An appeal to principle: a theory of appeals and review of migration status decision-making in the United Kingdom

The question asked by this thesis is when and why, as a matter of principle, should there be judicial scrutiny on the merits of administrative decisions on migration status (âmigration status decisionsâ) in the United Kingdom? It argues that this is a moral question, engaging concerns of fair treatment. The first two chapters examine the question theoretically. It is argued that access to justice is not a gift of citizenship and that migration status decision-making should be reviewable on the merits to avoid the appearance and/or occurrence of injustice in the light of the effects of migration control on individual migrants and the nature of migration status decision-making as âvery imperfect procedural justiceâ (save where a decision is not based on the judgment discretion of an administrator). The latter five chapters apply the normative claims to the United Kingdom constitutional context, including the relevant European regimes (European Convention on Fundamental Rights and European Union). First, as background to the argument, a history of recourse from migration status decision-making in the UK from the initial establishment of a review system in 1905 is sketched out. The history demonstrates the absence of a coherent or principled account of migration status appeals. The history is followed by a three-part critique of the current system of recourse in the UK. First rights of appeal in three case studies (deportation, offshore visitors and students) are examined. Secondly, the three standards of review available under judicial review (rationality, anxious scrutiny and proportionality) are critiqued, and thirdly, the contribution of European and international norms is considered. In general terms the thesis concludes that the current UK system of recourse is deficient in certain respects and suggests reform to the current appeals system