In a two-market Bertrand duopoly,each of two firms chooses one of two markets and a price in that market. All four choices are made simultaneously. In a two-market Cournot duopoly, the firms choose quantities rather than prices.It is well known that in the one-market case the threat of price undercutting means that Bertrand equilibrium prices and profits will be lower and quantities higher than Cournot equilibrium prices, profits and quantities.We find a quite different consequence of price undercutting in two-market duopoly. In the two-market case the threat of price undercutting means that Bertrand equilibria are in continuous mixed strategies, while every Cournot duopoly has an equilibrium in pure strategies, or in strategies that are pu...
The paper provides the analysis of game theory models application to identify duopoly market equilib...
This paper compares Bertrand and Cournot equilibria in a differentiated duopoly with substitute good...
We propose both a monopoly and a duopoly model of a two-sided market. Both settings are fully compar...
In a two-market Bertrand duopoly,each of two firms chooses one of two markets and a price in that ma...
We investigate a differentiated mixed duopoly in which private and public firms can choose to strate...
This article analyzes the duality of prices and quantities in a differentiated duopoly. It is shown ...
Abstract. We study the relationship between Cournot equilibrium and Bertrand equilibrium in duopoly ...
We investigate a differentiated mixed duopoly in which private and public firms can choose to strate...
In this paper we extend the results of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) to mixedduopolies. We show that q...
We investigate a differentiated mixed duopoly in which private and public firms can choose to strate...
We extend the Bertrand duopolistic competition to include captives. These are consumers that have no...
We investigate the question of endogenous choice of price and quantity competition in a mixed duopol...
We investigate a differentiated mixed duopoly in which private and public firms can choose to strate...
This paper assesses the view that Bertrand equilibrium is intrinsically more competitive than Courno...
This paper investigates simultaneous move capacity constrained price competition game among three fi...
The paper provides the analysis of game theory models application to identify duopoly market equilib...
This paper compares Bertrand and Cournot equilibria in a differentiated duopoly with substitute good...
We propose both a monopoly and a duopoly model of a two-sided market. Both settings are fully compar...
In a two-market Bertrand duopoly,each of two firms chooses one of two markets and a price in that ma...
We investigate a differentiated mixed duopoly in which private and public firms can choose to strate...
This article analyzes the duality of prices and quantities in a differentiated duopoly. It is shown ...
Abstract. We study the relationship between Cournot equilibrium and Bertrand equilibrium in duopoly ...
We investigate a differentiated mixed duopoly in which private and public firms can choose to strate...
In this paper we extend the results of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) to mixedduopolies. We show that q...
We investigate a differentiated mixed duopoly in which private and public firms can choose to strate...
We extend the Bertrand duopolistic competition to include captives. These are consumers that have no...
We investigate the question of endogenous choice of price and quantity competition in a mixed duopol...
We investigate a differentiated mixed duopoly in which private and public firms can choose to strate...
This paper assesses the view that Bertrand equilibrium is intrinsically more competitive than Courno...
This paper investigates simultaneous move capacity constrained price competition game among three fi...
The paper provides the analysis of game theory models application to identify duopoly market equilib...
This paper compares Bertrand and Cournot equilibria in a differentiated duopoly with substitute good...
We propose both a monopoly and a duopoly model of a two-sided market. Both settings are fully compar...