In this paper I consider the ordinal equivalence of the Shapley and Banzhaf values for TU cooperative games, i.e., cooperative games for which the preorderings on the set of players induced by these two values coincide. To this end I consider several solution concepts within semivalues and introduce three subclasses of games which are called respectively: weakly complete, semicoherent and coherent cooperative games. A characterization theorem in terms of the ordinal equivalence of some semivalues is given for each of these three classes of cooperative games. In particular, the Shapley and Banzhaf values as well as the segment of semivalues they limit are ordinally equivalent for weakly complete, semicoherent and coherent cooperative...
The Shapley value, one of the most common solution concepts in Operations Research applications of c...
A partially dened cooperative game is a coalition function form game in which some of the coalitiona...
Two extensions of the Shapley value are given. First we consider a probabilistic framework in which ...
In this paper I consider the ordinal equivalence of the Shapley and Banzhaf values for TU cooperativ...
We present parallel characterizations of two different values in the framework of restricted coopera...
Tomiyama [Tomiyama, Y., 1987. Simple game, voting representation and ordinal power equivalence. Inte...
Abstract In this paper we analyze cooperative games whose characteristic function takes values in a ...
We focus on bicooperative games, a variation of the classic cooperative games and, in particular, on...
Motivated by a case of discrimination against some particular players happened in the real world, we...
The semivalues are solution concepts for cooperative games that assign to each player a weighted sum...
In this thesis we consider cooperative games with transferable utilities, which are also called TU ...
Semivalues like the Shapley value and the Banzhaf value may assign the same payoff vector to differe...
International audienceThis short study reports an application of the Shapley value axioms to a new c...
Arantza Estévez-Fernández for comments on a previous draft. Three well-known solutions for coopera...
Two extensions of the Shapley value are given. First we consider a probabilistic framework in which ...
The Shapley value, one of the most common solution concepts in Operations Research applications of c...
A partially dened cooperative game is a coalition function form game in which some of the coalitiona...
Two extensions of the Shapley value are given. First we consider a probabilistic framework in which ...
In this paper I consider the ordinal equivalence of the Shapley and Banzhaf values for TU cooperativ...
We present parallel characterizations of two different values in the framework of restricted coopera...
Tomiyama [Tomiyama, Y., 1987. Simple game, voting representation and ordinal power equivalence. Inte...
Abstract In this paper we analyze cooperative games whose characteristic function takes values in a ...
We focus on bicooperative games, a variation of the classic cooperative games and, in particular, on...
Motivated by a case of discrimination against some particular players happened in the real world, we...
The semivalues are solution concepts for cooperative games that assign to each player a weighted sum...
In this thesis we consider cooperative games with transferable utilities, which are also called TU ...
Semivalues like the Shapley value and the Banzhaf value may assign the same payoff vector to differe...
International audienceThis short study reports an application of the Shapley value axioms to a new c...
Arantza Estévez-Fernández for comments on a previous draft. Three well-known solutions for coopera...
Two extensions of the Shapley value are given. First we consider a probabilistic framework in which ...
The Shapley value, one of the most common solution concepts in Operations Research applications of c...
A partially dened cooperative game is a coalition function form game in which some of the coalitiona...
Two extensions of the Shapley value are given. First we consider a probabilistic framework in which ...