Clientelism, corruption and kleptocratic politics in Bangladesh: a political economy analysis

Political clientelism and political corruption reinforce each other. While clientelism either in traditional or modern form remains appreciated in party politics, corruption is considered anathema and anti-systemic. Yet, clientalism and corruption feature prominently in party politics of developing democracies. This largely stems from a weak legal system and strong executive dominance, resulting in clientelism and corruption within a kleptocratic-centred political economy, where a nexus of political, economic and administrative elites exploits and misappropriates already scant resources. In Bangladesh, strong party alignment and political intolerance to opponent parties create a climate of strong political clientelism, leading to rampant state-patronised corruption and misappropriation of public money. Formal and informal legal immunity then institutionalise the practice into a kleptocratic political economy. This article argues that state authorities in Bangladesh consciously patronise the nexus of elites in a kleptocratic political economy, displaying a serious lack of democratic and political accountability