Enforcing corruption laws: the political economy of subnational prosecutions in Indonesia

This thesis focuses on subnational corruption law enforcement in a new democracy: Indonesia. It seeks to understand temporal and spatial variation in corruption prosecutions in the post-Suharto era, and answer three core research questions: Why has the number of corruption cases steadily increased over the past twenty years? Why is there significant subnational variation in the investigation and prosecution of corruption? And why are some cases of local corruption investigated and prosecuted while others are ignored? The argument developed in the thesis consists of three inter-linked components: that corruption generates complex collective action problems for law enforcement; that ostensibly public law enforcement regimes in Indonesia are informally privatised public law enforcement regimes; and that, in the context of these hybrid regimes, the availability of resources and the formation of coalitions is critical to understanding when individuals and groups mobilise corruption laws at the subnational level. The project uses a mixed methods research strategy—combining qualitative case studies, formal game theoretic modelling, and quantitative regression analysis—to develop and provide evidence for the argument. The research strategy required twelve months of fieldwork in Indonesia. In total over one hundred interviews in Jakarta and Central Java were conducted, and a unique dataset of local corruption cases was coded for two additional provinces. The thesis's argument and methodological approach has implications for literature that spans the field of law and politics: the political economy of prosecution, theories of legal mobilisation, socio-legal studies, and studies of politics and power in contemporary Indonesia.This thesis is not currently available via ORA