Ideology and war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1992-95

This thesis relies on evidence from the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia to argue that systematic ethnic violence occurred during the 1992-95 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina because of the implementation of extreme ideological visions promoted by top political leaders. The first section demonstrates how Serb and Croat nationalist politicians in Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia determined to create expanded monoethnic states as Yugoslavia collapsed in 1991-92. The second section illustrates how institutions dominated by Serbian President Slobodan Milošević and the Croatian government led by Franjo TuÄman sponsored the military campaigns conducted by Bosnian Serb and Croat forces, which attempted to realise the visions imagined in 1991-92. The final section reveals how in 1994-95, leaders from Croatia and Serbia shifted their short term strategies towards Bosnia for pragmatic reasons, and while the Croatian leadership succeeded in forcing Bosnian Croat nationalists to abate their separatist campaign, Milošević's efforts to pacify the Bosnian Serb leadership failed and Radovan Karadžić's regime continued to pursue its state-building programme until its defeat in summer 1995. Although both Milošević and Tuđman yielded their pre-war ambitions in the face of battlefield outcomes and international pressure, this thesis argues that both leaders regarded the peace agreements they signed as temporary compromises on their long-term ambitions. The words of top political decision-makers reveal the ideas and reasoning that inspired programmes to homogenise multi-ethnic Bosnia and divide it between Serbia and Croatia.