Although there exist learning processes for which the empirical distribution of play comes close to Nash equilibrium it is an open question whether the players themselves can learn to play equilibrium strategies without assuming that they have prior knowledge of their opponents' strategies and/or payoffs We exhibit a large class of statistical hypotheses testing procedures that solve this problem Consider a finite stage game G that is repeated infinitely often At each time the players have hypotheses about their opponents' repeated game strategies They frequently test their hypotheses against the opponents' recent actions When a hypotheses fails test a new one is adopted Play is almost rational in the sense that at each point of time the pl...
We investigate games whose Nash equilibria are mixed and are unstable under fictitious play-like lea...
This paper investigates simultaneous learning about both nature and others' actions in repeated game...
The present study would like to show - among other things - in the spirit of Hyndman, Terracol and V...
Consider a finite stage game G that is repeated infinitely often. At each time, the players have hyp...
Consider a finite stage game G that is repeated infinitely often. At each time, the players have hyp...
Although there exist rules that converge to Nash equilibrium for special classes of games (like fict...
While the cardinal role of game theory in economic analysis is no longer challenged, a fundamental q...
Experimental games typically involve subjects playing the same game a number of times. In the absenc...
This paper provides a genera1 framework to analyze rational learning in strategic situations where t...
Experimental games typically involve subjects playing the same game a number of times. In the absenc...
We report on an experiment designed to evaluate the empirical implications of Jordan’s model of Baye...
The authors examine learning in all experiments they could locate involving one hundred periods or m...
We report on an experiment designed to evaluate the empirical implications of Jordan’s model of Baye...
This paper extends the convergence result in Kalai and Lehrer (1993a, 1993b) to a class of games whe...
This paper presents a new, probabilistic model of learning in games which investigates the often sta...
We investigate games whose Nash equilibria are mixed and are unstable under fictitious play-like lea...
This paper investigates simultaneous learning about both nature and others' actions in repeated game...
The present study would like to show - among other things - in the spirit of Hyndman, Terracol and V...
Consider a finite stage game G that is repeated infinitely often. At each time, the players have hyp...
Consider a finite stage game G that is repeated infinitely often. At each time, the players have hyp...
Although there exist rules that converge to Nash equilibrium for special classes of games (like fict...
While the cardinal role of game theory in economic analysis is no longer challenged, a fundamental q...
Experimental games typically involve subjects playing the same game a number of times. In the absenc...
This paper provides a genera1 framework to analyze rational learning in strategic situations where t...
Experimental games typically involve subjects playing the same game a number of times. In the absenc...
We report on an experiment designed to evaluate the empirical implications of Jordan’s model of Baye...
The authors examine learning in all experiments they could locate involving one hundred periods or m...
We report on an experiment designed to evaluate the empirical implications of Jordan’s model of Baye...
This paper extends the convergence result in Kalai and Lehrer (1993a, 1993b) to a class of games whe...
This paper presents a new, probabilistic model of learning in games which investigates the often sta...
We investigate games whose Nash equilibria are mixed and are unstable under fictitious play-like lea...
This paper investigates simultaneous learning about both nature and others' actions in repeated game...
The present study would like to show - among other things - in the spirit of Hyndman, Terracol and V...