This paper reviews a recent literature that extends the Rubinstein/Stahl bargaining model to the case of contract bargaining. Theoretical issues, such as the appropriate game form, existence, and uniqueness of equilibria, are discussed. The paper finishes with a brief overview of some applications of the framework
I give necessary and sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of the equilibrium in a wide class of ...
We extend the Stahl-Rubinstein alternating-offer bargaining procedure to allow players to simultaneo...
Abstract. This paper analyzes a normal form game in which players write contracts that condition the...
This paper reviews a recent literature that extends the Rubinstein/Stahl bargaining model to the ...
Negotiation is a pervasive feature of social exchange. Bargaining theory and the related models exa...
The purpose of the thesis is to present some theoretical studies on bargaining situations. The thesi...
Trockel W. A Walrasian approach to bargaining games. ECONOMICS LETTERS. 1996;51(3):295-301.The paper...
This paper extends the bargaining and matching literature such as Rubinstein (1985) and Gale (1986 a...
This paper presents a new extension of the rubinstein-ståhl bargaining model to the case with n play...
We first analyze a pure bargaining problem where n players can split a pie on a unanimous agreement....
Abstract This paper presents a new extension of the Rubinstein-Ståhl bargaining model to the case wi...
Ariel Rubinstein proved a perfect equilibrium partition exists in a bargaining model. His results co...
Abstract. Bargaining is one of the most common negotiation situation. Agents must reach an agreement...
The uniqueness of equilibrium in bargaining games with three or more players is a problem preventing...
This paper shows that the Rubinstein alternating offers model can be modified to provide a Pareto su...
I give necessary and sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of the equilibrium in a wide class of ...
We extend the Stahl-Rubinstein alternating-offer bargaining procedure to allow players to simultaneo...
Abstract. This paper analyzes a normal form game in which players write contracts that condition the...
This paper reviews a recent literature that extends the Rubinstein/Stahl bargaining model to the ...
Negotiation is a pervasive feature of social exchange. Bargaining theory and the related models exa...
The purpose of the thesis is to present some theoretical studies on bargaining situations. The thesi...
Trockel W. A Walrasian approach to bargaining games. ECONOMICS LETTERS. 1996;51(3):295-301.The paper...
This paper extends the bargaining and matching literature such as Rubinstein (1985) and Gale (1986 a...
This paper presents a new extension of the rubinstein-ståhl bargaining model to the case with n play...
We first analyze a pure bargaining problem where n players can split a pie on a unanimous agreement....
Abstract This paper presents a new extension of the Rubinstein-Ståhl bargaining model to the case wi...
Ariel Rubinstein proved a perfect equilibrium partition exists in a bargaining model. His results co...
Abstract. Bargaining is one of the most common negotiation situation. Agents must reach an agreement...
The uniqueness of equilibrium in bargaining games with three or more players is a problem preventing...
This paper shows that the Rubinstein alternating offers model can be modified to provide a Pareto su...
I give necessary and sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of the equilibrium in a wide class of ...
We extend the Stahl-Rubinstein alternating-offer bargaining procedure to allow players to simultaneo...
Abstract. This paper analyzes a normal form game in which players write contracts that condition the...
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