The phenomenology of psychopathological embodiment a critique of Thomas Fuchs' concept of corporealization

In this article I offer a critical analysis and evaluation of Thomas Fuchs' concept of corporealization, as well as the Leib/ Korper distinction (i.e. the distinction between the lived and corporeal body) that it is founded upon. First, I show that the foundational concepts -- Leib and Körper -- are problematically heterogeneous, each including a diverse set of phenomena requiring further delineation and clarification. Second, I consider the historical origins of this heterogeneity and ambiguity within Fuchs' work. I show that Fuchs' Leib/Korper distinction, while owing more to Plessner than Merleau-Ponty, is to a great extent his own development. Third, I delineate five senses of the body, or of embodiment. These senses of the body are meant to (1) clarify the diverse phenomena included under Fuchs' label of corporealization and (2) offer examples of features of embodiment that challenge Fuchs' Leib/Korper polarity. Fourth, I argue that the concepts of Leib, Korper, and corporealization will need to be more rigorously defined before they can adequately illuminate the phenomena to which they are applied