What is the problem of change, what is the adverbial solution and what are the metaphysical implications of this solution?

This thesis in concerned with the problem of change, and in particular the adverbialist solution to the problem. In the first chapter, we look at the problem in detail. We look at three important formulations of the problem that come from Lewis, Johnston and Haslanger. These three formulations have their difficulties and, in particular, struggle to capture the metaphysical worry that change brings. We then present a formulation of our own, which exploits Lowe’s distinction between the semantic and metaphysical versions of the problem of change. In the semantic case, the problem relies on the principle of non-contradiction. In the metaphysical case, it relies on the indiscernibility of identicals. We then briefly explain the four main solutions and how they solve the problem. These solutions are presentism, temporal parts, relational properties and adverbialism. In the second chapter, we focus on the last of these solutions. Beginning by looking at adverbs in general, we give a condition for a solution to be adverbial. In the semantic case, a solution is adverbial if and only if it considers the temporal element in sentences to modify some other part or parts of the sentence. In the metaphysical case, a solution is adverbial if and only if time governs the relationship between objects and properties. We apply these conditions to Johnston's 'adverbialism', under two different interpretations, and discover it fails. Then we search for a strictly adverbial solution. Looking at Lowe, Forbes and two of Haslanger's articles, we discover a solution that is really adverbial. This solution, known as 'State of 'Fairs'ism (SOFism) maintains that statements are Austinian and say of a historical situation that it belongs to a type of situation. Time is part of the context of the statement that picks out a specific historical situation and it governs the obtaining of a type of situation. We then briefly show how this solves the problems of change. The third chapter looks at criticisms of adverbialism. In a number of places the criticism is aimed at a version of adverbialism that we ruled was not adverbial. But we consider the extent to which these criticisms apply to our version. We look at the criticisms of Lewis, Lombard, MacBride, Merricks and Rodriguez-Pereyra. We then examine a further worry that sentences containing adverbs entail sentences with the adverbial reference removed. That is, if A Fs gly, then A Fs. Allowing this adverbial entailment would ruin the adverbial solution. The reply to this is that different types of adverb need to be distinguished, and temporal adverbs do not allow this entailment. Our final chapter examines the commitments of adverbialism. The other solutions have clear commitments, but those of adverbialism are less obvious. Using the SOFist picture, we distinguish several commitments. In the first place, we are committed to the 'Austinian' view of statements and propositions. The adverbialist also has substantial ontological commitment to states of affairs, in particular to types and tokens of states of affairs and their relationship. We look at what token states of affairs might be and what types of states of affairs might be. The relationship between the two suggests that we should either be compositionalists about both or non-compositionalists about both. Each of these positions has significant issues. We also note the consequences this has for our notions of instantiation and change. We conclude that the adverbialist account has substantial commitments.