Add to ORKGMany philosophers believe that there is a fundamental distinction between knowing that something is the case and knowing how to do something. According to Gilbert Ryle, to whom the insight is credited, knowledge-how is an ability, which is in turn a complex of dispositions. Knowledge-that, on the other hand, is not an ability, or anything similar. Rather, knowledge-that is a relation between a thinker and a true proposition
This paper aims to shed light on an underexplored aspect of Gilbert Ryle’s interest in the notion of...
[T]he will is by nature active; cognitive phenomena, since they must bend to the condition of the wo...
How do people decide which claims should be considered mere beliefs and which count as kno...
Many philosophers believe that there is a fundamental distinction between knowing that something is ...
The purpose of this paper is to raise some questions about the idea, which was first made prominent ...
Contemporary discussions of knowledge how typically focus on the question whether or not knowing how...
Ryle's paper ‘Knowing How and Knowing That’ (1945), like chapter 2 of The Concept of Mind (1949), is...
I argue for an account of know‐how as a capacity for practical judgment—a view I derive from Gilbert...
The debate about the nature of knowledge-how is standardly thought to be divided between intellectua...
Since the 1940s, Western epistemology has discussed Gilbert Ryle’s distinction between knowledge-tha...
Is knowledge-how, or ''practical'' knowledge, a species of knowledge-that, or theoretical'' knowledg...
Stanley and Williamson reject Ryle's knowing-how/knowing-that distinction charging that it obstructs...
To appear in Philosophical Explorations March 2008I raise some doubts about the plausibility of Stan...
There are many kinds of knowledge. I may know that Paris is the capital of France, or know how to ba...
Orthodoxy has it that knowledge is bifurcated between di erent kinds of states and in particular th...
This paper aims to shed light on an underexplored aspect of Gilbert Ryle’s interest in the notion of...
[T]he will is by nature active; cognitive phenomena, since they must bend to the condition of the wo...
How do people decide which claims should be considered mere beliefs and which count as kno...
Many philosophers believe that there is a fundamental distinction between knowing that something is ...
The purpose of this paper is to raise some questions about the idea, which was first made prominent ...
Contemporary discussions of knowledge how typically focus on the question whether or not knowing how...
Ryle's paper ‘Knowing How and Knowing That’ (1945), like chapter 2 of The Concept of Mind (1949), is...
I argue for an account of know‐how as a capacity for practical judgment—a view I derive from Gilbert...
The debate about the nature of knowledge-how is standardly thought to be divided between intellectua...
Since the 1940s, Western epistemology has discussed Gilbert Ryle’s distinction between knowledge-tha...
Is knowledge-how, or ''practical'' knowledge, a species of knowledge-that, or theoretical'' knowledg...
Stanley and Williamson reject Ryle's knowing-how/knowing-that distinction charging that it obstructs...
To appear in Philosophical Explorations March 2008I raise some doubts about the plausibility of Stan...
There are many kinds of knowledge. I may know that Paris is the capital of France, or know how to ba...
Orthodoxy has it that knowledge is bifurcated between di erent kinds of states and in particular th...
This paper aims to shed light on an underexplored aspect of Gilbert Ryle’s interest in the notion of...
[T]he will is by nature active; cognitive phenomena, since they must bend to the condition of the wo...
How do people decide which claims should be considered mere beliefs and which count as kno...