The Impact of Interference on GNSS Receiver Observables – A Running Digital Sum Based Simple Jammer Detector

A GNSS-based navigation system relies on externally received information via a space-based Radio Frequency (RF) link. This poses susceptibility to RF Interference (RFI) and may initiate failure states ranging from degraded navigation accuracy to a complete signal loss condition. To guarantee the integrity of the received GNSS signal, the receiver should either be able to function in the presence of RFI without generating misleading information (i.e., offering a navigation solution within an accuracy limit), or the receiver must detect RFI so that some other means could be used as a countermeasure in order to ensure robust and accurate navigation. Therefore, it is of utmost importance to identify an interference occurrence and not to confuse it with other signal conditions, for example, indoor or deep urban canyon, both of which have somewhat similar impact on the navigation performance. Hence, in this paper, the objective is to investigate the effect of interference on different GNSS receiver observables in two different environments: i. an interference scenario with an inexpensive car jammer, and ii. an outdoor-indoor scenario without any intentional interference. The investigated observables include the Automatic Gain Control (AGC) measurements, the digitized IF (Intermediate Frequency) signal levels, the Delay Locked Loop and the Phase Locked Loop discriminator variances, and the Carrier-to-noise density ratio (C/N0) measurements. The behavioral pattern of these receiver observables is perceived in these two different scenarios in order to comprehend which of those observables would be able to separate an interference situation from an indoor scenario, since in both the cases, the resulting positioning accuracy and/or availability are affected somewhat similarly. A new Running Digital Sum (RDS) -based interference detection method is also proposed herein that can be used as an alternate to AGC-based interference detection. It is shown in this paper that it is not at all wise to consider certain receiver observables for interference detection (i.e., C/N0); rather it is beneficial to utilize certain specific observables, such as the RDS of raw digitized signal levels or the AGC-based observables that can uniquely identify a critical malicious interference occurrence