CLIENT DEPENDENCY AND DONOR DEPENDENCY: AMERICAN ARMS TRANSFERS TO THE HORN OF AFRICA, 1953-1986 (ETHIOPIA, ASSISTANCE, SOMALIA, MILITARY)

The power (influence) relationship underlying interaction between arms suppliers and arms recipients has been evolving throughout the post-World War II era due to the rapid diffusion of military resources to Third World nations. Because supplier-recipient relations are at times marred by conflict one must consider under what conditions an arms supplier will be able to wield influence over, or resist the pressures of its client states, and vice versa.^ This dissertation will propose two models--client dependency and donor dependency--which challenge the traditional approach of viewing arms transfers as a mutual exchange free of conflict and involving minimal costs and maximum benefits for both supplier and recipient. These two models will be applied to eight decision points concerning military relations between the United States and the two principal antagonists in the Horn of Africa--Ethiopia and Somalia. Through the years the military connection between Washington and the governments of Ethiopia and Somalia has been based upon an exchange of arms for bases, wherein these client states have typically tried to raise the ante (or rent) on the United States. In order to be able to explain \u27who got what and at what price\u27 one must examine the external, internal, and structural constraints which promoted or inhibited each side\u27s freedom of action and in turn affected their relative bargaining strength.^ This study suggests that donor dependency may increase over time as foreign policymaking organizations develop institutional stakes in, and establish routine procedures and working assumptions for dealing with recipient states. The absence of high level global competition between superpowers or the presence of domestic conflict over policy toward a client government may decrease the degree of donor dependency. Client dependency may increase as a result of internal or regional conflict. It may be reinforced or undermined by changes in the financial terms by which arms are transferred, the number of weapons sources available to a client state, and the degree of political or ideological compatibility between the supplier and recipient governments.