts plus Max Range : 4500nm at 10 kts Complement: 280Pacific-based Destroyers HMCS AlgonquinCommand and Control PlatformArea Air DefenceSearch and RescueSeaward SecurityVery good capability to relocate to remote locations and provide full suite of Command and Control ( C2) services to both military and civilian agencies.Services include;-secure/open satellite andradio communications-workspaces-task group staff-briefing facilities-radar/communicationsurveillance-rations and quarters-Internet/Intranet-secure workplaces.Large area coverage. Ability to detect, classify, identify and, if necessary, destroy airborne threats.On-scene command, helicopter equipped.Anti-air, anti-surface and antisubmarine weapons and sensors. Trained combat teams.C1Appendix CTABLE C -1 (continued)NAVAL UNIT CAPABILITIES FOR ENFORCEMENT/DOMESTIC OPERATIONSUnits Capability RemarksIROQUOIS Class Destroyers Boarding Parties 20 man team plus 50% in reserve.Container search trained including rappelling Able to provide up to 3 prize crews (custodial) to commandeered vessels.Explosives Ordnance Disposal (EOD)Casualty Clearing / Medical AssistanceOrganic capability to dispose of IED immediately threatening the ship.12-16 crew members crossed trained as casualty clearers, advanced First Aiders.Maritime InterdictionCH-124 HelicopterFlight Deck- detecting- intercepting- hailing- questioning- searching- rerouting- seizing/arresting3 Hr PLE125 kts (150 max)4 aircrewRescue capacity 4 - 6 (depending on A/C weight)Able to accommodate a variety of rotary wing from both Canadian and Allied forces. Dependent on the Helairdet status of the ship as well as her current flight deck certification.Deck cycle 12-18 hours depending on size of embarked Helairdet.Diving Small Boats12 man dive team.2 Zodiacs1 Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat (RHIB)Facilities to tie up numerous craft (boats booms/ladders).02Appendix CTABLE C -1 (continued)NAVAL UNIT CAPABILITIES FOR ENFORCEMENT/DOMESTIC OPERATIONSUnits Capability RemarksIROQUOIS Class Destroyers Refueling Aviation Fuel (JP5) Diesel/gasoline for small boats.Cranage Work Parties1 Stores Crane - 12001b SWL.Dependent on the other tasks ongoing, up to 50 man work parties could be made available for duties ashore including humanitarian assistance and security functions.Fire Fighting 6 professional Firefighters Ships company trained in shipboard firefighting and flood control.Engineering Mechanical, electrical, construction journeyman personnel.Workshops available.HALIFAX Class Frigates (FFH)HMCS Charlottetown HMCS Fredericton HMCS Halifax HMCS Montreal HMCS St John's HMCS Toronto HMCS Ville de QuebecMax Speed: 30 kts +Max Range: 7100nm at 15 kts Complement: 225Command and Control PlatformGood capability to relocate to remote locations and provide full suite of C2 services to both military and civilian agencies. Services include;-secure/open Satellite andradio communications-workspaces-briefing facilities-radar/communicationsurveillance-rations and quarters-Internet/Titan/DIN-secure sitePacific-based Frigates HMCS Calgary HMCS Ottawa HMCS Regina HMCS Vancouver HMCSWinnipegC3Appendix CTABLE C -1 (continued)NAVAL UNIT CAPABILITIES FOR ENFORCEMENT/DOMESTIC OPERATIONSUnits Capability RemarksHALIFAX Class Frigates Air Defence Self-defence or threat bearing picket only with very limited effectiveness against crossing targets. Ability to detect, classify, identify and if necessary destroy airborne threats within 10nm of own ship.Search and Rescue On-scene command, Helicopter equipped.Seaward Security Anti-air, anti-surface and antisubmarine weapons and sensors. Trained combat team s.Boarding Parties 20 man team plus 50% in reserve.Container search trained including rappelling.Able to provide up to 3 prize crews (custodial) to commandeered vessels.Casualty Clearing/Medical Assistance1 senior Physician Assistant 1 junior Physician Assistant 12-16 Steward/Cooks crossed trained as Casualty Clearers - Advanced First Aiders.Maritime interdiction - detecting- intercepting- hailing- questioning- searching- rerouting- seizing/arresting.CH-124 Helicopter 3 Hr PLE125 kts (150 max)4 aircrewRescue capacity 4 - 6 (depending on A/C weight).Diving 12 man dive team.C4Appendix CTABLE C -1 (continued)NAVAL UNIT CAPABILITIES FOR ENFORCEMENT/DOMESTIC OPERATIONSUnits Capability RemarksHALIFAX Class Frigates Flight Deck Able to accommodate a variety of rotary wing from both Canadian and Allied forces. Dependent on the Helairdet status of the ship as well as her current flight deck certification.Deck cycle 12 hours with embarked Helairdet.Small BoatsRefueling2 Zodiacs1 Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat (RHIB)Facilities to tie up numerous craft (boats booms/ladders).Aviation Fuel (JP5) Diesel/gasoline for small boats.Cranage Work Parties1 Stores Crane - 12001b SWLDependent on the other tasks ongoing, up to 50 man work parties could be made available for duties ashore including humanitarian assistance and security functions.Fire Fighting 6 professional Firefighters. Ships company trained in shipboard firefighting and flood control.Engineering Mechanical, electrical, construction journeyman personnel.Workshops available.C5Appendix CTABLE C -1 (continued)NAVAL UNIT CAPABILITIES FOR ENFORCEMENT/DOMESTIC OPERATIONSUnits Capability RemarksKINGSTON Class Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels (MCDV)HMCS Glace Bay HMCS Goose Bay HMCS Kingston HMCS Shawinigan HMCS Moncton HMCS SummersideMax Speed: 15 kts Max Range: 5000nm at 8 kts Complement: 31-40 (+ 8 if accommodations payload embarked)18 days endurance provided RODs can be operated.Pacific-based MCDVs HMCS Brandon HMCS Edmonton HMCS Nanaimo HMCS Saskatoon HMCSWhitehorse HMCS YellowknifeLimited Command and Control PlatformMine Hunting/ClearanceCan relocate to remote areas. Very limited capability to operate in ice.Limited number of comms circuits but capable of HF/UHF/INMARSAT secure/unsecure voice/data comms.VHF unsecure comms -secure briefing facilities -radar surveillance -no ESM-rations and quarters -Internet/Titan/DIN.Ship can embark Remotely Operated Vehicles (ROVs) or Side Scan Sonar systems to identify mine/objects on seabed.Ship can embark Containerized Dive System and Clearance Diving Team, in which case ship can dispose of any non-NBC ordnance.Ship can embark mechanical mine sweeping payloads to clear tethered minesSearch and Rescue On-scene CommanderSeaward Security 40mm and 50cals Visual engagements only Small ArmsBoarding Parties Nil.Explosives Ordnance Disposal (EOD)Nil - Unless ship is carrying Containerized Dive System and Clearance Diving Team embarked in which case ship can dispose of any non-NBC ordnance .C6Appendix CTABLE C -1 (continued)NAVAL UNIT CAPABILITIES FOR ENFORCEMENT/DOMESTIC OPERATIONSUnits Capability RemarksKINGSTON Class Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels (MCDV)Casualty Clearing/Medical AssistanceMaritime InterdictionCH-124 Helicopter DivingFlight DeckSmall BoatsRefueling Cranage Work Parties3 pers Casualty Clearing Team Advance First Aid qualified.- hailing- questioningNilNil - 3 rescue swimmers Ship can embark Containerized Dive System and Clearance Diving Team.Nil - Capable of VERTREP for personnel/stores transfer.6 pers ZodiacCan embark 10 pers RHIB.Gasoline for small engines. 20001b SWL.Dependent on the other tasks ongoing and crew size, up to 12 man work parties could be made available for duties ashore.Fire Fighting Ship’s company trained for shipboard firefighting and damage control.Engineering Electrical and Electronic journeymen embarked.Very limited on board repair facilities as maintenance provided by civilian contractor.01Appendix CTABLE C -1 (continued)NAVAL UNIT CAPABILITIES FOR ENFORCEMENT/DOMESTIC OPERATIONSUnits Capability RemarksHMCS PreserverAs the only east coast AOR (Auxiliary Oiler - Replenishment) unique capabilities are her large size, capable of transporting men and materiel, her enhanced helicopter maintenance facilities, enhanced medical facilities and large number of small boats.Max Speed: 20 ktsMax Range: 7500nm at 12ktsComplement: 365Command and Control PlatformGood capability to relocate to remote locations and provide full suite of C2 services to both military and civilian agencies. Services include;-secure/open Satellite andradio comms-workspaces-briefing facilities-radar/communicationsurveillance-rations and quarters-Internet/Titan/DIN-secure site.Pacific-based AOR HMCS ProtecteurAir Defence Limited to self-defence of own ship.Cargo Capacity Dry Cargo - 1000 tons. Ammo -1250 tons.Search and Rescue On-scene Command, Helicopter equipped.Boarding Parties 20 man team plus 50% in reserve.Container search trained including rappelling.Casualty Clearing/Medical AssistanceDivingMaritime Interdiction1 Medical Officer 1 Dental Officer 1 senior Physicians Assistant 1 junior Physicians Assistant 6 Bed Sick Bay with facilities for minor surgeries and X-ray12-16 Steward/Cooks crossed trained as Casualty Clearers - Advanced First Aiders.12 man dive team.- hailing- questioning- searching- rerouting- seizing/arrestingC8Appendix CTABLE C -1 (continued)NAVAL UNIT CAPABILITIES FOR ENFORCEMENT/DOMESTIC OPERATIONSUnits Capability RemarksHMCS Preserver CH-124 Helicopter 3 Hr PLE125 kts (150 max)4 aircrew.Diving Flight Deck12 man dive team.Able to accommodate a variety of rotary wing from both Canadian and Allied forces. Dependent on the Helairdet status of the ship as well as her current flight deck certification.Deck cycle 12 hours with embarked Helairdet.Small BoatsRefueling2 LCVP (40 man landing craft) 2 Zodiacs 1 RHIBFacilities to tie up numerous craft (boats booms/ladders).Distillate (ship)14,590 tons. Aviation Fuel (JP5) 400 tons. Diesel/gasoline for small boats.Cranage 2 10 tonne flight deck/stores cranes.Work Parties Dependent on the other tasks ongoing, up to 50 man work parties could be made available for duties ashore including humanitarian assistance and security functions.Fire Fighting 6 professional Firefighters. Ships company trained in shipboard firefighting and flood control.Engineering Mechanical, electrical, construction journeyman personnel.Workshops available.C9Appendix CTABLE C -1 (continued)NAVAL UNIT CAPABILITIES FOR ENFORCMENT/DOMESTIC OPERATIONSUnits Capability RemarksExplosives Ordnance Disposal (EOD)Military EOD team deals with conventional military ordnance on military property. If it is not something in military property then it becomes the problem of the local police/RCMP. If civilian organizations need help then it becomes a provision of service.EOD can deploy 3 teams of 3 at any one time. However, 1 team will have all the kit and the other two teams will have partial kit.EOD have a 1 hour roll (time from call to team until the truck is leaving FDU) out response for in area call after hours. During working hours it will be much faster.Port Security Unit (PSU)The mission of the PSU is to provide waterside security of harbours, anchorages and their immediate approaches to the high water mark in times of crisis or contingency in Canada and North America.Surveillance.Contact analysis and reporting.Interdiction of vessels going in and out of the harbour.Waterside security for military forces or OGDs.EOD can short notice deploy away from FDU for 3-5 days before support issues start to cause difficulties. Otherwise, EOD really needs 72 hours heads up to move.PSU is activated under the authority of Commander Canada Command in response to a threat to Canada.Deployability - factors and limitations: the PSU requires combat service support and landward security commensurate with the threat.Force Protection - a deterrence against waterborne threats.Command, Control and Communications support vessel movement control - i.e. assigning anchorages and berths.The PSU may also require intelligence, communications and other operational support, dependant on the threat and mission.C10Appendix CTABLE C -1 (continued)NAVAL UNIT CAPABILITIES FOR ENFORCEMENT/DOMESTIC OPERATIONSUnits Capability RemarksPort Security Unit (PSU) Port safety.Law enforcement support. EOD operations.Salvage and safe navigation. Aids to navigation.DivingMonitoring and enforcing safety and/or exclusion zones.Through provision of transportation and C2Port Inspection Dive TeamC11Appendix DMaps - Marine Vessel Detection PatternsUnless otherwise noted, the vessel data for all maps in Appendix D originated from Fisheries and Oceans Canada as PAL flight mission data. These data were parsed from all sensor sources at the Maritime Operations Centre at Maritime Forces Atlantic Headquarters in 2002.60 °W 50 ®WN E W F O U N D L A N DNEW ^ BRU N S WI CNOVAC O T ^ / j60 °W 50 °WFigure D-1. Cumulative Vessel Detections by PAL Flights - 2002D1N.OS N.Ofr N.OS N.OfrAppendix D60°W 50 °WC A N A D AN E WF O U N D L A N DNEW W BRUNSWI CN O V AICOTIA60 °W 50“WFigure D-2. Vessel Detections by PAL Flights - January 200260 °W 50 °WC A N A D AN E W F O U N D L A N DNEW ^ B RUNS WI CN O V AiCOTIJ60 °W 50°WFigure D-3. Vessel Detections by PAL Flights - February 2002D2N.OS N.Ot' N.OS N.OfrAppendix D60 °W 50 °WC A N A D AQUEBECNE W F O U N D L A N DNEWBRUNSWI CI. NOVAi COTi A60°WFigure D-4. Vessel Detections by PAL Flights - March 200260 ”W 50 "WC A N A D AQU E B E CV •» , ,a• • •60 °W 50°WFigure D-5. Vessel Detections by PAL Flights - April 2002D3N.OS N.O> N.OS N.OfrAppendix DN E W F O U N D L A N DNEW r B R U N S Wi C IN O V ACOTI AFigure D-6. Vessel Detections by PAL Flights - May 200250°WC A N A D AN E W F O U N D L A N DNEW ^ BR U N S WI C INOVA C O T1AFigure D-7. Vessel Detections by PAL Flights - June 2002C A N A D AQ U E B E C50 °WD4N.OS N.Ofr N.OS N.OfrAppendix DQUEBECN E W F O U N D L A N DNEW ^ B R U N S WI CNOVA C 0 TIANE WF O U N D L A N DNEW ^ B R U N S WI CNOVACOTI JC A N A D Au uFigure D-9. Vessel Detections by PAL Flights - August 2002C A N A D A50 °W60 °W 50*WFigure D-8. Vessel Detections by PAL Flights - July 200250°WD5N.OS N.Ot' N.OS N.OfAppendix D( I■ wS 3C A N A D AQ U E B E CN E W F O U N D L A N DN E W B R U N S W I CN O V AC O T I60*W 50 °WFigure D-10. Vessel Detections by PAL Flights - September 2002C A N A D AN E W F O U N D L A N D> 7 v. . . • . / * A H. 7 / i *r*r*,• %60°W 50 “WFigure D-11. Vessel Detections by PAL Flights - October 2002D6N.0* N.OS N.OfrAppendix DN E W F O U N D L A N DN E W ^ B R U N S W I C. N O V A; C O T I A60°W 50 °WFigure D-12. Vessel Detections by PAL Flights - November 200250 °WC A N A D AN E W F O U N D L A N DN E W r B R U N S W I C !N O V ArCOTMFigure D-13. Vessel Detections by PAL Flights - December 200250”WC A N A D AD 7N.OS N.Ot' N.OS N.OVAppendix DC A N A D AQUEBEC■ « \^ .»• .60°W 50 "WFigure D-14. Vessel Detections by PAL Flights - Summer 2002. / • *60 °W 50-W‘ 8Figure D-15. Vessel Detections by PAL Flights - Fall 2002D840 °N 50“N 40 "N 50"NAppendix D50 wC A N A D AV • \ * #. 7 *.Vi - •NE WF O U N D L A N DNEW B R U N S WI CNOVACOTIFigure D-16. Vessel Detections by PAL Flights - Winter 2002C A N A D A•• #50 ”Wa m’ SFigure D-17. Vessel Detections by PAL Flights - Spring 2002D940'N 50“N 40*N 50°NAppendix Dz“ 8zQUEBECNEWFOUNDLANDNEW ^ BRUNSWICNOVACOTM60°W 50°WFigure D-18. Cumulative Vessel Detections by PAL Flights - 2002NEWFOUNDLANDNEW ^ BRUNSWICNOVAiCOTIAi i i i i 1 i i— r — i 1 i i i i i i i i i60 °W 50°WFigure D-19. Vessel Detections by PAL Flights - January 200260°W 50”WD1040°N 50'N 40°N 50°NNOVA COT I AAppendix D60°W 50°W60°W 50"WFigure D-20. Vessel Detections by PAL Flights - February 200260°W 50°WFigure D-21. Vessel Detections by PAL Flights - March 2002D11N.OS N.OF N.OS N.OFNEWFOUNDLANDNEW ^ BRUNSWICNOVACOTMAppendix D60°W 50°Weo’wFigure D-22. Vessel Detections by PAL Flights - April 2002NEWFOUNDLANDNEW ^ BRUNSWICNOVAiCOTIA50 W60°W 50 vvFigure D-23. Vessel Detections by PAL Flights - May 2002D12N.OS N.OfrAppendix DMoat Contacts60°W 60°WFigure D-24. Vessel Detections by PAL Flights - June 2002QUEBECZ8BRUNSWI CNOVACOTIAz?60°W 50 °WFigure D-25. Vessel Detections by PAL Flights - July 2002D13Appendix D60°W 50°WQUEBECNEWFOUNDLANDNEW ^ BRUNSWI CNOVACOTiA60°WFigure D-26. Vessel Detections by PAL Flights - August 2002NEWFOUNDLANDNEW ^ BRUNSWI CNOVA ICOTI A60°W 50°W60°W 50°WFigure D-27. Vessel Detections by PAL Flights - September 2002D14NoOS N.Ofr N.OS N.OfrAppendix D60°W 50°WNEWFOUNDLANDNEW ^ BRUNSWI C, N O V A i C O TIAFigure D-28. Vessel Detections by PAL Flights - October 2002NE WFOUNDLANDNEW ^ BRUNSWI CNOVACOTIA60°W 50°W2I I I I I I I I I ~ " I ■ | I I ! I 1 I I \ ‘ °60°W 50“WFigure D-29. Vessel Detections by PAL Flights - November 2002D15N.OS N.OT N.OS N.OfrNEWFOUNDLANDNOVACOTIflAppendix D60°W 50”W I—60°W— 1—50“WFigure D-30. Vessel Detections by PAL Flights - December 2002NOVACOTIA60°WFigure D-31. Vessel Detections by PAL Flights - Summer 2002D1640“N 50°N 40“N60”W 50°WFigure D-32. Vessel Detections by PAL Flights - Fall 2002QUEBECMost ContactsNEWFOUNDLANDNEW ^ BRUNSWI CNOVACOTIAAppendix D60°W 50°WQUEBECNEWFOUNDLANDNEW ^ BRUNSWI CNOVAiCOTIAi "i r i i i i i i i' i i i i i i i i i i i i 60”W 50°WFigure D-33. Vessel Detections by PAL Flights - Winter 200260°W 50°WD17N.OS N.Ofr N.OS N.OfrMaximum PresenceNOVACOT MAppendix D60°W 50°W60°W 50”WFigure D-34. Vessel Detections by PAL Flights - Spring 2002Figure D-35. Vessel Detections by Naval Vessels - 1999 to 2000Source: Researcher’s contact logs aboard 13 naval vessels.D18Appendix EMAPS - SEARCH AND RESCUE ACTIVITYUnless otherwise noted, data for all maps in Appendix E were collected from Canadian Coast Guard national headquarters through the Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre at Halifax, Nova Scotia in 2002.60°W 50°WC A N A D AzVN EJNf 8 U N D L A H8- T r .1* U VM • *' *p *z60°WFigure D-1. SAR Incidents in Atlantic Canada - 1999 to 2002E140'N 50'N 40°N 50'NAppendix E60°WN E W F O U N D L ,IR UNS WFigure D-2. SAR incidents - 1999 to 2002 Surface ModelC A N A D A.*rN E W F flU N D L A N gFigure D-3. SAR Incidents 1999E240“N 50°N 40°N 50°NAppendix EC A N A D Ar i• • • /60 °WFigure D-4. SAR Incidents 2000C A N A D AN E W F O U N D L A N D•»60 °W 50 ”WFigure D-5. SAR Incidents 2001E350*NQUEBECN ^ V F O U N D L A ^ DNEW ^ BRU NSWICI1000m1Appendix EC A N A D Aa mFigure D-6. SAR Incidents 200250°WI50°Wz8N E W F O U N D L A N DME W B R U N S W I C IFigure D-7. SAR Incidents 1999 - Surface ModelE4QUEBECAppendix E60°W 50°WFigure D-8. SAR Incidents 2000 - Surface ModelQUEBECNEWFOUNDLANDSNEW” B R U N S W I C IFigure D-9. SAR Incidents 2001 - Surface Model40*NQUEBECNEWFOUNDLAlNEŴBRUNSWHAppendix E60 "W 50°WFigure D-10. SAR Incidents 2002 - Surface ModelC A N A D ANEWFOUNDLANDNEW ^ BRUNSWICIa ti50°WFigure D-11. SAR Incidents 1999-2002 - Summer MonthsE6NoOS NcOtAppendix EC A N A D A» ..zS3N E W F O U N D L A IJ JFigure D-12. SAR Incidents 1999-2002 - Fall MonthsCANADANEWFOUNDLAND60”WFigure D-13. SAR Incidents 1999-2002 - Winter Months50*WE 7IUEBECN E W F O U N D L A IN F W " BRUNSWI<®UEINEWFOUNDLANDNEWBRUNSWICI’N 9V AC® TIJAppendix ECANADAFigure D-14. SAR Incidents 1999-2002 - Spring MonthsFigure D-15. SAR Incidents 1999-2002 - Summer Months Surface ModelE8C O I LAppendix E60°W 50°WFigure D-16. SAR Incidents 1999-2002 - Fall Months Surface Model60°WQUEBECNEW ^ BRUNSWICI50°WFigure D-17. SAR Incidents 1999-2002 - Winter Months Surface ModelE9Q U EB ECN E W F O U N D L A INEW * B R U N SW IAppendix E60 °WFigure D-18. SAR Incidents 1999-2002 - Spring Months Surface ModelC A N A D AN E W F O U N D L A N DNEW ^ BRUNSWIC!■ ® «> T I ,Figure D-19. SAR Incidents 1999-2002 - AirE1040°NAppendix EC A N A D AZ8N*EW%•?§CANADAQUEBECu • ;• ,N E W ff l UNDLA NDNEW ^ BRUNSWICI!n o t A tCOTIJFigure D-20. SAR Incidents 1999-2002 - Marine60°W 50°W60°W 50°WFigure D-21. SAR Incidents 1999-2002 - HumanitarianE11N.OS N.C* N.OS N.OfrAppendix EEBECNEW FOUNDLANEW BRUNSW50 WFigure D-22. SAR Incidents 1999-2002 - Air Surface ModelFigure D-23. SAR Incidents 1999-2002 - Marine Surface ModelE12Appendix E60”W 50“Wz60°W 50"WFigure D-24. SAR Incidents 1999-2002 - Humanitarian Surface ModelC A N A D AQUENEWFOUNDLANDNEW ^ BRUNS WICl,I^OVAiCOTIA1000m60°W 50°WFigure D-25. SAR Incidents 1999-2002 - DistressE13NEWFf lUNDLANDNEW ^ B R U N S W IC l!n o v aICOTIJ1000m ̂Appendix ECANADAFigure D-26. SAR Incidents 1999-2002 - Potential DistressIE WF OUNDL,COTFigure D-27. SAR Incidents 1999-2002 - Distress Surface ModelE14Appendix EFigure D-28. SAR Incidents 1999-2002 - Potential Distress Surface ModelE15Appendix FMAPS - NAVAL FISHERIES PATROLSMaps of naval vessel tracks, and surface models of naval enforcement presence in Appendix F were created from 1980 to 1996 data found in individual Ship’s Logs at the National Library and Archives of Canada, and from 1999 to 2003 from research track logs maintained aboard naval vessels.For the purposes of these maps, the following seasons are defined: Summer (June, July, August), Fall (September, October, November), Winter (December, January, February), and Spring (March, April, May).C A N A D AQ U E B E CN E W F O U N D L A N DNEW r 7 / y * \RUNSWI C w ' K &N O V AC O T I60°W 50°WFigure F-1. Naval Fisheries Patrols 1980 - 2003 - Raw TracksSource: National Library and Archives of Canada (87 vessels); Ship track logs (33 vessels)F140°N 50°N 40°N 50°NAppendix FNOVA:COTM60°W 50°W I--50°WI60”WFigure F-2. Naval Fisheries Presence 1980 to 1997 - Surface ModelSource: National Library and Archives of Canada (86 vessels)NOVA COT IAFigure F-3. Naval Fisheries Presence 1999 to 2003 - Surface ModelSource: Ship track logs (33 vessels)F2N.OS N.Ofr NoOS NoOfrAppendix FC A N A D AQUEBECNEWFOUNDLANDNEW ^ BRUNSWI CNOVA60°W 50°W■ 55r?Figure F-4. Naval Fisheries Patrols 1980-1984 - Raw TracksSource: National Library and Archives of Canada (17 vessels)50°WC A N A D AQUENEWFOUNDLANDNEW ^ RUNSWI C5 0 'W60°WFigure F-5. Naval Fisheries Patrols 1985-1989 - Raw TracksSource: National Library and Archives of Canada (23 vessels)F3N.OS N.O* N.OS N.Ot-NOVAC O T MAppendix F60°W 50'W60°W 50°WFigure F-6. Naval Fisheries Patrols 1990-1994 - Raw TracksSource: National Library and Archives of Canada (29 vessels)60°W 50°WFigure F-7. Naval Fisheries Patrols 1995-1999 - Raw TracksSource: National Library and Archives of Canada (27 vessels)8F4N.OS N.Ofr N.OS N.OfrNOVAICOTMAppendix F60°W 50“WFigure F-8. Naval Fisheries Patrols 2000-2003 - Raw TracksSource: National Library and Archives of Canada (23 vessels)NEW ^ B R U N S W ICNOVACOTIA60°W 50 "W— I—60°W—1--50'WFigure F-9. Naval Fisheries Patrols 1980-2003 - JanuarySource: National Library and Archives of Canada, Ship track logs (11 vessels)F5N.OS N.Ofr N.0S N.O*NEW ^ B R U N S W IC iNOVAiCOTMAppendix F60'W 50°W—I--60"WFigure F-10. Naval Fisheries Patrols 1980-2003 - FebruarySource: National Library and Archives of Canada, Ship track logs (10 vessels)N E W F O U N D L A N DNOVAICOTM! I I " I I I I ! I T" I ■ I I I — I I" " | T I i I I I r 960°W 50°WFigure F-11. Naval Fisheries Patrols 1980-2003 - MarchSource: National Library and Archives of Canada, Ship track logs (10 vessels)F6N.OS N.Ofr N.OS N.Ot'NOVAiC O T MAppendix F60“W 50°W—I--50 “WFigure F-12. Naval Fisheries Patrols 1980-2003 - AprilSource: National Library and Archives of Canada, Ship track logs (8 vessels)60 °WN E W F O U N D L A N DNEW ^ B R U N S W ICNOVAC O T M50 °WFigure F-13. Naval Fisheries Patrols 1980-2003 - MaySource: National Library and Archives of Canada, Ship track logs (12 vessels)F7N.0* N.OS NcOfAppendix Fa wf W !NSW60°W 50°WFigure F-14. Naval Fisheries Patrols 1980-2003 - JuneSource: National Library and Archives of Canada, Ship track logs (10 vessels)C A N A D AN E W F O U N D L A N D60°W 50 °WFigure F-15. Naval Fisheries Patrols 1980-2003 - JulySource: National Library and Archives of Canada, Ship track logs (9 vessels)F8NEW ^ B R U N S W ICNOVAC O T M—I™50°W" I "60#WAppendix FFigure F-16. Naval Fisheries Patrols 1980-2003 - AugustSource: National Library and Archives of Canada, Ship track logs (7 vessels)N E W F O U N D L A N DNOVACOTIAi - i i ' i t i —i ■ i ■ i —i i - i i - i i - i i ■ i i i i i r— i60°W S0°WFigure F-17. Naval Fisheries Patrols 1980-2003 - SeptemberSource: National Library and Archives of Canada, Ship track logs (14 vessels)60°W 50°WF9N.OS N.Ofr N.OS N.0»Appendix FC A N A D AB R U N S WI C60°WFisheries50°WFigure F-18. Naval Patrols 1980-2003 - OctoberSource: National Library and Archives of Canada, Ship track logs (13 vessels)C A N A D AQUEBN E WF O U N D L A N DNEW ^ B R U N S W I C60°W 50 °WFigure F-19. Naval Fisheries Patrols 1980-2003 - November’ °8Source: National Library and Archives of Canada, Ship track logs (12 vessels)F10N.OS N.Ofr N.OS N.Ot'Appendix FC A N A D A60°W 50*WFigure F-20. Naval Fisheries Patrols 1980-2003 - December' S3Source: National Library and Archives of Canada, Ship track logs (3 vessels)C A N A D AB R U N S WI C;c o t i60°W 50*WFigure F-21. Naval Fisheries Patrols 1980-2003 - Summer' 53Source: National Library and Archives of Canada, Ship track logs (26 vessels)F1140°N 50’N 40°N 50°NAppendix FC A N A D A60°W 50°WFigure F-22. Naval Fisheries Patrols 1980-2003 - Fall' s"kSource: National Library and Archives of Canada, Ship track logs (39 vessels)C A N A D A60'W 50 °WFigure F-23. Naval Fisheries Patrols 1980-2003 - WinterSource: National Library and Archives of Canada, Ship track logs (24 vessels)F12N.OS N.Of N.OS N.O*Appendix F60°W 50 “WC A N A D A50 °W60”WFigure F-24. Naval Fisheries Patrols 1980-2003 - SpringSource: National Library and Archives of Canada, Ship track logs (30 vessels)60°W 50°WC A N A D AN E WF O U N D L A N DB RUNS WI CI50 °W60°WFigure F-25. Hague Line Naval Fisheries Patrols by 1980-1997Source: National Library and Archives of Canada, (7 vessels)F13Appendix GCP-140 (AURORA) PATROLS DEPICTED IN FIGURE 7-4Table G-1 contains the areas patrolled by CP-140 long-range maritime patrol aircraft during the year 2002. Dedicated fisheries patrols, i.e., those with a DFO fisheries enforcement officer embarked, are listed in under Flight Type as “fishpats.” Surveillance flights during which the primary surveillance mission was something other than support to fisheries, i.e. military surveillance, are listed as “surv.” All other flight missions, such as training, combat readiness proficiency, trials, and SAR are listed as “other.” The grids used to plan the CP-140 missions are found in Chapter Three as Figures 3-6, 3-7, 3-8, and 3-12.TABLE G-1CP-140 AURORA AIRCRAFT PATROLS IN FIGURE 7-4Date Flight type_______ Areas of Patrol______________Grid Used for Patrol02-Jan-02 surv 94/NS South CP-140 Patrol Areas04-Jan-02 surv A-63 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones06-Jan-02 surv 95/NFLD South CP-140 Patrol Areas07-Jan-02 surv A-63 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones08-Jan-02 surv 94/NS South CP-140 Patrol Areas09-Jan-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas11-Jan-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones11-Jan-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones12-Jan-02 surv 94/NS South CP-140 Patrol Areas13-Jan-02 surv A-62 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones14-Jan-02 surv 95/NFLD South CP-140 Patrol Areas15-Jan-02 surv 94/NS South CP-140 Patrol Areas15-Jan-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas16-Jan-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones17-Jan-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones18-Jan-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones19-Jan-02 surv A-62, A-66 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones20-Jan-02 surv 95/NFLD South CP-140 Patrol Areas21-Jan-02 surv 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas21-Jan-02 surv Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones22-Jan-02 surv 95/NFLD South CP-140 Patrol Areas22-Jan-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones23-Jan-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones23-Jan-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas23-Jan-02 surv A-63 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones24-Jan-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones24-Jan-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas24-Jan-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones25-Jan-02 surv 95/NFLD South CP-140 Patrol AreasG1Appendix GTABLE G-1 (continued)CP-140 AURORA AIRCRAFT PATROLS IN FIGURE 7-4Date Flight type_______ Areas of Patrol______________Grid Used for Patrol25-Jan-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas28-Jan-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones28-Jan-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones29-Jan-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas30-Jan-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas30-Jan-02 other G1, G2, G3, G4 MARLOAS30-Jan-02 other G1, G2, G3, G4 MARLOAS30-Jan-02 other G1, G2, G3, G4 MARLOAS30-Jan-02 other G1.G2, G3, G4 MARLOAS31-Jan-02 other G1, G2, G3, G4 MARLOAS31-Jan-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones31-Jan-02 other G1, G2, G3, G4 MARLOAS01-Feb-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas03-Feb-02 surv 95/NFLD South CP-140 Patrol Areas04-Feb-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas05-Feb-02 surv 95/NFLD South CP-140 Patrol Areas05-Feb-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas06-Feb-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas06-Feb-02 surv 92/NS Outer CP-140 Patrol Areas06-Feb-02 other F1 MARLOAS07-Feb-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas07-Feb-02 other A-67 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones07-Feb-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas09-Feb-02 surv 94/NS South CP-140 Patrol Areas11-Feb-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones12-Feb-02 surv A-63 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones13-Feb-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones14-Feb-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones14-Feb-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas18-Feb-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones18-Feb-02 surv A-67 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones19-Feb-02 surv A-62 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones21-Feb-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones22-Feb-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones22-Feb-02 other A-67 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones26-Feb-02 other 94/NS South CP-140 Patrol Areas27-Feb-02 other Unicom ATC & Restricted Danger Zones27-Feb-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas28-Feb-02 surv A-63 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones01-Mar-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones01-Mar-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas03-Mar-02 surv 96/Grand Banks CP-140 Patrol Areas06-Mar-02 surv 95/NFLD South CP-140 Patrol Areas05-Mar-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones06-Mar-02 other 92/NS Outer CP-140 Patrol Areas06-Mar-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones07-Mar-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones08-Mar-02 other F1 MARLOAS08-Mar-02 surv 98/Belle Strait CP-140 Patrol Areas08-Mar-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger ZonesG2Appendix GTABLE G-1 (continued)CP-140 AURORA AIRCRAFT PATROLS IN FIGURE 7-4Date Flight type Areas of Patrol Grid Used for Patrol09-Mar-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones09-Mar-02 surv 95/NFLD South CP-140 Patrol Areas11-Mar-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones12-Mar-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones13-Mar-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones13-Mar-02 other A-62 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones14-Mar-02 surv 95/NFLD South CP-140 Patrol Areas14-Mar-02 surv 94/NS South CP-140 Patrol Areas15-Mar-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones16-Mar-02 surv 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas17-Mar-02 surv 94/NS South CP-140 Patrol Areas18-Mar-02 surv 98/Belle Strait CP-140 Patrol Areas18-Mar-02 surv 91 CP-140 Patrol Areas20-Mar-02 surv 93/NFLD Inner CP-140 Patrol Areas19-Mar-02 surv A-67 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones19-Mar-02 surv 92/NS Outer CP-140 Patrol Areas18-Mar-02 other A-67 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones21-Mar-02 surv 94/NS South CP-140 Patrol Areas21-Mar-02 surv 95/NFLD South CP-140 Patrol Areas23-Mar-02 other A-67 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones28-Mar-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones29-Mar-02 surv 95/NFLD South CP-140 Patrol Areas02-Apr-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas02-Apr-02 fishpat 3L, 3M, 3N, 30 NAFO03-Apr-02 other A-63 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones04-Apr-02 fishpat 3L, 3M, 3N, 30 NAFO03-Apr-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones06-Apr-02 surv 94/NS South CP-140 Patrol Areas05-Apr-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones05-Apr-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones05-Apr-02 surv 3L, 3M, 3N, 30 NAFO09-Apr-02 fishpat 3L, 3M, 3N, 30 NAFO11-Apr-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones11-Apr-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones12-Apr-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones13-Apr-02 surv 95/NFLD South CP-140 Patrol Areas14-Apr-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones15-Apr-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones15-Apr-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones17-Apr-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones19-Apr-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones19-Apr-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones20-Apr-02 other 94/NS South CP-140 Patrol Areas21-Apr-02 other 94/NS South CP-140 Patrol Areas22-Apr-02 fishpat 3L, 3M, 3N, 30 NAFO23-Apr-02 fishpat 3L, 3M, 3N, 30 NAFO24-Apr-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas24-Apr-02 other Unicom ATC & Restricted Danger Zones26-Apr-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas26-Apr-02 surv Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger ZonesG3Appendix GTABLE G-1 (continued)CP-140 AURORA AIRCRAFT PATROLS IN FIGURE 7-4Date Flight type_______ Areas of Patrol______________Grid Used for Patrol28-Apr-02 other A-67 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones29-Apr-02 other A-63 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones30-Apr-02 other 3L, 3M, 3N, 30 NAFO30-Apr-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones01-May-02 fishpat 3L, 3M, 3N, 30 NAFO01-May-02 fishpat 3L, 3M, 3N, 30 NAFO03-May-02 other A-67 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones04-May-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones05-May-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas09-May-02 fishpat 3L, 3M, 3N, 30 NAFO09-May-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones10-May-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones11-May-02 surv 94/NS South CP-140 Patrol Areas12-May-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas13-May-02 other Zebra ATC & Restricted Danger Zones13-May-02 other A-67 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones14-May-02 fishpat OB, 2G, 2H NAFO15-May-02 fishpat 3L, 3M, 3N, 30 NAFO17-May-02 other A-63 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones19-May-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas21-May-02 other A-63 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones22-May-02 fishpat 3L, 3M, 3N, 30 NAFO23-May-02 fishpat 3L, 3M, 3N, 30 NAFO23-May-02 other A-62 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones24-May-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones26-May-02 surv 95/NFLD South CP-140 Patrol Areas27-May-02 fishpat 3L, 3M, 3N, 30 NAFO28-May-02 fishpat 3L, 3M, 3N, 30 NAFO25-May-02 SAR 3P, 3S NAFO29-May-02 other A-63 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones30-May-02 other A-62 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones31-May-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones04-Jun-02 fishpat Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones04-Jun-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones05-Jun-02 fishpat 3L, 3M, 3N, 30 NAFO05-Jun-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas06-Jun-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas07-Jun-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas07-Jun-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones07-Jun-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas08-Jun-02 other A-63 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones09-Jun-02 other A-63 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones10-Jun-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas10-Jun-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones11-Jun-02 fishpat OB, OA NAFO11-Jun-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas12-Jun-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas12-Jun-02 other 2G, 2H, 2J NAFO11-Jun-02 other G1.G2, G3, G4 MARLOAS11-Jun-02 other H1, H2, H3, H4 MARLOASG4Appendix GTABLE G-1 (continued)CP-140 AURORA AIRCRAFT PATROLS IN FIGURE 7-4Date Flight type_______ Areas of Patrol______________Grid Used for Patrol13-Jun-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones14-Jun-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones15-Jun-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas16-Jun-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas17-Jun-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones18-Jun-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones19-Jun-02 surv 95/NFLD South CP-140 Patrol Areas20-Jun-02 other OB, 2G, 2H NAFO21-Jun-02 fishpat 3L, 3M, 3N, 30 NAFO20-Jun-02 other A-67 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones21-Jun-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones21-Jun-02 other A-62 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones21-Jun-02 surv A-62 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones23-Jun-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas25-Jun-02 fishpat OB, 2G, 1F NAFO25-Jun-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas26-Jun-02 fishpat 1F, 2H, 2G NAFO24-Jun-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones25-Jun-02 other G1, G2, G3, G4 MARLOAS25-Jun-02 other G1, G2, G3, G4 MARLOAS26-Jun-02 other A, B, E3 MARLOAS26-Jun-02 other D1, D2, D3, D4 MARLOAS26-Jun-02 other G1, G2, G3, G4 MARLOAS26-Jun-02 other H1, H2, H3, H4 MARLOAS27-Jun-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas29-Jun-02 other 94/NS South CP-140 Patrol Areas26-Jun-02 other A, B, E2 MARLOAS26-Jun-02 other D1, D2, D3, D4 MARLOAS26-Jun-02 other G1, G2, G3, G4 MARLOAS26-Jun-02 other H1, H2, H3, H4 MARLOAS28-Jun-02 other A-67 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones24-Jun-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas30-Jun-02 other A-63 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones01-Jul-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones02-Jul-02 fishpat 3L, 3M, 3N, 30 NAFO03-Jul-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones03-Jul-02 fishpat 3L, 3M, 3N, 30 NAFO03-Jul-02 other A-67 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones04-Jul-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas04-Jul-02 surv Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones07-Jul-02 surv 95/NFLD South CP-140 Patrol Areas07-Jul-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones08-Jul-02 fishpat 3L, 3M, 3N, 30 NAFO09-Jul-02 fishpat OB, 1D, 1E, 1F NAFO09-Jun-02 other 2H, 2J NAFO10-Jul-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas11-Jul-02 surv 95/NFLD South CP-140 Patrol Areas11-Jul-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones16-Jul-02 fishpat OB, 2G, 2H NAFO16-Jul-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger ZonesG5Appendix GTABLE G-1 (continued)CP-140 AURORA AIRCRAFT PATROLS IN FIGURE 7-4Date Flight type Areas of Patrol Grid Used for Patrol17-Jul-02 fishpat 3L, 3M, 3N, 30 NAFO17-Jul-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones18-Jul-02 surv 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas18-Jul-02 surv A-67 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones19-Jul-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones20-Jul-02 surv 92/NS Outer CP-140 Patrol Areas22-Jul-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones23-Jul-02 surv 93/NFLD Inner CP-140 Patrol Areas24-Jul-02 surv 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas24-Jul-02 surv A-67 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones30-Jul-02 fishpat OB, 2G, 2H NAFO31-Jul-02 fishpat 3L, 3M, 3N, 30 NAFO01-Aug-02 surv OB, 2G, 2H NAFO02-Aug-02 surv A-63 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones03-Aug-02 surv 99, 100 CP-140 Patrol Areas05-Aug-02 surv OA, OB NAFO06-Aug-02 surv OA, OB NAFO08-Aug-02 surv OB, 2G, 2H NAFO09-Aug-02 surv OB, 2G, 2H NAFO11-Aug-02 surv 97/NFLD East CP-140 Patrol Areas13-Aug-02 surv 95/NFLD South CP-140 Patrol Areas14-Aug-02 fishpat 1F, 2J, 2H NAFO15-Aug-02 fishpat 1F NAFO15-Aug-02 other A-62 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones16-Aug-02 surv 98/Belle Strait CP-140 Patrol Areas16-Aug-02 other A-62 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones18-Aug-02 surv 91/NS Inner, 93/NFLD Inner CP-140 Patrol Areas19-Aug-02 fishpat 1F, 2J, 2H NAFO20-Aug-02 fishpat 1F, 2J.2H NAFO21-Aug-02 other A-12, A-13, A-17, A-18 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones23-Aug-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones25-Aug-02 surv 92/NS Outer CP-140 Patrol Areas27-Aug-02 other A-67 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones28-Aug-02 fishpat 1F, 2J, 2H NAFO28-Aug-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones28-Aug-02 other A-62 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones29-Aug-02 fishpat OB, 2G, 2H, 1F NAFO01-Sep-02 other A-12, A-13, A-17, A-18 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones04-Sep-02 fishpat 1F, 2J, 2H NAFO05-Sep-02 fishpat OB, 2G.2H, 1F NAFO06-Sep-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones06-Sep-02 other A-12, A-13, A-17, A-18 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones07-Sep-02 other 92/NS Outer CP-140 Patrol Areas09-Sep-02 other A-12, A-13, A-17, A-18 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones10-Sep-02 fishpat OB, 2G, 2H NAFO11-Sep-02 fishpat OB, 2G, 2H NAFO12-Sep-02 other A-62 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones17-Sep-02 surv 95/NFLD South CP-140 Patrol Areas18-Sep-02 fishpat OB, 2F, 1F NAFO18-Sep-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger ZonesG6Appendix GTABLE G-1 (continued)CP-140 AURORA AIRCRAFT PATROLS IN FIGURE 7-4Date Flight type Areas of Patrol Grid Used for Patrol18-Sep-02 other A-67 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones19-Sep-02 fishpat 1F, 2J.2H NAFO19-Sep-02 fishpat 1F, 2J,2H,3K NAFO20-Sep-02 other A-12, A-13, A-17, A-18 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones20-Sep-02 fishpat OB, 2G, 2H NAFO22-Sep-02 surv 94/NS South CP-140 Patrol Areas23-Sep-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones24-Sep-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones24-Sep-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones25-Sep-02 fishpat 1F, 2J, 3K NAFO26-Sep-02 fishpat OB, 2G, 2H NAFO28-Sep-02 other A-67 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones29-Sep-02 surv 94/NS South CP-140 Patrol Areas30-Sep-02 other A-10, A-11 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones01-Oct-02 other A-12, A-13, A-17, A-18 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones01-Oct-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones02-0ct-02 other A-12, A-13, A-17, A-18 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones03-0ct-02 surv A-63 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones03-0ct-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones03-0ct-02 other A-12, A-13, A-17, A-18 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones06-0ct-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones07-0ct-02 other A-12, A-13, A-17, A-18 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones07-0ct-02 surv 94/NS South CP-140 Patrol Areas08-0ct-02 fishpat OB, 2G, 1F NAFO08-0ct-02 other A-67 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones08-0ct-02 other A-67 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones09-0ct-02 fishpat 1F, 2J, 2H NAFO09-0ct-02 other G1, G2, G3, G4 MARLOAS09-0ct-02 other H1, H2, H3, H4 MARLOAS10-Oct-02 other A-12, A-13, A-17, A-18 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones10-Oct-02 surv 95/NFLD South CP-140 Patrol Areas10-Oct-02 surv OB, 2G, 2H NAFO11-Oct-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones11-Oct-02 surv 0A,0B NAFO12-Oct-02 other A-62 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones15-Oct-02 other A-62 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones16-Oct-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones16-Oct-02 other Unicorn, Zebra ATC & Restricted Danger Zones18-Oct-02 other A-12, A-13, A-17, A-18 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones18-Oct-02 other A-63 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones21-Oct-02 other A-62 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones21-Oct-02 other 1E, 2D, 2E NAFO23-Oct-02 other A-62 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones23-Oct-02 other A-12, A-13, A-17, A-18 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones24-Oct-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones24-Oct-02 other A-67 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones25-Oct-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones26-Oct-02 other A-10, A-11 ATC & Restricted Danger ZonesG 7Appendix GTABLE G-1 (continued)CP-140 AURORA AIRCRAFT PATROLS IN FIGURE 7-4Date Flight type Areas of Patrol Grid Used for Patrol01-Nov-02 surv 95/NFLD South CP-140 Patrol Areas04-Nov-02 other A-67 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones07-Nov-02 other A-62 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones08-Nov-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones09-Nov-02 other A-12, A-13, A-17, A-18 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones12-Nov-02 other A-62 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones15-Nov-02 other A-12, A-13, A-17, A-18 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones16-Nov-02 other A-67 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones19-Nov-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones19-Nov-02 surv A-63 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones19-Nov-02 other A-12, A-13, A-17, A-18 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones21-Nov-02 surv 92/NS Outer CP-140 Patrol Areas22-Nov-02 surv 91/NS Inner CP-140 Patrol Areas22-Nov-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones24-Nov-02 other A-62 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones27-Nov-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones27-Nov-02 other A-12, A-13, A-17, A-18 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones29-Nov-02 other A-12, A-13, A-17, A-18 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones01-Dec-02 surv Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones01-Dec-02 surv A-12, A-13, A-17, A-18 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones01-Dec-02 other A-67 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones07-Dec-02 surv A-63 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones08-Dec-02 surv 93/NFLD Inner CP-140 Patrol Areas08-Dec-02 surv Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones09-Dec-02 other A-63 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones10-Dec-02 other 0B, 2G, 2H NAFO11-Dec-02 surv 0B, 2G, 2H NAFO12-Dec-02 surv A-67 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones13-Dec-02 other A-62 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones14-Dec-02 surv A-63 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones15-Dec-02 other F1 MARLOAS16-Dec-02 surv A-63 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones18-Dec-02 surv F1 MARLOAS18-Dec-02 surv Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones28-Dec-02 surv 95/NFLD South CP-140 Patrol Areas30-Dec-02 surv 94/NS South CP-140 Patrol AreasSource: Maritime Air Component Commander (Atlantic) Staff, 2003.G8Appendix HPAL AIRCRAFT SURVEILLANCE PATROLS DEPICTED IN FIGURE 7-7Table H-1 contains the mission identifiers and areas patrolled by PAL surveillance aircraft during the year 2002. Table H-2 contains the mission identifiers and areas patrolled by PAL surveillance aircraft contracted by the Canadian Coast Guard for anti-pollution patrols during the same year. The grid used to plan the PAL missions is the North Atlantic Fisheries Organization depicted in Chapter Three at Figures 3-12 and 3-13. The first four digits of the mission identifier indicate for which DFO region the aircraft was tasked:BKGR - Gulf RegionBKNF - Newfoundland RegionBKSF - Scotia Fundy Region (now Maritimes Region)BKQR - Quebec Region.TABLE H -1 PAL AIRCRAFT PATROLS IN FIGURE 7-7Date Mission ID Areas of Patrol Grid Used for Patrol01-Jan-02 BKNF02-001 3L-OUTER NAFO02-Jan-02 BKNF02-002 3N-OUTER NAFO02-Jan-02 BKSF02-001 4X NAFO03-Jan-02 BKGR02-001 4T NAFO03-Jan-02 BKNF02-003 3M NAFO03-Jan-02 BKSF02-002 4W NAFO04-Jan-02 BKNF02-004 3LNO-INNER NAFO04-Jan-02 BKSF02-003 5ZE/4X NAFO05-Jan-02 BKNF02-005 3L-OUTER NAFO05-Jan-02 BKSF02-004 4VW NAFO06-Jan-02 BKSF02-005 5ZE/4X/4W NAFO07-Jan-02 BKNF02-008 3L-OUTER NAFO08-Jan-02 BKSF02-006 4WX NAFO09-Jan-02 BKGR02-002 4T NAFO09-Jan-02 BKNF02-010 3NO-OUTER NAFO09-Jan-02 BKSF02-007 4VW NAFO10-Jan-02 BKSF02-008 4X NAFO11-Jan-02 BKNF02-011 3L NAFO11-Jan-02 BKNF02-012 3PS NAFO11-Jan-02 BKSF02-009 5ZE/4X NAFO12-Jan-02 BKSFO2-010 4WX NAFO13-Jan-02 BKNF02-013 3NO NAFO13-Jan-02 BKSF02-011 4VW NAFO14-Jan-02 BKSFO2-012 4WX NAFO15-Jan-02 BKGR02-003 4T/4VS NAFO15-Jan-02 BKNF02-014 3L-OUTER NAFO15-Jan-02 BKNF02-015 3K/4R NAFOH1Appendix HTABLE H - 1 (continued)PAL AIRCRAFT PATROLS IN FIGURE 7-7Date Mission ID Areas of Patrol Grid Used for Patrol15-Jan-02 BKSF02-013 5ZE/4X NAFO16-Jan-02 BKSF02-014 4X NAFO17-Jan-02 BKNF01-017 3L-OUTER NAFO17-Jan-02 BKNF02-015 4VW NAFO17-Jan-02 BKNF02-016 3NO-OUTER NAFO17-Jan-02 BKNF02-021 4R/2J NAFO18-Jan-02 BKGR02-004 4T- NAFO18-Jan-02 BKNF02-018 3L3PS NAFO18-Jan-02 BKNF02-019 3NO OUTER NAFO18-Jan-02 BKSF02-016 4X NAFO19-Jan-02 BKNF02-020 3LM NORTH NAFO19-Jan-02 BKSF02-017 4VS NAFO20-Jan-02 BKNF02-022 3NO-OUTER NAFO20-Jan-02 BKSF02-018 4X NAFO21-Jan-02 BKGR02-005 4T NAFO21-Jan-02 BKNF02-019 4X NAFO21-Jan-02 BKNF02-023 3NO-OUTER NAFO23-Jan-02 BKSFO2-021 4X NAFO24-Jan-02 BKNF02-026 3LMSOUTH NAFO24-Jan-02 BKNF02-027 3LNO-INNER NAFO24-Jan-02 BKSF02-022 4VW NAFO25-Jan-02 BKNF02-028 3LM-NORTH NAFO25-Jan-02 BKNF02-029 4R NAFO26-Jan-02 BKNF02-031 S-AVALON NAFO26-Jan-02 BKNF02-032 3NO-OUTER NAFO26-Jan-02 BKSF02-023 4X NAFO27-Jan-02 BKSF02-024 4X/5ZE NAFO28-Jan-02 BKGR02-007 4T NAFO28-Jan-02 BKNF02-034 3NO-OUTER NAFO28-Jan-02 BKSF02-025 4V/SW NAFO29-Jan-02 BKNF02-035 3L-OUTER NAFO29-Jan-02 BKSF02-026 4X NAFO30-Jan-02 BKNF02-036 3LNO NAFO30-Jan-02 BKNF02-037 3K/2J NAFO31-Jan-02 BKGR02-008 4T/4VN NAFO31-Jan-02 BKSF02-028 5ZE/4X NAFO01-Feb-02 BKNF02-038 S AVALON NAFO01-Feb-02 BKNF02-039 3NO-OUTER NAFO01-Feb-02 BKSF02-029 4WX NAFO03-Feb-02 BKNF02-040 NO AREA NAFO03-Feb-02 BKSF02-031 4WX NAFO04-Feb-02 BKNF02-038 NO AREA NAFO04-Feb-02 BKNF02-042 3LOUTER NAFO04-Feb-02 BKSF02-032 4X/5ZE NAFO06-Feb-02 BKNF02-043 3 NO-OUTER NAFO06-Feb-02 BKNF02-044 S AV/3PS NAFO06-Feb-02 BKSF02-034 4W-4X NAFO07-Feb-02 BKGR02-009 4T NAFO07-Feb-02 BKNF02-045 3L-OUTER NAFO07-Feb-02 BKNF02-46 3LM-NORTH NAFOH2Appendix HTABLE H - 1 (continued)PAL AIRCRAFT PATROLS IN FIGURE 7-7Date Mission ID Areas of Patrol Grid Used for Patrol07-Feb-02 BKSF02-036 5ZE-4X NAFO08-Feb-02 BKNF02-047 3L NAFO08-Feb-02 BKSF02-037 4X NAFO09-Feb-02 BKNF02-048 3NO NAFO09-Feb-02 BKSF02-038 4VW- NAFO10-Feb-02 BKNF02-052 3LNO-INNER NAFO11-Feb-02 BKNF02-053 3L-OUTER NAFO12-Feb-02 BKNF02-054 3NO-OUTER NAFO13-Feb-02 BKNF02-055 3LM-S NAFO14-Feb-02 BKGR02-008 4T/4VN NAFO14-Feb-02 BKGR02-009 4T NAFO14-Feb-02 BKNF02-056 3LOUTER NAFO14-Feb-02 BKNF02-057 3PS NAFO14-Feb-02 BKNF02-058 3M EAST NAFO14-Feb-02 BKQr01-046 4S/T NAFO15-Feb-02 BKGR02-011 4T NAFO15-Feb-02 BKNF02-059 4R/2J/K NAFO15-Feb-02 BKSF02-044 4VW NAFO16-Feb-02 BKNF02-060 3L-OUTER NAFO16-Feb-02 BKSF02-045 5ZE/4X NAFO17-Feb-02 BKSF02-046 4X NAFO18-Feb-02 BKNF02-062 3NO NAFO18-Feb-02 BKNF02-063 30P-EDGE NAFO18-Feb-02 BKSF02-047 4VSW NAFO19-Feb-02 BKNF02-064 3NO-OUTER NAFO19-Feb-02 BKNF02-065 3PS NAFO19-Feb-02 BKSF02-048 4WX NAFO20-Feb-02 BKGR02-012 4T NAFO20-Feb-02 BKNF02-066 3PS NAFO20-Feb-02 BKNF02-067 3NO-OUTER NAFO20-Feb-02 BKNF02-068 4R-3K NAFO20-Feb-02 BKSF02-049 5ZE/4X NAFO21-Feb-02 BKSF02-050 4VW NAFO21-Feb-02 BKSF02-069 4P/2J/3K NAFO23-Feb-02 BKNF02-070 3L/3PS NAFO23-Feb-02 BKNF02-071 3NL/OUTER NAFO23-Feb-02 BKQR02-001 4T NAFO23-Feb-02 BKSF02-051 4VW NAFO24-Feb-02 BKNF02-072 3NO-OUTER NAFO24-Feb-02 BKNF02-073 3LM-NORTH NAFO24-Feb-02 BKSF02-053 4X NAFO25-Feb-02 BKNF02-075 2J/3K/4R/S NAFO25-Feb-02 BKNF02-076 3L OUTER NAFO25-Feb-02 BKSF02-054 4VSW NAFO26-Feb-02 BKNF02-077 3L/3PS NAFO26-Feb-02 BKNF02-078 3LNO NAFO26-Feb-02 BKSF02-055 4W NAFO26-Feb-02 BKSF02-057 4X NAFO27-Feb-02 BKSF02-059 4X NAFO28-Feb-02 BKSF02-060 4X NAFOH3PAL AIRCRAFT PATROLS IN FIGURE 7-7X><'■5c©Q.aCOx Xx co "T$ :=5 LULLI0 ^ ,LU W H1 ^o ^COCOQ.COa:£ ^ CO CO"OCMa:h ii -DoXc o c o c o c o c o c o c o c oa:LUI-ZD01ozCO—I I I ICO CO CO CO co co a:■sf ^ T t *1 “ 3 “ ) CO CO —I CM CM CM Tf 00' o> CD o>a> o o> 05 05 05 05 05 Oi Oi 05 o>Oi Oi Oi O ) 05 Oi 05 05 05 05 05 05 05o o o O O O O O O O O o o O o o o O O o o o O o o o1o O o O O O O O O O O o O O O O O O O O O O O OCM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CMiCMiCMO O O O O O O O O O O O O O o o O O O O o O O O o O O O O O O O O O O O o O O O O O O O O O O O o oLL LL LL 11 L L 11 L L 11 L L 11CH 111111n L I LL. 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N - 0 5 0 5 0 5 o C5 r — T^- T— T— T— T— CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CM CMo o O O O O O O O O O O o o O O o o o O O O O O O O T— t— T_ T _ ■»“ T~ T—T— ■*“ T— T - T— T~Appendix HTABLE H - 1 (continued)PAL AIRCRAFT PATROLS IN FIGURE 7-712-Mar-02 BKNF02-099 3L NAFO12-Mar-02 BKQR02-005 4W NAFO12-Mar-02 BKQR02-005 4W NAFO12-Mar-02 BKQR02-005 4T NAFO12-Mar-02 BKQR02-005 4T NAFO12-Mar-02 BKQR02-005 4T NAFO12-Mar-02 BKQR02-005 4T NAFO12-Mar-02 BKQR02-005 4T NAFO12-Mar-02 BKQR02-005 4T NAFO12-Mar-02 BKQR02-005 4T NAFO12-Mar-02 BKQR02-005 4T NAFO12-Mar-02 BKSF02-072 4W/X NAFO13-Mar-02 BKNF02-100 3LOUTER NAFO13-Mar-02 BKNF02-101 3L NAFO13-Mar-02 BKNF02-101 3L NAFO13-Mar-02 BKNF02-101 3L NAFO13-Mar-02 BKNF02-101 3L NAFO13-Mar-02 BKNF02-101 4R NAFO13-Mar-02 BKNF02-101 4R NAFO13-Mar-02 BKNF02-101 3K NAFO13-Mar-02 BKNF02-101 4R NAFO13-Mar-02 BKNF02-101 4R NAFO13-Mar-02 BKNF02-101 3L NAFO13-Mar-02 BKSF02-073 5ZE/4X NAFO14-Mar-02 BKNF02-102 3L NAFO15-Mar-02 BKNF02-103 3PS NAFO16-Mar-02 BKNF02-104 3LM-NORTH NAFO16-Mar-02 BKNF02-105 3LMNO/INNER NAFO16-Mar-02 BKSF02-074 4W/X NAFO16-Mar-02 BKSF02-075 4W NAFO16-Mar-02 BKSF02-077 4W/4VS NAFO16-Mar-02 BKSF02-078 4X/5ZE NAFO17-Mar-02 BKNF02-106 3NO-OUTER NAFO17-Mar-02 BKQR02-006 4T NAFO17-Mar-02 BKSF02-079 4W/5ZE NAFO18-Mar-02 BKGR-02-018 4T NAFO18-Mar-02 BKNF02-107 3PS NAFO18-Mar-02 BKSF02-080 4VW NAFO19-Mar-02 BKNF02-108 3K/2J NAFO19-Mar-02 BKSF02-081 4VW NAFO20-Mar-02 BKNF02-108 3LM-SOUTH NAFO20-Mar-02 BKSF02-082 4X/5ZE NAFO20-Mar-02 BKSF02-083 5ZE/4X NAFO21-Mar-02 BKNF02-110 3NO-OUTER NAFO21-Mar-02 BKNF02-111 3LM-NORTH NAFO22-Mar-02 BKGR02-020 4T NAFO22-Mar-02 BKNF02-112 3LOUTER NAFO22-Mar-02 BKQR02-007 4T NAFO23-Mar-02 BKNF02-113 3LM-SOUTH NAFO23-Mar-02 BKNF02-114 3LNO-INNER NAFOH5Appendix HTABLE H - 1 (continued)PAL AIRCRAFT PATROLS IN FIGURE 7-723-Mar-02 BKSF02-085 4X NAFO24-Mar-02 BKNF02-115 3NO-OUTER NAFO24-Mar-02 BKSF02-086 4WX NAFO25-Mar-02 BKGR02-021 4VN/4T NAFO25-Mar-02 BKNF02-117 3LM-OUTER NAFO25-Mar-02 BKNF02-118 3K\2J NAFO25-Mar-02 BKNF02-119 3LOUTER NAFO26-Mar-02 BKNF02-120 2J/3K NAFO26-Mar-02 BKNF02-121 3PS NAFO26-Mar-02 BKQR02-008 4T NAFO26-Mar-02 BKSF02-088 4X NAFO27-Mar-02 BKNF02-122 4R-SEALS NAFO27-Mar-02 BKSF02-089 4X NAFO28-Mar-02 BKNF02-125 3L NAFO28-Mar-02 BKSF02-090 4W NAFO29-Mar-02 BKNF02-126 3L NAFO29-Mar-02 BKSF02-091 4W NAFO30-Mar-02 BKGR02-022 4W NAFO30-Mar-02 BKNF02-128 3L NAFO30-Mar-02 BKNF02-129 3L NAFO31-Mar-02 BKQR02-010 4ST NAFO31-Mar-02 BKSF02-093 4W NAFO01-Apr-02 BKNF02-131 3M NAFO02-Apr-02 BKNF02-132 3PS NAFO02-Apr-02 BKSF02-094 5ZE/4X NAFO03-Apr-02 BKSF02-095 4VW NAFO04-Apr-02 BKNF02-135 3LOUTER NAFO04-Apr-02 BKSF02-096 5Z3/4X NAFO05-Apr-02 BKNF02-136 3K/2J SEAL NAFO05-Apr-02 BKNF02-137 3PS/30 NAFO05-Apr-02 BKQR02-011 4T NAFO06-Apr-02 BKNF02-138 4R NAFO06-Apr-02 BKNF02-139 3LM NAFO06-Apr-02 BKQR02-4S 4S NAFO07-Apr-02 BKSF02-098 5ZE/4X NAFO08-Apr-02 BKNF02-140 3K/4R-SEAL NAFO08-Apr-02 BKNF02-141 3L NAFO08-Apr-02 BKQR02-013 4S NAFO08-Apr-02 BKQR02-014 4T NAFO09-Apr-02 BKNF02-142 3L NAFO09-Apr-02 BKNF02-143 3LNO-INNER NAFO10-Apr-02 BKNF02-145 3K- NAFO10-Apr-02 BKSF02-100 4X/5ZE NAFO11-Apr-02 BKNF02-146 3LM-SOUTH NAFO11-Apr-02 BKNF02-147 3K NAFO11-Apr-02 BKSF02-101 4WX NAFO12-Apr-02 BKNF02-150 3LM NAFO12-Apr-02 BKSF02-102 4VS NAFO15-Apr-02 BKGR02-026 4T NAFO15-Apr-02 BKQR02-013 4S NAFOH6Appendix HTABLE H - 1 (continued)PAL AIRCRAFT PATROLS IN FIGURE 7-715-Apr-02 BKQR02-014 4T NAFO16-Apr-02 BKNF02-154 3LNO-LINE NAFO16-Apr-02 BKQR02-016 4S NAFO16-Apr-02 BKSF02-105 4VW NAFO17-Apr-02 BKQR02-027 4T NAFO17-Apr-02 BKNF02-156 3NO NAFO17-Apr-02 BKSF02-106 4X NAFO18-Apr-02 BKNF02-159 3K NAFO18-Apr-02 BKNF02-160 4L-OUTER NAFO18-Apr-02 BKQR02-017 4T NAFO18-Apr-02 BKSF02-107 4X/5ZE NAFO19-Apr-02 BKNF02-161 3NO-OUTER NAFO19-Apr-02 BKNF02-162 3K NAFO19-Apr-02 BKSF02-108 4WX NAFO20-Apr-02 BKSF02-109 4VW NAFO21-Apr-02 BKNF02-164 3L NAFO21-Apr-02 BKQR02-018 3L NAFO22-Apr-02 BKNF02-165 3L NAFO22-Apr-02 BKNF02-166 3L NAFO22-Apr-02 BKQR02-019 3L/3PS/4W NAFO23-Apr-02 BKGR02-028 4T NAFO23-Apr-02 BKQR02-020 4T NAFO23-Apr-02 BKSF02-110 4X NAFO24-Apr-02 BKNF02-166 3L NAFO24-Apr-02 BKQR02-022 4W NAFO24-Apr-02 BKSF02-111 4X NAFO25-Apr-02 BKNF02-167 3NO/K NAFO25-Apr-02 BKNF02-168 3L NAFO25-Apr-02 BKNF02-169 3LNO NAFO25-Apr-02 BKSF02-112 4X NAFO26-Apr-02 BKNF02-170 3LM NAFO26-Apr-02 BKSF02-113 4W/4VS NAFO27-Apr-02 BKNF02-171 3M-EAST NAFO27-Apr-02 BKSF02-114 5ZE/4X NAFO28-Apr-02 BKGR02-028 4T NAFO28-Apr-02 BKNF02-173 3NO-OUTER NAFO28-Apr-02 BKNF02-174 3PS/3L NAFO29-Apr-02 BKGR02-030 4T NAFO29-Apr-02 BKNF02-115 4WX NAFO29-Apr-02 BKNF02-175 3K NAFO29-Apr-02 BKNF02-176 3LOUTER NAFO30-Apr-02 BKNF02-177 3K NAFO01-May-02 BKNF02-178 3L -CRABS NAFO01-May-02 BKNF02-179 3K NAFO01-May-02 BKNF02-180 3LNO NAFO01-May-02 BKQR02-024 4T NAFO01-May-02 BKQR02-025 4T NAFO01-May-02 BKSF02-116 5ZE/4X NAFO02-May-02 BKNF02-181 4S-4R NAFO02-May-02 BKNF02-183 3PS NAFOH 7Appendix HTABLE H - 1 (continued)PAL AIRCRAFT PATROLS IN FIGURE 7-7Date Mission ID Areas of Patrol Grid Used for Patrol02-May-02 BKQR02-026 4SY-4SZ NAFO03-May-02 BKSF02-118 4W NAFO04-May-02 BKNF02-184 3L NAFO05-May-02 BKNF02-185 3LM-NORTH NAFO05-May-02 BKSF02-119 4W NAFO06-May-02 BKGR02-031 4X NAFO06-May-02 BKNF02-186 3L NAFO07-May-02 BKNF02-187 3LM-SOUTH NAFO07-May-02 BKNF02-188 3K/4R NAFO07-May-02 BKSF02-121 5ZE/4X NAFO08-May-02 BKNF02-189 3K-CRAB NAFO08-May-02 BKSF02-122 4X NAFO09-May-02 BKNF02-191 3L/N NAFO09-May-02 BKQR02-026 4SY/4SZ NAFO09-May-02 BKSF02-123 4W/4VS NAFO10-May-02 BKNF02-193 3M NAFO10-May-02 BKNF02-194 3L-INSIDE NAFO10-May-02 BKSF02-124 4X/5ZE NAFO11-May-02 BKNF02-195 3LOUTER NAFO11-May-02 BKNF02-196 3PN/S NAFO11-May-02 BKSF02-126 5ZE/4X NAFO12-May-02 BKNF02-197 4N NAFO12-May-02 BKQR02-028 4S NAFO13-May-02 BKGR02-033 4T NAFO13-May-02 BKNF02-196 3PN/S NAFO13-May-02 BKNF02-198 3L-OUTER NAFO13-May-02 BKNF02-199 3PN/4R NAFO13-May-02 BKQR02-029 4SZ/4SY NAFO13-May-02 BKQR02-030 4T NAFO13-May-02 BKSF02-127 4VW NAFO14-May-02 BKNF02-200 3L-OUTER NAFO14-May-02 BKNF02-201 3K NAFO14-May-02 BKQR02-031 4S NAFO15-May-02 BKGR02-034 4T NAFO15-May-02 BKSF02-129 4X NAFO16-May-02 BKNF02-202 3L NAFO16-May-02 BKSF02-130 4W NAFO17-May-02 BKNF02-203 3NO-OUTER NAFO17-May-02 BKNF02-204 3PS/PN-4R NAFO17-May-02 BKNF02-205 3L/PS NAFO17-May-02 BKQR02-032 12B/E/F NAFO17-May-02 BKSF02-131 5ZE/4X NAFO18-May-02 BKNF02-206 3NO-OUTER NAFO18-May-02 BKSF02-132 4VW NAFO20-May-02 BKGR02-035 4T NAFO20-May-02 BKNF02-208 3NO-LINE NAFO21-May-02 BKNF02-209 3LM-SOUTH NAFO21-May-02 BKNF02-210 3L NAFO21-May-02 BKQR02-033 4SZ NAFO22-May-02 BKNF02-211 3LM-NORTH NAFOH8Appendix HTABLE H - 1 (continued)PAL AIRCRAFT PATROLS IN FIGURE 7-7Date Mission ID Areas of Patrol Grid Used for Patrol22-May-02 BKQR02-034 4R/S NAFO23-May-02 BKNF02-213 3PS NAFO23-May-02 BKNF02-214 3LNO NAFO23-May-02 BKNSF2-135 4VW NAFO24-May-02 BKNF02-214 3LNO NAFO24-May-02 BKNF02-215 3NO-OUTER NAFO24-May-02 BKNF02-216 3K/3D NAFO24-May-02 BKSF02-136 4X NAFO25-May-02 BKNF02-217 3LM NORTH NAFO25-May-02 BKNF02-218 3PS/PN NAFO25-May-02 BKSF02-137 4WX NAFO26-May-02 BKNF02-219 3L OUTER NAFO26-May-02 BKNF02-220 3LNO NAFO26-May-02 BKSF02-138 4VSW NAFO27-May-02 BKGR02-037 4T NAFO27-May-02 BKSF02-139 4VSW NAFO04-Jun-02 BKSF02-145 4X/5ZE NAFO05-Jun-02 BKNF02-228 3L-OUTER NAFO05-Jun-02 BKSF02-146 4WX NAFO06-Jun-02 BKGR02-040 4T NAFO06-Jun-02 BKNF02-229 3PS NAFO06-Jun-02 BKNF02-230 3L NAFO06-Jun-02 BKNF02-231 3L-INNER NAFO06-Jun-02 BKQR02-038 4S NAFO06-Jun-02 BKSF02-147 4VSW NAFO07-Jun-02 BKGR02-041 4T NAFO07-Jun-02 BKNF02-232 4R NAFO07-Jun-02 BKNF02-233 3PS NAFO07-Jun-02 BKSF02-148 4X NAFO08-Jun-02 BKNF02-234 3L NAFO08-Jun-02 BKNF02-235 3K NAFO08-Jun-02 BKNS02-149 4W NAFO09-Jun-02 BKNF02-236 30P NAFO09-Jun-02 BKNF02-237 3PS NAFO10-Jun-02 BKQR02-039 4T/4S NAFO10-Jun-02 BKSF02-150 4WX NAFO11-Jun-02 BKNF02-239 2J/3K NAFO11-Jun-02 BKNF02-241 3L NAFO11-Jun-02 BKSF02-151 4VSNW NAFO14-Jun-02 BKGR02-243 4T NAFO14-Jun-02 BKNF02-246 3NO-OUTER NAFO14-Jun-02 BKSF02-153 4X NAFO15-Jun-02 BKNF02-247 3LM-NORTH NAFO15-Jun-02 BKQR02-041 4T NAFO15-Jun-02 BKSF02-154 5ZE/4X NAFO17-Jun-02 BKSF02-155 4X5ZE NAFO18-Jun-02 BKNF02-248 3LM NAFO18-Jun-02 BKSF02-156 4X5ZE NAFO19-Jun-02 BKGR02-044 4T NAFO19-Jun-02 BKNF02-249 3LM NAFOH9Appendix HTABLE H - 1 (continued)PAL AIRCRAFT PATROLS IN FIGURE 7-7Date Mission ID Areas of Patrol Grid Used for Patrol19-Jun-02 BKNF02-250 3LCRAB NAFO20-Jun-02 BKNF02-251 3L NAFO20-Jun-02 BKSF02-157 4VN NAFO21-Jun-02 BKNF02-252 3L NAFO21-Jun-02 BKSF02-159 4X NAFO22-Jun-02 BKNF02-253 3M-NORTH NAFO22-Jun-02 BKNF02-254 3PS/OP NAFO22-Jun-02 BKQR02-041 4T NAFO22-Jun-02 BKQR02-042 4T NAFO23-Jun-02 BKSF02-160 5ZE/4X NAFO24-Jun-02 BKGR02-045 4T NAFO24-Jun-02 BKNF02-256 3K-CRAB NAFO24-Jun-02 BKNF02-257 3L-OUTER NAFO25-Jun-02 BKSF02-161 4VW NAFO26-Jun-02 BKNF02-259 3NO-OUTER NAFO26-Jun-02 BKSF02-162 5ZE/4X NAFO27-Jun-02 BKNF02-261 3LM-NORTH NAFO27-Jun-02 BKQR02-043 4T NAFO28-Jun-02 BKNF02-262 3K NAFO29-Jun-02 BKSF02-164 5ZE/4X NAFO01-Jul-02 BKNF02-263 3NO-OUTER NAFO01-Jul-02 BKSF02-165 4VSW NAFO02-Jul-02 BKNF02-264 4R/3PN NAFO02-Jul-02 BKSF02-265 3LNO NAFO03-Jul-02 BKGR02-047 4T NAFO03-Jul-02 BKNF02-266 3L-OUTER NAFO03-Jul-02 BKSF02-166 4X/5ZE NAFO04-Jul-02 BKNF02-268 3L3PS NAFO04-Jul-02 BKQR02-044 4T NAFO04-Jul-02 BKSF02-167 4X NAFO04-Jul-02 BKSF02-267 3LINNER NAFO05-Jul-02 BKNF02-269 4R NAFO05-Jul-02 BKSF01-168 5ZE/4X NAFO06-Jul-02 BKNF02-270 3LM NAFO06-Jul-02 BKNF02-271 3LNO NAFO06-Jul-02 BKSF02-169 4VW NAFO08-Jul-02 BKSF02-170 5ZE/4X NAFO09-Jul-02 BKNF02-272 GRANITE-LK NAFO10-Jul-02 BKGR02-048 4T NAFO10-Jul-02 BKNF02-273 3LM NORTH NAFO10-Jul-02 BKSF02-171 4X5ZE NAFO11-Jul-02 BKNF02-274 3PS NAFO11-Jul-02 BKSF02-172 4WX NAFO12-Jul-02 BKNF02-275 4R-CRAB NAFO12-Jul-02 BKNF02-276 3LMNO NAFO13-Jul-02 BKNF02-277 3NO NAFO13-Jul-02 BKSF02-173 4VSW NAFO14-Jul-02 BKNF02-279 3LNO NAFO14-Jul-02 BKNF02-280 3LNO NAFO15-Jul-02 BKNF02-280 3PS NAFOH10Appendix HTABLE H - 1 (continued)PAL AIRCRAFT PATROLS IN FIGURE 7-7Date Mission ID Areas of Patrol Grid Used for Patrol15-Jul-02 BKNF02-281 3L-OUTER NAFO15-Jul-02 BKSF02-174 4X NAFO16-Jul-02 BKNF02-282 3M-EAST NAFO16-Jul-02 BKQR02-045 4T NAFO16-Jul-02 BKSF02-175 4VW NAFO17-Jul-02 BKSF02-176 5ZE/4X NAFO18-Jul-02 BKNF02-283 3NO-OUTER NAFO18-Jul-02 BKQR02-046 4T NAFO19-Jul-02 BKSF02-177 4X NAFO19-Jul-02 BKSF02-178 4VSW NAFO20-Jul-02 BKNF02-284 3NO-OUTER NAFO20-Jul-02 BKNF02-285 4R NAFO20-Jul-02 BKNF02-286 3LN-OUTER NAFO21-Jul-02 BKNF02-287 2J/3K/4R NAFO21-Jul-02 BKSF02-179 4W/4X NAFO22-Jul-02 BKNF02-288 3PS NAFO22-Jul-02 BKNF02-289 3M NAFO23-Jul-02 BKNF02-290 3LN OUTER NAFO23-Jul-02 BKSF02-180 5ZE/4X NAFO24-Jul-02 BKNF02-291 3LM NORTH NAFO24-Jul-02 BKSF02-181 4VSW NAFO25-Jul-02 BKNF02-292 3LM (SOUTH) NAFO25-Jul-02 BKNF02-293 3PS NAFO25-Jul-02 BKQR02-047 4S NAFO25-Jul-02 BKSF02-182 4X NAFO26-Jul-02 BKNF02-294 3L-OUTER NAFO27-Jul-02 BKGR02-051 4T NAFO27-Jul-02 BKNF02-295 3NO OUTER NAFO27-Jul-02 BKNF02-296 3K NAFO27-Jul-02 BKQR02-048 4S NAFO29-Jul-02 BKNF02-299 3L NAFO29-Jul-02 BKNF02-300 3PN/3PS NAFO29-Jul-02 BKSF02-185 4X NAFO30-Jul-02 BKNF02-301 3LM NORTH NAFO31-Jul-02 BKNF02-302 3 PS NAFO31-Jul-02 BKNF02-303 3LM SOUTH NAFO31-Jul-02 BKQR02-049 4T/4S NAFO31-Jul-02 BKSF02-186 4WX NAFO01-Aug-02 BKQR02-050 AREA 16 NAFO01-Aug-02 BKSF02-187 4X/5ZE NAFO02-Aug-02 BKNF02-304 3M NAFO02-Aug-02 BKNF02-305 3NO NAFO02-Aug-02 BKSF02-188 4VW NAFO03-Aug-02 BKNF02-306 3-L-INNER NAFO03-Aug-02 BKSF02-189 4X/5ZE NAFO04-Aug-02 BKNF02-307 3P NAFO04-Aug-02 BKNF02-308 3K NAFO04-Aug-02 BKNF02-309 4R NAFO04-Aug-02 BKQR02-051 4S NAFO05-Aug-02 BKNF02-310 3L-OUTER NAFOH11Appendix HTABLE H - 1 (continued)PAL AIRCRAFT PATROLS IN FIGURE 7-7Date Mission ID Areas of Patrol Grid Used for Patrol05-Aug-02 BKNF02-311 3M-EAST NAFO05-Aug-02 BKSF02-190 4VSW NAFO06-Aug-02 BKNF02-312 3M NAFO06-Aug-02 BKNF02-313 3PS NAFO06-Aug-02 BKSF02-191 4X/5ZE NAFO07-Aug-02 BKGR02-052 4T NAFO07-Aug-02 BKGR02-052 4T NAFO07-Aug-02 BKNF02-314 3L NAFO07-Aug-02 BKNF02-315 3L NAFO07-Aug-02 BKSF02-192 4X NAFO08-Aug-02 BKNF02-316 3L NAFO08-Aug-02 BKSF02-193 4VW NAFO09-Aug-02 BKSF02-194 5ZE/4X NAFO10-Aug-02 BKQR02-051 4S NAFO11-Aug-02 BKNF02-318 3NO OUTER NAFO11-Aug-02 BKSF02-195 4WX-5ZE NAFO12-Aug-02 BKNF02-320 4R NAFO12-Aug-02 BKNF02-321 3LN NAFO12-Aug-02 BKNF02-322 3L-OUTER NAFO12-Aug-02 BKQR02-052 4S NAFO13-Aug-02 BKSF02-196 4W NAFO14-Aug-02 BKNF02-323 3NO WEST NAFO14-Aug-02 BKNF02-324 3PS NAFO14-Aug-02 BKSF02-197 5XE/4X NAFO15-Aug-02 BKNF02-325 3K NAFO15-Aug-02 BKNF02-326 3-PS NAFO15-Aug-02 BKSF02-198 4X NAFO16-Aug-02 BKNF02-327 3NO WEST NAFO17-Aug-02 BKNF02-328 3M-EAST NAFO18-Aug-02 BKNF02-329 3LNO LINE NAFO18-Aug-02 BKSF02-200 44X/5ZE NAFO19-Aug-02 BKSF02-201 4VW/4X NAFO20-Aug-02 BKGR02-053 4T NAFO20-Aug-02 BKNF02-330 3L-OUTER NAFO20-Aug-02 BKNF02-331 3BC NAFO20-Aug-02 BKSF02-202 4X NAFO21-Aug-02 BKNF02-332 3M NAFO21-Aug-02 BKSF02-203 4X NAFO22-Aug-02 BKNF02-334 3PS NAFO22-Aug-02 BKNF02-335 3LPS NAFO23-Aug-02 BKNF02-336 3LM OUTER NAFO24-Aug-02 BKGR02-054 4T NAFO24-Aug-02 BKNF02-337 3LM NAFO24-Aug-02 BKSF02-204 4VW NAFO25-Aug-02 BKNF02-338 3NO NAFO25-Aug-02 BKQR02-053 4S/R NAFO25-Aug-02 BKSF02-205 5ZE/4X NAFO26-Aug-02 BKNF02-339 2J/2H NAFO26-Aug-02 BKSF02-206 4X NAFO27-Aug-02 BKNF02-340 3L-OUTER NAFOH12Appendix HTABLE H - 1 (continued)PAL AIRCRAFT PATROLS IN FIGURE 7-7Date Mission ID Areas of Patrol Grid Used for Patrol27-Aug-02 BKSF02-207 4XW NAFO28-Aug-02 BKGR02-055 4T NAFO29-Aug-02 BKNF02-342 3NO-OUTER NAFO29-Aug-02 BKNF02-343 3PS NAFO29-Aug-02 BKSF02-208 4VW NAFO30-Aug-02 BKNF02-344 3NO NAFO30-Aug-02 BKNF02-345 3KL NAFO30-Aug-02 BKSF-02-209 5ZE/4X NAFO31-Aug-02 BKNF02-346 3L NAFO31-Aug-02 BKQR02-054 4S NAFO01-Sep-02 BKNF02-347 3L NAFO02-Sep-02 BKNF02-348 3KL NAFO02-Sep-02 BKSF02-210 5ZE/4X NAFO03-Sep-02 BKNF02-349 3M-EAST NAFO04-Sep-02 BKNF02-350 3LM-OUTER NAFO04-Sep-02 BKNF02-351 3PS NAFO04-Sep-02 BKSF02-212 5ZE/4X NAFO05-Sep-02 BKGR02-056 4T NAFO05-Sep-02 BKNF02-352 4R NAFO05-Sep-02 BKSF02-213 4WX NAFO06-Sep-02 BKNF02-353 3L OUTER NAFO06-Sep-02 BKSF02-214 5ZE/4X NAFO07-Sep-02 BKNF02-354 3NO NAFO07-Sep-02 BKSF02-215 4X NAFO08-Sep-02 BKNF02-355 3L NAFO09-Sep-02 BKNF02-356 3L-OUTER NAFO10-Sep-02 BKNF02-357 3L-OUTER NAFO10-Sep-02 BKSF02-216 4X NAFO11-Sep-02 BKNF02-358 3M EAST NAFO11-Sep-02 BKNF02-359 3L0 NAFO11-Sep-02 BKSF02-217 5ZE/4X NAFO12-Sep-02 BKSF02-218 4W NAFO13-Sep-02 BKGR02-057 4T NAFO14-Sep-02 BFNF02-361 3LOUTER NAFO14-Sep-02 BKNF02-360 3L NAFO14-Sep-02 BKNF02-362 3L NAFO14-Sep-02 BKSF02-219 4W NAFO15-Sep-02 BKNF02-363 3L NAFO16-Sep-02 BKNF02-364 3NO-WEST NAFO16-Sep-02 BKSF02-221 4VSW NAFO17-Sep-02 BKNF02-365 3PS NAFO17-Sep-02 BKSF02-222 5ZE/4X NAFO18-Sep-02 BKGR02-058 4T NAFO18-Sep-02 BKNF02-366 3PN-4R NAFO18-Sep-02 BKSF02-223 4WX NAFO19-Sep-02 BKNF02-367 3LM NAFO19-Sep-02 BKSF02-224 4X NAFO20-Sep-02 BKGR02-059 4T NAFO20-Sep-02 BKNF02-368 3NO-OUTER NAFO20-Sep-02 BKNF02-368 3PS NAFOH13Appendix HTABLE H - 1 (continued)PAL AIRCRAFT PATROLS IN FIGURE 7-7Date Mission ID Areas of Patrol Grid Used for Patrol20-Sep-02 BKSF02-225 4X NAFO21-Sep-02 BKNF02-370 3NO-OUTER NAFO21-Sep-02 BKNF02-371 3NO-OUTER NAFO21-Sep-02 BKSF02-226 4VWX NAFO22-Sep-02 BKNF02-372 3LN-OUTER NAFO23-Sep-02 BKNF02-374 3NO NAFO23-Sep-02 BKNF02-375 2HJ NAFO23-Sep-02 BKNF02-376 3LM NAFO24-Sep-02 BKNF02-377 3L NAFO24-Sep-02 BKNF02-378 3NO-OUTER/3PS NAFO25-Sep-02 BKGR02-060 4T NAFO25-Sep-02 BKNF02-379 3L NAFO25-Sep-02 BKSF02-228 4W/4X NAFO26-Sep-02 BKNF02-380 3L NAFO26-Sep-02 BKNF02-381 3N OUTER NAFO26-Sep-02 BKSF02-229 4W NAFO27-Sep-02 BKSF02-230 4X/5ZE NAFO28-Sep-02 BKGR02-061 4T NAFO28-Sep-02 BKNF02-382 3LM NAFO29-Sep-02 BKNF02-383 4L OUTER NAFO29-Sep-02 BKNF02-384 3NO OUTER NAFO29-Sep-02 BKSF02-231 4W/4X/5ZE NAFO30-Sep-02 BKSF02-232 4W/4X NAFO01-Oct-02 BKSF02-233 4W/5ZE NAFO02-0ct-02 BKGR02-062 4T NAFO02-0ct-02 BKNF02-388 3NO OUTER NAFO02-0ct-02 BKNF02-389 3PS NAFO03-0ct-02 BKGR02-063 4T NAFO04-0ct-02 BKNF02-391 3L NAFO04-0ct-02 BKNF02-392 3NO OUTER NAFO04-0ct-02 BKSF02-236 4X NAFO05-0ct-02 BKNF02-393 3L NAFO06-0ct-02 BKGR02-064 4T NAFO06-0ct-02 BKNF02-394 3NO-WEST NAFO06-0ct-02 BKSF02-237 4V/W NAFO08-0ct-02 BKNF02-395 3NO-WEST NAFO08-0ct-02 BKSF02-238 4W/4Y/5ZE NAFO09-0ct-02 BKNF02-396 3LM-NORTH NAFO09-0ct-02 BKNF02-397 30/PS NAFO09-0ct-02 BKSF02-239 4W/4X NAFO10-Oct-02 BKGR02-066 4T/4VN NAFO10-Oct-02 BKNF02-398 3NO NAFO10-Oct-02 BKSF02-240 4X/5ZE NAFO11-Oct-02 BKNF02-399 3M EAST NAFO11-Oct-02 BKQR02-055 4T NAFO12-Oct-02 BKNF02-400 3L NAFO12-Oct-02 BKSF02-241 4WX NAFO13-Oct-02 BKNF02-401 3M-SOUTH NAFO14-Oct-02 BKNF02-402 3L NAFO14-Oct-02 BKNF02-403 3L NAFOH14Appendix HTABLE H - 1 (continued)PAL AIRCRAFT PATROLS IN FIGURE 7-7Date Mission ID Areas of Patrol Grid Used for Patrol14-Oct-02 BKSF02-242 4W NAFO15-Oct-02 BKNF02-404 3L NAFO15-Oct-02 BSFK02-243 5ZE/4X NAFO16-Oct-02 BKNF02-405 3M NAFO16-Oct-02 BKSF02-244 4WX NAFO17-Oct-02 BKNF02-406 3PN/S NAFO17-Oct-02 BKSR02-245 4VW NAFO18-Oct-02 BKSF02-246 4X-5ZE NAFO19-Oct-02 BKNF02-407 3L NAFO19-Oct-02 BKQR02-056 4S/4T NAFO20-0ct-02 BKNF02-408 3PS NAFO20-0ct-02 BKSF02-247 4W/4X NAFO21-Oct-02 BKNF02-409 3LN NAFO21-Oct-02 BKQR02-057 4S NAFO22-Oct-02 BKNF02-410 3NO-OUTER NAFO22-Oct-02 BKSF02-248 5ZE/4X NAFO23-Oct-02 BKNF02-411 3LM-SOUTH NAFO23-Oct-02 BKNF02-412 3PS NAFO23-Oct-02 BKSF02-249 4VW NAFO24-Oct-02 BKGR02-067 4T NAFO24-Oct-02 BKNF02-413 3PS NAFO24-Oct-02 BKSF02-250 4W/4X NAFO25-Oct-02 BKSF02-251 4W/X NAFO26-Oct-02 BKNF02-415 NORTHERN P NAFO26-Oct-02 BKNF02-416 3LNO NAFO27-Oct-02 BKNF02-418 3-L-OUTER NAFO27-Oct-02 BKSF02-252 5ZE/4X NAFO28-Oct-02 BKNF02-419 3PS NAFO28-Oct-02 BKNF02-420 TRANSIT NAFO29-Oct-02 BKNF02-421 3M NAFO29-Oct-02 BKSF02-254 4W/X NAFO30-0ct-02 BKNF02-422 3L NAFO30-0ct-02 BKNF02-423 3PS NAFO30-0ct-02 BKSF02-255 5ZE/4X NAFO31-Oct-02 BKNF02-424 3K NAFO31-Oct-02 BKNF02-425 3NO NAFO31-Oct-02 BKQR02-058 3S NAFO31-Oct-02 BKSF02-256 4W/X NAFO01-Nov-02 BKGR02-069 4T NAFO01-Nov-02 BKNF02-426 3M OUTER NAFO01-Nov-02 BKSF02-257 4W/X NAFO01-Nov-02 BKSF02-258 4X NAFO02-Nov-02 BKNF02-427 3LM NORTH NAFO04-Nov-02 BKNF02-428 3PS NAFO04-Nov-02 BKNF02-429 3NO-OUTER NAFO04-Nov-02 BKSF02-259 4VW NAFO05-Nov-02 BKNF02-430 5ZE/4X NAFO05-Nov-02 BKSF02-260 3LM-SOUTH NAFO06-Nov-02 BKNF02-431 3NO-OUTER NAFO06-Nov-02 BKNF02-432 3PS NAFOH15Appendix HTABLE H - 1 (continued)PAL AIRCRAFT PATROLS IN FIGURE 7-7Date Mission ID Areas of Patrol Grid Used for Patrol06-NOV-02 BKRG02-072 4T NAFO06-NOV-02 BKSF02-261 4X NAFO09-NOV-02 BKNF02-435 3LM NORTH NAFO09-NOV-02 BKSF02-264 4X NAFO10-NOV-02 BKNF02-436 3NO OUTER NAFO11-Nov-02 BKNF02-437 3K NAFO11-Nov-02 BKSF02-265 4X NAFO12-Nov-02 BKNF02-438 3LM-SOUTH NAFO12-Nov-02 BKNF02-439 3K NAFO12-Nov-02 BKNF02-440 3PS NAFO12-Nov-02 BKSF02-266 5ZE/4X NAFO13-Nov-02 BKNF02-441 3LM NAFO13-Nov-02 BKSF02-267 4W/4VN/4VS NAFO14-Nov-02 BKGR02-073 4T NAFO15-Nov-02 BKNF02-443 3LM NORTH NAFO15-Nov-02 BKQR02-059 4S NAFO16-Nov-02 BKNF02-444 2NO NAFO16-Nov-02 BKSF02-270 4W 4X5ZE NAFO17-Nov-02 BKNF02-445 3PS/N NAFO19-Nov-02 BKNF02-446 3LM NORTH NAFO19-Nov-02 BKSF02-271 4VW NAFO02-Dec-02 BKBF02-463 3LM NAFO02-Dec-02 BKSF02-289 4X/5ZE NAFO03-Dec-02 BKGR02-076 4T NAFO03-Dec-02 BKSF02-290 4X NAFO04-Dec-02 BKNF02-465 4R NAFO04-Dec-02 BKNF02-466 3NO NAFO04-Dec-02 BKSF02-291 4W/X NAFO05-Dec-02 BKNF02-467 3-L-OUTER NAFO05-Dec-02 BKNF02-468 4R/2J/3K NAFO05-Dec-02 BKNF02-469 3PS NAFO05-Dec-02 BKSF02-292 4X5ZE NAFO06-Dec-02 BKNF02-470 3M NORTH NAFO06-Dec-02 BKSF02-293 4VW NAFO07-Dec-02 BKNF02-472 3NO OUTER NAFO07-Dec-02 BKSF02-294 4W/4X/5ZE NAFO08-Dec-02 BKNF02-473 3N OUTER NAFO08-Dec-02 BKSF02-295 4X/5Z NAFO09-Dec-02 BKGR02-078 4T NAFO09-Dec-02 BKNF02-474 3LM SOUTH NAFO09-Dec-02 BKSF02-296 4X NAFO10-Dec-02 BKFN02-475 3NO OUTER NAFO10-Dec-02 BKNF02-476 3-PS NAFO10-Dec-02 BKSF02-297 4X, 5ZE NAFO11-Dec-02 BKNF02-477 4R NAFO11-Dec-02 BKNF02-478 3L INSIDE NAFO11-Dec-02 BKSF02-298 4VW NAFO12-Dec-02 BKNF02-479 3LNO NAFO12-Dec-02 BKNF02-480 3NO NAFO12-Dec-02 BKNF02-481 4R NAFOH16Appendix HTABLE H - 1 (continued)PAL AIRCRAFT PATROLS IN FIGURE 7-7Date Mission ID Areas of Patrol Grid Used for Patrol12-Dec-02 BKNF02-482 3PS NAFO12-Dec-02 BKSF02-299 4X/5ZE NAFO13-Dec-02 BKNF02-483 3L NAFO13-Dec-02 BKNF02-484 3K NAFO13-Dec-02 BKNF02-485 3PS NAFO13-Dec-02 BKSF02-300 4WX NAFO14-Dec-02 BKGR02-079 4T NAFO14-Dec-02 BKNF02-486 3NO NAFO14-Dec-02 BKSF02-301 4X5ZE NAFO15-Dec-02 BKSF02-302 4X NAFO16-Dec-02 BKGR02-078 4T NAFO16-Dec-02 BKNF02-487 3LOUTER NAFO16-Dec-02 BKSF02-303 4X NAFO17-Dec-02 BKSF02-304 4X/5ZE NAFO18-Dec-02 BKGR02-080 4T NAFO18-Dec-02 BKNF02-488 3K NAFO18-Dec-02 BKNF02-490 4R NAFO19-Dec-02 BKNF02-491 3NO-OUTER NAFO20-Dec-02 BKNF02-492 3PS NAFO20-Dec-02 BKNF02-493 3LM-NORTH NAFO21-Dec-02 BKNF02-305 4X/5ZE NAFO21-Dec-02 BKNF02-494 3NO NAFO21-Dec-02 BKSF02-306 4WX NAFO23-Dec-02 BKNF02-496 3LM SOUTH NAFO23-Dec-02 BKSF02-307 4X/5ZE NAFO23-Dec-02 BKSF02-308 4X/5ZE NAFO24-Dec-02 BKNF02-497 3NO OUTER NAFO24-Dec-02 BKSF02-309 5ZE/4X NAFO25-Dec-02 BKNF02-498 3M NAFO27-Dec-02 BKNF02-310 4W/4X NAFO28-Dec-02 BKNF02-499 3NO-OUTER NAFO28-Dec-02 BKSF02-311 4WX NAFO29-Dec-02 BKNF02-500 3L OUTER NAFO30-Dec-02 BKNF02-501 3NO OUTER NAFO30-Dec-02 BKNF02-502 3PS NAFO30-Dec-02 BKSF02-312 5ZE/4X NAFO31-Dec-02 BKNF02-503 3NO NAFO31-Dec-02 BKSF02-313 4X NAFOSource: Maritime Operations Centre, Halifax, 2003.H17Appendix HTable H-2 contains the mission identifiers and areas patrolled by PAL surveillance aircraft contracted by the Canadian Coast Guard for anti-pollution patrols during the year 2002. Except where no grid area is indicated, the grid used to plan the PAL missions is the North Atlantic Fisheries Organization depicted in Chapter Three at Figures 3-12 and 3-13. Where no grid area is indicated, the researcher used the NAFO area in which are located the features such as Hibernia, Virgin Rocks, Placentia Bay, and Conception Bay for creating Figure 7-7. The first three digits of the mission identifier indicates that the aircraft was tasked in support of the Canadian Coast Guard.TABLE H - 2 CCG PAL AIRCRAFT PATROLS IN FIGURE 7-7Date Mission ID Areas of Patrol Grid Used for Patrol02-Jan-02 CCG02-001 HIBERNIA Nil03-Jan-02 CCG02-002 VIRGIN ROCKS Nil07-Jan-02 CCG02-004 S. COAST Nil09-Jan-02 CCG02-005 HIBERNIA Nil10-Jan-02 CCG02-006 S. COAST Nil15-Jan-02 CCG02-008 HIBERNIA Nil21-Jan-02 CCG02-009 S. COAST Nil24-Jan-02 CCG02-010 HIBERNIA Nil28-Jan-02 CCG02-012 SE. COAST Nil29-Jan-02 CCG02-013 S. COAST Nil30-Jan-02 CCG02-014 unknown Nil31-Jan-02 CCG02-015 VIRGIN ROCKS Nil04-Feb-02 CCG02-017 S. COAST Nil07-Feb-02 CCG02-018 S. COAST Nil11-Feb-02 CCG02-019 S. COAST Nil12-Feb-02 CCG02-020 S. COAST Nil13-Feb-02 CCG02-021 S. COAST Nil14-Feb-02 CCG02-022 SOUTH Nil15-Feb-02 CCG02-023 SW. COAST Nil16-Feb-02 CCG02-024 SOUTH Nil26-Feb-02 CCG02-026 VIRGIN ROCKS Nil01-Mar-02 CCG02-027 HIBERNIA Nil05-Mar-02 CCG02-028 S. COAST Nil11-Mar-02 CCG02-031 3L NAFO11-Mar-02 CCG02-031 3L NAFO11-Mar-02 CCG02-031 3L NAFO11-Mar-02 CCG02-031 3L NAFO11-Mar-02 CCG02-031 3L NAFO11-Mar-02 CCG02-031 3L NAFO17-Mar-02 CCG02-032 unknown Nil18-Mar-02 CCG02-033 S. COAST Nil19-Mar-02 CCG02-034 3K/2J NAFOH18Appendix HTABLE H - 2 (continued)CCG PAL AIRCRAFT PATROLS IN FIGURE 7-7Date Mission ID Areas of Patrol Grid Used for Patrol20-Mar-02 CCG02-035 3K NAFO21-Mar-02 CCG02-036 3K NAFO22-Mar-02 CCG02-037 3KPS NAFO23-Mar-02 CCG02-038 3K NAFO26-Mar-02 CCG02-039 PLACENTIA BAY Nil31-Mar-02 CCG02-040 3L NAFO01-Apr-02 CCG02-041 CONCEPTION BAY Nil01-Apr-02 CCG02-042 CONCEPTION BAY Nil02-Apr-02 CCG02-043 CONCEPTION BAY Nil02-Apr-02 CCG02-044 CONCEPTION BAY Nil03-Apr-02 CCG02-043 CONCEPTION BAY Nil03-Apr-02 CCG02-044 CONCEPTION BAY Nil19-Apr-02 CCG02-046 HIBERNIA Nil22-Apr-02 CCG02-047 3L NAFO26-Apr-02 CCG02-048 SE. COAST Nil27-Apr-02 CCG02-049 S. COAST Nil11-May-02 CCG02-049 S. COAST Nil17-May-02 CCG02-050 HIBERNIA Nil22-May-02 CCG02-051 PLACENTIA BAY Nil20-Jun-02 CCG02-054 3LO NAFO11-Jul-02 CCG02-999 PLACENTIA BAY Nil23-Jul-02 CCG02-057 SW. COAST Nil24-Jul-02 CCG02-058 S. COAST Nil26-Jul-02 CCG02-059 HIBERNIA Nil16-Aug-02 CCG02-060 PLACENTIA BAY Nil27-Aug-02 CCG02-061 PLACENTIA BAY Nil28-Aug-02 CCG02-062 HIBERNIA Nil06-Sep-02 CCG02-063 PLACENTIA BAY Nil08-Sep-02 CCG02-064 3PS NAFO09-Sep-02 CCG02-065 EAST COAST Nil14-Sep-02 CCG02-066 S. COAST Nil15-Sep-02 CCG02-067 3L NAFO16-Sep-02 CCG02-068A 3L NAFO19-Sep-02 CCG02-069 S. COAST Nil27-Sep-02 CCG02-070 3L NAFO30-Sep-02 CCG02-071 VIRGIN ROCKS Nil10-Oct-02 CCG02-072 PLACENTIA BAY Nil11-Oct-02 CCG02-073 SE. COAST Nil15-Oct-02 CCG02-074 PLACENTIA BAY Nil23-Oct-02 CCG02-075 SW COAST Nil28-Oct-02 CCG02-076 PLACENTIA BAY Nil19-Nov-02 CCG02-077 PLACENTIA BAY Nil02-Dec-02 CCG02-081 PLACENTIA BAY Nil09-Dec-02 CCG02-083 PLACENTIA BAY Nil10-Dec-02 CCG02-084 S. COAST Nil19-Dec-02 CCG02-086 S. COAST Nil30-Dec-02 CCG02-089 PLACENTIA BAY Nil31-Dec-02 CCG02-090 PLACENTIA BAY NilSource: Maritime Operations Centre, Halifax, 2003.H19Appendix JNAVAL FISHERY AND PREVENTATIVE PATROLS 1980 -2003This appendix provides in various tables the names and dates during the period 1980 to 2003 of naval vessels employed in fisheries patrols in support of Fisheries and Oceans Canada, and preventative patrols in support of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Only patrols undertaken in the Atlantic Ocean were used in this study.Tables J-1 and J-2 were constructed from primary source data at the National Library and Archives of Canada, Maritime Forces Atlantic, Director General Operational Research, and Fisheries and Oceans Conservation and Protection Branch Newfoundland Region. The maps and tables presented in this thesis were derived from each of these patrols, except where data unavailable is indicated in the column “Data source.” A variety of data were extracted from each patrol, such as patrol ship geographic positions, marine traffic geographic positions, and the locations of boardings for inspection.Given the nature of the different sources of data, not all data sets were captured for each patrol. The primary data sources are listed in the tables as follows:Ship’s Log - Held at the National Library and Archives of Canada atOttawa.DFO CFINS - Data extracted from Fisheries and Oceans CFIN System (Canadian Fisheries Information Network.)Patrol Report - Report sent post-patrol by individual units either bymessage (ships) or by letter (submarines). Retained by Maritime Forces Atlantic Headquarters in Halifax.Template - Electronic templates in Microsoft Excel and Accesssupplied by researcher to naval vessels prior to patrol commencement. Templates facilitated electronic recording of positional information concerning own ship and other contacts.MOC CHDB - Data extracted from the Contact History Data Base(CHDB) maintained by the Maritime Operations Centre at Maritime Forces Atlantic Headquarters in Halifax. This data base contains positional information of military units that provide geographic co-ordinates to the US military Global Command and Control System (GCCS).J1Appendix JThe numbers appearing in the column “Ship Type” correspond to the different classes of ships.Type 1 - DDE Destroyer escort. Improved Restigouche and MackenzieclassesType 2 - DDH Destroyer with helicopter. Annapolis and Improved StLaurent classesType 3 - FFH Frigate with helicopter. Halifax class.Type 4 - DDH Destroyer with helicopter. Command and control platform.Iroquois class.Type 5 - AOR Auxiliary oil replenishment vessel. Protecteur and Preserverclasses.Type 6 - MSA Minesweeping auxiliary. HMCS Anticosti and HMCSMoresby.Type 7 - MCDV Maritime Coastal Defence Vessel. Kingston class.Type 8 - ASXL Diving auxiliary. HMCS Cormorant.Type 9 - SSK Conventional-powered submarine. Oberon and Victoriaclasses.Type 10 - CFAV Canadian Forces Auxiliary Vessel. Non-warship supportvessels crewed by civilians.TABLE J-1NAVAL FISHERIES PATROLS 1980 - 2003Ship Name Ship Type Start Stop Data SourcesDate DateNipigon 2 22-Apr-80 09-May-80 Ship's LogAssiniboine 2 12-Nov-80 28-Nov-80 Ship's LogAlgonquin 4 25-Nov-80 12-Dec-80 Ship's LogSkeena 2 08-Jan-81 23-Jan-81 Ship's LogFraser 2 19-May-81 04-Jun-81 Ship's LogCormorant 8 14-Oct-81 28-Oct-81 Ship's LogMargaree 2 22-Oct-81 05-Nov-81 Ship's LogHuron 4 21-Jan-82 05-Feb-82 Ship's LogNipigon 2 15-Feb-82 05-Mar-82 Ship's LogAssiniboine 2 18-Jan-83 03-Feb-83 Ship's LogNipigon 2 15-Mar-83 28-Mar-83 Ship's LogIroquois 4 24-Nov-83 10-Dec-83 Ship's LogCormorant 8 09-Jan-84 01-Feb-84 Ship's LogSkeena 2 13-Feb-84 29-Feb-84 Ship's LogSaguenay 2 12-Mar-84 29-Mar-84 Ship's LogAssiniboine 2 02-May-84 09-May-84 Ship's LogCormorant 8 28-May-84 23-Jun-84 Ship's LogSkeena 2 15-Jan-85 07-Feb-85 Ship's LogSaguenay 2 26-Feb-85 15-Mar-85 Ship's LogAlgonquin 4 07-May-85 24-May-85 Ship's LogAthabaskan 4 26-Jun-85 02-Jul-85 Ship's LogIroquois 4 28-Jun-85 11-Jul-85 Ship's LogAthabaskan 4 15-Jul-85 26-Jul-85 Ship's LogSkeena 2 29-Oct-85 15-Nov-85 Ship's LogCormorant 8 14-Jan-86 21-Feb-86 Ship's LogAlgonquin 4 01-Mar-86 05-Mar-86 Ship's LogNipigon 2 30-Sep-86 17-Oct-86 Ship's LogJ2Appendix JTABLE J-1 (continued)NAVAL FISHERIES PATROLS 1980 - 2003Ship Name Ship Type StartDateStopDateData SourcesAssiniboine 2 28-Oct-86 14-Nov-86 Ship's LogMargaree 2 28-Jan-87 08-Feb-87 Ship's LogSaguenay 2 24-Feb-87 04-Mar-87 Ship's LogCormorant 8 23-Mar-87 10-Apr-87 Ship's LogMargaree 2 16-Jun-87 03-Jul-87 Ship's LogFraser 2 06-Aug-87 20-Aug-87 Ship's LogAnnapolis 2 19-Jan-88 03-Feb-88 Ship's LogGatineau 1 03-May-88 20-May-88 Ship's LogAssiniboine 2 24-Oct-88 12-Nov-88 Ship's LogSkeena 2 18-Jan-89 10-Feb-89 Ship's LogGatineau 1 15-Nov-89 20-Nov-89 Ship's LogCormorant 8 17-Nov-89 16-Dec-89 Ship's LogSaguenay 2 04-Dec-89 18-Dec-89 Ship's LogTerra Nova 1 14-May-90 unknown DFO CFINSMargaree 2 22-Oct-90 09-Nov-90 Ship's Log, DFO CFINSCormorant 8 03-Dec-90 14-Dec-90 Ship's Log, DFO CFINSGatineau 1 28-Jan-91 unknown DFO CFINSSkeena 2 18-Feb-91 unknown DFO CFINSNipigon 2 29-Apr-91 unknown DFO CFINSMargaree 2 10-Jun-91 21-Jun-91 Ship's LogCFAV St Charles 10 -- Jun-91 unknown DFO CFINSMargaree 2 23-Jul-91 16-Aug-91 Ship's Log, DFO CFINSCFAV St Charles 10 -- Aug 91 unknown DFO CFINSCormorant 8 20-Aug-91 unknown Data unavailableOttawa 2 23-Sep-91 04-Oct-91 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINSMargaree 2 30-Sep-91 17-Oct-91 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINSCFAV Riverton 10 - Nov-91 unknown DFO CFINSCormorant 8 -- Dec-91 -- Dec-91 DFO CFINSCFAV Riverton 10 -- Jan-92 unknown DFO CFINSNipigon 2 10-Feb-92 28-Feb-92 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINSNipigon 2 17-Mar-92 31-Mar-92 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINSMargaree 2 06-Apr-92 16-Apr-92 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINSFraser 2 04-May-92 15-May-92 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINSFraser 2 13-Jul-92 31-Jul-92 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINSNipigon 2 10-Aug-92 unknown DFO CFINSSkeena 2 05-Oct-92 30-Oct-92 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINSOjibwa 9 05-Mar-93 12-Mar-93 Patrol ReportAnticosti 6 19-Apr-93 30-Apr-93 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINSMoresby 6 19-Apr-93 30-Apr-93 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINSGatineau 1 03-May-93 27-May-93 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINSSkeena 2 25-May-93 04-Jun-93 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINSNipigon 2 09-Jun-93 18-Jun-93 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINSMoresby 6 03-Aug-93 11-Aug-93 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINSSkeena 2 23-Aug-93 17-Sep-93 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINSAnticosti 6 20-Sep-93 08-Oct-93 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINSMoresby 6 21-Feb-94 02-Mar-94 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINSAnticosti 6 06-Apr-94 22-Apr-94 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINSMoresby 6 04-May-94 unknown Data unavailableFraser 2 10-May-94 21-May-94 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINSFraser 2 04-Jul-94 29-Jul-94 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINSAnticosti 6 25-Jul-94 14-Aug-94 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINSGatineau 1 08-Aug-94 26-Aug-94 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINSFraser 2 12-Sep-94 30-Sep-94 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINSJ3Appendix JTABLE J-1 (continued)NAVAL FISHERIES PATROLS 1980 - 2003Ship Name Ship Type StartDateStopDateData SourcesOkanagan 9 26-Sep-94 10-Oct-94 Patrol ReportCormorant 8 14-Nov-94 unknown Data unavailableCormorant 8 20-Mar-95 08-Apr-95 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINSToronto 3 27-Mar-95 10-Apr-95 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINSCormorant 8 18-Apr-95 08-May-95 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINSOnondaga 9 23-May-95 unknown Data unavailableNipigon 2 - Jun-95 unknown DFO CFINSAnticosti 6 04-Jul-95 14-Jul-95 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINSMoresby 6 17-Jul-95 unknown DFO CFINSHalifax 3 19-Aug-95 unknown DFO CFINSGatineau 1 11-Sep-95 06-Oct-95 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINSCormorant 8 10-Oct-95 08-Nov-95 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINSCormorant 8 20-Nov-95 14-Dec-95 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINSTerra Nova 1 05-Feb-96 unknown DFO CFINSToronto 3 27-Feb-96 17-Mar-96 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINSTerra Nova 2 09-Apr-96 unknown DFO CFINSMoresby 6 02-Jul-96 19-Jul-96 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINSAnticosti 6 29-Jul-96 unknown DFO CFINSToronto 3 16-Sep-96 11-Oct-96 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINSCormorant 8 28-Sep-96 unknown Data unavailableTerra Nova 1 27-Jan-97 unknown DFO CFINSTerra Nova 2 07-Apr-9 7 unknown DFO CFINSAnticosti 6 05-May-97 21-May-97 Ship's Log, DFO CFINSMontreal 3 26-May-97 06-Jun-97 Ship's Log, DFO CFINSGlace Bay 7 02-Sep-97 18-Sep-97 Ship's Log, DFO CFINSKingston 7 29-Sep-97 17-Oct-97 Ship's Log, DFO CFINSVille de Quebec 3 06-Oct-97 24-Oct-97 Ship's Log, DFO CFINSFredericton 3 03-Dec-97 19-Dec-97 Ship's Log, DFO CFINSGlace Bay 7 20-Oct-97 13-Nov-97 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINSNipigon 1 25-Apr-98 30-May-98 Data unavailableAnticosti 6 01-May-98 19-May-98 DFO CFINSKingston 7 17-Aug-98 23-May-98 DFO CFINSCharlottetown 3 21-Oct-98 11-Nov-98 DFO CFINSHalifax 3 01-Dec-98 17-Dec-98 Patrol Report, DFO CFINSCharlottetown 3 08-Jan-99 25-Jan-99 Patrol Report, DFO CFINSMontreal 3 22-Feb-99 12-Mar-99 Template, DFO CFINSSt John's 3 14-Jun-99 29-Jun-99 Template, DFO CFINSFredericton 3 28-Jul-99 17-Aug-99 Template, DFO CFINSKingston 7 08-Aug-99 31-Aug-99 Template, DFO CFINSVille de Quebec 3 08-Sep-99 29-Sep-99 Template, DFO CFINSMoncton 7 12-Oct-99 22-Oct-99 Template, DFO CFINSGlace Bay 7 12-Oct-99 22-Oct-99 Template, DFO CFINSMontreal 3 24-Nov-99 14-Dec-99 Template, DFO CFINSSt John's 3 17-Jan-00 04-Feb-00 Template, DFO CFINSVille de Quebec 3 20-Mar-00 04-Apr-00 Template, DFO CFINSGoose Bay 7 25-Apr-00 19-May-00 Template, DFO CFINSMoncton 7 08-May-00 13-May-00 Template, DFO CFINSToronto 3 02-Jun-00 19-Jun-00 Template, DFO CFINSAthabaskan 4 25-Jul-00 29-Jul-00 DFO CFINSGlace Bay 7 10-Aug-00 24-Aug-00 Data unavailableMontreal 3 14-Sep-00 29-Sep-00 Patrol Report, DFO CFINSAthabaskan 4 20-Nov-00 01-Dec-00 Template, DFO CFINSVille de Quebec 3 05-Dec-00 13-Dec-00 Patrol Report, DFO CFINSJ4Appendix JTABLE J-1 (continued)NAVAL FISHERIES PATROLS 1980 - 2003Ship Name Ship Type StartDateStopDateData SourcesMontreal 3 24-Jan-01 18-Feb-01 Template, DFO CFINSVille de Quebec 3 19-Mar-01 02-Apr-01 Patrol Report, DFO CFINSMontreal 3 04-Apr-01 12-Apr-01 Template, DFO CFINSSummerside 7 23-May-01 08-Jun-01 Patrol Report, DFO CFINSGoose Bay 7 13-Jun-01 28-Jun-01 DFO CFINSVille de Quebec 3 03-Jul-01 20-Jul-01 Template, DFO CFINSVille de Quebec 3 26-Nov-01 14-Dec-01 Template, DFO CFINSFredericton 3 18-Feb-02 08-Mar-02 Template, DFO CFINSSummerside 7 15-Apr-02 28-Apr-02 Template, DFO CFINSMoncton 7 24-Jul-02 03-Aug-02 Data unavailableKingston 7 24-Jul-02 03-Aug-02 Template, DFO CFINSGlace Bay 7 06-Sep-02 23-Sep-02 Template, DFO CFINSMoncton 7 23-Sep-02 11-Oct-02 Template, DFO CFINSGlace Bay 7 15-Oct-02 29-Oct-02 DFO CFINSGoose Bay 7 31-Oct-02 06-Nov-02 Template, DFO CFINSHalifax 3 25-Nov-02 12-Dec-02 Template, DFO CFINSCharlottetown 3 03-Feb-03 21-Feb-03 TemplateHalifax 3 19-Feb-03 01-Mar-03 Patrol ReportTABLE J-2NAVAL PREVENTATIVE PATROLS 1997 - 2003Ship Name Ship Type StartDateStopDateData SourcesTerra Nova 1 unknown 22-Jun-97 Data unavailableAnticosti 6 14-Jul-97 25-Jul-97 Data unavailableFredericton 3 02-Jul-98 17-Jul-98 Data unavailableAnticosti 6 16-Aug-99 27-Aug-99 TemplateAnticosti 6 09-Sep-99 28-Sep-99 TemplateMoncton 7 12-Jun-00 19-Jun-00 Data unavailableShawinigan 7 31-Jul-00 14-Aug-00 Data unavailableSummerside 7 31-Jul-00 14-Aug-OO Data unavailableKingston 7 12-Jun-03 16-Jun-03 MOC CHDBGlace Bay 7 12-Jun-03 16-Jun-03 MOC CHDBSummerside 7 16-Jun-03 20-Jun-03 MOC CHDBKingston 7 03-Nov-03 07-Nov-03 MOC CHDBMoncton 7 03-Nov-03 07-Nov-03 MOC CHDBJ5C-2 5 C£ G) Co j* © j"CD y . 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OM IO O Pk 00 00 0)01 DODO O) on O ) DO 0 0 ' - J CO Pk Pk CO DO_k _k doN CD CO 00 ~NjO)-f^4^cno)co-F^cncno)-i^co- k DO 0 0 0 0 CO _ C _ O CO O l O )0 ) -»■P k Pk CO DO DO DO CO CO DO Pk DO CO DO _ k 4 k CO CO DO DO CO DO DO CO COCO 0 0 CO O DO CO DO DO DO O l DO ^ 1 CO -Fk ~n| 4 k CO 0 0 DO O O ) CO—k -vj —k O l 0 ) O l Pk DO CO 0 0 0 0 Pk DO CO __k o DO 0 0 O l O ) O ) O lDO O ) C3) O Pk O O ) CD Pk CO O ) -Fk -Fk CO 0 0 oo O ) O ) O l DO 4 kC O D O C O —‘ • C O C O C O D O - t ^ C O C O C O C O D O C O D O C O D O C O D O D O D O O l t O ^ O l O O C O O S o i - ^ S A O O M O O - ^ O O O O O D O U S C O O l l \ ) C D C O - ‘ U l M O C D O O l O O S N ) - i > I A - * O A S C O O C 3 ) W O O - i ( D M S O ) ^ ( D W M © 0 ) A O^ D J 4 k > i y i c o a i D J c o ^ c o ^ . o i o o c o 0 ) 0 ) CO 00 CO O S S O l DO CO 0 0 CO o o P k ~. | CO < P k P k CO O ) P k P k N5DO - kO ) DO (no i d o S ’- k CO CO oo00O l O l DO CO CO CO CO _ k O l _ k CO DO4 k DO ^ k 0 0 O ) o O l CO CO CO 0 0 1 03b ) Pk CO b i CO DO DO 4 k b b b 1 o~n| CO o 00 01 DO DO o -v l O l O lCOO lDO O l —k 0 0 P k DOCO N p 4̂ p yibi bo co ̂ LkS S 0 0 M O O00 CO 4 k DO CO _ k CO DO O l CO CO —k—k O) 0 0 ;*>! CO O l 0 0 4 k CO CDl_k b i b CO b o b 1 o !_k CO0 0 b COo - - j O l CO - J O l -v l 'Q 0 0 COCO3 "■o'D "0I fco o__ v /D3 S 8GO o 0 ) —1 Q .o 'CQCOXl lo O c o 55 -aCD>TJ■ oCD3aNAVAL FISHERIES PATROL TOTALS - MAJOR WARSHIP 1980 TO 1997Appendix JTABLE J-3 (continued)NAVAL FISHERIES PATROL TOTALS - MAJOR WARSHIP 1980 TO 1997Ship Year PatrolDaysDistance(nm)Boardings SAR HelicopterHoursArrestsFraser 1994 11 2669 7 1 20.98 -Fraser 1994 25 5136 20 - 53.18 -Gatineau 1994 16 3578 11 - - 1Fraser 1994 16 3158 6 3 27.85 -Toronto 1995 15 2111 - - 26.30 -Gatineau 1995 24 4483 12 1 - -Toronto 1996 15 3506 13 - - -Toronto 1996 20 4038 13 1 - -Montreal 1997 12 2886 4 - - -Ville de Quebec 1997 16 2854 3 - - -Fredericton 1997 14 3242 2 - - -Source: Ships’ Logs, National Library and Archives.TABLE J-4NAVAL FISHERIES PATROL TOTALS - MINOR WARSHIP 1980 TO 1997Ship Year PatrolDaysDistance(nm)Boardings SAR HelicopterHoursArrestsCormorant 1981 13 2467 7 - - -Cormorant 1984 21 2950 13 - - -Cormorant 1984 25 4298 3 - - -Cormorant 1986 35 5217 17 - - -Cormorant 1987 18 2657 6 - - -Cormorant 1989 26 3867 - 1 - -Cormorant 1990 12 2136 7 - - -Anticosti 1993 12 2223 5 - - -Moresby 1993 12 1826 6 - - -Moresby 1993 9 1427 1 - - -Anticosti 1993 18 3068 5 - - -Moresby 1994 10 1678 - - - -Anticosti 1994 16 3228 6 - - -Anticosti 1994 17 3231 2 - - -Cormorant 1995 16 2234 - - - -Anticosti 1995 11 2058 3 - - -Cormorant 1995 19 2181 - - - -Cormorant 1995 23 3003 4 - - -Cormorant 1995 28 3557 - - - -Moresby 1996 13 2545 - - - -Anticosti 1997 17 2514 2 - - -Glace Bay 1997 15 2773 9 - - -Kingston 1997 15 2974 - - - -Glace Bay 1997 22 3421 8 - - -Source: Ships’ Logs, National Library and Archives.J7Appendix JTABLE J-5NAVAL FISHERIES PATROL BOARDINGS BY SHIP - 1990 TO 2002Ship 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002Anticosti - - 1 1 1 6 3 4 1 6Athabaskan - - .............................................................5 - -Charlottetown - - 1 5 5 - - -Cormorant 7 1 0 - - - 8 ..............................................................Fredericton - ..........................................................2 - 9 - - 7Gatineau - 5 - 1 3 1 3 20....... ..............................................................Glace Bay - ..................................................................2 2 - - 1 - 2Goose Bay - ................................................................................................ 13 10 -Halifax 1 2 - - 2 - - - 3Kingston - ...................................................................6 2 8 - - 2Margaree - 3 .................................................................................................................Moncton - - - ............................................................. 2 1 - -Montreal - ...................................................................6 - 1 5 8 9 -Moresby - - - 7 - 9 4 - .........................................Nipigon - 6 10 5 - 1 2 ..............................................................Ottawa - 9 ........................................................................................................Riverton - 3 8 - ....................................................................................Skeena - 5 5 22 - ................................................................................St. Charles - 2 1 - - ............................................................................................St.John's - ...............................................................................11 4Summerside - ......................................................................................................25 4Terra Nova 3 ........................................................15 1 4 .........................................Toronto - - - - - - 30 - - - 18 - -Ville de Quebec - - - - - - - 6 - 1 0 3 24 -Source: Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Newfoundland Region, 2002.J8Appendix JTABLE J-6FISHERIES AND OCEANS CANADA BOARDINGS BY SHIP - 1990 TO 2002Ship 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002Alert - - - 96 - 22 - - - - - - -Alexander - - - - - - 10 - - - - - -Alfred Needier - - - - - 24 2 - - - - - -Bernier - - - - - 7 8 - - 8 - - 6Cape Roger 135 178 171 154 208 23 35 103 112 71 7 58 48Chebucto 41 82 71 130 159 184 109 - - - - - -CG 285 - - - - - - - - - 1 - - -CSS Matthew - 9 1 - - - 2 - - - - - -Cygnus 27 120 159 191 153 127 103 - - - - - -L.J. Cowley 190 231 229 215 186 128 158 124 187 152 115 153 150Louisbourg 136 213 28Marinus 9 27 2Mary Hichens - 50 15 - 11 90 57 - - - - - -Parizeau - - - - 4 2 7 - - - - - -Provost Wallis - - - - - 24 - - - - - - -S.J. Franklin - - 13 - 33 - - - - - - - -S.W. Grenfell 13 99 44 23 34 1 11 22 10 22 5 23 -S.W. Templeton - - 5 - - - - - - - - - -Humphrey Gilbert - - - - - - 24 - - - - 6 -Tupper - - - - - 4 - - - - - - -Observer - 5Other DFO - - - - - - 29 - - - - - -Not recorded - 2 - 74 - - - - - - - - -Source: Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Newfoundland Region, 2002.J9Appendix JTABLE J - 7NAVAL FISHERIES PATROL SURVEILLANCE COVERAGE BY SHIP - 1999 TO 2003Ship Name StartDateStopDateMajor WarshipAvg Radar Detection (nm)Avg Area Covered by Radar (km2)Montreal 22-Feb-99 12-Mar-99 15.8 217,594St John's 14-Jun-99 29-Jun-99 18.8 224,160Fredericton 28-Jul-99 17-Aug-99 13.8 306,626Montreal 24-Nov-99 14-Dec-99 15.8 216,958St John's 17-Jan-00 04-Feb-00 13.4 214,225Ville de Quebec 20-Mar-00 04-Apr-00 16.9 251,529Toronto 02-Jun-00 19-Jun-00 18.6 275,610Montreal 24-Jan-01 18-Feb-01 17.1 332,161Ville de Quebec 19-Mar-01 02-Apr-01 6.5 72,109Montreal 04-Apr-01 12-Apr-01 18.1 116,428Ville de Quebec 03-Jul-01 20-Jul-01 9.6 151,324Halifax 25-Nov-02 12-Dec-02 11.9 237,536Average Major Warship 14.7 218,022Minor WarshipMoncton 12-Oct-99 22-Oct-99 14.2 106,132Glace Bay 12-Oct-99 22-Oct-99 14.1 105,999Goose Bay 25-Apr-00 19-May-00 8.5 45,667Moncton 08-May-00 13-May-00 13.5 160,097Kingston 24-Jul-02 03-Aug-02 6.9 43,660Glace Bay 06-Sep-02 23-Sep-02 6.7 20,303Moncton 23-Sep-02 11-Oct-02 9.2 61,333Goose Bay 31-Oct-02 06-Nov-02 9.9 43,425Average Minor Warship 10.4 73,327Source: Track and contact data logs kept by ships; calculations carried out in ArcGIS.J10Appendix KNAVAL FISHERIES PATROLS DEPICTED IN VARIOUS FIGURESTable K-1 contains the warship vessel names and patrol dates for fisheries patrols conducted during the period 1980 to 2003. The final column in the table lists the figures in which the naval vessels’ tracks were used. The key for the type of vessel listed is as follows:Type 1 - Destroyer (Mackenzie and Improved Restigouche classes)Type 2 - Destroyer (Improved St Laurent and Annapolis classes)Type 3 - Frigate (Halifax class)Type 4 - Destroyer (Iroquois class)Type 5 - Auxiliary Oil Replenishment vessel (Preserver class)Type 6 - Minesweeping Auxiliary (HMCS Anticosti, HMCS Moresby)Type 7 - Maritime Coastal Defence Vessel (Kingston class)Type 8 - Diving Auxiliary (HMCS Cormorant)Type 9 - Submarine (Oberon class).TABLE K-1NAVAL FISHERIES PATROLS USED IN FIGURESUnit Type Start Stop Used for FiguresNipigon 2 22-Apr-80 09-May-80 8-24, 8-25, F-1, F-2, F-12, F-24, F-4Assiniboine 2 12-Nov-80 28-Nov-80 8-24, 8-25, F-1, F-2, F-19, F-22, F-4Algonquin 4 25-Nov-80 12-Dec-80 8-24, 8-25, F-1, F-2, F-19, F-22, F-4Skeena 2 08-Jan-81 23-Jan-81 8-24, 8-25, F-1, F-2, F-9, F-23, F-4Fraser 2 19-May-81 04-Jun-81 8-24, 8-25, F-1, F-2, F-13, F-24, F-4Cormorant 8 14-Oct-81 28-Oct-81 8-24, 8-25, F-1, F-2, F-18, F-22, F-4Margaree 2 22-Oct-81 05-Nov-81 8-24, 8-25, F-1, F-2, F-18, F-22, F-4Huron 4 21-Jan-82 05-Feb-82 8-24, 8-25, F-1, F-2, F-9, F-23, F-4Nipigon 2 15-Feb-82 05-Mar-82 8-24, 8-25, F-1, F-2, F-10, F-23, F-4Assiniboine 2 18-Jan-83 03-Feb-83 8-24, 8-25, F-1, F-2, F-9, F-23, F-4Nipigon 2 15-Mar-83 28-Mar-83 8-24, 8-25, F-1, F-2, F-11, F-24, F-4Iroquois 4 24-Nov-83 10-Dec-83 8-24, 8-25, F-1, F-2, F-19, F-22, F-4Cormorant 8 09-Jan-84 01-Feb-84 8-24, 8-25, F-1, F-2, F-9, F-23, F-4Skeena 2 13-Feb-84 29-Feb-84 8-24, 8-25, F-1, F-2, F-10, F-23, F-4Saguenay 2 12-Mar-84 29-Mar-84 8-24, 8-25, F-1, F-2, F-11, F-24, F-4Assiniboine 2 02-May-84 09-May-84 8-24, 8-25, F-1, F-2, F-13, F-24, F-4Cormorant 8 28-M ay-84 23-Jun-84 8-24, 8-25, F-1, F-2, F-13, F-24, F-4Skeena 2 15-Jan-85 07-Feb-85 8-24, 8-25, F-1, F-2, F-9, F-23, F-5Saguenay 2 26-Feb-85 15-Mar-85 8-24, 8-25, F-1, F-2, F-10, F-23, F-5Algonquin 4 07-May-85 24-May-85 8-24, 8-25, F-1, F-2, F-13, F-24, F-5Athabaskan 4 26-Jun-85 02-Jul-85 8-24, 8-25, F-1, F-2, F-14, F-21, F-5Iroquois 4 28-Jun-85 11-Jul-85 8-24, 8-25, F-1, F-2, F-14, F-21, F-5Athabaskan 4 15-Jul-85 26-Jul-85 8-24, 8-25, F-1, F-2, F-15, F-21, F-5Skeena 2 29-Oct-85 15-Nov-85 8-24, 8-25, F-1, F-2, F-18, F-22, F-5Cormorant 8 14-Jan-86 21-Feb-86 8-24, 8-25, F-1, F-2, F-9, F-23, F-5Algonquin 4 01-Mar-86 05-Mar-86 8-24, 8-25, F-1, F-2, F-11, F-24, F-5Nipigon 2 30-Sep-86 17-Oct-86 8-24, 8-25, F-1, F-2, F-17, F-22, F-5Assiniboine 2 28-Oct-86 14-Nov-86 8-24, 8-25, F-1, F-2, F-18, F-22, F-5Margaree 2 28-Jan-87 08-Feb-87 8-24, 8-25, -1, F-2, F-9, F-23, F-5Saguenay 2 24-Feb-87 04-Mar-87 8-24, 8-25, F-1, F-2, F-10, F-23, F-5K1Appendix KTABLE K-1 (continued)NAVAL FISHERIES PATROLS USED IN FIGURESUnit Type Start Stop Used for FiguresCormorant 8 23-Mar-87 10-Apr-87 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-11, F-24 F-5Margaree 2 16-Jun-87 03-Jul-87 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-14, F-21 F-5Fraser 2 06-Aug-87 20-Aug-87 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-16, F-21 F-5Annapolis 2 19-Jan-88 03-Feb-88 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-9, F-23, F-5Gatineau 1 03-May-88 20-May-88 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-13, F-24 F-5Assiniboine 2 24-Oct-88 12-Nov-88 8-24, 8-25, 8-27, F-1, F-2, F-18 F-22, F-5, F-25Skeena 2 18-Jan-89 10-Feb-89 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-9, F-23, F-5Gatineau 1 15-Nov-89 20-Nov-89 8-24, 8-25, 8-27, F-1, F-2, F-19 F-22, F-5, F-25Cormorant 8 17-Nov-89 16-Dec-89 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-19, F-22 F-5Saguenay 2 04-Dec-89 18-Dec-89 8-24, 8-25, 8-27, F-1, F-2, F-20 F-23, F-5, F-25Margaree 2 22-Oct-90 09-Nov-90 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-18, F-22 F-6Cormorant 8 03-Dec-90 14-Dec-90 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-20, F-23 F-6Margaree 2 10-Jun-91 21-Jun-91 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-14, F-21 F-6Margaree 2 23-Jul-91 16-Aug-91 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-16, F-21 F-6Ottawa 2 23-Sep-91 04-Oct-91 8-24, 8-25, 8-27, F-1, F-2, F-17 F-22, F-6, F-25Margaree 2 30-Sep-91 17-Oct-91 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-17, F-22 F-6Nipigon 2 10-Feb-92 28-Feb-92 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-10, F-23 F-6Nipigon 2 17-Mar-92 31-Mar-92 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-11, F-24 F-6Margaree 2 06-Apr-92 16-Apr-92 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-12, F-24 F-6Fraser 2 04-May-92 15-May-92 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-13, F-24 F-6Fraser 2 13-Jul-92 31-Jul-92 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-15, F-21 F-6Skeena 2 05-Oct-92 30-Oct-92 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-18, F-22 F-6Ojibwa 9 05-Mar-93 12-Mar-93 8-24, 8-25, 8-27, F-1, F-2, F-11 F-24, F-6, F-25Anticosti 6 19-Apr-93 30-Apr-93 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-12, F-24 F-6Moresby 6 19-Apr-93 30-Apr-93 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-12, F-24 F-6Gatineau 1 03-May-93 27-May-93 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-13, F-24 F-6Skeena 2 25-May-93 04-Jun-93 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-13, F-24 F-6Nipigon 2 09-Jun-93 18-Jun-93 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-14, F-21 F-6Moresby 6 03-Aug-93 11-Aug-93 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-16, F-21 F-6Skeena 2 23-Aug-93 17-Sep-93 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-16, F-21 F-6Anticosti 6 20-Sep-93 08-Oct-93 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-17, F-22 F-6Moresby 6 21-Feb-94 02-Mar-94 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-10, F-23 F-6Anticosti 6 06-Apr-94 22-Apr-94 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-12, F-24 F-6Fraser 2 10-May-94 21-May-94 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-13, F-24 F-6Fraser 2 04-Jul-94 29-Jul-94 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-15, F-21 F-6Anticosti 6 25-Jul-94 14-Aug-94 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-15, F-21 F-6Gatineau 1 08-Aug-94 26-Aug-94 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-16, F-21 F-6Fraser 2 12-Sep-94 30-Sep-94 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-17, F-22 F-6Okanagan 9 26-Sep-94 10-Oct-94 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-17, F-22 F-6Cormorant 8 20-Mar-95 08-Apr-95 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-11, F-24 F-7Toronto 3 27-Mar-95 10-Apr-95 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-11, F-24 F-7Cormorant 8 18-Apr-95 08-May-95 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-12, F-24 F-7Anticosti 6 04-Jul-95 14-Jul-95 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-15, F-21 F-7Gatineau 1 11-Sep-95 06-Oct-95 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-17, F-22 F-7Cormorant 8 10-Oct-95 08-Nov-95 8-24, 8-25, 8-27, F-1, F-2, F-18 F-22, F-7, F-25Cormorant 8 20-Nov-95 14-Dec-95 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-19, F-22 F-7Toronto 3 27-Feb-96 17-Mar-96 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-10, F-23 F-7Moresby 6 02-Jul-96 19-Jul-96 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-15, F-21 F-7Toronto 3 16-Sep-96 11-Oct-96 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-17, F-22 F-7K2Appendix KTABLE K-1 (continued)NAVAL FISHERIES PATROLS USED IN FIGURESUnit Type Start Stop Used for FiguresAnticosti 6 05-May-97 21-May-97 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-13, F-24, F-7Montreal 3 26-May-97 06-Jun-97 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-13, F-24, F-7Glace Bay 7 02-Sep-97 18-Sep-97 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-17, F-22, F-7Kingston 7 29-Sep-97 17-Oct-97 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-17, F-22, F-7Ville de Quebec 3 06-Oct-97 24-Oct-97 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-18, F-22, F-7Fredericton 3 03-Dec-97 19-Dec-97 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-20, F-23, F-7Glace Bay 7 20-Oct-97 13-Nov-97 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-18, F-22, F-7Montreal 3 22-Feb-99 12-Mar-99 8-24, 8-26, F-1 F-3, F-10, F-23, F-7St John's 3 14-Jun-99 29-Jun-99 8-24, 8-26, F-1 F-3, F-14, F-21, F-7Fredericton 3 28-Jul-99 17-Aug-99 8-24, 8-26, F-1 F-3, F-15, F-21, F-7Kingston 7 08-Aug-99 31-Aug-99 8-24, 8-26, F-1 F-3, F-16, F-21, F-7Anticosti 6 16-Aug-99 27-Aug-99 8-24, 8-26, 8-27, F-1, F-3, F-16, F-21, F-7, F-25Ville de Quebec 3 08-Sep-99 29-Sep-99 8-24, 8-26, F-1 F-3, F-17, F-22, F-7Anticosti 6 09-Sep-99 28-Sep-99 8-24, 8-26, F-1 F-3, F-17, F-22, F-7Moncton 7 12-Oct-99 22-Oct-99 8-24, 8-26, F-1 F-3, F-18, F-22, F-7Glace Bay 7 12-Oct-99 22-Oct-99 8-24, 8-26, F-1 F-3, F-18, F-22, F-7Montreal 3 24-Nov-99 14-Dec-99 8-24, 8-26, F-1 F-3, F-19, F-22, F-7St John's 3 17-Jan-00 04-Feb-00 8-24, 8-26, F-1 F-3, F-9, F-23, F-8Ville de Quebec 3 20-Mar-00 04-Apr-00 8-24, 8-26, F-1 F-3, F-11, F-24, F-8Goose Bay 7 25-Apr-00 19-May-00 8-24, 8-26, F-1 F-3, F-12, F-24, F-8Moncton 7 08-May-00 13-May-00 8-24, 8-26, F-1 F-3, F-13, F-24, F-8Toronto 3 02-Jun-00 19-Jun-00 8-22, 8-24, 8-26, F-1, F-3, F-14, F-21, F-8Athabaskan 4 20-Nov-00 01-Dec-00 8-24, 8-26, F-1 F-3, F-19, F-22, F-8Montreal 3 24-Jan-01 18-Feb-01 8-24, 8-26, F-1 F-3, F-9, F-23, F-8Ville de Quebec 3 19-Mar-01 02-Apr-01 8-24, 8-26, F-1 F-3, F-11, F-24, F-8Montreal 3 04-Apr-01 12-Apr-01 8-24, 8-65, F-1 F-3, F-12, F-24, F-8Ville de Quebec 3 03-Jul-01 20-Jul-01 8-24, 8-26, F-1 F-3, F-15, F-21, F-8Ville de Quebec 3 26-Nov-01 14-Dec-01 8-24, 8-26, F-1 F-3, F-19, F-22, F-8Fredericton 3 18-Feb-02 08-Mar-02 8-24, 8-26, F-1 F-3, F-10, F-23, F-8Kingston 7 24-Jul-02 03-Aug-02 8-24, 8-26, F-1 F-3, F-15, F-21, F-8Glace Bay 7 06-Sep-02 23-Sep-02 8-24, 8-26, F-1 F-3, F-17, F-22, F-8Moncton 7 23-Sep-02 11-Oct-02 8-24, 8-26, F-1 F-3, F-17, F-22, F-8Goose Bay 7 31-Oct-02 06-Nov-02 8-24, 8-26, F-1 F-3, F-18, F-22, F-8Halifax 3 25-Nov-02 12-Dec-02 8-24, 8-26, F-1 F-3, F-19, F-22, F-8Charlottetown 3 03-Feb-03 21-Feb-03 8-24, 8-26, F-1 F-3, F-10, F-23, F-8Kingston 7 12-Jun-03 16-Jun-03 8-24, 8-26, F-1 F-3, F-14, F-21, F-8Glace Bay 7 12-Jun-03 16-Jun-03 8-24, 8-26, F-1 F-3, F-14, F-21, F-8Summerside 7 16-Jun-03 20-Jun-03 8-24, 8-26, F-1 F-3, F-14, F-21, F-8Kingston 7 03-Nov-03 07-Nov-03 8-24, 8-26, F-1 F-3, F-19, F-22, F-8Moncton 7 03-Nov-03 07-Nov-03 8-24, 8-26, F-1 F-3, F-19, F-22, F-8K3Appendix LNAVAL FISHERIES PATROL - HMCS HALIFAXDATA RECORDINGComd MARLANT has been tasked by CMS to evaluate the benefit to the Navy of operations in support of OGD. The overall aim of this record keeping is to provide accurate data for geographical and financial analysis in support of this evaluation.This particular analysis seeks to measure the effectiveness of a naval asset, in this case a frigate, to carry out surveillance and enforcement activities over a large maritime area.The following data is needed to determine the actual level of effort expended in surveillance activities. Previous units that have gathered this data state that there is little extra effort required of the ship’s company to gather this data, save for some time spent in collation. Templates in the form of MS Access databases have been provided for ease of data input. Please deliver the completed floppy disk and a hard copy of the data to LN 31-3 Lt(N) Ian Anderson, ext. 3203, or LN3 Capt(N) Larry Hickey.Data required:Own ship position hourly (on the even hour) Template:Weather log (data entry every six hours) Template:Contact log Template:Notes: Enter position of contacts when initially detectedRecord total number of contacts detected (all types of ships and aircraft) Indicate vessels boarded with a "B" in appropriate column If at anchor, continue to record positions If alongside in port, indicate arrival/departure in remarks column If detached on SAR, continue to record positions. Indicate start/stop in remarksData summary sheet Template: hal07-02 summary.docNotes: Normally, patrols will start/stop at Chebucto HeadFuel figures are important. They provide the constant for measuring expensesRecord individual CRRs completed during fishpatIt is important to capture the perceived value of fisheries patrols. In addition to CRRs, Commanding Officers are encouraged to record their thoughts vis-a-vis training, maintenance, morale, etc. It is vital that care is taken when entering positional data to ensure accuracy.Comd MARLANT appreciates your support of this new performance measurement activity.hal0702trk.mdbhal07020wx.mdbhal0702cont.mdbL1Appendix L| 0le Ed* Sflew Insert Fgrmat Records loots Window fjelp^ y j i z t i E Hi L * y | « a ^ < H u ^ m > • * ; •• © O -1-inlxla P osition Log FormLa*Port* | HMCS VILLE de QUEBECI 380 FishPat 05-01 Own Ship's Position LogPom# DTGZuki| 261430 | Nov j J ( 2001Remarks: |OwnsNp Lai North | Ownthfi Long Wert | irW n irrnM I 44.26.85 | 06.32 89Example: 43 deg 33.28'N 063deg31.54'W is recorded as: 43.33.28 63.31.54Record: H 1 < 1 ► | h |> >| of 380m a r t I a l r S ) * ® Ewove«...| ^ Inbox... | j^ O w e ... | j> « m p l- | |g lM k r « - J i N 2: 57PMFigure L-1. Microsoft Access Template for Own Ship’s Position LogE Microsoft AccessFie t<* Bew Insert Fgrmat Records loots Window tfelpid'! u a a % a - v 'n * n i l ^ ^ * «< a / - ' 0 .HMCS VILLE de QUEBECFishPat 05-01 Contact LogDTGZiiu y I 2001 jJTrack Number |r ~ rTarget Name jPESCA VAGUE IROSensor LeoendA - CPI 40 Aurora P-PALG - GCCS M R - Ship's RadarH -Sea King Z-RADAR SATE-ESM/EUNT VX-CommtV-VisualBoarded | TargetLatN | Target LongV/||"T“ | 43.09.30 | 05.13.16B - BoardedT arget Country ||sp5! 3•V I Remarks: | Total Contacts: | | 15Record: 14 | r I I T ► |» l|» I of 17J 8 » a r t | i & H fflNoveM el...| g f o b o x j j C u t e n t R . . . H g ]M to >Wo f . J * N 2: 56PMFigure L-2. Microsoft Access Template for Vessel Contact Log (Vessels Detected)L2Appendix MNAVAL FISHERIES PATROL - DATA SUMMARYHMCSDND Patrol #:Hourly position, contact, and weather logs toi) Points at which fishpat started and ended:3) Total distance travelled during fishpat: nautical miles3) Avg ranges of sensors against F/Vs:Kelvin Hughes nautical milesSG 150 nautical milesOther nautical milesi) Avg difference from predicted ranges: percent [H over ranging Q under ranging?)Total # of fishing vessels boarded:(indicated in contact log by B for "boarded")} Total # of violations detected:I) Violator vessel names and positions:Patrol Dates:DFO Patrol #:be kept as separate files. Template provided.j) Total # of hours of ship's helicopter surveillance:hoursk) Average ranges of helicopter sensors against fishing vessels:nautical miles1) How far did helo extend surveillance range:nautical milesn) Total # of PAL flights in support:o) Total # of hours of PAL support:hoursp) PAL Flight Mission Numbers:(Obtain from DFO/PAL faxes)q) Names of DFO / NAFO ships in support:r) Total # of MPA flights in support:s) Total # of hours of MPA support:hourst) DTGs of Forms Purple:Vote: Expense Data on next page1) Total # of violators arrested:) Arrested vessel names and positions:M1Appendix MCxpense Datai) Ship's fuel expended on patrol: r) Helo fuel expended on patrol:cumscumsv) Fuel expended in transit to patrol start point, f not Halifax or St John's:cums:) Fuel expended in transit from patrol end >oint to next tasking if not into Halifax or St ohn's:cumsr) Cost o f own ship fuel expended on patrol:dollars Cdn:) Cost o f helicopter fuel expended on patrol:dollars Cdna) Fuel price per bbl during patrol:dollars Cdnb) Names of Fisheries Protection Officers:c) Name of Commanding Officer:Value of Patrol for Crew Trainingdd) List CRRs (by number) completed during patrol:ee) Seamanship requirements completed during patrol:ff) Any other useful training carried out during patrol:M2Appendix NPARTICIPATION OF FISHERIES ASSOCIATIONSThe table in this appendix lists by province the fisheries associations that were active in 2003, the year that the Deterrence Survey was conducted. The columns to the right of the table indicate the number of questionnaires sent to each association.TABLE N -1PARTICIPATION OF ATLANTIC CANADA FISHERIES ASSOCIATIONSProvince Name of Fisheries Association No. of CopiesMembers sentNS 45' Shelburne Co. Fixed Gear Quota Group unk -NS Area 19 Crab Fishermen's Association unk 6NS Area 30 Fishermen's Association unk -NS Atlantic Canadian Mobile Shrimp Association unk -NS Atlantic Coast Scallop Fishermen's Association unk -NS Atlantic Herring Co-op Ltd. unk 5NS Bay of Fundy Inshore Fishermen's Association unk -NS Canso Trawlermen's Co-op unk 5NS Cape Breton East Fishers Association unk -NS Cheticamp & Area Inshore Fishermen's Association unk -NS Cumberland North Fishermen's Association 50 10NS East Cape Breton Fishermen's Association unk -NS Eastern Nova Scotia Mobile Gear Association unk -NS Eastern Shelburne Fishermen's Association unk -NS Eastern Shore Fishermen's Protective Association 260 20NS Federation of Gulf Nova Scotia Groundfishermen unk -NS Full Bay Scallop Association unk -NS Fundy East Fishermen’s Association unk -NS Glace Bay Inshore Fishermen's Association unk -NS Groundfish Generalists Fishermen's Association unk -NS Gulf-Nova Scotia Bonafide Fishermen's Association unk -NS Gulf-Nova Scotia Tuna Association unk -NS Guysborough County Inshore Fishermen's Association unk -NS Halifax West Fishermen's Association unk -NS Inverness North Fishermen's Association unk 30NS Inverness South Fishermen's Association unk -NS Jonah Crab Association unk -NS LFA District 34 Lobster Committee unk -NS Margaree Harbour Inshore Fishermen’s Association unk -NS Maritime Fishermen's Union (Local 4) unk -NS Maritime Fishermen's Union (Local 6) 100 15NS Maritime Fishermen's Union (Local 9) unk 10NS North of Smokey Fishermen's Association unk -N1Appendix NTABLE N - 1 (continued)PARTICIPATION OF ATLANTIC CANADA FISHERIES ASSOCIATIONSProvince Name of Fisheries Association No. of CopiesMembers sentNS Northern Cape Breton Fishing Vessels Association unk -NS Northside Fishermen's Association unk -NS Northumberland Fishermen's Association unk -NS Nova Scotia Fishermen's Association (Scallop Sector) unk -NS Nova Scotia Fixed Gear 45-65' unk -NS Nova Scotia Mackeral Association unk -NS Nova Scotia Swordfishermen's Association unk -NS Nova Scotia Women's Fish Net unk -NS Prospect Area Full Time Fishermen's Association unk 10NS Richmond County Inshore Fishermen's Association unk -NS Scotia Fundy Inshore Fishermen's Association unk -NS Scotia Fundy Mobile Gear Fishermen's Association unk -NS Shelburne County Competitive Fishermen's Association unk -NS Shelburne County Gillnet Fishermen's Association unk -NS South Shore Gillnet Fishermen's Association unk -NS South Shore Independent Fishermen's Association unk -NS Southwest Fishermen's Quota Group unk -NS Southwest Nova Fixed Gear Association unk -NS Southwest Nova Tuna Association 35 1NS Upper Bay of Fundy Fish Draggers Association 5 5NS West Nova Scotia Fishermen's Coalition unk -PE Central Northumberland Fishermen’s Association unk -PE Eastern Kings Fishermen’s Association unk 5PE North Shore Fishermen’s Association unk -PE P.E.I. Fishermen’s Association unk -PE P.E.I. Groundfish Association unk -PE P.E.I. Shellfish Association unk -PE Prince County Fishermen’s Association unk -PE Prince County Shellfish Association unk -PE Queens County Shellfish Association unk -PE Snow Crab Fishermen Inc unk -PE Southern Kings & Queens Fishermen’s Association unk -PE Western Gulf Fishermen’s Association unk 10NB Alma Fishermen's Association unk -NB Area 18 Crab Fishermen's Association unk -NB Association des crabiers acadiens unk -NB Association des crabiers du Nord-Est inc. unk -NB Association des crevettiers acadiens du Golfe inc. unk -NB Association des seineurs du Golfe, inc. unk -NB Assoc des pecheurs professionnels membres d’equipage unk -NB Botsford Professional Fishermen's Association unk -NB Campobello Fishermen’s Association unk -NB Eastern Fishermen's Federation unk -NB Federation r6gionale acadienne des pecheurs professionnels unk -NB Fundy North Fishermen's Association unk -NB Grand Manan Fishermen’s Association unk -NB Island Fishermen Association unk -NB Southern New Brunswick Scallop Draggers Association unk -NF Barry Group Inc Ltd unk -NF Beothuk Fish Processors Ltd unk -N2Appendix NTABLE N - 1 (continued)PARTICIPATION OF ATLANTIC CANADA FISHERIES ASSOCIATIONSProvince Name of Fisheries Association No. of MembersCopiessentNF Davis Strait Management Ltd unk -NF Fisheries Association of Newfoundland & Labrador unk -NF Fishery Products International Ltd unk -NF Grand Banks Seafoods Ltd unk 12NF Quin-Sea Fisheries Ltd unk -Note: Column “Copies sent” records the number of copies of the questionnaire that were despatched to the fisheries associations once contact had been made and agreement to participate was obtained.Table N -2 lists by province the number of licensed fishers that were represented by the fisheries associations in the Maritime provinces during the period that the Deterrence Survey was being carried out.TABLE N - 2NUMBER OF LICENCED FISHERS BY PROVINCE AND REGION - 2002Province Region Licences Core Non-coreTotalNova Scotia Scotia-Fundy 2,895 9,222 12,117Nova Scotia Gulf 651 1,790 2,441Prince Edward Island Gulf 1,315 3,446 4,761New Brunswick Scotia-Fundy 353 1,487 1,840New Brunswick Gulf 1,303 3,816 5,119Newfoundland Newfoundland 4,154 11,161 15,315Total 10,671 30,922 41,593Source: Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Commercial - Licences: Fishers Information, 9 December 2005, (29 November 2007).N3Appendix PSurvey of Fishers' Views on the Effectiveness of Maritime Patrol Activities in Canadian WatersCardiff University Maritime Studies Project P.O. Box 48051 Bedford, Nova Scotia B4A 3Z2September 2003P1Appendix PSurvey of Fishers' Views on the Effectiveness of Maritime Patrol Activities in Canadian WatersPurpose:The Questionnaire:Why You ?The Importance of Your Participation:Guarantee of Confidentiality:Questions ?In cooperation with local fisheries associations, this survey is being conducted for scholarly purposes by a Canadian graduate student at Cardiff University of Wales, forming part of his PhD project relating to aspects of oceans management in Canada.This questionnaire was designed to record opinions concerning the perceived effectiveness of various maritime patrol activities in Canadian coastal zones. It consists of 19 short questions, and should take only about 15 minutes of your time.As a person employed in the fisheries, you spend long periods at sea and observe first-hand the patrol activities of various government departments.As a person whose livelihood is tied to the sea, your views are important to understanding what is really happening on the water. Your participation in completing the questionnaire, or any specific question, is entirely voluntary; however, the participation of everyone who receives a questionnaire is very important to help the researcher better understand the true picture.This is an anonymous survey. All information provided by you will be kept strictly confidential. The researcher is guided by, and must adhere to, ethical principles concerning research that involves people. At no time, under any circumstance, will individual responses be made known. All responses will be pooled for analysis.If you have questions about the questionnaire, or the survey in general, please contact Mr. Larry Hickey (902) 832-6268 or by email at: larry.hickey@ns.sympatico.caCompleted questionnaires should be returned to the individual who distributed them, or sent to:Mr. L.M. HickeyCardiff University Maritime Studies Project P.O. Box 48051 Bedford, Nova Scotia B4A 322Abbreviations used in this questionnaire:CCG Canadian Coast GuardDFO Fisheries and Oceans Canada Your participation in this studyDND Department of National Defence is very much appreciated.EC Environment CanadaNAFO North Atlantic Fisheries OrganizationRCMP Royal Canadian Mounted PolicePage 2 - Survey o f Fishers' Views on the Effectiveness o f Maritime Patrol Activities in Canadian WatersAppendix PInstructions for Completing the Questionnaire:Please take the time to read each question carefully. Some questions contain multiple parts.The majority of the questions are arranged so that you simply put a mark in thebox □ to indicate your response. A few questions request that you fill in the blanks withshort one or two word responses, or circle a number on a scale from 0 to 6.There are no wrong answers to any of these questions. You may not think that you have enough information upon which to base a response. However, you probably have a "gut feel" and this is what you should use to answer the question. The purpose of this survey is to determine what are your perceptions of an issue, irrespective of what other individuals or agencies might say about it.This survey is strictly voluntary. If you do not wish to answer a particular question, please write "No answer" in the margin beside the question number to indicate that you considered the question and did not inadvertently skip over it.Background Information:1) How many years have you been going to sea (fishing or otherwise) ?□ Less than 2□ 2 to 5 years□ 6 to 10 years□ 11 to 15 years□ 16 to 20 years□ 21 to 25 years□ More than 252) How many weeks per year do you fish?□ Less than 8□ 8 to 16 weeks□ 17 to 24 weeks□ 25 to 32 weeks□ 33 to 40 weeks□ 41 to 48 weeks□ 49 to 52 weeks3) From what size of boat do younormally fish for the majority of your weeks at sea?□ Less than 45 ft□ 45 to 65 ft□ 66 to 100 ft□ More than 100 ft4) What average distance from the coast do you fish the majority of your weeks at sea?5) The majority of the time, you fish the:□ Inshore □ Offshore6) Fishing is your:□ Sole source of income (100%)□ Major source of income (50 to 99%)□ Minor source of income (less than 50%)7) What type of gear do you use? Please select all types.□ Otter Trawls□ Drags or Rakes□ Seines□ Gillnets□ Traps□ Longlines□ Handlines□ Other8) For which two (2) types of licence or species do you spend the most time fishing, and for how many weeks each?Between to nautical miles.Example:PrimarySecondGroundfish Weeks 20 Lobster Weeks 8WeeksWeeksPage 3 - Survey o f Fishers' Views on the Effectiveness o f Maritime Patrol Activities in Canadian WatersAppendix PCommon Canadian Atlantic Maritime Patrol PlatformsCrMWWJPage 4 - Survey o f Fishers' Views on the Effectiveness o f Maritime Patrol Activities in Canadian WatersAppendix PPresence o f Maritime Patrol Assets and Nature o f Fisheries Violations:9) How many times per week that you are fishing or travelling to and from your fishing area do you see each of the patrol vessels or aircraft pictured on the opposite page?Please indicate your response by circling the appropriate number of sightings.Photo Dept Type of Platform least Sightings per Week______ mostA CCG Beechcraft Aircraft 0 1-2 3-4 5-6 7 or moreB DFO Beechcraft Aircraft ’ 0 1-2 3-4 5-6 7 or moreC DND Air Force Aurora Aircraft 0 1-2 3-4 5-6 7 or moreD DND Navy Sea King Helicopter 0 1-2 3-4 5-6 7 or moreE RCMP Small multi-task Patrol Boat 0 1-2 3-4 5-6 7 or moreF DFO Offshore multi-task Patrol Cutter 0 1-2 3-4 5-6 7 or moreG DND Navy Patrol Frigate 0 1-2 3-4 5-6 7 or moreH DFO Small multi-task Patrol Cutter 0 1-2 3-4 5-6 7 or moreI DND Navy Minor War Vessel 0 1-2 3-4 5-6 7 or moreJ DFO Inshore multt-.ask Patrol Vessel 0 1-2 3-4 5-6 7 or more10) What are the two most common types of fisheries violations in your fishing areas?Examples : registration number not displayed properly on boat, fishing without a licence, using illegal mesh sizes or illegal traps, fishing in a prohibited or closed area, etc.Most common Next most common___________________The aim of Question11 is to get a feel for whether or not spending resources on vessel and aircraft patrols has any value in preventing people at sea from breaking laws. Please indicate your response by circling a number from 0 t o6 for each type of vessel or aircraft. High numbers mean that you feel that the presence of that vessel or aircraft is likely to prevent a violation. Low numbers mean that there is less deterrent value; a 0 means there is no deterrent value at all.11) In your opinion, would the visual or radar presence of a maritime patrol vessel or aircraft deter a person from committing a serious fisheries violation in your fishing area?Photos of common maritime patrol vessels and aircraft are on the opposite page.Examples:Serious violation: no licence, illegal traps or meshes, fishing in a prohibited or closed area Minor violation: registration number not displayed properly on boatPhoto Dept Type of Platform least Deterrent Value______ mostA CCG Beechcraft Aircraft 0 1 2 3 4 5 6B DFO Beechcraft Aircraft 0 1 2 3 4 5 6C DND Air Force Aurora Aircraft 0 1 2 3 4 5 6D DND Navy Sea King Helicopter 0 1 2 3 4 5 6E RCMP Small multi-task Patrol Boat 0 1 2 3 4 5 6F DFO Offshore multi-task Patrol Cutter 0 1 2 3 4 5 6G DND Navy Patrol Frigate 0 1 2 3 4 5 6H DFO Small multi-task Patrol Cutter 0 1 2 3 4 5 6I DND Navy Minor War Vessel 0 1 2 3 4 5 6>el 0 1 2 3DFO inshore multi-task Patrol Vesse 2 4 5 6Page 5 - Survey o f Fishers' Views on the Effectiveness o f Maritime Patrol Activities in Canadian WatersAppendix P12) Please indicate whether or not you agree or disagree with the following statements.Patrols requiredAgree Disagree More Fewera) The surveillance effort by patrol vessels and aircraft in my fishing areas is adequate to ensure compliance with fisheries regulations.b) The surveillance effort by patrol vessels and aircraft in my fishing areas is adequate to ensure compliance with environmental regulations.c) The surveillance effort by patrol vessels and aircraft in my fishing areas is adequate to prevent violations of other laws, such as illegal immigration, drug smuggling, etc.d) Frequency of onboard inspections at sea is adequate to ensure compliance with fishing regulations.e) Fisheries and Oceans Canada conducts the right number of patrols in my fishing areas.f) The Canadian Coast Guard conducts the right number of patrols in my fishing areas.g) The Department of National Defence conducts the right number of patrols in my fishing areas.h) The RCMP conducts the right number of patrols in my fishing areas.Agree DisagreeAgree DisagreeAgree DisagreeAgree DisagreeAgree Disagree Agree DisagreeAgree DisagreeMore FewerMore FewerMore FewerMoreMoreMoreMoreFewerFewerFewerFewer13) What percentage of the time do you believe that either DFO Fisheries Protection Officers or RCMP officers are embarked aboard Navy ships for enforcement purposes? Please circle the number that is closest to your estimate of the percentage.DFO 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100RCMP 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 10014) What percentage of the time do you believe that either DFO Fisheries Protection Officers or RCMP officers fly aboard Air Force aircraft for enforcement purposes?DFO 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100RCMP 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 10015) In your opinion, which of the following federal departments is the most effective at deterring illegal activities the Canadian coastal zone? Select only one.□ CCG □ DFO □ DND □ EC □ RCMPPage 6 - Survey o f Fishers' Views on the Effectiveness o f Maritime Patrol Activities in Canadian WatersAppendix P16) In your opinion, how often do FISHERMEN / FISHERS violate regulations in the Canadian coastal zone? Please read across for each type of regulation.Fishing Regs □ Never □ Seldom □ Sometimes □ Frequently □AlwaysEnvironmental Regs □ Never □ Seldom □ Sometimes □ Frequently □AlwaysOther Regs / Laws □ Never □ Seldom □ Sometimes □ Frequently □Always17) In your opinion, how often do other MARINERS I BOATERS in general violate regulations in the Canadian coastal zone? Please read across for each type.Fishing Regs □ Never □ Seldom □ Sometimes □ Frequently □AlwaysEnvironmental Regs □ Never □ Seldom □ Sometimes □ Frequently □AlwaysOther Regs I Laws □ Never □ Seldom □ Sometimes □ Frequently □Always18) Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements.NeitherStrongly agree nor Stronglyagree Agree disagree Disagree disagreea) Over-regulation by government is havingan adverse effect on the fishery. □ □ □ □ □Competition with other boats in my fishingarea is causing depletion of the resource. □ □ □ □ □Conserving fisheries resources is theresponsibility of each person who fishes as well as the agencies involved in fisheries management.□ □ □ □ □The Canadian Coast Guard should begiven a greater role in conservation and protection activities than it has at present.□ □ □ □ □The Dept of National Defence should begiven a greater role in conservation and protection activities than it has at present.□ □ □ □ □The Royal Canadian Mounted Policeshould be given a greater role in conservation and protection activities than it has at present.The following additional surveillance technologies should be employed in the Canadian coastal zone:□ □ □ □ □• Onboard automatic identity and location reporting systems such as AIS and INNAV□ □ □ □ □• Satellite technology □ □ □ □ □• Naval submarines □ □ □ □ □• High frequency surface wave radar □ □ □ □ □Page 7 - Survey o f Fishers' Views on the Effectiveness o f Maritime Patrol Activities in Canadian WatersAppendix PNAFO Fishing AreasQFUEEt&ANOBounda y of SubottsBounduy of Divisions — — —183-Meter (lOO-Fuhom) Contour——200-Mile Fishing Zone Bcrunduy •».<200-Mile Fishing Zone Bounday Coincident w ith Boundcy of OubottPage 9 - Survey o f Fishers' Views on the Effectiveness o f Maritime Patrol Activities in Canadian WatersAppendix PCanadian Lobster Fishing Areas (LFA)QUEBECMcnUd foundlandMmU SAPage 10 - Survey o f Fishers' Views on the Effectiveness o f Maritime Patrol Activities in Canadian WatersAppendix PCrab Fishing Areast*AK!CftAft FBHING "— "Û TAKTU; |Jt t * IS AftBA^ZONCS 0 6 pSCHE DU CRASSi SfV BBttffieuBARASH (ZOREt 4 Atfl S) 8IBCA,€. 1 » |— L t■ ite m f o m e b i . l a zone be t i t t i 4 FBESetlJC f At U KCKT I I I LEE m » BC f l S U l 88 CAKABA Form ViewFigure Q-1. Microsoft Access Template for Media Content AnalysisQ2Appendix RVARIOUS TABLES AND CO-ORDINATESThis appendix contains tables and figures that were not appropriate for inclusion in other appendices.TABLE R-1AUTHORITY FOR RELEASE OF MILITARY DATAYear______________Name________________________ Authority__________1999 Rear-Admiral Duncan Miller Commander, Maritime Forces Atlantic2000 Rear-Admiral Bruce MacLean Commander, Maritime Forces Atlantic2002 Rear-Admiral Glenn Davidson Commander, Maritime Forces Atlantic2004 Rear-Admiral Dan McNeil Commander, Maritime Forces Atlantic2006 Rear-Admiral Dean McFadden_____ Commander, Maritime Forces Atlanticeo°wE W F O U N O L A N DN E W ’ B lt U N S W IC ,6 Charlottetown7 Northumberland Strait8 M agdelaine Islands9 Pictou10 Sydney11 Louisbourg12 Sable Island13 C ape Sable Island14 Yarmouth15 Brier Island16 Saint John, NB1 G asp62 C h a le u rB a y3 Shippegan4 Shediac5 Richibuctoecrw18 Stephenville19 Burgeo» 21 St John’s, NL22 Bonavista Bay23 Bay of Exploits24 Cape St John25 Hibernia50°W20 Burin Penninsula17 W estern Head9Figure R-1. Locations Named in Various Map AnalysesR1Appendix R450400350300250200150100Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 2002 -------2003 2004 - - - 2005Figure R-2. Monthly SAR Caseload in Halifax SRR - 2002 to 2005 Source: Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre, Halifax, 2002.Pleasure 8%Fishing14%Commercial7%Power53%OtherSail 0% 18%Figure R-3. SAR Incidents by User Type - Victoria SRR 2002 Source: Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre, Victoria, 2002.Appendix RTABLE R-2SAR INCIDENTS BY TYPE - 1997 TO 20021997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002Halifax Search and Rescue RegionAir 125 150 206 191 164 152Marine 1,702 1,927 2,325 2,191 1,995 1,947Humanitarian 172 158 119 98 115 103Unknown 93 103 181 121 102 126Total Halifax SRR 2,092 2,338 2,831 2,601 2,376 2,328Victoria Search and Rescue RegionAir 223 220 232 289 221 202Marine 1,579 1,623 2,255 2,325 2,229 1,952Humanitarian 329 365 305 319 298 372Unknown 233 201 202 181 200 184Total Victoria SRR 2,364 2,409 2,994 3,114 2,948 2,710Sources: Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre, Halifax, 2002; Joint Rescue Coordination Centre, Victoria, 2002.TABLE R-3MARINE RESPONDERS IN SAR CASES - 2002Marine Resources Taskings HoursHalifax SRRCCG Marine (SAR) 947 3,418CCG Marine (non-SAR) 164 855CCG Auxiliary 146 397Federal Vessel (Other) 1 1Provincial Vessel 1 1Police Vessel 10 9Commercial Vessel 16 266Fishing Vessel 90 278Other 163 446Pleasure Craft (Private) 9 24Victoria SRRCCG Marine (SAR) 1,800 4,444CCG Auxiliary 993 2,242Naval Vessel 33 48Federal Vessel (Other) 46 44Provincial Vessel 41 27Police Vessel 78 104United States Coast Guard 6 5Fire Boat 11 6Commercial Vessel 179 236Fishing Vessel 96 224Other 78 104Pleasure Craft (Private) 365 462Source: Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre, Halifax, 2002;Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre, Victoria, 2002R3Appendix RTABLE R-4LOCATION OF CCG LIFEBOAT BASES - ATLANTIC REGIONHome Port CCG Vessel Length(m) Latitude LongitudeSaint John, NB Courtney Bay 16.3 45.271388889 -66.071388889Westport, NS Westport 16.3 44.264166667 -66.348888889Clarks Harbour, NS Clarks Harbour 16.3 43.459444444 -65.653333333Sambro, NS Sambro 16.3 44.468055556 -63.599444444Port Bickerton, NS Bickerton 16.3 45.100555556 -61.722500000Louisbourg, NS Spindrift 16.3 45.917222222 -59.970833333lies de la Madeleine, QC Cap aux Meules 16.3 47.380555556 -61.856111111Burgeo, NL W.G. George 16.3 47.614722222 -57.607777778Burin, NL W. Jackman 16.3 47.036111111 -55.163611111Souris, PE Cape Spry 14.6 46.344722222 -62.248888889Summerside, PE Cap Nord 14.6 46.383611111 -63.787777778Shippegan, NB Cap Breton 14.6 47.744444444 -64.698055556Riviere au Renard.QC Cap Rozier 14.6 48.995277778 -64.386944444Tadoussac, QC Cap D'Espoir 14.6 48.138055556 -69.714722222Havre Saint Pierre,QC Cap De Rabast 14.6 50.236944444 -63.603611111Port aux Choix, NL Cape Norman 14.6 50.705277778 -57.350555556Lark Harbour, NL Cape Fox 14.6 49.095555556 -58.378888889Source: Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre, Halifax, 2007.TABLE R-5LOCATION OF GOVERNMENT PATROL BASES - ATLANTIC REGIONName of Base Dept Type Latitude LongitudeHalifax DND Port 44.655556 -63.575556Shearwater DND Airport 44.639444 -63.503056Greenwood DND Airport 44.991667 -64.900000Gander DND Airport 48.937222 -54.567778Goose Bay DFO Airport 53.318056 -60.422222Dartmouth DFO Port 44.660000 -63.556944Yarmouth DFO Port 43.830000 -66.121944Sydney DFO Port 46.138333 -60.200000St John's DFO Port 47.558056 -52.706667R4EN H A N C IN G TH E NAVAL MANDATE FOR LAW ENFORCEM ENT: HOT P U R S U IT OR HOT POTATO?by C a p ta in (N ) L au ren ce M. H ickeyIntroductionDays after the 1995 apprehension of the fishing vessel Estai on the Grand Banks, the Toronto Sun carried a provocative front-page periscope photograph of a Spanish stern trawler at close range. This so-called ‘Turbot Crisis’ brought fisheries and sovereignty issues into focus for Canadians. Moreover, the reporting of this unusual employment of a submarine was, for many, the first indication that their navy played an active role in the enforcement of domestic and international law in Canada’s maritime zones.While Canada’s navy has always been active in the nation’s maritime affairs, there is a case to be made for expanding the naval role with respect to domestic maritime enforcement in support of safeguarding national security and the exercise of Canadian sovereignty. The intent of this article is to suggest why a more comprehensive role is both practical and necessary. The Canadian Navy maintains a significant presence in Canada’s maritime zones, and it should have all the legal tools required to enforce Canadian law in those regions. This is not to suggest that the navywould shift its primary emphasis from preparing for combat at sea to coast guard duties. Rather, it is an appeal for powers that would enable the navy to act upon violations detected while carrying out its fundamental military role. Other government departments have become increasingly reliant on the navy during a decade of government-wide retrenchment. The issues that shape attitudes towards the employment of armed forces for law enforcement tasks also need to be identified and challenged. Finally, a simple model for executing this new role will be proposed. But first, it is necessary to examine what the navy’s enforcement role is at present.Naval Contribution to Maritime EnforcementFor the past several years, all federal departments and agencies have suffered the consequences of reduced budgets. Department of Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO) and the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) have experienced significant pressures with respect to operating aging fleets inCaptain Hickey is both Commander Fifth Maritime Operations Group and Deputy Commander Canadian Fleet Atlantic.S pring 2 0 0 6 • C a n a d ia n M ilita ry Jou rna l 4 1PUBLISHED ARTICLESA pp end ix SHM C S Kingston Maritime coastal defence vessel.MARITIME ISSUESAppendix SPUBLISHED ARTICLESthe face o f increased demand for post-9/11 patrol activities. Indeed, Senator Colin Kenny complained in 2004 that the CCG, the navy, and by extension, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), were not defending Canada's coasts in “ any meaningful way”.1 While this may be an overstatement, in reality no single government department or agency on its own can assure the safety, security or sovereignty o f Canada. Thus, any additional contribution the navy can make - either by itself or in partnership with other government departments - could enhance significantly Canada’s ability to exercise national sovereignty.At present, the navy’s contribution to domestic maritime enforcement is maintaining a comprehensive surveillance and domain awareness capability, providing routine support to departments with enforcement mandates, and being prepared to apply coercive force in emergent crises. Over the past decade, on the Atlantic coast, Canadian naval vessels spent between 150 and 250 days at sea per year, many o f them on overseas deployments, but the majority of them within the nation's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). While many of these sea-days were devoted to training and exercises, they provided many ‘eyes on the water’ , and constituted a distinct federal presence in Canada's maritime approaches.2 In recent years, the navy has spent fewer and fewer days at sea, due to reductions in fleet size and annual budgetary constraints.In addition to its at-sea presence, the navy is already an active participant in fisheries enforcement through a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) negotiated between the Department o f National Defence (DND) and DFO. This MOU defines the terms and procedures for the provision of support by the navy and the air force, and it sets the number o f sea-days (Figure 1) and flying-hours allocated to surveillance and fisheries enforcement. Naval vessels and m ilitary maritime patrol aircraft, with DFO officers embarked, conduct fishery patrols in the inshore and offshore maritime zones. Essentially, they provide the means to transport fisheries officers into areas o f fishing activity so that the appropriate authorities can monitor, inspect, and, i f necessary, arrest anyone violating domestic and/or international law.iw t ivm i w 2mm m t x m m *Figure 1 - Naval Fisheries Patrol Sea Days - Atlantic. (Maritime Forces Atlantic Sea Operations staff. 2004)Figure 2 - Boardings by Fisheries Officers Embarked aboard Naval Ships - Atlantic. (Fisheries and Oceans Canada, 2002)IBa»»ismiB2 0 0D1992Figure 3 - Navy’s Percentage of Total DFO Boardings for Newfoundland Region. (Fisheries and Oceans Canada, 2002)Over the past several years, DFO has, in fact, begun to rely increasingly on the navy for support, particularly since DFO reduced its offshore enforcement fleet. While the number of boardings carried out by DFO officers embarked aboard naval vessels remains relatively constant (Figure 2), the overall percentage of boardings instigated by fisheries officers embarked in naval vessels is increasing (Figure 3).Historically, the navy has focused its fisheries patrols upon the Grand Banks, resulting in the emergence o f distinct patterns of naval presence. Figure 4 shows a concentration of patrol effort on the Tail o f the Grand Banks, with increased presence on the routes to and from Halifax and St. John’s.’ The focus on the Tail was due in large measure to the plethora of foreign vessels attracted to this particularly abundant fishing ground, and then later in the 1990s, to the requirement to enforce the moratorium imposed on the Tail as a result of plummeting ground fish stocks. Figure 5 captures the shift in concentration away from the Tail where, by 1999, only a small total allowable catch had been allocated. The new direction was towards the Flemish Cap, where other species such as shrimp were, and still are, commercially viable. Figure 6 depicts the coverage and, by extension, the presence of military maritime patrol aircraft during a routine 30-day period.4 2 C anad ian M ilita ry Jou rna l • S pring 2006S2navy’s tendency to revisit areas of high activity and traffic density - coupled with its sophisticated modern sensor capability - predisposes its vessels to detect breaches of domestic and international law. However, at present, unless a peace officer from another government department is embarked, there is little recourse open to a naval vessel other than to report the situation to the appropriate law enforcement authority, and to wait for action to be taken by others. Why then has Canada been so reticent to take the next step, as have many other nations, to employ the navy for enforcement of federal statutes in all Canadian maritime zones in a more primary manner than relegating it to its present supporting role?Reticence to Use Armed Forces for Domestic EnforcementT here is no simple answer to this question. However, an explanation can be found in a number of separate but related issues. Public perceptions of the army, and a general unease with the use of the army for law enforcement on land, have influenced how constabulary naval roles are viewed. At heart is the public’s apparent inability to distinguish between the army and the navy in terms of domestic operations. In addition, some also question whether law enforcement is truly a legitimate use of the Canadian Forces in the first instance. Lastly, there are those who argue that constabulary duties are non-traditional, that they detract from the status of a navy, and that they erode its war fighting capability. On further examination, it becomes evident that these concerns do not present such an insurmountable obstacle as may first have been thought.The Army and Law EnforcementA s instruments of national power, most Western armed forces have been conceived and maintained to execute state policy abroad - although they can also be employed domestically in certain situations where their unique military attributes can be used very effectively. In practice, democratic governments constrain the internal use of their militaries, usually to avoid potential political fallout, and also, to maintain the legitimacy of their democratic governance. Canada is no exception, and this tradition has its roots in British legal heritage, which was imported to British North America before Confederation.It is argued that the perceived unwillingness to employ the Canadian Army in law enforcement roles during modern times comes from long-standing prejudices resulting from misuse of the army in foregone times. The British B ill o f Rights of 1688 is the point of departure for an analysis of civil-military relations in the British Isles, and, by extension, the Dominion of Canada. This Act rendered the army subordinate to Parliament, and restricted its use by the Crown.4 Interestingly, the B ill o f Rights of 1688 makes no reference to the Royal Navy, a powerful arm of the state during that particular period of empire building. Clearly, it was not viewed as a threat to the domestic political structure of the era. After the B ill o f Rights, there followed a series of acts that provided statutory authority and funding for armed forces to operate on land.Figure 5 - Enforcement Presence by Naval Ships on Fisheries Patrol: 1999 - 2000. (Data from 13 naval fisheries patrols)Figure 6 - Presence of CP-140 Aurora Maritime Patrol Aircraft: 15 Jan - 15 Feb 2004. (Data from 18 flights)Appendix SPUBLISHED ARTICLESAs demonstrated by the preceding figures, the Canadian Navy is fully engaged in safeguarding both national security and the exercise of Canadian sovereignty. In a period when patrol activities by other government departments has been waning, the navy continues to maintain a not insignificant ‘on-the-water’ presence in Canada’s maritime zones. TheFigure 4 - Enforcement Presence by Naval Ships on Fisheries Patrol: 1980 — 1996. (National Library and Archives data from 59 ship’s logs)S p rin g 2 0 0 6 • C a n a d ia n M ilita ry Jou rna lS3MARITIME ISSUESAppendix SPUBLISHED ARTICLES“In recent years, the navy has spent fewer and fewer days at sea, due to reductions in fleet size and annual budgetary constraints.”For well over two centuries, the army remained an important tool in the execution o f domestic policy, largely because it was the only organized body o f men that the Crown could call upon for its coercive ends. Consequently, well into the 19lh Century, soldiers were employed frequently to maintain public order, notwithstanding the potential risk to civil liberties. Over time, public figures began to question the means employed to maintain law and order, as well as the appropriateness o f the use of the army for this purpose. This evaluation coincided roughly with the M etro p o litan Police A ct o f 1829, and the creation of Britain’s fledgling police forces.Attitudes toward the use o f the army in the domestic context ultimately migrated to Canada. Here, the army was used prior to the Second World War to quell disturbances, to suppress election disorder, and to put down uprisings, such as the Riel Rebellion of 1885. Some argue that the negative memory of these actions remains embedded with today’s population, resulting in resentment towards using the Canadian Army to quell c iv il disorder. However, it is d ifficu lt to gauge accurately public sentiment about the use of the army for law enforcement purposes. There have been only four instances of the use of Canadian military forces in their most intrusive form since 1945.5 In the case o f both the 1970 FLQ and the 1990 Oka crises, the armed forces were praised for the calm and disciplined manner in which they both contained the crisis and prevented its escalation.6 I f there is truly lingering resentment over use of the Canadian Forces for law enforcement tasks, it is difficult to explain why visible military assistance is requested for major politically-charged events, such as the G8 Ministers’ conferences in Kananaskis and Halifax, or the Summit of the Americas in Quebec City.Legitimacy of the Canadian Forces for Law EnforcementContrary to what many might think, law enforcement is, indeed, a legitimate function of the Canadian Forces. Parliament has indicated clearly both its acceptance o f and its expectation that the armed forces have a role in law enforcement in certain circumstances. This statutory basis can be found in the N a tio n a l Defence A ct (NDA). This Act codifies the principles for control of the armed forces, and provides the legal framework for the provision of military support to provinces or other government departments for maintaining public order.Parliament has two major expectations in relation to the armed forces and law enforcement. First, the Canadian Forces must be capable o f a broad spectrum o f services provision in both crisis and non-crisis scenarios. Through the NDA, Parliament empowers the Minister of National Defence or the Governor-in-Council to authorize the“Attitudes towards the use of the army in the domestic context ultimately migrated to Canada”armed forces to “ perform any duty involving public service” , including the “ provision of assistance in respect of any law enforcement matter” . This commonly takes the form of humanitarian assistance - including ground search and rescue, aid to civil disasters, such as floods and fires, environmental emergencies and other humanitarian situations, such as missing persons and mercy flights. The “ provision of assistance in respect of any law enforcement matter” clause also encompasses what is known as assistance to law enforcement agencies (ALEA). Within this category, support from the armed forces runs the gamut from the benign, such as provision of ranges or training areas for police use, to situations in which a disturbance of the peace is occurring or is about to occur, and when armed forces personnel or equipment may be required for support. The NDA also sets the conditions for armed forces support to federal penitentiaries for assisting in the suppression of prison disturbances, and it provides authority for the earlier mentioned MOUs with DFO, the RCMP, and with Environment Canada (EC). These MOUs provide the legal basis for the navy to assist the other federal departments to enforce narcotics, fisheries and environmental laws through use of naval assets for surveillance, information sharing and interdiction support.Second, Parliament expects the Canadian Forces to be capable of taking responsibility for restoring public order when necessary - that is, for coming to the aid of the civil power. Pursuant to the N ational Defence Act, military ‘service’ can be furnished “ in any case in which a riot or disturbance of the peace, beyond the powers o f civil authorities to suppress, prevent or deal with and requiring that service” . The Chief of the Defence Staff is accorded the discretion to determine the scope and nature of military ‘service’ in these situations. Under aid of the civil power, armed forces members possess the powers and duties of ‘constables’ , but they remain under military command and control.Aid of the civil power is an arguably controversial ‘service’ , since it conjures up images of soldiers with rifles patrolling Canadian streets, and, in the view of some citizens, it embodies the idea of a police state with the threat of concomitant suspension of civil liberties. Historian Sean Maloney asserts that employing military forces domestically is a “ politically provocative act, one that carries much weight regardless of the situation” .7 Others argue that the use of military forces for law enforcement purposes obfuscates military and civilian roles, undermines civilian control o f the armed forces, and is not an appropriate use of resources/ This criticism notwithstanding, the police state has never been an acceptable concept in Canada, and the infrequent requisitions for aid to the civil power are always undertaken as a means of last resort. Moreover, as stated earlier, recent examples of armed forces employment in aid to the c iv il power met with overall approval. More importantly, however, Parliament has demonstrated, through various legal instruments, that it both accepts and expects Canada’s military to play a role in law enforcement, but that role w ill be subject to tight political control.4 4 C a n a d ia n M ilita ry Jo u rn a l • S p ring 200 6S4Appendix SPUBLISHED ARTICLESDo constitutional issues prevent the navy, as opposed to the army, from enforcing Canadian law? A review o f the Constitution Act indicates otherwise. The Act states that “ ...the exclusive Legislative Authority o f the Parliament o f Canada extends to...M ilitia , M ilitary and Naval Service, and Defence... Beacons, Buoys, Lighthouses...Navigation and Shipping... Sea Coast and Inland Ferries”. Such subjects are clearly related to maritime activities on or beyond the coasts, and the Act codifies federal responsibility for each. The Act also prescribes the exclusive powers o f the provinces, powers that focus on activities and issues affecting provincial territory, namely, terra f irm a * Thus, the Constitution A ct clearly implies that Canada’s ocean zones are federal jurisdictions. As such, appropriate organs o f the federal government may enforce Canadian law within these jurisdictions, provided they have the legal mandate. In order for the navy to enforce rather than just assist in enforcement, relatively minor amendments to various maritime-related enabling statutes are required.Lack of Distinction between Army and Navy in ‘ Domestic Operations'’Notwithstanding Kananaskis and other fora, in which the Canadian Forces deployed in high profile support of enforcement agencies, public perception commonly views ‘traditional’ military law enforcement operations as those in which the army is the ‘agency o f last resort’ . For many, no distinction exists between the navy dealing with narcotics smuggling, pollution, and fisheries violations at sea, and the army conducting aid to c iv il power operations on land. The latter are very visible, affect large numbers of citizens, and can be intrusive upon normal life, whereas naval enforcement operations are largely invisible to the majority o f Canadians. Due to this lack of distinction, negative biases derived from perceptions of the army's operations are unconsciously applied to those of the navy.Enforcement as Noii-Traditional EmploymentW hen the question o f naval law enforcement is raised, policymakers, lawyers, and senior bureaucrats are naturally reticent to concede any case for enhancing the Canadian Navy’s constabulary role, because such activities are ‘non-traditional’ . It can be argued that MOU-based counternarcotics. fisheries, customs, and immigration law enforcement operations carried out by the navy are not considered in the same category as the ‘force o f last resort’ missions. Rather, these types of operations are deemed more to fall into the realm of support to law enforcement agencies. That these operations are seen to be a ‘non-traditional’ role for the navy is both unfortunate and misinformed. Indeed, the need for fisheries protection from American interests in Canadian waters at the turn o f the century was a major factor with respect to the creation o f an indigenous navy.Among naval analysts, the employment of navies for constabulary tasks is not a universally popular concept. Vice-Admiral (ret’d) Gary Garnett stresses the importance ofS p rin g 2 0 0 6 • C a n a d ia n M ilita ry Jo u rn a lmaintaining a distinction between the enforcement roles of the Canadian military and civilian authorities. He notes, as have many other analysts, that, in Canada, law enforcement has been traditionally a civilian function. With respect to naval law enforcement, there are disadvantages to employing naval vessels in these roles. The most apparent is that navies are designed generally for war-lighting, not necessarily constabulary tasks. In fact, during the ‘Cod Wars' with Iceland in the 1970s, British frigates proved to be too ‘overly-sophisticated’ for the task.10 Garnett's principal concern is to avoid the watering down of combat skills, and his point, in my view, has some validity. However, the intent would not be to convert the Canadian Navy into a fleet of coast guard cutters. Rather, naval ships would continue to train for their primary combat roles, and small teams would receive additional specialized training to become proficient at their secondary constabulary duties.Maritime Warfare expert Commander (ret’ d) Peter Haydon argues that the navy should be the key contributor to sovereignty and security patrols of Canada’s maritime zones, because Defence is the sole department that has the capability to do the patrols properly and efficiently, and the navy is the only organization that understands and can implement the concept of sea control." But he also cautions against too much ‘constabularization’ , to the point that the nation possesses only a coast guard. In that scenario, he argues that Canada would find itself excluded from multinational naval operations. Both Haydon and Garnett suggest that sending forces perceived to be of a constabulary nature to international operations would signal a weak commitment by Canada to alliance or coalition objectives. Haydon argues that Canada’s overseas commitments would then be limited to token army and light a irlift participation, largely because Canada would lose its seat at the table at m ajor international crisis management events. Canada’s use of the navy to further diplomatic ends, to strengthen alliance relationships, and to engage in confidence- building measures would not be possible, and that would marginalize Canada on the world stage.1- This effect runs counter to the government’s stated desire to regain Canada’s stature and influence in the international system.This potential for marginalization expressed by both Haydon and Garnett would be legitimate, i f the Canadian Navy were to be viewed in the future largely as a constabulary force. However, as long as the navy maintains the primacy of combat operations as its raison d ’etre, and trains to that end, the likelihood of such marginalization is remote.Garnett also suggests that the presence of a combined civil-m ilitary force that executes law enforcement tasks on a routine basis could potentially inflame sensitive international situations, as was the case during the British/Icelandic ‘Cod Wars’.13 However, it can be argued that concern with respect to provocation is really an issue of expectation. The Canadian tradition has been that of civilian law enforcement in the marine environment, and other nations have come to expect that reaction. As political scientist Colin Gray points out: “ If Canadian law is accepted as authoritative, and i f the law is4 5“Among naval analysts, the employment of navies for constabulary tasks Is not a universally popular concept.”S5MARITIME ISSUESToronto Sun (Toronto). 6 Juno 1995. Portocope image taken by outhorAppendix SPUBLISHED ARTICLESinvoked against a single vessel and not against a state, there j should be no provocation.” Likewise, he adds, since so many j other countries use their navies for fisheries protection, it can ! be argued that there is a strong prim a fa c ie case for Canada to follow suit.14Garnett is not alone in his reservations. Other serving { and retired flag officers are opposed to their Service taking j on a more active domestic maritime enforcement posture. In | attempting to understand why this is the case, and one cannot ! discount simple deep-seated biases. Naval analysts, such j as Mark Janis, Richard H ill and Eric Grove, offer various I topologies for ranking navies by class. Generally, super- ! powers sit at ‘the top o f the pecking order’ , while at the lowest rungs are found the ‘constabulary and token’ navies. Canada ranks its own navy at Level Three, far away from those navies described as being ‘constabulary’.15 The relevance? Simply put, there is a general correlation between ranking of a nation's navy and a nation’s status in I the international system. The majority of navies of developed i countries occupy the upper tiers, whereas the navies o f j developing nations, those of a more constabulary nature, are j found in the lower end o f the ranking spectrum.16 The Canadian Navy, given its early roots as a fisheries j protection force, wished to shed that image and become a ! ‘real’ navy. Arguably, some senior naval leaders may j perceive a certain stigma i f their fleets are associated with j constabulary rather than combat-capable functions that rank | them higher on the international stage. Thus, the attitudes of j modern naval officers might well be a legacy of concern j with respect to image.Both Garnett and Haydon have cautioned against ‘non-traditional’ law enforcement by Canada's naval forces. However, John Thomas, former Commissioner of the Canadian Coast Guard, is more blunt:I do not think that DND should have the role of coastal security... Navy personnel are trained for war and navy systems are developed for war, not to fu lfil a policing role on the coast... the navy should be called upon only when the police force cannot do the job... there is a need for a flexible response. The military should be seen, from a policy perspective, as a force of last resort, in the same way as they are for land-based police operations.17Thomas - and, to a lesser extent, Haydon and Garnett - speaks to a bipolar world of a bygone era, during which Canada’s Navy was structured to counter symmetric threats. It is unlikely that North America will face a conventional military threat, such as had been the case during the Cold War. The maritime security environment changed with the fall o f the Berlin Wall, and its continuing evolution was punctuated with the terrorist attacks of 2001. Globally, societies are witnessing an increased emphasis on asymmetric capabilities by organized crime and a variety of trans-state actors. It is reasonable to assume that terrorist groups are prepared to use merchant vessels to transport their personnel and weapons. Any number of scenarios can be imagined here.In addition to counter-terrorism, the protection of fishing rights, the prevention of illegal activity at sea, and the protection of the environment w ill continue to require vigilance on the part of the federal government. Canada’s national security policy, Securing an Open Society, calls for effective, integrated multiple-agency threat assessment, protection, and prevention capabilities. However, it is no longer easy to divine what the sovereignty protection role of the Canadian Navy is when, as observed in Canada’s In ternational Policy Statement (IPS), ‘‘the boundary between the domestic and international continues to blur”.'B The IPS insists that security and defence policy must change. Thus, it is time to discard old ideas about traditional employment, and to consider what is practical and relevant for the future maritime security environment. Other nations have already done so.Fisheries protection has long been a traditional role for European naval and coast guard forces. Britain’s naval experience in this role dates back to the 16lh Century. At present, the Royal Navy undertakes quarantine enforcement, fishery protection, contraband operations, drug interdiction, oil and gas field patrols, anti-piracy operations, support to counterinsurgency operations and maritime counter-terrorism. Moreover, the Royal Navy maintains a Fishery Protections Squadron, equipped with six offshore patrol vessels and four mine counter-measures vessels. Looking at other parts of Europe, the French Navy, for example, acquired patrol vessels several years ago for policing duties. Farther north, the Norwegian Coast Guard forms part of the Royal Norwegian Navy, whereas Denmark has no coast guard. However, the Danish Navy exercises police authority for enforcement of sovereignty issues. European navies generally furnish lawm m singe* m m . Tu**etuntil* #«The provocative, front-page periscope photograph.4 0 C anad ian M ilita ry Jou rna l • S pring 2006S6Appendix SPUBLISHED ARTICLESenforcement services directly to national authorities through MOUs. Usually what these navies provide are naval platforms and facilities. In some cases, such as the Danish model, the navy carries out constabulary and traffic-police duties, whereas the appropriate civil authority conducts the criminal investigations. From a European perspective, naval participation in law enforcement is a significant contribution to good governance at sea.1"United States Experience w ith Posse ComitatusIt is interesting to compare the Canadian position to that of the United States - where the law has, until recently, prohibited the use of the armed forces for domestic enforcement. The Posse Comitatus Act was passed in 1878 to prevent the US Army from carrying out law enforcement tasks in the United States. This was a reaction to the use o f m ilitary forces in the Confederate states for the maintenance o f peace and good order, to the enforcement o f policies for post-Civil War reconstruction, and to ensure that rebellious sentiments did not re-ignite. The US Congress became concerned when the army stationed troops at political events and polling stations under the premise of ensuring c iv il order. The intent o f the Posse Comitatus A ct was to prevent the Army from becoming ‘the national police force’ , and to return the army to its proper role in defence of US territory.20Interestingly, the Posse Com itatus A ct did not apply to the US Navy, only the US Army. It is possible that, as with Britain’s B ill o f Rights o f 1688, the navy was not viewed as a threat to the US domestic political structure of the era. In 1956, the Posse Com itatus A ct was amended to apply to the US A ir Force, but, curiously, it made no mention of the US Navy. By 1974, it was interpreted that, although the Act did not specifically apply to the navy, its principles were to be upheld. However, a loophole allowed the navy to be employed for civilian law enforcement purposes, given the express permission of the US Secretary of the Navy, a civilian official. Thus, the paramount principle o f civilian control over military forces could be maintained.21In 1982, at the request o f the US Department of Transport, the US Secretary o f Defense approved US Navy support to the US Coast Guard for law enforcement purposes. Specifically, the US Navy could conduct surveillance, tow or escort seized vessels, transport prisoners, provide logistic support to Coast Guard units, and embark Coast Guard personnel to conduct boardings of American and stateless vessels. These powers and procedures marked a considerable departure from the outright prohibition of US naval involvement in law enforcement, and they indicate American acceptance of this role for their navy.Having established the legitimacy o f the use of the navy for law enforcement purposes, and having challenged some perceptions about constabulary and non-traditional naval employment, it remains to be discussed what an enhanced mandate for naval law enforcement would really entail.Proposal for Naval M aritim e Enforcement of Canadian M aritim e Zoneshis article calls for the navy to be empowered with the legal authority to enforce directly selected federal statutes on a routine basis throughout the maritime zones of Canadian jurisdiction. At present, Canadian naval forces are relegated to a support function only, except under special circumstances when coercive force is required, and is requested by the appropriate Minister.I f these legal powers were to be granted, what would this new role entail? The navy’s fundamental mission would remain the “ generation and maintenance of combat-capable, multi-purpose maritime forces to meet Canada’s defence objectives” . Nonetheless, i f naval vessels detected violations to Canadian law while conducting their defence or sovereignty missions, they would have the requisite legal tools to act upon those discoveries. However, there is no suggestion that the navy would be obliged to cease its principal operations to deal with violations detected. Rather, the naval commanding o ffice r’s decision whether to enforce the law would be shaped by the priority of his naval operations - and by the circumstances of the violation detected. In practice, this precedent already exists. Throughout Canada, police officers have similar discretion to choose when and where to enforce laws, with due consideration to the severity of the offences, the risk to the public, and so on. As well, the navy would not be expected to enforce all federal statutes, only those that apply to specific activities on the seas. These interventions would be limited only to those offences that are directly linked to the protection of Canadian sovereignty, and this constraint should allay concerns referred to earlier about placing police power in the hands of military personnel.The proposed new role would not envisage the navy conducting investigations of violations detected at sea. Rather, naval personnel would carry out the preliminary work designed to contain the scene of the violation. Again, an analogy of normal police work is useful. Throughout Canada, general duty police officers are normally first at the scene. They then turn over d ifficu lt or serious cases to specialist officers or detectives. The general duty officer is trained in basic policing functions - such as understanding how not to contaminate a crime scene, how to maintain care and custody of evidence, and so on - so that qualified detectives can investigate the case in detail. This basic knowledge is necessary to ensure that the Crown's case is not undermined by procedural errors at the outset of an investigation. In the model proposed, naval personnel would act as the general duty officers, and would turn over the case for investigation by DFO or by EC representatives, or by the RCMP as appropriate. Moreover, the support to enforcement already established by interdepartmental MOUs would not change. Thus, routine patrols with fisheries or RCMP officers embarked would continue, and reactive operations, such as counter-drug interdictions, would be carried out with the appropriate enforcement officers embarked.“Fisheries protection has long been a traditional role for European naval and coast guard forces.”TS p rin g 2 0 0 6 • C a n a d ia n M ilita ry Jo u rn a l 4 7S7Appendix SPUBLISHED ARTICLESSome argue that the Canadian Navy would not be qualified to undertake a more direct enforcement role, primarily because naval personnel are not conversant w ith the requirements o f a court case. Essentially, this question involves training and shipboard organization. One solution would be to confer peace officer status on all watch- keeping officers, as well as a small cadre o f sailors.” These people would train specifically for law enforcement duties, and would become the ship’s experts with respect to the use of force, the care and custody o f evidence, and other related matters. The logical choice for these teams would be the personnel who form the navy’s existing naval boarding parties. At present, naval boarding party team training is very similar to, but shorter than, that received by Canadian police officers, and it would require minimal adjustment to cater to at-sea enforcement requirements. It would mainly entail becoming familiar with the minimal number o f federal statutes that would be enforced by the navy, and to ‘top up’ the team’s legalistic understanding o f requirements for court.2'’In the end, there is little doubt that the navy could execute an enhanced enforcement role, given its considerable experience in maritime interdiction operations abroad. Whether it w ill be given the chance to do so remains an open question.ConclusionsPolicing Canada’s maritime zones and approaches presents no shortage of difficulties to overcome, particularly as the federal government struggles to allocate finite resources to a plethora of ministries charged with maintaining national security. While the navy has always had a major part to play in protecting Canadian sovereignty, the burden of law enforcement has fallen largely upon other government departments. This reality reflects a Canadian tradition of law enforcement by civilian agencies. However, in light of the evolving post-9/11 asymmetric security environment, there is a case to be made for expanding the naval role in domestic maritime enforcement. Influenced to a degree by land-oriented aid to civil power operations, detractors question the legitimacy of this use of armed forces or denounce the idea as non-traditional. However, none of these issues presents an insurmountable obstacle to developing an enhanced role for Canada’s naval forces.With federal enforcement departments becoming increasingly reliant on naval assets for support of their operations, the navy’s significant presence in Canada’s maritime zones should be leveraged, and the Canadian Navy, empowered with appropriate legal authority, should be granted the option to enforce Canadian law in those vast areas. Doing so would be yet another important step in realizing the goals articulated in Canada’s national security policy. Specifically, that entails the provision of maritime security to Canadians in an effective integrated manner.“The proposed new role would not envisage the navy conducting investigations of violations detected at sea ”NOTES1. Canada, Report o f the Standing Senate 9.Committee on National Security and Defence. 10.Canatki 's Coastlines: The Longest Untler-defenJecl Borders in the World. October, 2003. pp. 108-109.2. Presence is essential in a vast Atlantic E E Z o f 1.4 I I .million km: where, for example, it was estimatedthat 534 fishing vessels and 1137 merchant vessels were operating in March 2005.3. A ll maps were produced from the author’s data,with the assistance o f G IS technicians Roxanne 12.Gauthier and Richard Maync, as w ell as graphic artist Ralph Lang.4. E.C.S. Wade and A.W. Bradley, Constitutional and Administrative Im w (London: Longman, 1985). p. 406.5. Aid to the Civil Power is a type o f domestic opera- 13.tion in which military forces arc called out to suppress a riot or disturbance of the peace because itis beyond the civil authorities to control. The four instances are: 1969 Montreal Police Strike; 1970 FLQcrisis; 1976 Alberta sniper; and 1990 Oka crisis.6. Speech by Superintendent A. Antoniuk to R C M Pofficers at R C M P Training Academy, Regina,Saskatchewan, 27 September 1990; DesmondMorton. Understanding Canadian Defence (Toronto: 14.Penguin, 2003), p. 158.7. Sean M . Maloney, “Domestic Operations: TheCanadian Approach," Parameters (Autumn, 1997), 15.pp. 135-152.8. Matthew Carlton Hammond, “The PosseComitatus Act: A Principle in Need o f Renewal,” Washington University Law Quarterly 75 (No. 2, 16.Summer, 1997) . accessed 6 February 2005.Constitution Act. 1867, s. 91, s. 92. 17.Elizabeth Young, “Policing Offshore: C iv il Power or Armed Forces," RUSl Journal 122 (No. 2,June 1977), pp. 18-22. 18.Peter T. Haydon, Canadian Naval Future: A Necessary Long-Term Planning Framework,IRPP Working Paper 2 0 0 4 -12 (Montreal: Institute 19.for Research on Public Policy, November 2004), pp. 13-14.Peter T. Haydon, “ W hat Naval Capabilities Does Canada Need?” in Maritime Security in the Twenty-First Century: Maritime Security Occasional Paper No. 11. E .L. Tummers (ed.), (H a lifax: Dalhousie University, December2000), p. 157.G ary L. Garnett. “The N a vy ’s Role in the 20.Protection o f National Sovereignty.” In AnOceans Management Strategy fo r theNorthwest Atlantic in the 21" Century: The Niobe Papers; Volume 9, Peter T. Haydon 21.and Gregory L. W ito l (eds.), (H alifax:The Naval Officers Association o f Canada,1998), p. I I ; Young, “Policing Offshore," 22.pp. 18-22.C olin S. Gray, Canada’s Maritime Forces: Wellesley Paper I (Toronto: Canadian Institute o f International Affairs, January 1973), p. 46.Canada, Department o f National Defence, Leadmark: The N avy’s Strategy fo r 2020(Ottawa: Directorate o f Maritim e Strategy, 2001), pp. 43-45.Michael A. Morris, “M ilitary Aspects o f the 23.Exclusive Economic Zone," in Ocean Yearbook 3 (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1982), p. 336.Testimony o f John F. Thomas before the Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Issue 19. Evidence Morning Session 9 June 2003. Canada, Privy Council O ffice, Canada's International Policy Statement (Ottawa: 2005),p. 12.Michael Pugh, “Policing the Seas: The Challenge of Good Governance,” in The Rote o f European Naval Forces after the Cold War. G. de Nooy (cd.), (Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 1996), pp. 105-111; Michel d’Oleon, “Policing the Seas: The Way Ahead." in The Role o f European Naval Forces after the Cold War, G. de Nooy (ed.),(Ncthcrlands: Kluwer Law International. 1996), p. 144.Craig T. Trebilcock, The Myth o f Posse Comitatus, October 2000. , accessed 6 February 2005.Michael R. Adams. “Navy Narcs." United States NavaI Institute Proceedings (September 1984): pp. 35-37.This idea was proposed as a means of preparing the Canadian Coast Guard for constabulary duties. See testimony o f John F. Thomas before the Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Issue 19, Evidence Morning Session 9 June 2003. Sec also Canada, Report of the Standing Senate Committee on Fisheries and Oceans. Safe, Secure, Sovereign: Reinventing the Canadian Coast Guard. March 2004, p. 48.Based upon author’s experience and training as a former member o f the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.4 8 C a n a d ia n M ilita ry Jo u rn a l • S p ring 2006S8Appendix SPUBLISHED ARTICLESEdited ByRobert H* Edwards andGraham WalkerS9Appendix SPUBLISHED ARTICLESCaptain (N ) L .M . Hickeyrhe tragic events o f September 11th, 2001 have become the catalyst for a long-overdue appraisal o f security provisions and relationships within North America. In Canada, government departments conducted this self-examination with considerably less urgency than in the United States, on whose territory the attacks were directed. Nonetheless, the Canadian population was awakened, and an ad hoc Cabinet Committee on Public Security Anti-Terrorism was set up to divine the way ahead and to assuage this public concern. Further, the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence turned its attention to the requirement for a national security policy, with maritime security as a subset. While these activities provided ample debate for policy makers and bureaucrats in Ottawa, the real operational impacts w ill be felt in the regions, particularly in the maritime context. The aim o f this paper is to discuss, at the regional level, the relationships and methods o f interdepartmental cooperation among federal departments in Atlantic Canada.1Renaissance o f CooperationAlthough interdepartmental cooperation appears to have become topical only during the past two years, in fact, it has existed in varying degrees since Confederation. However, in the recent past, the impetus for greater emphasis was a 1990 Treasury Board study led by Senator Gordon Osbaldeston. The study’s purpose was to identify opportunities for enhancing the efficiency, and improving delivery, o f the federal marine fleets’ programs. Ultimately, the Senator’s report, titled A l l the Ships That Sail: A Study o f Canada’s Fleets, led to the consolidation o f the Canadian Coast Guard and Department o f Fisheries and Oceans fleets. More importantly, for our discussion, the study observed that cooperation among federal departments was poor and, as a remedy, recommended the establishment o f a strategic-level committee to guide the departments with maritime fleets towards more effective operations and interactions. This recommendation was acted upon in 1991 with the convening o f the Interdepartmental Programme Coordination and Review Committee (IPCRC).Although Ottawa-based, IPCRC was important from a regional perspective because with it came a structure o f sub-committees and working groups. These covered operations, surveillance, hydrographies, communications, vessel design and vessel utilisation. Operations sub-committees were formed on the east and west coasts, and set in motion tangible progress towards interdepartmental cooperation. The Atlantic Operations Sub-Committee met regularly, and oversaw the development and implementation o f an unclassified wide-area information-144S10Appendix SPMBW SH ARTICLESsharing network known as the Canadian Maritime Network. Likewise, an Interdepartmental Concept o f Maritime Operations (ICM O) document was developed and accepted for use among the major departments w ith maritime security and enforcement mandates. It seemed as though the federal actors were well on the way to cracking the code to real interdepartmental coordination and effective employment o f maritime human and materiel resources.Regrettably, that was not to be the case. The 1990s saw the stagnation o f interdepartmental relationships, and both the CANM ARNET and the Interdepartmental Concept o f Maritime Operations fell into disuse. There was little funding available to progress interdepartmental issues, and public sector managers’ priorities turned inwards to their own departmental needs during periods o f budgetary constraint. Relations with other government departments were buoyed by occasional spikes o f activity that necessitated multi-departmental responses, such as the Turbot Crisis in 1995, and the Swiss A ir disaster o f 1998 but, in general terms, many o f the benefits set in motion by the Osbaldeston study simply stopped dead in their tracks. Sadly, IPCRC was stood down in September 2001.Current SituationWhile IPCRC was ultimately abandoned, it provided both an example and a workable framework upon which to build. Interdepartmental cooperation exists now in an environment o f complex, multi-agency relationships that, as a simple rule-of-thumb, spans three levels o f interaction. The first o f these levels is the strategic. Issues at the strategic level are those that are international in nature, usually concerning policy, and are addressed by national headquarters in Ottawa. The next level is the operational or regional level. Issues at the operational level are those that are province-wide or cover multiple provinces and large areas o f the Atlantic approaches. The last level is the tactical or local level. Tactical level issues tend to be more narrowly focussed, often pertaining to specific incidents or operations that do not employ region-wide resources. Interdepartmental relationships at all levels can be categorised as being:• informal versus formal;• proactive versus reactive; and• intelligence versus operational response.Security - Law E nforcem ent or D efence?To understand how departments relate to one another locally, it is important to note that in Canada maritime security is viewed by government, first and foremost, as a law enforcement issue rather than a defence issue, even in the case o f terrorism.2 This significant point seems not to have been completely understood by SCONSAD in their investigation o f the need for a national security policy. The Committee, in their recent report Canada’s Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World, waxes nostalgically about the Royal Canadian Navy’s success in coastal protection when the country was on a war-time footing during the 1940s, and suggests that the present Canadian Navy has abandoned patrols o f its home coasts.3 However, in the present governance structure, the Canadian Navy as a part o f the Canadian Forces, has no legal mandate fo r law enforcement and fu lfils its constabulaiy role by supportingT he C E N T R E fo r F O R E IG N P O L IC Y S T U D IE S - 2003S11Appendix SPUBLISHED ARTICLES(..outlmntai S sanity and Canada U.S. Wi'latims 146those departments that do: the key ones being the Solicitor General and Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, and Environment Canada. This is done primarily through the provision o f naval ships and maritime aircraft as transport for peace officers or conservation and protection officers while other m ilitary capabilities are used for surveillance and monitoring o f the Canadian ocean areas. As such, short o f a direct attack on Canada or some threat so overwhelming that the responsible departments simply couldn't cope, the Navy would not become the lead agency for most maritime security scenarios in the current federal construct.Informal and Form al CooperationInformal liaison occurs across the broad spectrum o f government affairs. It may be simply a matter o f regional s taff sounding out their counterparts o f the same level in another departments’ regional headquarters about a routine issue or pending initiative. It could be national staffs chatting unofficia lly about upcoming policy deliberations or changes to programmes. Informal liaison at the tactical level could, for example, involve Royal Canadian Mounted Police or Halifax Regional M unicipality Police talking to M ilitary Police about local security patrols. Informal cooperation is highly dependent upon individual personality and networking skills. By contrast, formal cooperation is that which is established through official appointments, secondments, memberships in various committees and working groups, ad hoc or otherwise. In many cases, the o ffic ia l nature o f this liaison is captured in an incumbent’ s job description or terms o f reference.Proactive InitiativesRegional authorities deal w ith the management o f their departmental mandates and emergent crises through both proactive and reactive means. In general, proactive measures reflect the interdepartmental working group and committee structure that convenes with various periodicity to resolve issues spanning departmental mandates, as well as existing Memoranda o f Understanding between selected departments. This proactive structure, especially since September 11th, has become the foundation upon which departments can manage their individual and jo in t responses to reactive operations.Proactive cooperation takes many forms and occurs as part o f normal daily activities. Longstanding relationships have ensured that lines o f communication remain open so that contact leading to action can be made easily when the need arises. These relationships have been created and maintained through day-to-day liaison, through participation in official working groups and committees, and through various local and regional training exercises.Day-to-day LiaisonUsing the case o f Maritime Forces Atlantic as a single department having relationships with many other departments and agencies, the following are examples o f proactive day-to-day liaisons being undertaken on a year-round basis:• Liaison w ith the Conservation and Protection staffs o f Fisheries and Ocean Canada (DFO) to coordinate naval support to fishery patrols in accordance with a MOU;T he C E N T R E fo r F O R E IG N P O L IC Y S T U D IE S - 2003Appendix S• Liaison w ith the Oceans Management Branch o f DFO to provide surveillance information to assist w ith the scientific study, management, and potential enforcement o f the proposed Sable G ully Marine Protected Area;• Liaison w ith Environment Canada (EC) for assistance in detecting and investigating pollution incidents. Naval vessels have also carried Canadian W ild life Service scientists during fishery patrols to assist w ith ongoing pelagic bird surveys;• Liaison w ith the RCMP to provide support for counter-narcotics operations in accordance with an MOU. M A R L A N T also provides logistical support in the form o f transportation to assist the RCMP w ith its Coastal Watch program;• Liaison w ith Health Canada to coordinate support o f the Navy’s Nuclear Emergency Response Team during visits to Halifax by nuclear-powered vessels;• Liaison w ith various agencies for jo in t security efforts such as the G-7 Finance Ministers’ Conference;• Liaison w ith United States Navy commands such as the Commander-in-Chief Atlantic Fleet, Commander Second Fleet, and the Office o f Naval Intelligence (ONI) on naval matters o f Homeland Defence;• Liaison w ith the United States Coast Guard First District (Boston) on matters o f safety, security, and Homeland Security.Interdepartmental Committee and Working Group StructureThe relationships among A tlantic Canadian interdepartmental committees and working groups at all three levels are depicted in Figure 1. There are more interdepartmental groups in existence, however, those included in the diagram are the ones that are either operationally or security oriented, and they are also the most active.The two main Ottawa-based groups that address maritime security issues are shown in Figure 1 as proactive activities at the strategic level. The ad hoc Cabinet Committee on Public Security Anti-Terrorism has minister-level representation from the Privy Council Office, Solicitor General, Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Canadian Coast Guard, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Transport Canada, Department o f National Defence and police agencies. Over the past two years, PSAT has provided Cabinet with advice on proposed marine security measures and their prioritisation. The second strategic level initiative, the Interdepartmental Maritime Security Working Group, is a working body that furnishes PSAT w ith fu lly staffed conclusions and recommendations on security issues.4 The membership o f IM SW G is equally diverse. Elsewhere in this volume, Captain (N) Peter Avis discusses the composition and roles o f these two groups, so I won’t go into specific detail here.The Arctic Security Interdepartmental Working Group is the third strategic-level body with regional security on its agenda. Participants from 15 federal departments, as well as territorial representatives, meet semi-annually to discuss Arctic issues. Sub-committees have been established recently for A rctic sovereignty, security, interoperability and the environment.5Moving to the operational level, several groups are depicted as proactive activities in Figure 1. Three o f the bodies concern themselves with the broader scheme o f oceans management rather than the more focussed topic o f maritime security. These are the Eastern Scotian Shelf Integrated Management group (ESSIM), the Atlantic Coastal Zone Information Steering Committee (ACZISC), and the Interdepartmental Committee on Oceans (ICO). Their relevance to this discussion is simply that many o f their members are the same representativesThe C E N T R E fo r F O R E IG N P O L IC Y S T U D IE S - 2003S13Appendix SPUBLISHED ARTICLESFigure 1: Interdepartmental committees and working groups.Proactive A ctivities Reactive ActivitiesStrategic LevelPSAT ASIWGIMSWG Informal liaisonIBETJITTOperational LevelECIMOC RICMOESSIMNSFC SC ExercisesACZISCICO Informal liaison EmergentCrisisOperationalResponseInformal liaisonSL Seaway VSC Tactical Levelto the other various security groups and, as such, use opportunities afforded by oceans management venues to further foster longstanding relationships.Originally conceived in British Columbia in 1996 to address cross-border crime, Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBET) have been established in 14 locations across the country, including the A tlantic region. These teams comprise representatives from the RCMP, CCRA, CIC and other police agencies in Canada, and their American counterparts in the U.S. Customs Service, U.S. Border Patrol, and the U.S. Coast Guard. IBET’s focus is on potential threats o f terrorism, impeding the smuggling o f drugs, humans, contraband cigarettes, or other illegal substances.6 CCRA is in the process o f setting up Joint In-Transit Targeting Teams (JITT) w ith other agencies and American officials in Halifax, Montreal, Vancouver, Newark, and Seattle to monitor and intervene suspicious sea and air cargos and containers both in Canada and at international points o f departure.In A tlantic Canada, at the operational level, there are two key bodies that have the greatest influence on how enforcement and maritime security are managed within the region. The first is the Eastern Canada Interdepartmental Maritime Operations Committee (ECIMOC), which was formerly IPCRC’s Atlantic Operations Sub-Committee prior to IPCRC’s demise. ECIMOCT he C E N T R E fo r F O R E IG N P O L / C l ~ S T U D IE S - 2003S14Appendix S14 ^is made up o f federal departments that either conduct, or have an interest in, operations in the maritime environment. Principal members include M AR LAN T (the current chair), DFO including representatives from both the CCG Maritimes, and Newfoundland and Labrador Regions, CCRA, CIC, TC, EC, and the Office o f Critical Infrastructure Preparedness and Emergency Preparedness (OCIPEP). Recently, Health Canada participated in view o f their major involvement in the merchant vessel Wadi Alarab anthrax incident. ECIMOC’s aim is to identify and develop the most practical means o f applying operational resources to facilitate jo in t and effective employment. It is through ECIMOC that a tentative link to the strategic-level IMSWG has been established through the distribution o f each group’ s records o f discussion. This link is shown in Figure 1 as a dashed double-headed arrow.The other significant organ is the Nova Scotia Federal Council’ s Security Committee. This ad hoc committee, comprised o f Regional Directors General o f federal departments with enforcement or security mandates, meets every two months to discuss a broad range o f security- related issues. In the aftermath o f September 11th , it was this committee that recognised that the federal departments in the A tlantic region needed to improve their ability to work together in order to respond to future security incidents. This committee initiated a series o f table top and command-post exercises, designed to stimulate and, i f necessary, to force interaction between departments through the resolution o f complex scenarios containing both terrestrial and marine elements.Program o f Interdepartmental ExercisesAlthough there have been several exercises held in the Atlantic region since September 11th, the most noteworthy was held in May, 2002. This two-day exercise, ATLANTIC GUARD was championed by the members o f Nova Scotia Federal Council Security Committee, sponsored by OCIPEP and hosted by D N D ’ s Land Force Atlantic Area (LFAA). ATLANTIC GUARD challenged 13 federal and three provincial agencies with three different scenarios that presented security, health and environmental disaster problems. The ATLANTIC GUARD Final Report, prepared by an independent assessor from outside o f government, highlighted the requirement to regularly exercise interdepartmental cooperation in order to standardise such things as telecommunications, public affairs and command and control.7 A similar exercise, ATLANTIC GUARD II was conducted 28-31 October, 2003. This command-post exercise met the basic interoperability objectives, but reiterated the need for continued effort in resolving jo in t command and control issues among many departments.Other multi-agency exercises undertaken in the Atlantic region post-September i f include:• CCRA Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Table Top Exercise - 24 September, 2002. This exercise was one in a series o f table top exercises held across the country by CCRA. The scenario presented was that o f a “ dirty bomb” entering Halifax by container ship;• Exercise ATLANTIC SPEAR - 18-22 November, 2002. Hosted by LFAA, the scenario was a G8 meeting to be held on Campobello Island, New Brunsick at very short notice. While primarily an LFAA initiative to train its headquarters staff, it included participation from several federal government departments such as DFAIT, RCMP, CIC, and Health Canada. Maritime Forces Atlantic staff provided a maritime component;T h e C E N T R E fo r F O R E IG N P O L IC Y S T U D IE S - 21)03S15Appendix SPUBLISHED ARTICLESL.ontincfiiuiSecunG and Canada U.S. Relations ! 50• Exercise A TLA N TIC SHIELD - 12 May, 2003. Hosted by the Halifax Port Authority, this exercise was designed to test the response to a bomb threat against a v isiting cruise ship. The exercise served two purposes: one, it satisfied the Port Authority ’ s need to demonstrate a specified level o f security to the cruise industry in order to ensure continuing visits to Halifax, and; two, it presented an opportunity to determine the level o f response required from the Halifax Regional Municipality, the province and from federal departments.Shown in Figure 1 is an arrow that represents the ability to deal with unforeseen or emergent crises through the experience, insight, and contacts gained in multi-agency problem-solving scenario-based exercises in a proactive programme.Regional Interdepartmental Concept o f Maritime OperationsUnder the aegis o f ECIMOC, a sub-committee is drafting, in one umbrella document called RICMO, the procedures necessary to accomplish maritime-related tasks requiring interdepartmental cooperation. These guidelines include, but are not limited to counter-terrorism operations, environmental responses, illegal migrants, counter-drug operations, preventative patrols, and surveillance operations. As well, RICMO w ill contain regional interdepartmental communications and points o f contact, inventories o f air, sea and shore-based assets, an inventory o f M OU among departments, and legislative or regulatory mandates, and statutory authorities including the use o f force. In Figure 1, an arrow represents the link between RICMO and the operational response to an emergent crisis.Reactive R elationshipsFigure 2 depicts the elements that are in place to enable authorities to respond to an emergent situation based on information garnered through the various intelligence networks. The diagram shows departmental intelligence sections represented at all three levels, linked with each other, and with international intelligence agencies at the strategic and operational levels. The main departments contributing to this community within Canada are CSIS, RCMP, CCRA, DND CIC, and the Communications Security Establishment (CSE). A llied links in the United States include ONI, the Defence Intelligence Agency (D IA), the U.S. Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination Center, and the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) East. Information is shared with departments depending upon the recipient’s need to know and, in most cases, departments can respond effectively w ith in individual department mandates.Threat Assessment Group (TAG)Unfortunately, or fortunately depending upon your point o f view, the intelligence networks uncover large numbers o f items requiring investigation and the determination o f credibility, level o f threat, and so on. The ability to ‘ filte r’ this information varies among departments, as does each department’ s understanding o f what is o f significance to another. In the fall o f 2002, a vessel with a suspect container arrived in Halifax. Four departments or agencies were aware o f this container, but the information about the container and potential responses to it were interpreted differently by each department. This pointed to a need to formalise a process to transition from compiling information, to determining whether an operational response isT h e C E N T R E fo r F O R E IG N P O L IC Y S T U D IE S - 2003S16Appendix S1 5required, to mounting the actual operation. As a result, in the Atlantic region, the RCMP sponsored the development o f a body known as the Threat Assessment Group (TAG).Figure 2: The relationship of intelligence to operational response.PUBLISHED ARTICLESReactive A ctiv itiesStrategic LevelP roactive A ctiv itiesInformal liaisonA lliedInte lOperationalResponseContingencyOperationTAGInformal liaisonn Informal liaisonOperational LevelTactical LevelA TAG meeting is the genesis o f a coordinated interdepartmental operational response to an emergent issue that transcends the mandate o f any one department. The TAG w ill also assist with the determination o f a lead agency. TAG members belong to four principal departments: CSIS , RCMP, CCRA, and DND. Other departments may be called i f the issue is obviously relevant to a particular department. TAG members include both intelligence analysts and operators, and the aim o f the TAG is to ensure that a common understanding o f a potential event is reached, so that each agency can then plan and coordinate its response.8Maritime D om ain AwarenessThere is an inherent need to develop and maintain an understanding o f what activities are happening in Canada’s coastal zones and its approaches. This situational awareness is required by multiple government departments with overlapping mandates and interests in our maritime security environment. The Navy uses a specific tool to acquire this domain awareness, andThe C E N T R E fo r F O R E IG N P O L IC Y S T U D IE S - 2003S17Appendix SPUBLISHED ARTICLES( . . .O il0 H i 7 S c O H i ' - i l U i lO \ U.S. Rshares it w ith other government departments. It is known as the “ recognised maritime picture” and is represented in Figure 2 w ith the circular symbol (RMP). The term “ recognised” is used to indicate that the picture has been evaluated prior to its dissemination. In other words, rather than having stations simply pass data between themselves, there is a central authority to whom data is forwarded for compilation, evaluation and dissemination as a recognised picture: an analyst’ s evaluation o f what is happening in a given area. Generation o f the RMP is worthy o f discussion here due to its inherent relationship to intelligence, and as a good example o f inter-agency cooperation.The RMP compiled by the Navy is produced for an ocean area that encompasses Atlantic waters well past the 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone, extending north to the Pole and west to the end o f the Great Lakes and encompassing the entire St. Lawrence Seaway, following the Canada-U.S. border where appropriate. This area has been adopted for picture management purposes, not to suggest a legislated mandate for control within that area. Although this arbitrary area o f responsibility is assigned for management purposes, the various databases supporting the picture actually contain data for the entire globe.A t present, sufficient resources would not be available for comprehensive surveillance o f the large area o f responsibility, were only m ilitary assets to be used. Accordingly, the RMP is compiled in cooperation w ith many other agencies that possess data on maritime activity. The benefits o f this are clear; a wider collective awareness and links through which to share information, plus a growing ability to reduce duplication o f effort and use resources efficiently. As such, the picture combines data o f the follow ing nature:• Reports from Canadian m ilitary ships and aircraft. M ilitary aircraft fly a number o f hours each week for dedicated surveillance, and conduct surveillance as a secondary task even when on training missions. Ships are also under standing direction to hail merchant vessels, and this communication results in further information on each vessel;• Reports from aircraft contracted by DFO. The contractor, Provincial Airlines, flies these patrols w ith a well-equipped air platform that provides radar, infrared and photographic data. A key aspect o f these flights is that the data can be forwarded in flight for integration into the picture (except the photo data), resulting in near real time picture compilation. This makes the fisheries patrol aircraft one o f the most capable surveillance assets on the east coast o f Canada. Although normally limited to the fisheries context, these flights are reporting pollution incidents and have started to report merchant shipping as well. An initiative is in place to allow the Navy to redirect or task one o f these flights, should that be required, to monitor a vessel o f interest;• Reports from CCG, including the mandatory reports required from commercial vessels at 96 and 24 hours prior to reaching a Canadian port. This data is hosted in the CCG’s own picture and accessed by a direct link between the DND and CCG systems. The Coast Guard system is a fundamental cornerstone o f maritime picture building in Canada; it contains the reports mandated by Canadian legislation, and has been identified as the data path for Automated Identification System data (transponder beacons.) Transponder beacons are important because they provide position and identity automatically by radio signal, without the need for surveillance assets to go forth to find them;• Reports based on fishing vessel transponder beacons. These are automated radio signals from fishing vessels, w ith their positions and identities. DFO receives these reports for European Union fisherman when those vessels are operating in certain areas nearThe C E N T R E fo r F O R E IG N P O L IC Y S T U D IE S - 2003S18Appendix SCanada’s EEZ, and the reports are forwarded to the Navy to be included in the RMP. Likewise, Canadian vessels fishing in domestic areas started carrying these beacons in the summer o f 2003;• Reports based on positions included in merchant vessel voluntary weather reporting, on a global scale. Merchant ships report the weather in their local area, typically at 4-6 hour intervals. Pooled by weather bureaus worldwide, Environment Canada receives the sum o f all this data. Since these reports contain the call sign and position o f the vessels, they are o f use to the RMP. These reports are forwarded to the Navy via the Internet, and converted to the format necessary for inclusion in the picture;• Reports from various NATO sites, as a result o f their own local picture-building efforts. The four main NATO centres each produce a picture for their area and share that with each other, and NATO allies. Although they do not report ships o ff the east coast o f Canada, the data is included in the RMP for long-range cueing and to support naval ships when deployed. Although NATO has not typically been a large reporting source for merchant vessels, the focus in this regard is changing;• Reports from various centres in the U.S. Navy. The data forwarded from the United States contains locator messages for merchant vessel traffic on a global scale. As well, the U.S. Navy shares its list o f high interest vessels w ith Canada and the names o f these vessels are placed on an alert list. When a report on any o f the vessels is received in the Canadian RMP, the information is passed on to the applicable U.S. agency;• Reports based on national technical sensors. Data from classified systems can provide information on shipping movements; and• Commercial sources. Many shipping companies currently maintain their own plot o f where their ships are operating and often that data can be seen on internet. This data is not routinely included in the RMP, but can be used to investigate vessels o f interest and is a growth area for inclusion in the picture.It is clear that the RMP’s foundation is a shared effort between many partners. Canada undertakes data sharing with as many other maritime agencies as security considerations and legislation allow, since this logically increases the potential for early warning o f vessels o f interest. Many successful uses o f the RMP have been made follow ing notification by an outside agency o f a vessel o f interest or concern. A ll told, this effort attempts to produce a level o f ‘ surveillance in depth’ to protect Canadian interests.Hindrances to CooperationRobust interdepartmental cooperation w ill always have its challenges, some o f which have nothing to do with personalities. The administrative structure o f the federal ministries itself complicates cooperative efforts. For example, a single security or enforcement issue within the Atlantic region could involve consultation with only 1 Regional Director o f Citizenship and Immigration but up to 4 Regional Directors o f Fisheries and Oceans Canada and 3 Regional Directors for the Coast Guard simply due to the manner by which regional administrative boundaries o f each department have been established. Equally, jurisdictions vary among and within departments depending upon the statute to be enforced, adding yet another level o f complexity. A single department may have jurisdiction only out to 24 nautical miles for oneThe C E N TR E fo r F O R E IG N P O L IC h 'STUDIES - 2003S19Appendix SPUBLISHED ARTICLES Continental Security and Canada — U.S. Relations 154statute, while the same department can legally enforce a different statute, or element o f the same statute out to the lim it o f the 200 nautical mile EEZ.Arguably, the most significant impediment to interdepartmental cooperation is the historic evolution from departmental cultures bred o f narrow mandates. These mandates are premised on the enforcement o f a single federal statute, or the delivery o f an equally constrained number o f programmes. Departments with this type o f organisational culture approach complexFigure 3: Composite diagram of interdepartmental cooperation in Atlantic Canada.Proactive Activities Reactive A ctiv itiesStrategic LevelPSAT ASIWGIMSWGTInformal liaison OperationalResponseContingencyOperationIBETMOU PatrolsTAG Operational LevelECIMOC RICMOESSIM ACZISC ICONSFC S c f"> ExercisesInformal liaison Emergent CrisisOperationalResponseInformal liaisonSL Seaway VSC Tactical Levelscenarios from their own limited viewpoint, and tend not to look beyond their own needs until forced to do so by extenuating circumstance. Employee unions have some impact on these cultures, but their attitude towards cooperation varies from union to union. The proactive committee work and exercises attempt to educate federal staffs in prioritisation based on the requirements o f particular scenarios rather than simply the specific aspects that affect their departments, but it is often an uphill battle. Continuous budget cutbacks over a prolonged period have made public sector managers more focused on cost avoidance rather than mission accomplishment. This is the culture o f the business plan. The managers that have succeeded in the past are those that have managed declining budgets well, and they have been rewarded for it. There is a different mind-set in that type o f manager than in the type needed for tackling complex situations with a multitude o f agencies.The C E N T R E fo r F O R E IG N P O U C Y S T U D IE S - 2003S20Appendix S155 h oration>Although there has been significant progress since Sept 11th, there remains systemic reticence to share information, as opposed to intelligence, among departments. To be fair, in some cases there are legal and privacy issues, but in many others it is simply a matter o f defaulting to the safe position o f withholding information. Returning to my point about a ‘business case mentality,’ cost recovery continues for information, sometimes within the same department. Remarkably, in almost all federal departments there is both mistrust and poor communication between a department’s regional office and its headquarters. It is a common occurrence in the Atlantic region that departmental staffs learn o f strategic-level initiatives not through their own departments, but rather through attendance at a multi-agency working groups and hearing about it from other departments.Although the working group and committee structure certainly fosters closer working relations between departments, its main weakness is that virtually none o f the bodies has executive authority to hold accountable any department or representative who fails to follow through w ith an agreed-upon initiative. It is incumbent upon a department to complete a task for which it has volunteered; there is no real penalty for not holding up one’ s end o f the bargain. This explains why some initiatives seem to drag on for years before coming to fruition, particularly i f the individual championing the issue is transferred elsewhere.C onclusionInterdepartmental cooperation is alive in the Atlantic region, employing official working groups and committees as its framework. Through this structure, frequent multi-agency exercises have been conducted that have begun the long-term education process o f staffs at all levels. Although in itia lly premised on emergent disaster relief situations, the relationships cultivated through informal and formal initiatives have enabled departments to deal with maritime security issues with greater confidence and ability. However, because executive authority has not been bestowed on any one body, interdepartmental relationships require continual nurturing, lest they wither and fall into disuse during periods when departmental bureaucracies turn their attention to internal problems, as was the fate o f IPCRC.The interdepartmental cooperation described in this paper exists despite the lack o f Government o f Canada strategic security and surveillance policies. This policy vacuum set in motion the evolution o f this ad hoc structure. It works adequately, in my view, due in large part to the professionalism and influence o f a small number o f individuals in key departments, and their genuine desire to do what is right for Atlantic Canadians despite limitations imposed by various bureaucracies. However, there are better ways ‘to do business,’ although some may require wholesale shifts o f mindset in governance and accountability; at least i f the findings o f SCONSAD are any example.9 We can only hope that the same collaborative spirit manifests itse lf nation-wide as these new constructs are examined and potentially adopted.The C E N T R E fo r F O R E IG N P O IJ C 1 ' S T U D IE S - 2003S21Appendix SPUBLISHED ARTICLES r vSccioity at'O C anada i . v delations I DoEndnotes1. This paper draws heavily on background material written in support o f the author’s appearance before SCONSAD. The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance o f Lieutenant-Commander Ian Anderson and Lieutenant (N) Rory Rafuse in the preparation o f this material.2. Canada, Royal Canadian Mounted Police. National Counter-Terrorism Plan. Annex L.3. Canada, Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence. Canada’s Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World. October 2003, p. 17.4. Captain (N) Peter Avis, '‘Surveillance and Canadian Maritime Domestic Security,” Canadian M ilita ry Journal Vol. 4, # 1 (Spring 2003): pp. 9-14.5. Colonel Norris Pettis, Chairman, “ Minutes o f Arctic Security Interdepartmental Working Group Meeting 18-19 November 2002” (Yellowknife: December, 2002).6. Canada, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, “ Canada / U.S. Integrated Border Enforcement Teams” (accessed 31 October 2003).7. Jim Bruce, Exercise Atlantic Guard Final Report (Halifax: Science Applications International Corporation Canada, Emergency and Safety Services Division, 2002).8. Testimony o f Chief Superintendent Ian Atkins, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, before the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Issue 22 - Evidence 22 September 2003 (accessed 30 October 2003)9. SCONSAD has recommended a complete restructuring o f the Canadian Coast Guard as an Agency, and the formalising o f strategic direction by the permanent appointment o f a Deputy Prime Minister, with the establishment o f a permanent Secretariat for national security issues within the Privy Council Office. See Canada, Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence. Canada's Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World. October, 2003, 85-93 and 125-133.The C E N T R E fo r F O R E IG N P O L IC Y S T U D IE S - 2003S22

Canadian Naval Intelligence

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Canadian Naval Intelligence

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