Add to ORKGIn this note we characterize optimal punishments with detection lags when the market consists of n oligopolistic firms. We extend a previous note by Colombo and Labrecciosa (2006) [Colombo, L., and Labrecciosa, P., 2006. Optimal punishments with detection lags. Economic Letters 92, 198-201] to show how in the presence of detection lags optimal punish- ments fail to restore cooperation also in markets with a low number of firms.Financial support from Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología (SEJ2006-06309), and Gobierno Vasco (IT-313-07) is gratefully acknowledged
International audienceIn this article we study collusive strategies and the optimal level of fines w...
We explore targeted punishment as an explanation for collusion among many firms. We run a series of ...
We explore targeted punishment as an explanation for collusion among many firms. We run a series of ...
In this paper we characterize optimal punishments with detection lags when the market consists of n ...
Collusion sustainability with optimal punishments and detection lags, with an application to a Courn...
In this paper we characterize optimal punishments with detection lags when the market consists of n ...
In this note we characterize optimal punishments with detection lags when the market consists of n o...
Collusion sustainability depends on firms' aptitude to impose suffciently severe punishments in case...
Optimal Collusion with Limited Severity Constraint Collusion sustainability depends on firms ’ aptit...
Collusion sustainability depends on firms’ aptitude to impose sufficiently severe punishments in cas...
In this article we study collusive strategies when firms face random demand fluctuations. This work ...
THESIS 8010This thesis is organized into four independent chapters. Chapter 1 is divided into two pa...
In an oligopoly supergame, firms' actions in prices and quantities are subject to non-negativity con...
Collusion under imperfect monitoring is explored when firms ’ prices are private information and the...
When firms can supply several separate markets, collusion can take two forms. Either firms establish...
International audienceIn this article we study collusive strategies and the optimal level of fines w...
We explore targeted punishment as an explanation for collusion among many firms. We run a series of ...
We explore targeted punishment as an explanation for collusion among many firms. We run a series of ...
In this paper we characterize optimal punishments with detection lags when the market consists of n ...
Collusion sustainability with optimal punishments and detection lags, with an application to a Courn...
In this paper we characterize optimal punishments with detection lags when the market consists of n ...
In this note we characterize optimal punishments with detection lags when the market consists of n o...
Collusion sustainability depends on firms' aptitude to impose suffciently severe punishments in case...
Optimal Collusion with Limited Severity Constraint Collusion sustainability depends on firms ’ aptit...
Collusion sustainability depends on firms’ aptitude to impose sufficiently severe punishments in cas...
In this article we study collusive strategies when firms face random demand fluctuations. This work ...
THESIS 8010This thesis is organized into four independent chapters. Chapter 1 is divided into two pa...
In an oligopoly supergame, firms' actions in prices and quantities are subject to non-negativity con...
Collusion under imperfect monitoring is explored when firms ’ prices are private information and the...
When firms can supply several separate markets, collusion can take two forms. Either firms establish...
International audienceIn this article we study collusive strategies and the optimal level of fines w...
We explore targeted punishment as an explanation for collusion among many firms. We run a series of ...
We explore targeted punishment as an explanation for collusion among many firms. We run a series of ...