International crimes prosecution case selection: the ICC, ICTR, and SCSL

International crimes prosecutions have become more common since 1993, both domestically and at international courts and tribunals. The advance of this norm confronts realist state interests causing debate about the norm’s status. Kathryn Sikkink views a norm as cascading when enough states adopt it to cause international influence, without domestic pressure, to procure levels of conformity. This thesis considers the degree of conformity by observing the level of case selection independence to determine whether this norm is cascading. By identifying the jurisdictional and functional elements of case selection independence, I develop a framework for observing the interface between politics and law. While Sikkink errs towards the quantity of international crimes prosecutions, I focus on the quality. This project examines case selection independence at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the International Criminal Court, in Uganda. The project considers whether case selection has become more or less independent at these courts – whether the norm of international crimes prosecution has cascaded or contracted. In observing the various case selection independence elements I attempt to explain the observed cascades and contractions at each court. I then consider whether a cascade or contraction occurred during the period of the courts’ collective design and function. The research qualitatively observes a cumulative justice contraction. The research observes a combination of factors affecting case selection independence, including shifts in power dynamics between and among weak and powerful states, increasing state sophistication in international court engagement, a shift in jurisdiction triggering actors and forums, and realist state co-option of norm entrepreneurs via endearing explanation of independence- diminishing policies.