McGarvey (1953) has shown that any irreflexive and anti-symmetric relation can be obtained as a relation induced by majority rule. We address the analogous issue for dominance relations of finite cooperative games with non-transferable utility (coalitional NTU games). We find any irreflexive relation over a finite set can be obtained as the dominance relation of some finite coalitional NTU game. We also show that any such dominance relation is induced by a non-cooperative game through β-effectivity. Dominance relations obtainable through α-effectivity, however, have to comply with a more restrictive condition, which we refer to as the edge-mapping property
A set of outcomes for a transferable utility game in characteristic function form is dominant if it ...
By a cooperative game in coalitional structure or shortly coalitional game we mean the standard coop...
We study the formation of a ruling coalition in political environments. Each individual is endowed w...
McGarvey (1953) has shown that any irreflexive and anti-symmetric relation can be obtained as a rela...
We characterize the set of agreements that the players of a non-cooperative game may reach when they...
In cooperative games, the coalition structure core is, despite its potential emptiness, one of the m...
In cooperative games, the coalition structure core is, despite its potential emptiness, one of the m...
We characterize the agreements that the players of a noncooperative game may reach when they can com...
LÁSZLO ́ Á.KÓCZY AND LUC LAUWERS Abstract. For each outcome (i.e. a payoff vector augmented with ...
Cooperative games with transferable utilities, or simply TU-games, refer to the situations where the...
AbstractIf a finite strategic game is strictly dominance solvable, then every simultaneous best resp...
A set of outcomes for a transferable utility game in characteristic function form is dominant if it ...
In this paper we provide a cooperative solution as well as a non-cooperative analysis to study coali...
For each (individually rational) payoff configuration of a tu-game with a non-empty coalition struct...
The concept of coalition proof Nash equilibrium was introduced by Bernheim et al. [5]. In the presen...
A set of outcomes for a transferable utility game in characteristic function form is dominant if it ...
By a cooperative game in coalitional structure or shortly coalitional game we mean the standard coop...
We study the formation of a ruling coalition in political environments. Each individual is endowed w...
McGarvey (1953) has shown that any irreflexive and anti-symmetric relation can be obtained as a rela...
We characterize the set of agreements that the players of a non-cooperative game may reach when they...
In cooperative games, the coalition structure core is, despite its potential emptiness, one of the m...
In cooperative games, the coalition structure core is, despite its potential emptiness, one of the m...
We characterize the agreements that the players of a noncooperative game may reach when they can com...
LÁSZLO ́ Á.KÓCZY AND LUC LAUWERS Abstract. For each outcome (i.e. a payoff vector augmented with ...
Cooperative games with transferable utilities, or simply TU-games, refer to the situations where the...
AbstractIf a finite strategic game is strictly dominance solvable, then every simultaneous best resp...
A set of outcomes for a transferable utility game in characteristic function form is dominant if it ...
In this paper we provide a cooperative solution as well as a non-cooperative analysis to study coali...
For each (individually rational) payoff configuration of a tu-game with a non-empty coalition struct...
The concept of coalition proof Nash equilibrium was introduced by Bernheim et al. [5]. In the presen...
A set of outcomes for a transferable utility game in characteristic function form is dominant if it ...
By a cooperative game in coalitional structure or shortly coalitional game we mean the standard coop...
We study the formation of a ruling coalition in political environments. Each individual is endowed w...