Strands in the theory of meaning from Frege to Wittgenstein

Chapter 1. Wittgenstein's conception of Philosophy I begin by comparing Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy to Russell's, noting that they held different views of philo- sophy in relation to natural science. Wittgenstein's method of examples' is compared with the Socratic method. Might philosophy be different from what it in fact is? Wittgenstein was a philosopher of language; the theory of meaning as fundamental. Examples given of the Private Lan- guage Argument and the philosophy of mathematics. Recapitu- lation. Appendix 1. Translation of 'Ober Dogmatistnus' from Wittgenstein und der Wiener Xreis. (pp 182 - 184) Appendix 2. Translation of a chapter of the Big Typescript on the nature of philosophy (pp 406 - 435). Corresponding passages noted. Chapter 2 . Preliminary considerations in the Tractatus A sketch of the genesis of the Tractatus, showing that Wittgenstein placed great emphasis on the doctrine of showing and saying. Tractatus concerned with a perfect language? No, but with the conditions for any language. 'Ordinary' and 'logical' propositions in the Moore notes were not explained adequately. The possibility of 'semantic ascent' in relation to the doc- trine of saying and showing. Sketch of the picture theory. Explanation of the difference between 'abbilden', 'darstellen' and 'vertreten'. Discussion of isomorphism and the relation between language and ontology. Example taken of relation"of Names and Objects. Structure and form. Comparison with Frege, and Frege's problems with 'the concept horse'. Waismann's criticism of Frege's use of Bedeutung repudiated. [continued in text ...]