This paper analyzes the problem of designing mechanisms to implement efficient solutions in economies with externalities. We provide two simple mechanisms implementing the Pigouvian Social Choice Correspondence in environments in which coalitions can or cannot be formed.Publicad
This thesis consists of five papers. Paper [1] analyzes one possible way of replacing dynamic Pigouv...
We show that in almost every economy with separable externalities, every competitive equilibrium can...
We show that in almost every economy with separable externalities, every competitive equilibrium can...
This paper analyzes the problem of designing mechanisms to implement efficient solutions in economie...
This paper analyzes the problem of designing mechanisms to implement efficient solutions in economie...
This paper analyzes the problem of designing mechanisms to implement efficient solutions in economie...
This paper analyzes the problem of designing mechanisms to implement efficient solutions in economie...
This papers analyzzes the problem of designing mechanisms to implement efficient solutiions in econo...
This papers analyzzes the problem of designing mechanisms to implement efficient solutiions in econo...
This papers analyzzes the problem of designing mechanisms to implement efficient solutiions in econo...
This papers analyzzes the problem of designing mechanisms to implement efficient solutiions in econo...
This paper considers the problem of incentive mechanism design that results in e±cient allocations f...
This paper considers the problem of incentive mechanism design that results in efficient allo-cation...
We show that in almost every economy with separable externalities, every competitive equilibrium can...
We show that in almost every economy with separable externalities, every competitive equilibrium can...
This thesis consists of five papers. Paper [1] analyzes one possible way of replacing dynamic Pigouv...
We show that in almost every economy with separable externalities, every competitive equilibrium can...
We show that in almost every economy with separable externalities, every competitive equilibrium can...
This paper analyzes the problem of designing mechanisms to implement efficient solutions in economie...
This paper analyzes the problem of designing mechanisms to implement efficient solutions in economie...
This paper analyzes the problem of designing mechanisms to implement efficient solutions in economie...
This paper analyzes the problem of designing mechanisms to implement efficient solutions in economie...
This papers analyzzes the problem of designing mechanisms to implement efficient solutiions in econo...
This papers analyzzes the problem of designing mechanisms to implement efficient solutiions in econo...
This papers analyzzes the problem of designing mechanisms to implement efficient solutiions in econo...
This papers analyzzes the problem of designing mechanisms to implement efficient solutiions in econo...
This paper considers the problem of incentive mechanism design that results in e±cient allocations f...
This paper considers the problem of incentive mechanism design that results in efficient allo-cation...
We show that in almost every economy with separable externalities, every competitive equilibrium can...
We show that in almost every economy with separable externalities, every competitive equilibrium can...
This thesis consists of five papers. Paper [1] analyzes one possible way of replacing dynamic Pigouv...
We show that in almost every economy with separable externalities, every competitive equilibrium can...
We show that in almost every economy with separable externalities, every competitive equilibrium can...
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