We apply duration analysis to model the tenure and mode of exit of CEOs from FTSE 350 companies from 1996–2005, a decade in which corporate governance reforms have sought to increase the accountability of the CEO to shareholders and their representatives on the board. We find a greater likelihood of dismissal in the latter part of the period. However, we also find that the likelihood of forced departure sharply decreases from the fifth year of a CEO's tenure. We find evidence that this is because CEOs who survive beyond year four are able to entrench themselves in their position
Long CEO tenure can harm firm performance even after the CEO is replaced. We analyze this issue by c...
This paper develops a theory to study the political economy of CEO longevity by examining how agreem...
Forced CEO exit has received limited attention as a unique form of CEO succession. Empirical work ra...
This paper shows that CEOs are fired after bad firm performance caused by factors beyond their contr...
This paper shows that CEOs are fired after bad firm performance caused by factors beyond their contr...
The decision a Board of Directors (a board) makes to dismiss or retain its CEO is one of extreme imp...
This thesis is structured around four empirical chapters examining related issues in corporate gover...
The decision a Board of Directors (a board) makes to dismiss or retain its CEO is one of extreme imp...
The decision a Board of Directors (a board) makes to dismiss or retain its CEO is one of extreme imp...
We examine CEOs' risk of termination, its determinants and its effect on firm value. Using survival ...
We study how corporate governance affects firm value through the decision of whether to fire or reta...
The present research analyses the determinants and the implications of senior management departures ...
While much has been written on the subject of CEO succession, most of this research has focused eith...
This paper provides a cross-country analysis to determine whether CEO turnover is a credible discipl...
This paper provides a cross-country analysis to determine whether CEO turnover is a credible discipl...
Long CEO tenure can harm firm performance even after the CEO is replaced. We analyze this issue by c...
This paper develops a theory to study the political economy of CEO longevity by examining how agreem...
Forced CEO exit has received limited attention as a unique form of CEO succession. Empirical work ra...
This paper shows that CEOs are fired after bad firm performance caused by factors beyond their contr...
This paper shows that CEOs are fired after bad firm performance caused by factors beyond their contr...
The decision a Board of Directors (a board) makes to dismiss or retain its CEO is one of extreme imp...
This thesis is structured around four empirical chapters examining related issues in corporate gover...
The decision a Board of Directors (a board) makes to dismiss or retain its CEO is one of extreme imp...
The decision a Board of Directors (a board) makes to dismiss or retain its CEO is one of extreme imp...
We examine CEOs' risk of termination, its determinants and its effect on firm value. Using survival ...
We study how corporate governance affects firm value through the decision of whether to fire or reta...
The present research analyses the determinants and the implications of senior management departures ...
While much has been written on the subject of CEO succession, most of this research has focused eith...
This paper provides a cross-country analysis to determine whether CEO turnover is a credible discipl...
This paper provides a cross-country analysis to determine whether CEO turnover is a credible discipl...
Long CEO tenure can harm firm performance even after the CEO is replaced. We analyze this issue by c...
This paper develops a theory to study the political economy of CEO longevity by examining how agreem...
Forced CEO exit has received limited attention as a unique form of CEO succession. Empirical work ra...