Often, fixed-line incumbents also own the largest mobile network. We consider the effect of this joint ownership on market outcomes. Our model predicts that while fixed-to-mobile call prices to the integrated mobile network are more efficient than under separation, those to rival mobile networks are distorted upwards, amplifying any incumbency advantage. As concerns potential remedies, a uniform off-net pricing constraint leads to higher welfare than functional separation and even allows to maintain some of the efficiency gains.Grant PTDC/EGEECO/100696/2008 of the Ministry of Science and Technolog
This paper presents results from a calibrated welfare model of the UK mobile telephony market which ...
We present a calibrated model of the UK mobile telephony market with four mobile networks; calls to ...
This paper questions whether competition can replace sector-specific regulation of mobile telecommun...
Often, fixed-line incumbents also own the largest mobile network. We consider the effect of this joi...
Fixed-line incumbents often also own the largest mobile network. We consider the effect of this join...
Published online: 29 August 2013Fixed-line incumbents often also own the largest mobile network. We ...
We model competition between two unregulated mobile phone companies with price–elastic demand and le...
This paper considers the rapidly developing fixed-mobile convergence (FMC) service as a two-sided ma...
This paper examines the influence of mobile network competition on the prices of fixed-to-mobile cal...
This paper surveys the recent literature on competition between mobile networks in the pres-ence of ...
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to show that fixed-mobile convergence (FMC) has gathered much...
This paper analyses the competition between interconnected mobile phone networks, under the assumpti...
We develop a model of competition in prices and infrastructural investment among mobile network prov...
We present a calibrated model of the UK mobile telephony market with four mobile networks; calls to...
We analyze a model of multi firm competition between mobile network operators. The model assumes ine...
This paper presents results from a calibrated welfare model of the UK mobile telephony market which ...
We present a calibrated model of the UK mobile telephony market with four mobile networks; calls to ...
This paper questions whether competition can replace sector-specific regulation of mobile telecommun...
Often, fixed-line incumbents also own the largest mobile network. We consider the effect of this joi...
Fixed-line incumbents often also own the largest mobile network. We consider the effect of this join...
Published online: 29 August 2013Fixed-line incumbents often also own the largest mobile network. We ...
We model competition between two unregulated mobile phone companies with price–elastic demand and le...
This paper considers the rapidly developing fixed-mobile convergence (FMC) service as a two-sided ma...
This paper examines the influence of mobile network competition on the prices of fixed-to-mobile cal...
This paper surveys the recent literature on competition between mobile networks in the pres-ence of ...
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to show that fixed-mobile convergence (FMC) has gathered much...
This paper analyses the competition between interconnected mobile phone networks, under the assumpti...
We develop a model of competition in prices and infrastructural investment among mobile network prov...
We present a calibrated model of the UK mobile telephony market with four mobile networks; calls to...
We analyze a model of multi firm competition between mobile network operators. The model assumes ine...
This paper presents results from a calibrated welfare model of the UK mobile telephony market which ...
We present a calibrated model of the UK mobile telephony market with four mobile networks; calls to ...
This paper questions whether competition can replace sector-specific regulation of mobile telecommun...