We consider the notion of Pareto optimality under the assumption that only the pairwise majority relation is known and show that the set of necessarily Pareto optimal alternatives coincides with the McKelvey uncovered set. As a consequence, the McKelvey uncovered set constitutes the coarsest Pareto optimal majoritarian social choice function. Moreover, every majority relation is induced by a preference profile in which the uncovered alternatives precisely coincide with the Pareto optimal ones. We furthermore discuss the structure of the McKelvey covering relation and the McKelvey uncovered se
We consider a setting where a coalition of individuals chooses one or several alternatives from each...
We introduce two new majoritarian social choice correspondences. We initially assign to every altern...
The set of alternatives is infinite. If social welfare function f satisfies the Pareto criterion and...
We consider the notion of Pareto optimality under the assumption that only the pairwise majority rel...
Abstract We consider the notion of Pareto optimality under the assumption that only the pairwise maj...
Can an axiomatic justification be given for the requirement that society picks all and only Pareto o...
Preferences of a set of n individuals over a set of alternatives can be represented by a preference ...
An extension of Condorcet's paradox by McGarvey (1953) asserts that for every asymmetric relation R ...
It is shown that the Majoritarian Compromise of Sertel (1986) is subgame-perfect implementable on th...
This paper shows that different institutional structures for aggregation of preferences under majori...
The set of alternatives is infinite. If social welfare function f satisfies the Pareto criterion and...
International audienceWe show that a majoritarian relation is, among all conceivable binary relation...
We introduce two new majoritarian social choice correspondences. We initially assign to every altern...
Selecting a set of alternatives based on the preferences of agents is an important problem in commit...
This paper studies the Pareto optimality properties of policy proposals that are made by k (k≧2) str...
We consider a setting where a coalition of individuals chooses one or several alternatives from each...
We introduce two new majoritarian social choice correspondences. We initially assign to every altern...
The set of alternatives is infinite. If social welfare function f satisfies the Pareto criterion and...
We consider the notion of Pareto optimality under the assumption that only the pairwise majority rel...
Abstract We consider the notion of Pareto optimality under the assumption that only the pairwise maj...
Can an axiomatic justification be given for the requirement that society picks all and only Pareto o...
Preferences of a set of n individuals over a set of alternatives can be represented by a preference ...
An extension of Condorcet's paradox by McGarvey (1953) asserts that for every asymmetric relation R ...
It is shown that the Majoritarian Compromise of Sertel (1986) is subgame-perfect implementable on th...
This paper shows that different institutional structures for aggregation of preferences under majori...
The set of alternatives is infinite. If social welfare function f satisfies the Pareto criterion and...
International audienceWe show that a majoritarian relation is, among all conceivable binary relation...
We introduce two new majoritarian social choice correspondences. We initially assign to every altern...
Selecting a set of alternatives based on the preferences of agents is an important problem in commit...
This paper studies the Pareto optimality properties of policy proposals that are made by k (k≧2) str...
We consider a setting where a coalition of individuals chooses one or several alternatives from each...
We introduce two new majoritarian social choice correspondences. We initially assign to every altern...
The set of alternatives is infinite. If social welfare function f satisfies the Pareto criterion and...